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Abstract
This study presents a critique of post-foundational political thought, suggesting that it 
lacks a positive account of the unpolitical, of a radical outside of politics. I argue that 
political  thought  that  oscillates  around  the  distinction  between  “politics”  and  “the 
political”  is  correlationist  and  totalizing,  resulting  in  the  forgetting  of  its  “Great 
Outdoors.” This critique is advanced through a close analysis of texts by Carl Schmitt, 
Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy. 
Against this background stand out Massimo Cacciari's and Roberto Esposito's categories 
of “the impolitical,” and Giorgio Agamben's notion of “bare life.” “The impolitical” is 
positively defined as a critique of the modern political and of its valorization. However, I 
suggest that Cacciari and Esposito do not succeed in taking the impolitical to its limit: it 
remains  attached  to  the  political  as  its  shadow  and  its  internal  critique.  Agamben's 
account of the impolitical in terms of “bare life” introduces into our discussion the real 
experience of living outside of politics. Even though Agamben views the impolitical only 
negatively, he suggests an avenue for further research in his notion of “form-of-life.” The 
latter,  nevertheless,  addresses  the  problem  of  “bare  life”  only  by  redeeming  its 
politicalness and thus,  ultimately,  fails  to engage the unpolitical.  I  turn to  the radical 
phenomenology of life of Michel Henry in order to address the problems of correlation 
and the totalizing ambition of politics. From this perspective, the unpolitical is conceived 
as life: an a priori positive and real experience of self-affection that manifests itself in the 
radical reduction of the world. This conception reverses the way in which living beyond 
politics  is  addressed in  contemporary scholarship.  In particular,  it  recasts  the modern 
figure  of  the  refugee  in  terms  of  a  historically  situated  epitome  of  life's  becoming-
unpolitical. The unpolitical allows for an affirmation of life as an immediate experience 
available to the living regardless of their relation to the world, and of pure movement as a 
projection of life's movement of self-revelation and transformation. 
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1Introduction
Hakim Bey suggests that we live in a time when the “closure of the map” has completed,  
meaning that there is no longer any space left unoccupied by the system of states. About a 
century ago, terra incognita as such ceased to exist. However, parallel to this closure, we 
have witnessed the emergence, unprecedented in history, of mass population movements 
and  forced  displacements,  which  place  the  lives  of  millions  of  people  outside  a 
traditional,  state-centred  system  of  coordinates.  In  other  words,  many  people  find 
themselves 'outside' of politics, while this 'outside' is itself nowhere to be found. Even if 
we distance ourselves from the question of the mere material existence of this 'outside', 
we  are  unable  to  progress  much  further.  We  can  hardly  find  any  discussion  in 
contemporary political theory of something like 'the unpolitical', something that would 
radically extend beyond politics. It is not accounted for either in terms of a localizable 
space  or  in  purely  theoretical  terms.  The  popularity  of  the  discourse  on  biopolitics 
complicates the situation even further. Once we recognize that politics is not limited to 
the institutional operation of the state, but extends toward and penetrates the very lives of 
modern individuals and populations, we are left wondering whether modern politics has 
indeed become a totality that we cannot or do not dare to overcome. These are, ultimately, 
the  thoughts,  doubts  and  questions  that  have  resulted  in  the  present  project.  In  this 
respect, the primary goals of this dissertation are, first, to examine contemporary political 
thought regarding its engagement with a possibility of a radical outside of politics; and 
second, based on this critical investigation, to present a conception of the unpolitical that 
would account for this outside in positive terms.
It  is  my  contention  that  in  order  to  really  avoid  a  drift  toward  a  new  kind  of  
totalitarianism, political theory needs to be able to think, to direct its gaze to its outside, 
and to acknowledge its radical exteriority and positivity beyond the concerns of politics, 
unrelated to the experience of political co-belonging. What is at  stake in thinking the 
unpolitical, then, is a theoretical reconstitution of the “great outdoors” of politics, which 
would  allow  something  like  the  'soul'  or  the  non-objective  and  non-objectifiable 
experience  of  living  to  play  a  role  in  determining  what  constitutes  happy  life, 
2togetherness,  and community.  It has been the task of politics and political  thought to 
ponder upon these questions, however, in order to open up to the possibilities of living 
differently in this world and thus, perhaps, of 'amending' this world, one has to be able to 
present a case for living that is not uniformly defined in political terms. The sense of 
community need not be reduced to politics, because once we fail to recognize the reality 
and positivity  of  unpolitical  existence  and unpolitical  community,  the  very notion  of 
politics becomes the means of policing and even justifying the injustices, as well as the 
exclusion and segregation of those who do not fit within the political space or do not 
appear to immediately posses the 'proper' quality of living. In the midst of the numerous 
calls to rethink politics so that this politics, in turn, becomes capable of addressing the 
problems that  haunt  contemporary societies,  my call  for  finding a  perspective on the 
unpolitical is a call for the articulation and affirmation of the possibilities of living and 
being together that are not limited or determined by any political conceptions, ideologies, 
movements and demands. At the same time, this living is not apathetic, withdrawn, or 
disinterested:  it  is  oriented toward an 'inner'  reality,  its  recognition as  an  a priori of 
politics  and not  as  its  ultimate  rejection.  Thus,  the  unpolitical  outlines  an  alternative 
ground for the unconditional experience of living and enjoying life in the multiplicity of 
its projections in the world.
It seems that the initial question that needs to be asked in the search for the unpolitical is 
what  lies  beyond  politics,  traditionally  conceived  as  the  sphere  of  state  operation. 
Perhaps, the unpolitical, then, is simply that which extends beyond the state. There are at 
least two broad ways in which contemporary political thought addresses this question: 
'mainstream' and 'critical'.1 A great number of critiques of the state, and state-oriented 
notions of politics, have occurred within the 'mainstream' theoretical discourse of political 
science. These critiques primarily address the displacement of the political structure of 
the state in view of various international processes such as globalization and regional 
1 I do not mean to suggest that there are no 'critical' interventions within the 'mainstream' thought or the 
other way around. I recognize that my use of the notions of 'mainstream' and 'critical' here is overly 
simplified and too general.  I  use this distinction only to outline a general difference between two  
approaches,  one more empirically oriented and the other more ontologically oriented. In  no way I 
mean to reduce and diminish the internal complexities of these streams of theory.
3integration. The spread of the late capitalist mode of production across the globe, it is 
argued, has resulted in the fact that the states no longer constitute the primary actors of 
international  and  domestic  politics.  The  flows  of  financial  capital  and  multinational 
corporations  have  taken  over  the  task  of  ordering  the  lives  of  the  populations. 
Furthermore, it might be suggested that the processes of regional integration such as, for 
example,  the  European  Union,  tend  to  relegate  the  centre  of  political  life  from the 
national to the supranational level. However, the majority of these accounts do not seem 
to allow for the unpolitical: they rather relocate politics to a different, larger scale than 
that of the state, absorbing anything beyond the state into the political sphere.
Contemporary 'critical' political theory revolves around questions of political ontology: in 
order to explore the outside of the traditional sphere of politics-as-state it endeavours to 
rethink what constitutes the very being or essence of politics. In other words, questions of 
political ontology have become of the utmost importance for those who are not satisfied 
with the limitations of the traditional understanding that delimits political being strictly in 
terms of the public sphere of rational deliberation, state functions and institutionalized 
systems of representation. Politics-as-state has met its greatest theoretical challenges from 
post-foundational  thinkers  who  have  succeeded  in  transforming  the  classical,  rigid 
framework of political analysis into a more open and flexible horizon of 'the political'. 
They answer the question of what lies beyond the state by creating the notion of 'the 
political'.  Consequently,  critical  political  thought,  just  as  its  mainstream  counterpart, 
through its critique of the state merely relocates 'politics' on the plane of 'the political',  
leaving the unpolitical beyond the scope of its concerns.
What we witness as a result of these constant relocations and displacements of politics is 
the  disappearance  or  simply a  confirmation  of  the  absence  of  a  clear-cut  distinction 
between what is  political  and what  is  not.  Meanwhile,  the question of the outside of 
politics,  primarily in terms of a natural allocation of duties,  deliberate apoliticism, or 
contemplative withdrawal, has consistently been present in ancient political philosophy, 
at least since Plato and Aristotle. For example, the distinctions between oikos and polis, 
theoria and praxis, bios theoretikos and bios politikos, vita contemplativa and vita activa 
4have contributed to the establishment of a fairly rigid delimitation of the political and 
non-political  spheres  of  human  activity.  Furthermore,  the  liberal  development  of  the 
ancient conceptual distinctions resulted, again, in a more or less clear understanding of 
what constitutes the space of politics (the public aspect of social relationships) and what 
must  remain  essentially  apolitical,  confined to  private  concerns.  Thus,  the  distinction 
between politics  and non-politics  was established in  relation to  the distinction  of  the 
'outer'  and  'inner'  aspects  of  human  life.  Ultimately,  the  modern  individual  is  split 
between rational, outward-oriented activity that, in the interaction with others, constitutes 
politics,  and an inner activity of her 'soul',  'spirit',  passion or emotion,  as well  as the 
mundane necessities of everyday life,  that remain non-political insofar as they do not 
enter the domain of public rational deliberation about the common good. As I noted, these 
traditional  distinctions  between  what  is  politics  and  what  is  non-political  have  been 
widely  challenged  and  rethought  within  contemporary  political  theory.  Politics  is  no 
longer strictly confined to the public sphere and the domain of state activities but extends 
toward what once was considered its outside: economy, passions, desires, conflicts, and 
life itself. The 'soul' is no longer outside of the reach of politics; on the contrary, it is 
pronounced to be the operating ground of modern biopolitical regime. As a result, politics 
consumes relationality in its generality and leaves no room for the radical unpolitical. 
However, I believe that despite the fact that politics is no longer clearly distinguished 
from the non-political, the ghost of the latter lingers on. Something like the unpolitical 
keeps  reappearing,  however  negatively and as  a  side-note  of  political  theory and its 
concerns. In a nutshell, in the attempt to rethink politics, contemporary political thought 
turns its back on the unpolitical, but does not get rid of it altogether.
The  attention  to  the  outside  of  politics  today is  often  framed  in  terms  of  “negative 
politics,”2 that is, in terms of what remains unthought in modern political thought, and 
what can be eventually brought into the light of political consciousness. However, at the 
same time one can speak of the advent of the unpolitical in contemporary thought, of 
2 See, for example, a recent issue of Diacritics 39, No. 2, entitled Negative Politics: At the City’s Limit, 
and  a  book  by  Diana  Coole  Negativity  and  Politics:  Dionysus  and  Dialectics  from  Kant  to  
Poststructuralism (2000).
5which the present  project  is  an instance.  This advent is  grounded in the repressed of 
political theory and in the unconscious of the political: it begins where politics does not 
dare to go in the fear of its 'disappearance'. An interesting example of this advent, which 
manages to go beyond the concerns of the political negativity,  is the current work of 
Laurent  Dubreuil  (2006;  2009;  2011),  who  postulates  the  problem  of  the  totalizing 
tendency of the political in a way similar to ours. He suggests that “many contemporary 
thinkers forget what even Aristotle had not omitted: the totalizing ambition of politics 
should be contradicted by an affirmation of life itself, notwithstanding the political order 
that attempts to contain it” (2006, 97). Dubreuil's efforts are motivated by “the dream of 
breaking away not  only from the  police,  but  also  from all  forms  of  politics  and the 
political” (2009, 5), resulting in the affirmative contradiction of “apolitics.” The latter is 
defined as “a movement of critique, refusal, separation,  and proclamation where those 
involved, while not losing sight of the fact that  policies may clash, still insist that it is 
inherently insufficient to simply settle wrongs” (17). The settlement of these wrongs is at 
stake for politics, the task of which is to organize and manage the lives merely “lived,” 
while apolitics “simply allows us to make life more  livable” (17; my emphasis). This 
notion of “livable life” thus constitutes the starting ground for Dubreuil's 'project' of the 
affirmative refusal of politics.
In  a  similar  vein,  the  basic  intuition  of  this  dissertation  is  that  despite  the  lack  of 
theoretical engagement with the unpolitical, life beyond politics is a reality. The fluidity 
in the conception of politics and of life suggests that the lack of an immediate vision of 
something like the unpolitical is conditioned not by its ultimate absence, non-existence or 
impossibility, but by a certain colouring of the lens through which we tend to look at the 
world. I will argue that this lens of thought is dominated by the presupposition of the 
primacy of politics (supposedly inherent in human nature), which results in its blindness 
toward the outside. Politics is  believed to be able to account for the totality of human 
existence, experiences and interactions, and to be the only means of 'salvation' within the 
secular societies of the West. This dissertation, then, is a call for a reversal of perspective, 
6in a form of undermining the primacy of politics and the political, and challenging their 
totalizing tendency. 
I suggest that the notion of the unpolitical is able to attune our theoretical vision to the 
reality of experiences that radically extend beyond politics (no matter how it is defined or 
redefined) and, as such, remain almost unthinkable. This work, then, is a creative inquiry 
into the possibility of this 'almost' – the space that the notion of the unpolitical occupies. 
Inasmuch  as  political  thought  regards  politics  as  the  anchoring  'concept'  of  human 
relationality and of the experience of living in this world, unpolitical thought aims to 
displace politics in its primacy and to point to its own limits, that is, to the limits of 
thought.  Consequently,  the unpolitical,  as a notion,  is  primarily an attempt,  at  least  a 
partial one, to think the unthought, to speak of the unspeakable and to get a glimpse of the 
invisible of life that persists in its irremediable indifference to politics, but not in order to 
make it fully present in language, in sight, in thought and in politics, but so that we can 
continue  to  live  it  as  such,  in  mystery.  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  the  notion  that  I 
endeavour  to  develop  here  is  itself  absolutely  mysterious  and  has  no  'practical' 
ramifications. I will propose quite directly that the unpolitical refers to the radical outside 
of politics which can be 'found' in the certainty of life's self-revelation in self-affection. 
The  unpolitical  phenomenology  of  life,  then,  answers  the  totalizing  tendency of  the 
political, anchored, as I will show, in the principle of correlation. Furthermore, I would 
also like to believe that my notion of the unpolitical can be used as a theoretical tool to 
account for the  lived  experiences of those 'subjects' (both human and non-human) that 
find themselves outside the political system of coordinates of modernity. For example, 
those, as I mentioned, who are confined to the non-existent 'outside' of the international 
system of states, such as the refugees and the stateless. Can we think about their lives 
unpolitically in a positive way? And what do these figures reveal to us all about life as 
such? Finally, can we possibly think of a way of living in this world that is not grounded 
in or conditioned by politics?
I  will  commence my exploration with  the following theses  in  mind.  First,  politics  is 
totalizing insofar as in its attempt to redefine itself it fails to positively account for its 
7radical  outside.  Second,  in  contemporary  political  thought  there  is  no  sufficient 
engagement with this problem of the totalizing tendency of the political as well as with its 
radical outside.  Third, despite this theoretical insufficiency, life beyond politics is the 
real3 that we experience immediately in the very act of living our lives, but of which we 
can  hardly  speak.  Finally,  it  is  necessary  to  attempt  to  speak  of  this  essentially 
unspeakable so that we can discover new possibilities of living 'other', 'true' and 'happy' 
lives that are constituted positively, that is, not as secondary acts of resistance to politics 
and its faults. In sum, the overarching intent of this dissertation is, by a way of critique, to 
present a positive notion of the radical outside of politics, to establish the unpolitical as 
the  a  priori  of  politics,  and  to  affirm  unpolitical  life  that  positively  persists  in  its 
indifference (and non-relation) to all versions of politics and the political.
Overview
In order to accomplish these tasks, I will deal with three major notions already apparent 
in the title of this work: 'politics', 'beyond', and 'life'. A chapter will be dedicated to each 
of these notions correspondingly.  Positing the question of what it would mean to live 
outside  politics  today,  this  dissertation  opens  with  a  critique  of  contemporary,  post-
foundational political thought, suggesting that the latter lacks a positive account of the 
unpolitical  as  a  radical  outside  of  politics.  In  the  first  chapter,  my  critique  will  be 
structured around two major points. First, I will argue that political thought that oscillates 
around  the  distinction  (often  referred  to  as  “the  political  difference”)  between  the 
traditional notion of “politics-as-state” and its reconstitution in terms of “the political” is 
correlationist. That is, the excess or the outside of “politics,” vaguely signified as “the 
political,”  is  recognized  only  negatively,  resulting  in  the  constitution  of  the  merely 
relative outside of politics and in the forgetting of its “Great Outdoors.” Second, it will be 
3 In my use of the notion of 'the real' in this dissertation I do not rely on any particular theory of 'the  
real', but rather use it as a concept that essentially stands for or gestures toward the radical as opposed 
to  the  relative outside  of  politics,  which,  as  I  will  show below, is  a  problematic  aspect  of  post-
foundational political thought. Furthermore, through my recourse to the notion of 'the real' in relation 
to the unpolitical  I  emphasize that  the latter is not just  a concept,  an  abstraction or an ephemeral 
psychic  register  that  is  never  manifest as  such,  but  rather  that  the  unpolitical  is  necessarily 
experienced. In an important sense, as we will see toward the end of this dissertation, 'the real' implies  
the specific material reality of the unpolitical experience as auto-affection of life.
8suggested that political thought, defined by the correlation, exhibits a totalizing ambition  
insofar as it does not account positively for its real unthought, i.e.,  the unpolitical.  In 
other words, the excess of politics always (re)appears itself as political, leaving no room 
for its radical outside. This two-fold critique will be advanced through a close analysis of 
texts by Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière, and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Jean-Luc Nancy. 
The second chapter  will  be dedicated to  two major  ways  in  which  the  unpolitical  is 
confronted  within  contemporary  theory.  First  is  the  category  of  “the  impolitical” 
(l'impolitico),  developed  by  Italian  political  thinkers  Massimo  Cacciari  and  Roberto 
Esposito. Second is the notion of the impolitical as“bare life” (nuda vita), formulated by 
another Italian thinker Giorgio Agamben. I turn to these particular theories because they, 
instead of focusing primarily on politics, pay close attention to its outside. Cacciari and 
Esposito  offer  a  reversal  of  perspective  from modern  politics  to  the  impolitical:  the 
political is recognized as totalizing and is to be addressed through a new perspective. The 
value of the political is challenged resulting in the proposition to rethink politics based on 
the recognition of its limit, its outside. As a result, the impolitical no longer appears on 
the margins of political thought but rather forms its centre: impolitical thought is called 
upon to lead the modern political to its transformation into politics without foundation. 
Moreover, the impolitical is no longer seen in terms of a threat of neutralization; it is 
accounted for in positive terms, as something that has been constantly present within the 
political while remaining mostly unrecognized. Thus, Cacciari's and Esposito's task lies 
in bringing the repressed of the political, i.e., the impolitical, back into the consciousness 
of political thought. Through my analysis of this notion in Cacciari and Esposito I will 
highlight its achievements and innovation, but also its limitations. I will ask how far these 
authors go in their thinking of the impolitical and whether in it they reach something like 
the outside of politics as such. 
Agamben's notion of bare life brings an important development into unpolitical thought: 
he defines the impolitical in terms of “bare life,” thus introducing into this notion the real 
experience of living beyond politics. Even though his view of the impolitical is negative, 
9since  bare,  excepted  life  is  the  originary  problematic  aspect  that  constitutes  Western 
(bio)politics,  his  notion  of  “form-of-life”  contains  an  intriguing  intimation  of  the 
unpolitical-to-come. As a result, I will first examine Agamben's view of the impolitical as 
bare life, and then present a reading of his notion of “form-of-life” in attempt to further 
my task of discerning the unpolitical in the midst of totalizing politics. In the end, through 
a reading of Cacciari's, Esposito's and Agamben's works I will construct the ground for 
something  like  the  unpolitical  form-of-life,  where  “bare  life”  is  allowed  to  persist 
positively outside the space of “coming politics.”
The third, final chapter of this dissertation assumes the task of thinking life unpolitically, 
in order to arrive at a conception of the radical outside of politics. I believe that it is in an  
phenomenological approach to life that we can arrive at something that radically exceeds 
politics, since this trend of thought leads us to consider or rather reconsider the inner 
experiences of living that were mostly dismissed by post-foundational thought. This inner 
space has been conceived as a mere product of ideology or discourse, and thus the ground 
for the interventions of power, replacing what once bore a name of 'soul'. However, once 
we bring into the discussion the question of affect, this inner realm can no longer be 
dismissed as merely constructed: while the content of affect can be a result of, let us say, 
power relations, the very ability to be affected remains beyond the reach of any political 
intervention.  The  view  of  life  as  affectivity  and  receptivity,  then,  opens  up  another 
'dimension' of experience that is often overlooked in critical political thought. That is, it 
raises a question about lived experiences that cannot be accounted for in positive terms 
from the perspective of worldly relationality, which necessarily includes politics. In this 
respect, I will engage with the radical philosophy of life of contemporary French thinker 
Michel Henry and suggest that with his help it is possible to conceive the unpolitical in 
terms of life that constitutes the unconscious as such of the political. It is positive, real, 
non-relational experience of self-affection that manifests itself in the radical reduction of 
the world. I will also present a way in which this view of the unpolitical addresses the 
problems of the political correlation and of its totalizing ambition, and how it can open 
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our  thinking  toward  appreciation  of  the  experience  of  living  beyond  politics,  of  the 
unpolitical form-of-life. 
In the end, I will suggest how my theoretical engagement with the unpolitical can bear 
some  more  'practical'  consequences.  I  will  essentially  return  to  the  questions  that 
motivated my inquiry in the first place: what does it mean to live beyond politics in a  
time when this outside no longer exists, can no longer be located on the world map.  In 
order to explore the possibilities presented by the notion of the unpolitical form-of-life, I 
will turn to an examination of the modern condition of the refugee. I will examine what 
the figure of the refugee reveals to us in the reduction of its political world. My intuition 
is  that  the  refugee  is  a  historically  situated  epitome of  the  ahistorical  experience  of 
'becoming-unpolitical'. Furthermore, I will see how the notion of the unpolitical offers a 
reversal in the way in which this figure is understood in contemporary scholarship.
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Chapter I. Politics and the Political: Correlation and the 
Totalizing Tendency of the Political Difference
All is consumed.
All is occupied, exploited, filled to the mouth, the  
rim, the edge. Space is pregnant. Places are full.  
Each  section  is  full.  ...  Land  is  dense,  bulging,  
filled  to  capacity.  It  chokes.  I  choke.  I  feel  
claustrophobic outside.
Michel Serres
Everything  is  outside,  yet  it  is  impossible  to  get  
out.
Francis Wolff
Within  contemporary  political  theory  there  is  a  tendency  to  think  about  politics  as 
revolving around two principles: one fluid, unordered, mobile and dynamic, and the other 
rigid,  stable and ordered. There are a number of parallels that can be drawn between 
various strains of political thought in this respect, and there are a number of notions, 
which  are  not  limited  only  to  political  thought,  that  essentially  refer  to  these  two 
principles. For example, one can hear the echo of these principles in the discussions of 
the relationship between constituted and constitutive power,  of consciousness and the 
unconscious,  or  bound  and  unbound  energies,  of  the  symbolic  and  the  real,  and  of 
restricted and general economy. One of the prominent ways of taking on the rigid and 
fluid principles in politics is through the concepts of politics and the political (an English 
translation of German das Politische and French le politique). 
Dissatisfaction with politics, narrowly defined as the state and its institutions, leads to a 
conceptual  shift,  first  in  Germany  and  then  in  France,  toward  the  political –  an 
ontological  dimension  of  undecidability  and  contingency,  agonism  and  difference 
underlying  political  reality.  Extending  beyond  the  French  context,  the  political  has 
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become an important conceptual tool for a variety of recent studies in political theory, 
which gradually transform the classical,  rigid framework of political  analysis  into the 
more open and flexible horizon of the political. Among the scholars who, at least to some 
extent,  employ  or  comment  on  this  distinction  are  Benjamin  Arditi  (1996),  Hannah 
Arendt  (1998),  Alain  Badiou  (2005a),  Diana  Coole  (2000),  Jacques  Derrida  (1997), 
Mladen Dolar  (2008),  Michel  Foucault  (1990;  2010),  Ernesto Laclau  (1990),  Ernesto 
Laclau  and  Chantal  Mouffe  (1985),  Philippe  Lacoue-Labarthe  and  Jean-Luc  Nancy 
(1997),  Claude Lefort  (1988),  Oliver  Marchart  (2007),  Chantal  Mouffe  (1993,  2005), 
Jean-Luc  Nancy  (1991;  1997;  2000;  2010a),  Kari  Palonen  (2007),  Jacques  Rancière 
(1995; 1999; 2001), Paul Recoeur (1965), Carl Schmitt (2007), Yannis Stavrakakis (1999; 
2007), Slavoj Žižek (1999a), and many others. 
I suggest that the conceptual distinction of politics and the political has acquired certain 
dominance, if not become the new common sense, within contemporary political thought, 
and as such is itself in need of a critical examination. Along with praise, the political has 
received a number of criticisms regarding its overly philosophical or 'abstract' nature and 
a  resulting lack of  engagement  with 'real'  politics.  In  other  words,  the very value of 
political ontology has been questioned  (see, for example, Strathausen 2009). However, 
there has  been almost  no critique of  the thought  of  the  political  regarding its  nearly 
totalizing  status  which,  I  argue,  is  related  to  another  problem with  this  distinction  – 
correlation.  As  a  result,  in  what  follows  below  I  attempt  a  critical  account  of  the 
relationship  between  the  notions  of  politics  and  the  political  and  suggest  that  it  is 
correlationist and also exhibits a totalizing tendency. 
My following critique of correlation is inspired by Quentin Meillassoux who advances a 
thesis  on  the  necessity  of  contingency  based  on  his  critique  of  correlationism.4 
4 Despite  the  fact  that  Meillassoux's  work  serves  as  a  point  of  departure  for  my  critique  of 
correlationism  here,  I  will  not  deal  extensively  with  his  'solution'  to  the  problem of  correlation 
presented in the second part of his book  After Finitude. An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency  
(2008). Even thought he coined the term “correlationism,” he is not unique in pointing out the essence 
of  this  problem within  modern  thought.  Ultimately,  I  will  turn  to  Michel  Foucault's  and  Michel 
Henry's 'diagnosis' of this paradox of modern thought insofar as their thinking presents an opportunity 
to directly engage the problem of political correlation in relation to the question of the radical outside  
of politics in terms of  life.  Meillassoux, on the other hand, as well as the movement of speculative 
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Meillassoux suggests that the central notion of modern philosophy since Kant appears to 
be that of correlation:  “the idea according to  which we only ever  have access to  the 
correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered apart from 
the other” (2008, 5). The same problem arises in the relationship between the subject and 
object,  and  between  the  'inside'  and  the  'outside'.  According  to  Meillassoux, 
correlationism disqualifies  the  possibility of  viewing the  domains  of  subjectivity  and 
objectivity independently from one another. In this spirit, modern philosophers emphasize 
the primacy of the relation over the related terms: “[t]he ‘co-‘ (of co-givenness, of co-
relation, of the co-originary, of co-presence) is the grammatical particle that dominates 
modern philosophy...” (5). 
The status of exteriority is at stake here and, specifically, its relation with the 'inside' (e.g., 
language and consciousness). Meillassoux points out that “correlational exteriority” has a 
paradoxical  nature:  on  the  one hand,  correlationist  thought  insists  on the  fact  of  “an 
originary  connection  to  a  radical  exteriority.”  On  the  other  hand,  this  insistence 
dissimulates “a strange feeling of imprisonment or enclosure within this very exteriority 
(the 'transparent cage') … given that we are  always-already in it (the 'always already' 
accompanying the 'co-' of correlationism as its other essential locution), and given that we 
have no access to any vantage point from whence we could observe these 'object-worlds'” 
(7). The transparent cage creates an 'illusion' of being thrown into the outside, however, 
this outside is never experienced as such but only from 'behind the bars' of consciousness. 
Consequently, the outside evoked by correlationist philosophies is “a cloistered outside,” 
meaning that one is imprisoned in it insofar as it is altogether relative: “[c]onsciousness 
and its language certainly transcend themselves toward the world, but there is a world 
only insofar as a consciousness transcends itself toward it. Consequently, this space of 
exteriority is merely the space of what faces us, of what exists only as a correlate of our  
own existence” (7; my emphasis). Any transcendence of the inside is 'false',  since we 
never  reach the  outside  as  such,  and what  remains  is  merely the  process  of  infinite  
reaching  out,  of  extending  outward.  Meillassoux  contends  that  contemporary 
realism in general, presents another direction for research that will not be addressed in this dissertation 
due to the limit of its scope, as well as limitations of time and space.
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philosophers keep insisting that thought is fully oriented toward the outside because they 
fail to admit that with the abandonment of “dogmatism” they have irrecoverably lost “the 
great outdoors,  the  absolute  outside of pre-critical thinkers: that outside which was not 
relative to us, and which was given as indifferent to its own givenness to be what it is, 
existing in itself regardless of whether we are thinking of it or not; that outside which 
thought could explore with the legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory – of being 
entirely elsewhere” (7). There is no place for radical exteriority in contemporary thought 
as long as it is correlationist.
In a similar way, I suggest that we can notice a correlationist tendency in contemporary 
political thought, insofar as it is centred around the relationship between politics and the 
political, where the former refers to the conscious, 'visible' reality of ordered communal 
life in the polis (traditional view of politics-as-state), and the latter stands for the excess, 
outside or the unconscious of politics. However, this extension of 'politics' beyond the 
limited sphere of the state, toward a 'general economy of the political', is conditioned by 
and inseparably attached to this very state or visible political reality. The political is the 
correlational  exteriority  of  politics:  it  aims  at  accounting  for  the  excess  of  politics, 
however, ends up re-inscribing it within order as the principle which infinitely escapes 
but is never able to leave the political 'inside'. As a result,  many attempts at thinking 
politics beyond the state fail insofar as they draw their theoretical energy from what they 
want to displace – the state order or politics-as-state.
Furthermore, contemporary theoretical attempts to define and sketch the political present 
themselves as severe critiques and alternatives to classical political  visions, especially 
liberal theories. I maintain that these contemporary theories are only partially successful 
because they fall  into the same trap as  their  classical  counterparts:  they both repress 
elements that are seen as antithetical or negative to the 'achievement' of their own vision 
of the political. In this way, both classical and contemporary political theories suffer from 
different intensities of correlation, where 'authentic' politics is defined through negation 
or repression of its Other. In the case of traditional political theory, the elements that act 
counter to social  unity and identity are repressed,  excluded or ignored.  This strain of 
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political thought acknowledges that disruptive or contingent elements are closely related 
to  or  even  condition  politics;  however,  it  tends  to  repress  the  'memory'  of  such 
conditioning and cover the consequent silence with the fantasy of social unity (expressed 
by various social contract theories) that ultimately forms the ground of modern politics. 
That is, classical theories place the emphasis on the side of the mutual reconciliation of 
human  beings  through  the  institution  of  political  society,  the  state  or  sovereign,  the 
necessity of which is posited in opposition to the fear of contingent, asocial, apolitical 
reality. 
Contemporary political thought reverses the relationship between the non-political and 
political realities: in a way, it makes possible the return of the repressed of politics. What 
is called the political (the disruptive and agonistic element), was formerly conceptualized 
as non-political, typically, as the state of nature. Contingency and conflict are now seen as 
pertaining to politics 'proper' (i.e., the political). Nonetheless, this position is affirmed not 
on its own terms but as a critique of the state-oriented conception of politics. That is, 
what is repressed, suppressed or ignored in contemporary political theory is the fact that 
its critique is primarily motivated by the pressure of an organizing principle, namely, the 
state. This correlative nature of  the political is not fully acknowledged, resulting in the 
mere reproduction of the relative outside of politics. In this regard, contemporary thought 
of the political is self-referential: it is centred around a split  and a correlation between 
politics and the political (or inauthentic and authentic politics), and does not account for 
the unpolitical as such. In the end, what is endlessly reproduced is the irreducible play 
between two principles or registers of political 'matter'  (rigid and fluid, conscious and 
unconscious),  which Oliver Marchart  (2007) calls  “the political  difference.”5 Through 
this notion Marchart, in the positive light, explicates the relation between the two terms 
but does not address the problem of correlation. Other scholars similarly acknowledge the 
5 In this respect, an important thinker who could be engaged in this discussion, but who ultimately 
remains beyond the attention of the present work, is Jacques Derrida and, in particular, his discussion  
of the question of difference in terms of  différance  (see,  for example,  Derrida 1982).  Yet another 
approach to the question of the unpolitical in relation to difference (which remains beyond the scope 
of  the  present  project)  could  be  developed  around  an  engagement  with  the  philosophy of  Gilles  
Deleuze, as well as that of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari.
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irreducible attachment between politics and the political, however, they as well fail to 
effectively address the problematic aspects of this (cor)relation. 
I argue that, due to correlation, contemporary political thought lost its “great outdoors”: 
unpolitical reality (or the excess inherent to the political difference) remains unthought. 
The political exhibits the totalizing tendency insofar as it does not leave room for the 
radical  outside of politics  or the unpolitical  as such. As a result,  many contemporary 
accounts of the political fail to effectively address the problem they themselves identify: 
the problem of totalizing politics as expressed in the statement “everything is political.” 
Contemporary political thought is not able to fully transcend this totalizing horizon of 
modern politics also because this horizon gives birth to critical thought in the first place. 
Nevertheless, this contemporary totalizing tendency of the political is not 'complete' but 
remains 'open': the political, as the condition of possibility of being-together in general, 
refuses to complete itself. It is rather constituted as a totality revolving around its own 
opening, incompletion or void. As a result, we can rather call the totalizing tendency of 
the political an “ambition” (cf. Dubreuil 2006, 97), since the ambition remains ambition 
only insofar as it is unfulfilled or incomplete. The kind of political thought that allows for 
such an open totality is often referred to as “post-foundational”: the only foundation or 
“quasi-ground”  it  preserves  and  almost  religiously  maintains  is  the  “necessary 
contingency,” i.e.,  the  absence  of any final ground/foundation of politics  (for a  more 
detailed discussion of this point see Marchart 2007, 11–34). 
Another distinctive trait that accompanies and, perhaps, even fuels the totalizing ambition 
of the political is the  fear of depoliticization. In this respect, Marchart  (2007) suggests 
that  post-foundational  thought  depends  on  the  “neutralization  or  sublimation  thesis.” 
According to it, “the political becomes increasingly neutralized or colonized by the social 
... or sublimated into non-political domains ... The primacy of the political is ... always in 
danger of becoming entirely closed up in the ‘iron cage’ of bureaucratized, technologized, 
and depoliticized society” (44). In other words, the political is an essentially threatened 
principle and thus it  has to be forcefully  affirmed,  rather than simply recognized and 
described, against  the imminent prospect of depoliticization.  From this point of view, 
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anything unpolitical is interpreted only negatively, something that has to be avoided or 
politicized.  A condition without politics is  described as a state of either 'suffering'  or 
apolitical  'apathy',  non-participation and abstention from praxis.6 Thus,  the unpolitical 
receives primarily negative acknowledgement and treatment in post-foundational political 
thought.
The primary aim of this chapter is to explicate and to develop a critique of the correlation 
and the totalizing ambition of the political, and to discern a limited place assigned to the 
unpolitical in contemporary political theory. I will also look at how the political emerges 
as a truly interdisciplinary question, as it extends beyond the limited sphere of politics 
and shakes the disciplinary boundaries of the political sciences by exploding its 'object'. 
Furthermore, I will trace how the political ultimately comes to 'claim'  life, to consume 
and merge with it. To accomplish these tasks, I will turn to the works of Carl Schmitt,  
Michel Foucault,  Jacques Rancière and Jean-Luc Nancy. There are a number of other 
thinkers of politics that I could potentially turn to in this respect; however, due to the 
limitations of the present project, I cannot address them all. The four key thinkers of the 
political, whom I selected here, exemplify several important themes within contemporary 
political thought, as well as present good cases for an examination of the correlation and 
the totalizing tendency of the political. Carl Schmitt was the first to introduce the political 
with its new meaning, and, thus, his work has influenced many contemporary debates 
about the 'essence' of the political. Specifically, through his friend and enemy distinction 
he  institutes  real  conflict  at  the  heart  of  the  political,  extends  the  latter  beyond  the 
traditional political sphere of the state, and transforms the political into an expansive and 
parasitic phenomenon. The importance of Michel Foucault for my project consists in his 
methodological critique of the traditional accounts of “Power” as “the system of Law-
and-Sovereign.”  His  critique  leads  to  the  reconceptualization  of  power  in  terms  of  a 
multiplicity of force relations that are not regional (i.e., limited to the sphere of politics-
as-state) but extend, in a way similar to Schmitt,  toward the general economy of the 
political.  Foucault's  governmentality  studies  further  present  us  with  the  material  to 
6 For example,  Alain Badiou suggests that  “time without  politics” is  characterized by “resignation” 
(2005a, 145). 
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exemplify and critique the constitution of the new totalizing tendency of the political 
marked by the correlation, which seems to emerge despite the conscious intentions of the 
author. Jacques Rancière, like many others, places the conflictual aspect at the core of the 
political  and  offers  a  new  (however,  still  correlationist)  methodology  for  political 
thought: a conceptual distinction between politics and the political or order of the police 
and politics. The specificity of his project lies in his affirmation of 'authentic' politics in 
terms of  rare  events that necessarily come to interrupt the homogeneity of the police 
order. Furthermore, his theoretical engagement with the excluded or 'the part of no part' is 
exemplary of the lack of a positive account of the unpolitical as such in contemporary 
theory. Jean-Luc Nancy, in his radical rethinking of relationality and being-in-the-world, 
presents another ontological treatment of the notion of the political. His affirmation of 
Being as essentially 'with', and of existence as co-existence, results in the institution of 
the ontological or primordial totality of the political, as the ground-abyss of everything. 
Nancy also elucidates the essential connections between worldliness and being political 
as  well  as  between  politics  and  thought,  which  are  eagerly  accepted  by  many 
contemporary political thinkers. By the end of this chapter, I expect to achieve a more or 
less clear understanding of the political  correlation and the totalizing ambition of the 
political  as  problems  that  need to  be further  addressed  within  contemporary political 
theory. In this respect, I will also introduce the question of the unpolitical 'as such' that, I 
believe, constitutes a way of addressing these problematic aspects of political thought. 
1.1. The Schmittian Totality of the Political: 
Deciding on the Unpolitical
Carl Schmitt's  The Concept of the Political (2007) is notoriously regarded as the first 
major instance of theorizing the political in a new way. I argue that it is also a major early 
example of instituting the political as a new kind of totality that penetrates human life to 
its very core. The concept of the political, as presented by Schmitt, is no longer limited in 
terms of the state but is determined by the friend and enemy distinction. Nevertheless, it 
remains to some degree correlated with the concept of the state: insofar as the political 
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functions as a displacement of politics-as-state, it depends on an initial emplacement for 
its manifestation. Furthermore, insofar as the political has no 'proper' space, it evolves 
into a potentially all-encompassing and parasitic reality that leaves practically no space 
for  the  radical,  unpolitical  outside  or  the  neutral.  The unpolitical,  in  the  form of  an 
exception, is nothing but a product of a sovereign decision, which is exercised in order to 
prepare the homogeneous field where it becomes possible to distinguish a friend from an 
enemy.  In  what  follows,  I  endeavour  to  unpack  these  arguments  by focusing  on the 
analysis  of  Schmitt's  two  major  works,  The  Concept  of  the  Political  and  Political  
Theology. My aim is to present not a reductive reading of Schmitt's oeuvre but, perhaps, 
to simply expose the elements of his novel thought of the political and the unpolitical that 
have found their way into contemporary post-foundational political thought.
The context of Schmitt's thought
Even though Schmitt introduced the concept of the political into the theoretical discourse 
of  the 20th century,  he was not the one to  'invent'  the term itself.  The substantivized 
adjective, “the political” (an English translation of German das Politische and French le  
politique) appeared, according to Kari Palonen (2007), long before Schmitt in the works 
of Schiller and Schlegel. However, both of them used the concept in a more traditional 
way, that is, they used it to refer to politics defined by the activity of the state and its 
institutions.  Furthermore,  an  abstract  concept  of  the  political  was  used  by  another 
German thinker, Georg Jellinek, in his book Allgemeine Staatslehre (1900). But again, for 
him it was subordinate to the state. In general these examples suggest that the question of 
the nature of politics and the political  was an open and controversial  question in  the 
Wilhelminian  and  Weimar  debates  (Palonen  2007,  70).  It  is  within  this  intellectual 
climate that Schmitt's thought arises. In a way, he responds to the prior usages of the 
concept of the political in the theoretical debates of his time. 
This fact points to an important dimension of Schmitt's thought – its historical context. 
First of all, the concept of the political embraces the 'spirit' of the beginning of the 20th 
century. Schmitt lived and worked in a conflict-ridden age: the horrors and the aftermath 
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of the World War I, the struggles of the Weimar Republic and, specifically, the failure of 
its democracy, all contributed to his critique of liberalism and life-long attraction to the 
thought of conflict and, especially, to Thomas Hobbes  (Gottfried 1990). In addition to 
conflict,  at  least  two other opposing tendencies characterize the beginning of the 20 th 
century.  These  are,  first,  the  emergence  of  effective,  non-state  political  actors  and 
processes, as well as the expansion of democracy and the politicization of civil society 
(see, Arditi 1996, 15). As a result, state institutions and borders, supposedly, play a less 
and less important roles in defining proper political spaces. Second, there is the opposite 
process of the disappearance of 'no-man's space', of the factual outside of the nation-state 
system.  As  Hakim  Bey  suggests,  the  historical  development  of  the  20 th century  is 
characterized by “the closure of the map,” meaning that “[t]he last bit of Earth unclaimed 
by  any  nation-state  was  eaten  up  in  1899.  Ours  is  the  first  century  without  terra 
incognita, without a frontier” (1991, 102). I suggest that the disappearance of the material 
outside of the state-system triggers the thought of the political, which, in a way, performs 
a function of compensation for the lost 'beyond'. The 20th century is the first century that 
denies, rejects or abandons transcendence in both material and ideal sense: the material 
space of the globe is fully appropriated, consumed by either states or the international 
community of states, and the 'ideal space' of thought (as a result of secularization and 
devaluation of  traditions)  falls  prey to  the “seduction of  immanence...  a  denying and 
averting  of  every  form  of  transcendence”  (de  Wit  2008,  165).  Due  to  his  deep 
indebtedness to Catholic religious thought, Schmitt, however, remains critical of such a 
rejection of  transcendence.  Nevertheless,  he does  not  'salvage'  it  as  an absolute  (that 
radically extends beyond the 'city of man') but, rather, introduces “transcendence within 
immanence” into political thought in the form of the sovereign decision – the founding 
event of politics (cf. Ojakangas 2005a, 28–29). 
Beyond  the  historical  events  of  the  beginning  of  the  century,  we  can  observe  the 
intellectual climate within which Schmitt's thought developed. Most importantly for our 
discussion  here,  Schmitt  was  prone  to  the  influence  of  wide-ranging  critiques  of 
liberalism and modernity, of reason and transcendence, occurring against the background 
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of “the closure of the map” and the emergence of non-state political actors. A critique of 
reason  in  Schmitt  is  apparent  in  his  recourse  to  a  certain  “irrationalism”  or  even 
mysticism in the definition of the political and especially the decision that it is founded 
on. As Radhika Desai (2002) suggests, Schmitt's thought is founded on a “philosophical 
irrationalism”  that  draws  its  inspiration  from  Nietzsche's  critique  of  Enlightenment 
reason. The main opposition it relies on is between “the political, an irrationalist 'real', 
and the rational” (394), that is, the state and its institutions. The rational is a domain of 
orderly  conceptions,  and  the  irrational  refers  to  a  certain  reality  of  life  that  resists 
conceptualization and rationalization – “the formless unformulable world of the chaos of 
sensations” (395), as Nietzsche put it in The Will To Power. These two realities, “life” and 
“intellect,” Desai suggests, are present in Schmitt in the form of the opposition between 
“the  immediacy  of  life”  and  its  “rational  interpretation”  (395). I  believe  that  his 
conceptualization of the political emerges as an indication of the ever-present, however 
suppressed, “immediacy” that manifests itself in the potentiality of conflict and war, in an 
actual  existential  threat.  The  political  is  “vital  substance”  or  “pure  life”  that  breaks 
through the crust of repetition and formalism of the state law (see, Schmitt 2005, 15). It is 
important to note that for Schmitt these two principles (life and repetition) are inseparable 
from each other; moreover, they become manifest only at the moment of their interaction 
or at the moment of their conflict. The conflictual nature of reality implies, according to 
Schmitt, that not only the major concepts of political theory are polemical, but that their 
real manifestation has to emerge out of polemos in order to be 'genuine'. In this way, the 
political, as dynamic life, is necessarily attached to or correlated with its Other – politics,  
state, repetition, life at a stand-still. To speak of the concept of the political beyond this 
confrontation would mean to depoliticize it, which is not what Schmitt wants to achieve.
Another  important  feature  that  emerges  as  a  result  of  the  “crisis  mentality”  and  the 
critique of modernity, is existentialism. Since transcendence as well as the majority of 
traditional values were devalued, “human existence, in its brute factivity, became a value 
in and of itself ” (R. Wolin 1990, 394). Such “brute primacy of human existence” implies 
that  in  a  world  devoid  of  meaning,  which  used  to  be  guaranteed  by a  transcendent 
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absolute, the primary certainty of life becomes death. It is not surprising, then, that the 
threat of death, its inevitable possibility, is presented by Schmitt as the indicator of the 
'genuine' political. The conflict that he locates at the core of the political is determined by 
the  real  possibility  of  dying  and  killing:  “[t]he  friend,  enemy,  and  combat  concepts 
receive their real meaning precisely because they refer to the real possibility of physical 
killing” (2007, 33). Except death, there seems to be no other measure left that can form 
the foundation of new politics. In the words of Richard Wolin, in such a context “naked 
self-preservation” becomes “the highest end of political life” (1990, 405). 
In fact, since no life is free from the looming possibility of death, life in itself becomes 
unavoidably political, with war being its highest and most intense manifestation. Schmitt 
suggests that “[p]olitics means intensive life” (quoted in Wolin 1990, 406). The political 
is a constitutive part of living insofar as it is charged with a degree of intensity. Such a 
view of  the  intimate  connection  between  specifically  human  life  and  the  political  is 
further  exemplified by Schmitt's  embrace of pessimistic  anthropology.  He argues  that 
“optimistic  anthropology”  views  humans  as  beings  driven  toward  consensus  and 
agreement with each other, while “...all  genuine political theories presuppose man to be 
evil, i.e., by no means an unproblematic but a dangerous and dynamic being”  (Schmitt 
2007, 61). The drive to consensus and deliberation on the way to an agreement is one of 
the defining features of the liberal conception of the political process. Schmitt, on the 
contrary,  embraces  a  'belief'  in  human  nature,  defined  by  the  drive  to  conflict  and 
confrontation.  In  his  recourse  to  the  Hobbesian  view of  humanity,  Schmitt  seems  to 
suggest that the commencement of the political way of life, through the institution of the 
sovereign, does not deal away with the human desire for conflict but merely represses it. 
In other words, liberal political thought represses the 'genuine' political and substitutes it 
with the neutral (i.e., depoliticized) sphere of the state. As a result, Schmitt's critique of 
liberalism  can  be  interpreted  as  an  attempt  at  lifting  the  repression  introduced  by 
liberalism: the concept of the political is the return of the repressed of politics-as-state.
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Liberal repression and the return of the repressed of politics
Considering the historical and intellectual context of Schmitt's thought, I would like to 
emphasize again that the concept of the political arises primarily as a  response  and a 
reaction to the classical liberal conception of politics, defined in terms of the state. In the 
words of Leo Strauss, “...Schmitt's basic thesis is entirely dependent upon the polemic 
against liberalism; it is to be understood only qua polemical...” (Strauss 2007, 84 ), that 
is, set against the liberal processes of neutralization and depoliticization. The political, in 
Schmitt (and later) does not stop reflecting on its historical origins, and this is where it  
seems to gain its theoretical energy. Moreover, as I noted above, the political is the return 
of the repressed of politics. First, the concept of the political is the return of the historico-
theoretical repressed:  those  features  (e.g.,  conflict)  that  were  recognized  by  liberal 
thought but eventually denied conscious existence in political space. Second, the political 
(as  the  'real'  to  which  the  concept  refers)  expresses  the  ever-present  interruption  of 
politics by its  unconscious: the continuous disruption of the ordered political reality by 
the mobile and evasive principle of concrete life.
In his critique of liberalism,7 Schmitt presents it primarily as an ideology and movement 
of neutralization and depoliticization.  According to Schmitt,  in the 17th century there 
occurs a shift in Europe from Christian theology to “natural” science. At the core of the 
shift lies “an elemental impulse that has been decisive for centuries, i.e. the striving for a 
neutral  sphere,”  a  sphere  in  which  there  would  be  no  conflict,  in  which  common 
agreement would be reached through debates and exchange of opinion (Schmitt 1993, 
137).  This  trajectory  can  be  traced  within  liberal  narrative  of  transition  from  the 
conflictual  state  of  nature  to  the  neutral  sphere  of  the  political  state,  and  can  be 
interpreted as  a  deliberate  depoliticization  of  reality,  as  well  as  the repression of  the 
essence  of  the  political.  In  order  to  understand  better  the  Schmittian  reversal  of  the 
'hierarchy'  between the domain of the political  and the state of nature,  let  me have a 
7 Schmitt's  critique  of  liberalism  is  clearly  expressed,  for  example,  in  his  essay  The  Age  of  
Neutralizations and Depoliticizations (1993) and in The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (1985). 
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closer look at an example of a liberal line of argumentation constructed in defence of the 
necessity of institution of politics in the form of the state. 
Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan (1994) is an exemplary case of the traditional, (proto)liberal, 
conception of politics. Hobbes advocates the necessity of the institution of politics, in the 
form of the state and the sovereign, based on the fear of “the state of nature,” the non-
political,  disordered  reality  of  human  existence  in  the  absence  of  absolute  power  or 
authority.  Furthermore,  Hobbes  aims  to  justify  the  transition  to  the  political  form of 
existence from this natural state by suggesting that human passions and rationality make 
it possible or even demand it (ch. xiii, 13-14). The state of nature, on the one hand, is the 
state of absolute, unlimited 'freedom', where one can do whatever he wants and is limited 
only by his own, primarily physical, capacities, since everyone is endowed with a certain 
amount of “natural power” (ch. x, 2). In a sense, in the state of nature power circulates 
freely: it is not fixed in one place and in one person. On the other hand, this 'freedom' in 
the state of nature leads to a conflict of interests, where the natural rights and desires of  
multiple individuals constantly intersect and, since there is no external power that could 
oversee social interactions and ensure observation of the contracts, it leads to “the war of 
all against all” (ch. xiii, 8). Consequently, the apparently unlimited 'freedom' turns into 
'unfreedom',  insofar  as  one  is  never  guaranteed  anything:  all  there  is  are  obstacles, 
presented by the conflicting desires of others. Since freedom, for Hobbes, is primarily 
defined by the absence of impediments for the attainment of one's desires (survival and 
self-preservation being of the utmost importance), the state of nature, in the end, is the 
impediment to everyone's freedom and security.
As Hobbes famously put it, life in the state of nature is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and 
short” (ch. xiii, 9). It is an a-social life of contingency and war, without a guarantee for 
not only personal security, but any kind of social meaning and productivity (see, ch. xiii, 
9). According to Hobbes, the main concern of every individual is struggle for power and, 
most importantly, self-preservation by any means. As a result, lack of security and fear of 
death become the major motivations for the social contract between all (ch. xvii). The use 
of  reason,  with  which  all  humans are  equally endowed,  ensures  that  the  majority of 
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individuals,  in  the  pursuit  of  their  best  interest,  decide  to  agree  on  the  peaceful  co-
existence. Thus, the political state is established by persons who, in the face of the fear of  
death, give up their 'freedom' and absolute right to everything and “confer” it, together 
with  their  power,  to  one  person,  the  sovereign,  in  exchange  for  protection  from the 
internal  and  international  enemies  or  aggressors.  This  results  in  centralization  and 
accumulation of power in sovereign “hands” (ch. xvii, 13). The establishment of the state 
fixes and codifies, as law, the circulation and exercise of power, which becomes solely 
the right of the sovereign. Moreover, it fixes and regulates the use of violence, residual 
from the  state  of  nature,  that  becomes  the  exclusive  right  of  the  sovereign.  In  sum, 
Hobbes attempts to establish a certain hierarchy between the conflictual, a-social and a-
political state of nature and the political state, defined by freedom and peace. 
I would like to suggest that Hobbes' line of argumentation is representative of the liberal 
repression of the political, and we can get a glimpse of the nature of this repression by 
reading  Hobbes  against  himself.  In  his  description  of  the  state  of  nature  Hobbes 
emphasizes its disorderly, asocial and apolitical character. Life in this state is qualitatively 
inferior to political form of life: it is solitary as opposed to social, poor as opposed to 
wealthy, nasty and brutish as opposed to peaceful and civilized, unproductive as opposed 
to  fruitful,  etc.  As Hobbes writes,  in  the  condition of  war,  which  defines  the  natural 
condition  of  mankind,  “there  is  no  place  for  industry,  because  the  fruit  thereof  is 
uncertain,  and  consequently,  no  culture  on  earth,  no  navigation,  nor  use  of  the 
commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of 
moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the 
earth,  no  account  of  time,  no  arts,  no  letters,  no  society,  and  which  is  worst  of  all, 
continual  fear  and danger  of  violent  death,  and the life  of man,  solitary,  poor,  nasty,  
brutish, and short” (ch. xiii, 9). In short, in order to establish and maintain the hierarchy 
between the state of nature and politics, Hobbes presents the former in the most negative 
terms. However, if we look closer at his interpretation of the transition from the state of 
nature to politics, we can notice that a number of social and political elements are already 
present in this 'savage' state. 
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First  and  foremost,  the  very  possibility  of  agreement  of  all,  i.e.,  the  social  contract, 
requires the use of language, which means that the state of nature is not absolutely asocial 
and not devoid of shared meaning and understanding. A contract,  for Hobbes, is “the 
mutual transferring of right” (ch. xiv, 9), and “[t]he way by which a man ... transferreth 
his right is a declaration, or signification by some voluntary and sufficient sign or signs, 
that he doth so ... transfer, or hath so ... transferred the same, to him that accepteth it” (ch.  
xiv, 7; my emphasis). So, before the political commonwealth comes into existence, such a 
mutual transference of right has to, at least theoretically, occur among the majority of 
people.  However,  if  among these people there were no shared meaning and a sort  of 
community  established,  how  and  where  would  it  be  possible  to  declare  or  signify 
anything in front of anyone and, moreover, to determine the “sufficiency” of the signs 
used? It is precisely because of this, as Hobbes notes, it is impossible “to make covenants 
with brute beasts”: “not understanding our speech, they understand not, nor accept of, any 
translation  of  right,  nor  can  translate  any  right  to  another;  and  without  mutual  
acceptation, there is no covenant” (ch. xiv, 22; my emphasis). So, the sharing of language 
or speech is the defining condition of mutual acceptation, and thus, of social contract. 
Before there is politics there is social meaning and some sort of order in the state of  
nature. The latter is not simply a chaotic, disordered reality of brutal war; the fact that 
there is no overarching authority to ensure the observation of contracts does not mean 
that there are no contracts in the natural state. On the contrary, this state is a state of 
multiple, non-hierarchical contracts and covenants. On several occasions Hobbes speaks 
of such “covenants entered into ... in the condition of mere nature” (ch. xiv, 27), based, 
for example, on “mutual trust” (ch. xiv, 18) or “fear” (ch. xiv, 27), including the fear of 
God (ch. xiv, 31). So, the problem of the non-performance of contracts, which Hobbes 
'observes' in “the miserable condition of war” (consequent to “when there is no visible 
power to keep them [men] in awe, and tie them by fear of punishment to the performance 
of their covenants” (ch. xvii, 1)), cannot be rendered identical to the absence of sociality, 
as Hobbes seems to advocate. 
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Furthermore, the interpretation of the state of nature as apolitical itself springs from the 
unquestioned premise of what counts as politics. From the very beginning Hobbes seems 
to assume what politics is and can be, and constructs his view of the non-political from 
that perspective. As a result, conflict, unordered power struggles and wars are excluded 
from his view of politics that is confined to the commonwealth. However, at least from 
two perspectives  we can  observe  political  activity in  the  state  of  nature:  first,  in  the 
establishment of multiple contracts based on deliberation and mutual understanding and 
use of language;  second, in the struggle between the multiple  'nodes'  of concentrated 
power.  From  this  perspective,  while  'classical'  politics  is  defined  by  the  ordered 
movement of power, controlled and managed by the sovereign, 'politics' in the state of 
nature  is  present  in  the  un-  or  dis-ordered  movement  or  circulation  of  power.  Thus, 
Hobbes' politics, i.e., the political commonwealth, is but a continuation of war by other 
means.  Nevertheless,  in  order  to  justify the  necessity  and  essential  'goodness'  of  the 
commonwealth, Hobbes, against himself, affirms that the state of nature is both asocial 
and apolitical, and that life in the state of nature is qualitatively different from life in the 
political community of the state. As a result, social existence and politics are reduced to 
the space of the state, 'designed' to preclude the dangers of contingency, insecurity and 
unordered, free flowing and circulating power in the state of nature. The very concept of 
politics becomes a guarantor of security, a tool for policing the borders of ordered social 
interactions.  The  thought  of  the  real  conflict  is  repressed  within  traditional  political 
theory: the institution of sovereign regulation is assumed to have conclusively eliminated 
the dangers of conflictual, contingent and non-political life.
I  argue  that  Schmitt's  concept  of  the  political  essentially  signals  the  return  of  the 
repressed of the liberal political thought. In his attempt at lifting the liberal repression,  
Schmitt explicitly rejects identification of politics with the state. In response, he not only 
(re-)introduces  confrontation  and  struggle  into  politics,  but  posits  the  “ever  present 
possibility of [war-like] conflict”  (Schmitt 2007, 32) at the heart  of “the political.”8 In 
8 However,  some scholars,  for  instance,  Slavoj  Žižek  (1999b) and  Chantal  Mouffe  (2005),  critique 
Schmitt for not being radical enough, that is, for not going beyond the conflict between “us” and 
“them” in his concept of the political. Žižek suggests that the real task of leftist thought of politics 
should be the “return of the political proper, that is, the reassertion of the dimension of antagonism” 
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other words, Schmitt posits the state of nature, defined by the ever-present possibility of 
war, at the centre of the political, thus reversing the Hobbesian desire for the containment 
of conflict through the order of the state. In sum, what Hobbes defines as the non-political 
state of nature, for Schmitt comes to constitute the very specificity of the political.9
“The political is the total”: the friend and enemy distinction
Schmitt's concept of the political introduced a new tendency into political thought: it is a 
self-referential reflection on the new history of politics, on the “essence” of late-modern 
politics  and  its  tendencies,  but  at  the  same  time  it  itself  is  an  instance  of  the  new 
historico-political consciousness, in which politics is no longer reduced to the actuality of 
the political sphere (the state and institutions) but extends far beyond its limits, merges 
with life itself and thus becomes totality. What is interesting about this approach is not 
necessarily its content: it is the approach itself, its methods and framework that are really 
novel  (cf. Szabo 2006). Regardless of the content that is attributed to the political by 
Schmitt and his followers, the overarching framework remains without much variation: 
the  political  is  interpreted  as  potentiality  that  exists  and  can  actualize  anywhere  and 
anytime,  be  it  in  the  form of  an  event,  decision,  resistance,  revolution,  insurrection, 
inscription of the excluded, etc. Schmitt redefines the basic concepts of political theory: 
not only is the political no longer limited by the sphere of the state, it turns out not to be 
limited by anything, it becomes a new, open totality that cannot ever complete itself or 
become closed.10 Thus, Schmitt proclaims, “[w]e have come to recognize that the political 
is the total” (2005, 2). 
Such a  new interpretation  of  the  political  as  totality  is  reflected  in  Schmitt's  famous 
friend-enemy distinction. He writes: “The specific political distinction to which political 
actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy. This provides a 
(Žižek 1999b, 35), which is coextensive with the political far beyond foreign relations.
9 For a discussion of Agamben's radicalization of Schmitt on this point, see, Prozorov (2009).
10 Many other scholars note this radical move and similarly suggest that the political transforms from a 
limited  concept  into  an  expansive,  deterritorialized  and  parasitic  one;  it  becomes  an  ontological 
horizon and merges with life itself  (see, for example, Arditi 1996; Arditi 2008; Chrostowska 2009; 
Deuber-Mankowsky 2008; Marder 2005; Shapiro 2003; Shapiro 2010; Szabo 2006; R. Wolin 1990).
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definition in the sense of a criterion and not as an exhaustive definition or one indicative 
of substantial content [...] The distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree 
of  intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation [...] The political 
distinction is  the strongest and most intense of the distinctions and categorizations...” 
(2007,  26,  27;  my  emphasis). Several  important  points  emerge  here.  According  to 
Schmitt, first, the political gains its conceptual autonomy only through the specificity of  
criterion that it refers to and not through a reference to an essence; second, in the concept 
of the political distinction as such is given an important role; third, an energetic aspect of 
the political is expressed through the reference to intensity. Finally, the political exhibits 
expansive and  parasitic tendencies, insofar as it is not limited to a specific sphere and 
derives its abundant energy from a variety of human activities.
One of the main goals that Schmitt proclaims as he pursues the concept of the political is 
to show that the political is not limited to the state. Thus the opening sentence of the 
essay:  “The  concept  of  the  state  presupposes  the  concept  of  the  political”  (19). 
Furthermore, Schmitt wants to distance himself from the common 'negative' definitions of 
the political sphere of his time, and to present a positive one that proceeds from its own 
criteria. He notes that politics tends to be defined negatively: “in contrast to various other 
ideas,  for  example  in  such antitheses  as  politics  and economy,  politics  and morality,  
politics and law...” (20). Moreover, it is also often subordinated to these other spheres, 
resulting in the political being just an extension of other human activities. In opposition to 
such  an  attitude,  Schmitt  introduces  into  the  discourse  of  political  philosophy  a 
distinction which is, supposedly, independent from other spheres of activity and, thus, 
presents an autonomous basis for the concept of the political.  This concept, however, 
remains incomplete, it is rather a non-concept in a sense of “a name for that what cannot 
have a name” (Ojakangas 2005a, 36): a name of intensive 'life', the reality of which can 
never  be fully grasped by the intellect.  Insofar as the political  does not  refer  to  “the 
essential substance,” but finds its temporary certainty in a “criterion” that, by definition, 
is always potentially multiple, it evades any limitation through a definition. As Marton 
Szabo suggests, “[t]he political does not seek the essence, but the specific,” meaning that 
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“Schmitt chooses from the competing possibilities of specification that one aspect based 
upon which things get a political meaning, namely the friend-enemy distinction” (Szabo 
2006, 32). In the end, Schmitt affirms not the autonomy of the political (based on a clear 
definition of its  object),  as per his initial  indication,  but,  rather,  the specificity of the 
political  criterion  (cf.  Arditi  1996,  17).  This  ultimately  provides  the  concept  of  the 
political with much flexibility and a possibility for mobility across other social fields. The 
political is no longer dependent on other spheres; on the contrary, it invests them with its 
intense principle of differentiation. It is worth noting, in this regard, that it not just the 
figures of the friend and enemy, as well as their struggle, that define the political: the 
distinction as such plays an important role here. As Gary Ulmen suggests in his reading 
of Schmitt's later work,  Theory of the Partisan, the political is “defined not by enmity 
(friend-enemy),  but  by  the  very  distinction”  (Ulmen  1987,  189).  The  political  is  a 
principle of distinction or differentiation. It is not surprising that later political thinkers 
will come up with a very appropriate term, “the political difference,” to refer to the play 
of the irreducible difference at the heart of the political (cf. Marchart 2007).
Another important factor that contributes to the totalizing tendency of the political is the 
notion of  intensity. Schmitt suggests that the main difference of the political distinction 
from other distinctions is the degree of its intensity, which results in the proposition that 
any distinction  can  be  politicized.  As  the  intensity  of  a  certain  opposition  grows,  it 
eventually can reach its highest level (friend/enemy distinction); and, when it reaches this 
level,  it  is  no  longer  an  ethical,  religious  or  any  other  opposition  but  a  political 
distinction. The quantitative augmentation of the intensity of an opposition results in its 
qualitative transformation – politicization. In this  way, Schmitt's discussion introduces 
potentiality as an important factor of the concept of the political: any opposition  may 
become  political.  In  the  words  of  Michael  Marder,  “[g]iven  that  any opposition  can 
become  political  if  it  reaches  the  maximal  intensity  of  friend-enemy  groupings,  the 
political 'principle' assumes the place of potentiality inherent in various other spheres” 
(2005, 15–16). Moreover, if we take into account Schmitt's pessimistic anthropology, we 
can argue that human life as such tends toward politicization: it is attracted to the political 
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(i.e., the potentiality of war and real conflict where life and death are at stake) in its very 
essence.  In  a  nutshell,  the combination of  the  criteria  of  intensity and potentiality in 
Schmitt results in the construction of the political as totality, meaning that every relation 
can potentially reach the level of intensity necessary for the political to emerge. 
Inasmuch as the political is only marked by the criteria of distinction and intensity and, 
so, it  can potentially consume or politicize any and every relation (i.e., opposition), it 
does not have a place of its own; that is, it does not belong to a limited sphere or a field.  
In this regard Szabo  (2006) suggests that the political acquires an  infinite character: it 
can refer to anything by “touching” but not encircling its subject. The political, then, is a 
total contact or “an infinite substance that penetrates life as a whole” (33). The political is 
nothing  else  but  “intensive  life.”  We  can  draw  an  interesting  parallel  between  this 
interpretation of the political and Georges Bataille's “general economy,” both of which 
employ the rhetoric of energies and intensities. Bataille  (1988) revised major economic 
concepts and coined the notion of “general economy” – the unconscious of a “restricted” 
or “rational economy” (traditionally limited to the principles of productive activity and 
accumulation).  General  economy  considers,  contrary  to  economic  science,  the 
heterogeneous “play of living matter in general” (23) that is not limited to a particular 
domain or a utilitarian aim. This “general play” is very similar to what Schmitt suggests 
about the political: its 'energy' is not restricted to a specific domain. The concept rather 
refers to the play of the political distinction in general or, to use Bataille's language, to a 
general economy of the political.11 
We can further note that the concept of the political is parasitic. It not only infinitely 
absorbs  life,  even  in  its  potentiality,  it  also  feeds  off  and  digests  the  heterogeneous 
energies of life. The political is “'parasitic' insofar as it draws its power from nonpolitical 
commitments”  (Shapiro  2003,  107).  As  Schmitt  writes,  “[t]he  political  can  derive  its 
energy from the most varied human endeavours, from the religious, economic, moral, and 
other antithesis” (2007, 38). This parasitism, on the one hand, results from the absence of 
11 Some might object that the political is not capable of forming either an internal or external economy 
(cf. Marder 2009, 59). However, such an objection, I believe, still rests on the notion of “restricted 
economy.” As a result, I think it is possible to speak of a general economy of the political in Schmitt.
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the 'proper' place of the political; on the other hand, it is a defining feature of the political 
distinction as such. As Marder suggests, “Schmitt frames his discussion of the political in 
a  kind  of  negative  ontology,  in  the  non-space  or,  better  yet,  in  the  displacement  of 
different domains of human action”  (2009, 60).  That is,  the ability of the political  to 
thrive off the heterogeneous energies is not just an outcome of dislocation of politics (an 
evolutionary  adaptation)  but  is  indicative  of  the  political  itself  as  the  principle  of  
displacement.12 
To sum up, the new totalizing tendency of the political consists in the consumption of life 
(in  its  concreteness  and  potentiality)  and  of  various  human  relations  by  the  total 
possibility of politicization. If, for example, ancient Greek, medieval and classical liberal 
society used to have the criteria (at the very least, theoretical) for a more or less clear 
distinction between politics and the non-political,13 late-modern political though, of which 
Schmitt is a representative, finds such a distinction problematic. Due to the displacement 
of the state's monopoly on politics, there is no longer an institution or objective structure 
that could take the place of the state and draw the line between the political and the non-
political  (cf. Szabo 2006, 29). Moreover, since the political, as potentiality, invests life 
and all social spheres, they ultimately rely on it in the last instance  (Marder 2009, 62). 
They are not non-political as such, but are merely not yet fully politicized. I suggest that 
Schmitt's  drive toward total  politicization can be explained by the problem of liberal 
depoliticization, identified by him from the very start. However, it also seems plausible to 
suggest  that  the  institution  of  the  political  as  totality  can  be  attributed  to  a  certain 
(irrational) fear of depoliticization or the unpolitical. Insofar as the political is viewed as 
always in danger of neutralization, depoliticization and sublimation into other domains 
12 The political as the principle of displacement is taken up seriously by contemporary political thought,  
especially in relation to the analysis of the mass phenomena of human displacement and dislocation, 
such as the refugees, asylum seekers and migrants. The political as displacement of other spheres is  
exemplified by the figure of the refugee that represents anything that flees from the rigid state-centred 
framework of international  order,  challenges and transcends it  toward the general economy of the 
political, where the play is “performed” by living matter in general. I will return to this discussion 
further on.
13 For example, the polis is opposed to oikos, freedom to slavery, inside to outside (e.g., the city wall as 
“the sine qua non of the Greek polis” (McKesson Camp II 2000, 47)), political commonwealth to the 
state of nature, and a public space to private.
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(cf. Marchart 2007, 44), this view provokes a reactive affirmation not just of the primacy 
of the political  but of the impossibility of any  real (as opposed to merely appearing) 
depoliticization at the ontological level. In this way, pressure from the fear of the non-
political contributes to the institution of the political as totality. 
The political displacement: laceration of the body politic
I would like to further argue that a correlation is at the core of the political as totality: this 
totality is  split  or  “doubly inscribed.”  There are  two registers  of  politics  that  remain 
infallibly present in the discourse of modern political theory, including Schmitt's thought. 
The  political  differentiates  itself  from  itself  in  self-critique,  in  self-overcoming  or 
becoming, and there are at least two primary dimensions of this self-differentiation. The 
first dimension, as I discussed above, consists in the negative attachment of the thought 
of the political to its historical origin, meaning that the late-modern thought of politics is 
self-referential: it grounds itself in the tension and argumentation with the preexisting, 
liberal,  political  thought.  The  second  dimension  consists  in  the  recognition  of  a 
difference, and consequent tension, between often visible, relatively immobile, ordered 
political reality (politics-as-state, bureaucracy), and the fluid, 'unconscious' principle that 
interrupts this order (the political as intensive life, conflict and an expansive movement of 
distinction).  In the words of Benjamin Arditi,  these are the “two registers of political 
matter,” of which one (politics) is fixed, and the other (the political) is expressive of the 
“living  movement,  the  magma  of  conflicting  wills”  (Arditi  1996,  21).  Furthermore, 
Slavoj Žižek calls such relation between the two principles a “double inscription” of the 
political: “the political is inscribed as a gentrified domain of normalized or institutional 
political  exchanges  (politics)  and  as  the  negativity  of  decisions  and  actions  that  put 
objectivity into question (the political), whether at the local or macro levels, within or 
outside the political sub-system”  (quoted in Arditi 2008, 17). In Arditi's interpretation, 
this means that politics and the political interpenetrate because of a “double coding” (17). 
They are not alternative modes of inscription but, rather, correlated modes that constitute 
themselves through a relation of mutual dependence and negation or interruption. 
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In Schmitt we can see this correlation exemplified by the relation between the concepts of 
the state and the political. In this respect, the opening sentence of  The Concept of the  
Political is  symptomatic:  “The  concept  of  the  state  presupposes the  concept  of  the 
political” (2007, 19; my emphasis). Even though Schmitt implies here that the political is 
prior to the state, it is ultimately the state that seems to call the political into question and 
thus into being. The state still serves as a point of departure and the stable ground for 
Schmitt's elaboration of the concept of the political. (This is the opposite of what we see 
in liberal social contract theories, for instance, in Hobbes, where politics is 'summoned' 
by the  state  of  nature;  in  Schmitt's  case  it  is  the  state  or  politics  that  demands  the 
introduction of the political and its conflictuality.) I would like to suggest that the reverse 
of  Schmitt's  statement  is  also  necessary  for  his  theory:  the  concept  of  the  political 
presupposes the concept of the state, insofar as 'someone' (the sovereign) has to make a 
decision on who counts as an enemy or a friend. The state and the political presuppose 
and, simultaneously, negate and interrupt each other. As a result, the political, as totality 
structured around correlation, does not effectively do what it appears to promise: it does 
not 'liberate'  the fluid principle from the rigid one. On the contrary,  in his attempt to 
rethink  politics,  Schmitt  subordinates  the  political  to  the  state,  first,  in  terms  of  its 
negation and, ultimately, as a product of the sovereign decision. 
Schmitt recognizes these two registers of politics by distinguishing not just between the 
concepts of the state and the political, but also between the mechanisms of repetition and 
real life. In Political Theology (which was published several years before The Concept of  
the Political) he writes: “In the exception the power of real life breaks through the crust 
of a mechanism that has become torpid by repetition” (2005, 15). Even though he speaks 
of the exception here, such a relation between real life (or an event) and repetition applies 
to his concept of the political. The power of deciding on the distinction between friend 
and enemy interrupts supposedly inert and neutral,  non-conflictual reality of the state-
centred  form of  life.  The  power  of  real  life,  which  is  inherently  political  due  to  its 
dynamic and intensive character, breaks through the inert layer of repetitious practices 
and mechanisms. However,  this power does not dismantle these practices, it  does not 
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dispose of the body politic but rather appears as its chronic illness, a wound or laceration. 
The  punctual  disruption  of  politics  by  the  political  principle  of  real  life  is  not  a 
transformation of order into chaos; on the contrary, it functions within the framework of a 
normal situation. As Colin Wright suggests, “radical novelty for Schmitt can only mean 
chaos and anarchy. Because 'there is no norm that is applicable to chaos' (Schmitt: 2005, 
p. 13) and no exception without a norm, it follows that 'the exception is different from 
anarchy and chaos; order in the juristic sense still prevails' (p.12)” (2008, 8). The power 
of real life that provides the political with its dynamic energy is not chaotic: it seems to 
function as a force that actualizes itself primarily in reaction or in opposition to its own 
petrification  in  the  practices  of  normalization.  The political,  then,  is  a  self-lacerating 
rather than a self-cancelling unity: real life (i.e., the political) which breaks through the 
crust  of  repetition  and  mechanization,  does  not  create  a  new order  but  interrupts  or 
lacerates the existing one. So, through his concept of the political, Schmitt introduces a 
permanent wound to the body politic.
In this regard, the Greek notion of stasis is useful for thinking through the concept of the 
political in terms of the constant insurrection or laceration within the established political 
order. On the one hand, stasis refers to a position and lack of movement. This meaning is 
the most familiar to us today because, via Latin status/statio, it survived until this time by 
signifying “a situation in which there is no change or development” (Oxford Dictionary), 
and, politically, the state (Constantinou 2004, 6). On the other hand, according to Nicole 
Loraux  (2001),  the  major  political  meaning of  stasis in  ancient  Greece  was  actually 
related to antagonism, strife, revolution or, to use a Roman concept, civil war. In more 
poetic  language,  it  is  “the  division  that  tears  apart  and  tears  open:  from  Solon  to 
Aeschylus, stasis is a deep wound in the body of the city” (24). Schmitt also takes notice 
of stasis, “an intriguing contradiction of a dialectical nature” (2008, 122–123). In a way 
similar to Loraux's, he writes: “[s]tasis means in the first place quiescence, tranquillity, 
standpoint, status; its antonym is kinesis, movement. But stasis also means, in the second 
place, (political) unrest, movement, uproar and civil war” (123).14 In The Concept of the  
14 On the notion of stasis see also works of Dimitris Vardoulakis (2009; 2010).
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Political Schmitt points out that the kind of enmity inherent in the political is necessarily 
public: the enemy of the political distinction is the public enemy (hostis,  polemios) and 
not  the  private  one (2007,  28).  This  distinction  is  derived  from  the  ancient  Greek 
distinction between  polemos, proper war between Hellenes and Barbarians, and  stasis, 
insurrection, conflict within the polis and among Hellenes. For the Greeks polemos was 
the only real war, while stasis, as internal conflict, had a less radical meaning. Following 
Plato Schmitt writes: since “a people cannot wage war against itself ... a civil war is only 
a self-laceration and it does not signify that perhaps a new state or even a new people is 
being  created”  (28–29,  note  9;  my  emphasis). So,  when  Schmitt  talks  about  the 
potentiality of war as a defining feature of the political distinction, he thinks of polemos 
and not stasis, thus his reduction of the political to the domain of foreign affairs, and to 
the possibility of total annihilation or killing (i.e., creation of a radically new 'state') as the 
measure  of  the  authenticity  of  enmity  (polemos).  However,  in  The  Concept  of  the  
Political, despite  Schmitt's  affirmation  of  the  political  as  polemos,  we come  across 
elements of the political that are similar to  stasis. For example, as I showed above, the 
political, as real and intensive life (that obviously cannot be confined to the sphere of 
international relations), constantly irrupts from within and interrupts the torpid order of 
the state.
Furthermore,  while  in  The  Concept  of  the  Political  Schmitt  wants  to  insist  on  the 
exclusively  polemical nature  of  political  conflictuality,  we find a  confirmation of  the 
reworking  of  this  concept  in  terms  of  stasis in  his  much  later  work,  Theory  of  the  
Partisan ([1963] 2004). In this work Schmitt elaborates his theory of enmity and suggests 
that there are several types of enmity which,  consequently,  introduce a differentiation 
within the concept of the political. I suggest that the initial concept of the political relies 
primarily on the presence of “the conventional enmity of controlled and bracketed war” 
between states (17). The conventional enemy presents an existential  threat but is also 
treated as an equal and with respect; moreover, the relation of enmity is often regulated 
by the norms of international law. The partisan, on the other hand, acts outside these 
restrictions, his very being is defined by his standing outside any containment: “[t]he 
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modern partisan expects neither law nor mercy from the enemy. He has moved away 
from the conventional  enmity [...]  and into the realm of  another,  real  enmity,  which, 
through terror and counter-terror, grows continually, up to reciprocal annihilation” (17; 
my  emphasis). This  form  of  enmity  dominates  partisan  struggles  against  foreign 
occupation  but  also  often  emerges  during  civil  wars.  The rise  of  “irregular”  partisan 
struggles,  based  on the  notion  of  real  and absolute  enmity,  for  Schmitt  signified  the 
gradual breakdown of the political order grounded in the primacy of state and inter-state 
enmity.  The recognition of the partisan as a new important political  figure signals an 
important turn in the concept of the political: the dominant “war among states, with its  
precise rules, is put aside and substituted by a revolutionary war among parties [partisan-
war]” (44). The distinctive criteria for identifying the partisan are: “irregularity, increased 
mobility of active combat, and increased intensity of political engagement,” as well as his 
“telluric” character (23).15 Schmitt emphasizes that the political character of the partisan 
is  decisive,  otherwise,  nothing  would  distinguish  him  from  a  common  thief  or  a 
criminal.16 (Here,  as  in  The  Concept  of  the  Political,  Schmitt  highlights  the  public 
character of enmity.) The figure of the partisan represents a new type of the political 
which is not limited by conflict between the states, but can be rather defined in terms of 
laceration  from  within  the  state  order.  It  emerges  here  and  there  irregularly  and 
exemplifies the  heightened intensity  of the political distinction. As Schmitt concludes, 
“[t]he theory of the partisan flows into the concept of the political,  into the question 
15 The partisan, however, has his limitations due to these characteristics: first, his enemy is real and not 
absolute; second, he is limited by the defensive (despite the increased mobility) and telluric character 
of his struggle, an “autochthonous” relation to the piece of earth he defends (2004, 76).
16 Schmitt singles out the role of the “friend” or “the third party” in the recognition of the political nature 
of the partisan struggle.  “[T]he interested  third party  plays an essential role when it provides that 
reference to the regular, which the partisan’s irregularity needs in order to remain within the political  
sphere. Now, the substance of the political is not enmity pure and simple, but the ability to distinguish  
between friend and enemy, and to presuppose  both friend  and enemy. Although the powerful third 
party interested in the partisan’s action can think or act  as egoistically as he wishes,  his political  
interest is on the side of the partisan. This results in the birth of a political friendship, which is already 
a type of political recognition, even if it does not come to public or formal recognition as a fighting 
part or as government” (2004, 75–76; my emphasis). This passage is unique in Schmitt's writings on 
the political since it gives an account of political friendship. In  The Concept of the Political Schmitt 
only mentions friendship as a defining feature of the political distinction but on no occasion discusses 
it at any length, suggesting a conclusion that it is essentially enmity that 'defines' the political (cf. Van 
Der Zweerde 2007). 
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concerning who is the real enemy and in a new nomos of the earth” (78).17 As the nature 
of enmity in the contemporary world changes, so does the concept of the political. In the 
end,  Schmitt  opens his  concept  of  the  political  to  a  much wider  application  than  he 
initially conceived. 
In the final analysis, the correlative character of the political, together with its totalizing 
tendency, makes it hard to conceive of anything that remains beyond politicization, actual 
or potential. Insofar as political matter is split into two correlated registers (the political 
and  politics,  antagonism  and  order,  movement  and  immobility)  anything  can  be 
incorporated into it. The elements that confront the established order are automatically 
politicized and even re-inscribed into order as its negation and interruption. Furthermore, 
as we will see below, anything that challenges the political is also politicized through that 
very confrontation. It is no longer the state that defines the political; on the contrary, the 
excess of traditional politics (e.g., conflict, antagonism, war, intensive life) is at the core 
of the concept  of the political.  However,  regular  politics or the state still  remain the 
necessary component in the emergence of the political. For Schmitt, the political, in its 
correlation with politics, is the total. As a result of such a totalizing tendency it becomes 
almost impossible to draw a line or to distinguish between what is political and what is 
not.
The unpolitical exception and the neutral
What  is  outside the  political?  For  Schmitt,  there  seems  to  be  nothing  that  escapes 
potential politicization. As I showed above, the political is inherent in the very nature of 
humanity; it is intensive life, and, thus, it is impossible to eliminate. Leo Strauss (2007) 
comes to a similar conclusion in his critique of Schmitt. He argues that insofar as the 
political  is  proclaimed  by Schmitt  to  be  “a  basic  characteristic  of  human  life,”  it  is 
17 Nevertheless,  Schmitt  suggests  that  the  partisan  eventually  becomes  involved  in  the  wars  with 
“absolute enmity.” In the wake of the revolutionary movements of the begging of the 20 th century but 
also in the nuclear age, “[t]he denial of real enmity paves the way for the destructive work of absolute  
enmity” (2004, 78). For example, Lenin, “a professional revolutionary engaged in a global civil war, 
went further and turned the real enemy into a foe [absolute enemy]” (76). As a result, he consciously 
conceives of the partisan as an important figure in the struggle against the absolute enemy in “national  
and international civil war” (45).
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destiny: humans cannot escape it (94). Moreover, it is also necessary in this way, because 
it is given in human nature, and human ceases to be human when it ceases to be political 
(95). Strauss  suggests  that  ultimately  the  question  of  negation  or  affirmation  of  the 
political can be reduced to a quarrel about human nature: whether humans are 'good' or 
'evil'. Schmitt's assumption about humans as 'evil' cannot be deduced from his concept of 
the political; on the contrary, the political rests on the presupposition of the pessimistic 
anthropology. The latter is indeed no more than a “supposition,” which cannot be proved 
but largely remains a matter of an “anthropological confession of faith” (96). As a result, 
insofar  as  the  opposite  anthropological  belief  is  possible,  the  political  is  in  principle 
“threatened,”  and thus  requires  not  mere  “recognition”  of  its  reality,  but  its  decisive 
“affirmation.” Schmitt's  The Concept of the Political presents such an affirmation in a 
form  of  a  normative  (and  not  in  itself  polemical,  as  he  would  prefer  to  view  it) 
affirmation of a belief  in  the human as “evil” by nature,  that is,  as a dangerous and 
dynamic being  (see, Strauss 2007,  96–97). Furthermore, Strauss rightly notes that the 
“inescapability of the political is displayed in the contradiction in which man necessarily 
becomes entangled if he attempts to eliminate the political. This effort has a prospect of 
success if and only if it becomes political...” (94). While here Strauss mainly thinks of the 
politicization  of  such  an  effort  by  its  necessary  intensification  and  resulting 
transformation of the situation into that of enmity and war between the opponents of the 
political (pacifists) and it proponents (nonpacifists), the contradiction of this attempt to 
overcome the political goes much further.
In particular, this contradiction appears in the decision on the exception or the unpolitical; 
it is an originary contradiction that cannot be resolved logically, and which, consequently, 
acquires  the  status  of  a  miracle-like  event  that  institutes  the  abyssal  ground  of  any 
political decision. In 1933 Schmitt writes: “We have come to recognize that the political 
is  the  total,  and as  a  result  we know that  any decision  about  whether  something  is 
unpolitical is always a political decision, irrespective of who decides and what reasons 
are advanced” (Schmitt 2005, 2). I suggest that this quote from a preface to the second 
edition of Political Theology, which was written shortly after The Concept of the Political 
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and  Hitler's  coming  to  power  in  Germany,  is  the  quintessence  of  Schmitt's  political 
thought. It brings together two of the major concepts from two of his most influential 
works: the concept of the political, revolving around the opposition between friend and 
enemy, and decision on the exception, as a defining feature of sovereignty: “[s]overeign 
is he who decides on the exception” (5). What is the relationship between the political 
and the exception? An answer to this question will help to shed some light on the fate of 
the unpolitical in Schmitt's thought. 
In my opinion, the main connection between the political and the exception in Schmitt is 
decision. In fact, upon a closer examination, we can distinguish between two kinds of 
decisions  on  two  types  of  distinction:  first,  a  decision  on  the  absolute  form  of  the 
exception or the unpolitical – the originary event; second, a decision about friend and 
enemy groupings (i.e., the political) that occurs within the space already affected by the 
originary event. Schmitt writes that “[t]he exception appears in its absolute form when a 
situation in which legal prescriptions can be valid must first be brought about.  Every 
general norm demands a normal,  everyday frame of life  to  which it  can be factually 
applied and which  is  subjected to  its  regulations.  The norm requires  a  homogeneous 
medium  ...  and  he is  sovereign  who definitely  decides whether  this  normal situation 
actually exists” (13; my emphasis). We can see here 'the originary event' of the political: 
institution of the normal situation or a homogeneous medium where it becomes possible 
to identify friends and enemies or to decide on their distinction. Such a decision cannot 
be applicable to chaos. I suggest that what is excepted through this originary decision is 
the unpolitical or “the neutral”: in this sense, the exception in its  absolute form  is the 
exception of the unpolitical, of the radical outside of the political. However, for Schmitt, 
insofar as any decision about something unpolitical is always a political decision, there 
can  be  no  unpolitical  as  such.  It  is  immediately  politicized  through  the  sovereign 
decision. The unpolitical, then, is a mere illusion and a negativity posited for a political 
purpose (which is consistent with Schmitt's view of the political  as an expansive and 
totalizing  principle).  In  this  regard,  Schmitt's  thought  of  the  political,  a  correlative 
affirmation of the political against the background of liberal depoliticization, is itself the 
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political  gesture  par  excellence.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  sense  of  the  unpolitical  in 
Schmitt beyond mere 'illusion' in the 'real' of the exception (i.e., the power of life that 
breaks through). By claiming that any decision on the unpolitical is a political decision, 
Schmitt involves the logic of exception: an element is included through its exclusion. 
Something is unpolitical only as long as it is an outcome of a political decision, meaning 
that while the decision excludes an element from the political field,  it  simultaneously 
creates an unbreakable (constitutional) tie of the excluded with the political. I maintain 
that the unpolitical (the outside of the political,  the absolute form of the exception or 
simply life) is incorporated, in Schmitt, into the political only partially, as a product of a 
political decision (i.e., on the exception) within the already instituted normal situation. 
The unpolitical as such, not correlated to a political decision, which is, perhaps, intimated 
in Schmitt's reference to “chaos” and “the exception in its absolute form,” is not given a 
substantial  account.  The Schmittian totality of the political  seems to require a radical 
outside but ultimately remains blind to it. Consequently, Schmitt would rather suggest 
that there is no unpolitical beyond the exception to the norm (i.e., correlated to a political 
decision), and that there is no radical outside of the political. There is only the immanent 
transcendence of the exception (cf. Ojakangas 2005a). Such a denial of the outside is “a 
pronounced  blindness,”  characteristic  of  the  self-grounding phenomena (of  which  the 
political  is  an example),  “to everything that  surrounds or falls  outside of it”  (Marder 
2005, 19). The political grounds itself in its own premises, it is self-referential, and thus 
the only “outside” it allows is the limited exception – an inclusive exclusion. I believe 
that contemporary post-foundational political thought inherits this feature from Schmitt: 
it does not conceive of the unpolitical beyond such an exception. 
Inasmuch as the exception is ultimately beyond the friend and enemy distinction, it is 
similar to that what Strauss calls “the neutral.” He suggests that the Schmittian enemy 
figure appears as a result of the the dissolution of neutrality: “...each looks intently at his 
enemy; in order to gain a free line of fire, with a sweep of the hand they wave aside – 
without looking at  – the neutral  who lingers in the middle, interrupting the view of the 
enemy”  (Strauss 2007, 106; my emphasis). Even though for Strauss the neutral seeks 
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mediation and is a case for a possible reconciliation of the enemies, one does not have to 
interpret it  that way only. The neutrality can be viewed in more general terms, as the 
unpolitical that is blindly (“without looking at”) swept aside by the desire for the political 
and its advocacy. We recognize again the  blindness  to the outside that accompanies the 
political  as  a  self-grounding  phenomenon.  The  neutral,  as  the  third  of  the  political 
distinction, is not only ignored but also actively repressed and eliminated, resulting in 
constitution of the ground for the political as absent. As Marder puts it, “for Schmitt, the 
political begins with the cognitive-perceptual elimination of the neutral third”  (Marder 
2005, 18). This third, as I suggested above, is the unpolitical, the outside of the political 
as such. However, in Schmitt's work this neutral field is made present or visible only in a 
limited way – as an exception. Thus, the blind field of the unpolitical has a potentially 
visible spot – an exception – in which we can get a glimpse of the outside, and from 
which  the  political  can  observe  itself.  So,  while  Schmitt's  political  is  the  total  and 
expansive,  its  outside  is  retained in  the exception.  Its  absent  origin  is  'localized'  and 
recreated in the exception. In this way, the political is a borderline concept: it acquires its 
meaning by drawing a line between itself and its other, in this case the unpolitical. And 
the latter  is only partially accounted for as the exception. This results in the political 
being an exception-based concept: it explains (and traces its origin) and legitimates itself 
through that which it is not, even though its other is granted only a limited recognition. 
The primary example of the exception in Schmitt is sovereignty and sovereign decision. 
In the words of Sylwia Chrostowska, sovereign self-exemption constitutes “a political 
event of the first order”  (2009, 104).18 The sovereign exempts itself from the norm it 
institutes, since in order to be able to suspend it (like in the state of exception), he has to 
remain outside the law. The logic of sovereignty is that of the excluded middle, like a 
proposition about all propositions (e.g., that all propositions are either true or false) that 
in  its  very  utterance  institutes  a  fixed  relationship  among  all  other  propositions,  but 
18 It would be interesting to compare the status of the sovereign decision in Schmitt, as a political event 
of the first order, to an event as the starting point of politics, for example, in Rancière's and Badiou's  
thought. For Rancière (1999) an event, as the inscription of “the part with no part” into the order of 
police, signifies the initiation of politics proper. For Badiou, an event initiates the process of fidelity  
and politics as the truth procedure. For an interesting comparison between Schmitt's exception and 
Badiou's event see an article by Colin Wright (2008). 
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remains undecided on its own belonging to the set of those propositions (thus it cannot be 
decided if it is true or false). It is both inside and outside, an inclusive exclusion or simply 
a  paradox.  William  Rasch  (2002) contends,  in  this  regard,  that  “for  the  law  of  the 
excluded middle to operate, it must be the excluded middle, neither true nor false. Thus, 
self-exemption 'solves'  the paradox of totalizing propositions by rudely and insolently 
becoming the paradox” (39). Sovereign self-exemption is such a paradox: an ultimate 
exception, a limited instance of the unpolitical, which is neither friend nor enemy, neither 
inside nor outside. Giorgio Agamben's reading of Schmitt is emblematic here. In Homo 
Sacer (1998) he proposes that Western politics rests on the originary exception of bare 
life or sovereign banishment of  zoē from the order of  bios or politics. Bare life, as an 
exception  or  “the  unpolitical”  (173),  however,  has  its  perfect  double  – the sovereign 
decision.  The space  of  politics  is  thus  established and continues  to  be  re-established 
through a double exception – of sovereign and bare life. This constant re-invention of the 
exception  is  necessary  since,  as  Colin  Wright  points  out,  it  performs  a  structurally 
stabilizing function that governs the field of (political) knowledge: the exception “polices 
an inside through an articulation with an outside, creating the strategic usefulness of a 
zone of indistinction – such as the Hobbesian sovereign, the Rousseauian Legislator, or, 
indeed, the Freudian primordial father” (Wright 2008, 11). Agamben's analysis of Schmitt 
seems  to  suggest  that  the  neutral  or  the  unpolitical  in  Western  political  tradition  is 
reduced to the exception. It will be the task of further examination of Agamben's thought 
to see whether he succeeds in recognizing a possibility of the outside of politics beyond 
the monopoly of the exception. 
In  conclusion,  Schmitt  invests  the  concept  of  the  political  with  a  new meaning  that 
oscillates around the friend and enemy distinction, and exhibits a totalizing and expansive 
character.  It  emerges  as  a  historical  reaction  that  takes  the  form  of  a  critique  of 
neutralization and liberal depoliticization. The political is conceived by Schmitt mostly as 
a response to what it wants to deny – the state of liberal political philosophy. The totality 
of the political is further characterized by the correlation: a play between the state and the 
concept of the political (a play between two registers of political “matter”), and between 
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dynamic life and its mechanization through repetition. Beyond this totality of the political 
Schmitt seems to leave room for the unpolitical (or the neutral) only in the form of the 
exception. While Schmitt famously defines the political through the distinction between 
friend  and  enemy,  one  fully  comprehends  the  scope  of  the  political  only  by 
complementing it with a reading of his Political Theology that proclaims that the political 
is  the total  and that  any decision about  whether  something is  unpolitical  is  always a 
political decision. Consequently, two decisions define Schmitt's thought – a decision on 
the  unpolitical,  and a  decision on distinction  between friend and enemy.  In the final 
analysis, the political seems to leave no room for the unpolitical as such. As per Schmitt's 
suggestion, the unpolitical manifests itself only in the form of the exception, mediated by 
a political decision, and never positively and immediately as such.
1.2. Foucault's Politics: Dynamic Social Ontology, Struggle for 
Power and Care of the Self
Even though Foucault did not posit the distinction between 'politics' and 'the political' in 
these  very  terms,  he  introduced  into  the  thought  of  politics  a  new  trend  that  was 
appropriated by political theory in a way similar to the concept of the political: as a tool  
for the critique of the traditional view of politics. The novelty of Foucault's thought, in 
this regard, lies in the methodological critique of the traditional account of “Power” as 
“the system of Law-and-Sovereign.” First, I argue that Foucault's reconceptualization of 
power, in terms of the multiplicity of force relations, leads, in a way similar to Schmitt's, 
toward  the  general  economy  of  the  political  as  the  general  economy  of  power. 
Furthermore, Foucault's investigations of modern governmentality suggest the conclusion 
that everything is political or, rather, that everything is potentiality political, that is, may 
become  political  through  the  intervention  of  power  struggles  and  resistance. 
Consequently, throughout Foucault's archeological and genealogical works, we can note 
the double inscription of the notion of politics: politics in the strict sense, as the struggle 
for power, the  experience of power games and the play of resistances, agonistic in its 
structure; and  politics  as the institutional  crystallization  of these games,  often a rigid 
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system that gives rise to the problems of political constitution. Foucault famously applies 
his methodological innovations to the study of modern society, suggesting that we live in 
the age of biopolitics. The relations of power that, in the first place, are not confined to a 
specific field of operation, in modernity take life as their object. Considering Foucault's 
novel methodology as well as his suspicion of ahistorical political analysis, I will raise 
the question of the unpolitical in relation to his discussion of the specifically modern 
form of power or governmentality. In modernity politics exhibits its totalizing ambition 
by attaching its operation to individual bodies and populations in an effort to govern and 
multiply  life.  Life is  the  problem of modern politics.  We get some intimations of the 
unpolitical in Foucault's late ethical works that, I suggest, might point in the direction of 
unpolitical forms of living, based on a different notion of life. Life that “escapes” the grip 
of modern (bio)politics takes the form of care of the self. However, it remains unclear 
whether this practice of care is merely a case of 'another' politics or of a real, unpolitical 
experience of living.
Dynamic social ontology: power and force relations
The  initial  problem  that  arises  in  relation  to  Foucault  as  a  political  thinker  is  the 
significance of the notion of politics. It is not always clear what meaning Foucault assigns 
to “politics” and “political” (as an adjective), moreover, whether he distinguishes them at 
all from “power relations.” Initially it seems that Foucault's use of this adjective is rather 
conventional, meaning that it  refers to government of the state. Barry Hindess  (2005) 
holds a similar opinion and suggests that Foucault was not much concerned with how 
“politics” and related terms should be used; and he uses “political” to refer to aspects of 
the  government  of  a  state:  “a type  of  reason  that,  in  his  view,  has  been particularly 
influential in the history of Western societies and that [...] could well be described as 
‘political’” (390; my emphasis). What is important here is that politics, as government of 
the state, is desubstantialized: it is not a universal or substantial characteristic of politics, 
it is just one type of reason that assumes dominance in modernity and presents itself as 
invariant and ahistorically given. In fact, the thought of political reason as state reason is 
specific to modernity  (cf. Foucault 1979): as the thought of the essence of sovereignty 
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and the centralized exercise of power it  has been among the major preoccupations of 
modern political philosophers. Foucault is critical of such an enterprise not because he 
thinks that it fails to account for the 'real' of the political, but because such preoccupation 
with the state as the ahistorical locus of power fails to recognize its own immanence to a 
wider field of operation of multiple forces. The government of modern society is not 
limited  to  government  by  the  state;  the  latter  is  just  one  of  the  ways  of  strategic 
integration of multiple tactics (a mode of power) that extend throughout the social body. 
So, Foucault's critique of this “political reason” does not call for its replacement with 
another reason; it calls for the illumination and uncovering of “a positive unconscious” or 
a “grid of intelligibility” of modern political rationality.
Foucault introduces the notion of “a positive unconscious” in his foreword (written in 
1970) to the English edition of The Order of Things (first published in French in 1966). In 
the midst of the discussion of the differences between his archaeological method and that 
of a historian of science, Foucault suggests that while the latter's concern is to describe 
consciousness (e.g., discoveries and problems) and the 'negative' unconscious of science 
(e.g.,  invisible  influences and obstacles,  implicit  philosophies),  his  task is  to reveal a 
positive unconscious of knowledge. “This unconscious [of science] is always the negative 
side of science – that which resists it, deflects it, or disturbs it. What I would like to do, 
however,  is  to  reveal  a  positive  unconscious  of  knowledge:  a  level  that  eludes  the 
consciousness of the scientist and yet is part of scientific discourse, instead of disputing 
its validity and seeking to diminish its scientific nature” (Foucault 1994, xi). I would like 
to suggest that the figure of the positive unconscious can be used not only in relation to 
Foucault's early archaeological works, but also as a conceptual tool for understanding his 
genealogical studies. There occurs a shift in Foucault's thought sometime between the 
publication of  The Order of Things  (1966) and  The Archaeology of Knowledge  (1969), 
and his notion of the positive unconscious is indicative of this shift: it can be interpreted 
as  a  “correction”  to  Foucault's  initial  appreciation  of  psychoanalysis  (which  revolves 
around the “negative” unconscious) as a counter-science. The positive unconscious is not 
in a relation of disruption to consciousness,  on the contrary,  it  is  immanent to it:  the 
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conscious organization of scientific discourse can be understood by revealing its “grid,” 
the rules that operate at the level of a discursive formation. The positive unconscious does 
not elude consciousness even though it is not immediately present to it; it can be brought 
to light as positivity, and not just as a failure of reason. We can detect in this notion of the  
positive  unconscious  the  planar character  of  Foucault  thought,  which  is  explicitly 
articulated in The Archaeology of Knowledge. As a result, my political correlation thesis 
will apply to his thought to a much lesser degree: as we will see, the correlated terms, 
similarly to  the relation between consciousness and the positive unconscious,  are  not 
mere negatives of each other, they are positively co-present (but not immediately visible) 
to each other. The circularity of their relation is never 'vertical' but is situated on the same 
level, on a plane. However, I will argue further that politics, nevertheless, remains 'doubly 
inscribed' in Foucault.
The positive unconscious of The Order of Things reappears in Foucault's first volume of 
The  History  of  Sexuality ([1976]  1990) in  terms  of a  “grid  of  intelligibility.”  In  the 
“Method” section of this work Foucault explicitly presents his methodological critique of 
“Power” (and politics) as “the system of Law-and-Sovereign” by revealing its “grid of 
intelligibility” – “the multiplicity of force relations.”19 Through a critique of the political 
reason of modernity, Foucault presents a different “level” of political analysis – that of “a 
micro-physics  of  power”  (Foucault  1995,  26) or  “micro-politics,”  to  use  a  Deleuzian 
term. This micro-political analysis renders power, the multiplicity of force relations, as “a 
grid of intelligibility of the social order” (Foucault 1990, 93). Let us now look closer at 
what Foucault means by this. 
Foucault begins his critique of “Power” with a historically situated critique of the state-
oriented thought, of modern political reason. Foucault identifies “Power” with what is 
traditionally meant by politics: “the system of Law-and-Sovereign” (1990, 97), “a group 
of institutions and mechanisms that ensure the subservience of the citizens of a given 
19 Of course, this method was developed by Foucault before the publication of the first volume of The 
History of Sexuality, for example, in Discipline and Punish (1975). However, I believe that it is The 
History of  Sexuality  that  presents Foucault's  critique of  “Power” in the most concise and forceful 
manner. 
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state” (92), or a number of managerial techniques that order societies and oversee the 
centralized exercise of power and its 'proper' distribution in order to achieve the essential 
goal of politics – 'good life'. Power is understood here as a certain substance that can be 
possessed,  held  and  exercised,  and  that  is  contained  within  the  essential  political 
institutions as a result of its originary transaction (in the form of the social contract) of 
the multitude with the sovereign.  In opposition to  such a view of  “Power,”  Foucault 
offers an alternative: power as “the multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere 
in which they operate and which constitute their own organization” (92). It is a flexible 
grid  which  “underlies”  or  “conditions”  (but  only  as  the  positive  unconscious)  the 
manifest  expressions  of  “Power.”  The  latter  is  but  a  result  of  the  integration  of  a 
multiplicity  of  forces  that  is  never  finial.  It  is  such a  split  of  political  reality into  a 
multiplicity of forces and their integration that, I suggest, gives us an initial indication of 
the correlation or the double inscription of politics in Foucault. 
This multiplicity of force relations has many characteristics of the Schmittian concept of 
the  political  (however,  in  this  case,  it  is  not  a  concept  that  is  a  stake  but  the  very 
materiality of the forces). Among these traits is, first of all, conflictuality, for the force 
relations  under  consideration  are  not  only  multiple  but  also  engaged  in  “ceaseless 
struggles”  (Foucault  1990,  92).  They  are  “unbalanced,  heterogeneous,  unstable,  and 
tense” (93), “nonegalitarian and mobile” (94). Here Foucault  presents a war or battle 
model of power  (cf. Protevi 2010; Lazzarato 2002). He offers a similar description in 
Discipline  and  Punish ([1975]  1995):  “the  study  of  this  micro-physics  [of  power] 
presupposes that ... one should take as its model a perpetual battle rather than a contract 
regulating a transaction or the conquest of a territory” (Foucault 1995, 26; my emphasis). 
Here we see a rejection, similar to Schmitt's, of the liberal, contractual model of social 
relations: the operation of the multiple forces does not tend 'naturally' toward unification 
due to the reasonable necessity for security or unity.  On the contrary,  it  is a war-like 
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model, not reducible to the international arena, as in Schmitt.20 The battle is 'ontological', 
constitutive of the very being of the social. 
So, in his analysis of power Foucault relies on a conflictual ontology. While for Schmitt 
the political lies in the friend and enemy distinction and their war-like relationship, for 
Foucault the conflict is prior to any constituted identities (insofar as friend and enemy are 
real,  identifiable  entities).  The  Schmittian  version  of  conflict  is  thus,  at  most,  a 
crystallized  form of  the  relations  of  forces.  The  battle  or  war  model  of  power  that 
Foucault  presents  is  located  not  at  the  level  of  constituted  identities  or  defined 
adversaries, but at the ontological level, meaning that it presents an originary difference 
that lies at the basis of the social order. John Protevi (2010) suggests, in this regard, that 
Foucault employs a “differential historical methodology” (this applies, specifically, to the 
study  of  power  relations  in  his  genealogical  analyses  and  later  works  on 
governmentality).  So,  what  I  called  'conflictual  ontology'  implies  that  the  conflict  is 
understood  in  terms  of  irreducible  difference  and  multiple  force  relations.  It  is  a 
“differential methodology” or “a dynamic social ontology” (7). 
Another important feature of Foucault's methodology is the immanence of organization to 
the  multiplicity:  forces  are  immanent  in  the  sphere  in  which  they  operate  and  they 
constitute  their  own  organization.  For  example,  as  I  noted  above,  the  state  is  just  a 
specific organization of forces, it is in no way necessary or unchangeable; it, as a mode of 
organization, is immanent to the field of multiple forces. Thus, in Foucault's view there is 
no  split  into  two  dimensions,  for  example,  visible  and  invisible  or  structure  and 
superstructure (he is critical of both phenomenological and Marxist approaches). There is 
no overarching “Power” or organization that exists separately from the multiplicity, and 
that captures and controls it from the outside. Any organization of power is “a strategy 
that is immanent in force relationships” (Foucault 1990, 97). The organization of forces 
happens  from  within  the  “sphere”  in  which  they  operate.  As  Protevi  puts  it,  “[i]t's 
20 For a comparison of Schmitt and Foucault see also Deuber-Mankowsky 2008, whose major argument 
is that while Schmitt's account of the political is reducible to the domain of foreign policy, Foucault's 
analysis of governmentality as political economy of life (politicization of life in biopolitics) deals with 
the micro-level of social relations, which Schmitt's conception does not account for. 
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important to emphasize that this multiplicity is ontological, as is its integration”  (2010, 
12–13). This, again, emphasizes the planar character of Foucault's thought. 
This plane of power relations is 'infinite', in a sense that it is not confined to a specific 
(finite) sphere. Like the political, power relations proliferate everywhere, they come from 
everywhere,  they do not  have a  singular  source;  in  this  sense power  is  omnipresent, 
“power is everywhere” (Foucault 1990, 93). Everything is potentially involved in power 
relations or power games. Foucault writes: “Relations of power are not in a position of 
exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge 
relationships, sexual relations), but are  immanent in the latter; they are the immediate 
effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and 
conversely they are the  internal conditions  of these differentiations; relations of power 
are not in superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; 
they have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play” (94; my emphasis). 
This  passage  brings  up  several  important  points:  first,  the  organization  of  power  is 
immanent and in no way superstructural; second, power knows no exteriority in relation 
to other 'spheres' or kinds of relations, on the contrary, it is immanent to them, meaning 
that the very appearance of their difference (their classification) is an effect of power 
relations. Finally, power is productive and not merely repressive. 
While force relations make power intelligible (as their  strategic integration),  power is 
itself “a grid of intelligibility” for social relations. In order to understand the latter one 
has to decode or decipher them, to decompose the visible unities and identities into the 
multiple fields of forces that are organized on the basis of various strategies that only 
appear as  stable  or  given  (for  example,  class  and  gender  divisions,  situations  of 
domination,  etc.).  In  an interview conducted  in  1978 by Pasquale  Pasquino Foucault 
describes his project as a  reading of reality: “[d]eciphering a layer of reality in such a 
way that  the lines  of  force and the lines  of  fragility come forth...  It  is  the reality of 
possible struggles that I wish to bring to light” (Foucault 1996a, 261; my emphasis). So, 
the relations of forces are at the basis of Foucault's epistemology: they form a field or a 
grid  that  enables  our  understanding  of  social  reality  and  reveals  possible  points  of 
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struggle. The notion of force, which in physics signifies capacity for work or productive 
interaction and impact, once it is incorporated into the study of social reality, becomes the 
primary  source  of  production  and,  consequently,  of  the  intelligibility  of  social 
organization. 
Foucault's use of the notion of 'force', in this regard, gives us an interesting insight into a 
long  philosophical  tradition  of  investigation  of  “the  world  as  active  power”  (see, 
Pietarinen and Viljanen 2009). To be more specific, Foucault's thought of power relations 
traces its origin to the Nietzschean notion of the “will to power.”21 These are “relations of 
domination (Herrschafts – Verhältnissen) which are immanent in a multiplicity of force 
relations”  (Ansell-Pearson 1991, 273), and productive of human subjects.  According to 
William Connolly, there are two ways of interpreting Nietzsche's philosophy of power: 
first, in terms of mastery and domination; second, as affirmation of otherness (1988, 161). 
These two readings are not opposed to each other, they can be unified, to some extent, in 
an  interpretation  of  the  will  to  power  as  self-overcoming  (through  affirmation  of 
irreducible  difference)  that  implies  self-mastery  (a  kind  of  ethics).  In  both  cases  the 
important point is that the will to power is not confined to any 'sphere' of relations, it is a 
universal principle attributed to all living beings. In Walter Kaufmann's view, the will to 
power  for  Nietzsche  is  “not  only  the  basic  urge  of  man  but  nothing  less  than  the 
fundamental drive of all living beings” (1974, 206). He quotes from Beyond Good and 
Evil: 
Suppose, finally, we succeeded in explaining our entire instinctive life as the 
development and ramification of one basic form of the will – namely, of the 
will to power, as my proposition has it; suppose all organic functions could be 
traced back to this will to power and one could also find in it the solution of 
the problem of procreation and nourishment – it is  one  problem – then one 
21 Foucault openly acknowledged his debt to Nietzsche on several occasions.  For example, in his last 
interview Foucault responds: “...I am simply Nietzschean, and I try to see, on a number of points, and 
to the extent that it is possible, with the aid of Nietzsche's texts – but also with anti-Nietzschean theses 
(which are nevertheless Nietzschean!) – what can be done in this or that domain. I'm not looking for 
anything  else  but  I'm  really  searching  for  that”  (Foucault  1988,  251).  As  Keith  Ansell-Pearson 
suggests, Nietzschean influences in Foucault can be reduced to the major two: first, understanding of 
power in terms of relations of forces, and second, critique of modern metaphysics and its privileging 
of subject as an autonomous entity (1991, 270). 
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would have gained the right to determine  all  efficient force univocally as – 
will  to  power.  The  world  viewed  from  inside,  the  world  defined  and 
determined according to  its  “intelligible  character” – it  would be “will  to 
power” and nothing else [J 36]. (Nietzsche quoted in Kaufmann 1974, 217)22
So, for Nietzsche all “efficient” forces can be defined in terms of the will to power; and 
these very forces constitute the world. As a result, to view the world from the inside, that 
is, according to its “intelligible character,” would mean to view it from the perspective of 
forces. To use Foucault's formulation of this epistemological problem, the will to power is 
a “grid of intelligibility” of the world.  It is interesting that the latter for Nietzsche is 
specifically the world of the  living; the will to power is fundamental drive of all  living 
beings: “Only where there is life, there is also will: not will to life but . . . will to power.  
There is much that life esteems more highly than life itself; but out of the esteeming itself 
speaks the will to power” (quoted in Kaufmann 1974, 206).23
Furthermore, Nietzsche's understanding of the will to power as the animating force of the 
world can be interpreted as a response to the Hegelian view of force (as Spirit striving for 
freedom). Without going into too much detail, an important feature of Hegelian thought is 
the dialectical sublation of difference (aufhebung); in this case it concerns the opposition 
of the sensible world and the supersensible (metaphysical) force of Concept or Spirit (see, 
Schmidt 2009). The notion of force seems to appear as a medium that carries out the 
dialectical movement of the Concept; force is like the blood of the world: “This simple 
infinity, or the absolute Notion, may be called the simple essence of life, the soul of the 
world, the universal blood, whose omnipresence is neither disturbed nor interrupted by 
any difference, but rather is itself every difference, as also their supersession; it pulsates 
within itself but does not move, inwardly vibrates, yet is at rest. It is self-identical, for the 
differences are tautological; they are differences that are none” (Phenomenology of Spirit, 
22 Kaufmann notes in relation to this proposition that Nietzsche still employs experimental thinking here, 
which is perceivable from his rhetoric. However, later Nietzsche will express his views from a position 
of a prophet or a legislator. On the normative aspects of Nietzsche's notion of the will to power see, for 
example, Sedgwick (2007).
23 It is interesting that Nietzsche seems to ascribe the will to power not to life in general, but specifically 
to “organic life.” He writes: “In the case of an animal, it is possible to trace all its drives to the will to  
power; likewise all the functions of organic life to this one source”  (Will to Power, section 619, p. 
333). 
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section 162, p. 100). This Hegelian force of the Concept or movement of the Spirit (the 
universal blood, the simple essence of life, the soul of the world) is reminiscent of the 
Nietzschean will  to  power (that  which defines  and animates the world,  and which is 
attributed  to  the  living  as  a  universal  drive).  Walter  Kaufmann  draws  an  interesting 
comparison in this regard and suggest that Hegel's “aufheben” (which means preserving, 
cancelling  and  lifting  up,  and  could  be  translated  as  “sublating”)  and  Nietzsche's 
“sublimieren”  (which  could  be  translated  as  “sublimating”)  are  very  closely  related 
(1974, 228–256). In fact, Latin word sublimare, from which the latter is derived, means 
aufheben  in  German;  in  this  respect,  Nietzsche's  sublimation involves  a  simultaneous 
preserving,  cancelling,  and  lifting  up  as  well.  Furthermore,  Kaufmann  suggests  that 
“sublimation is possible only because there is a basic force (the will to power) which is  
defined  in  terms  of  an  objective  (power)  which  remains  the  same  throughout  all 
'metamorphoses'” (236). In other words, while an immediate objective is cancelled, the 
essential goal (i.e., power) is preserved, resulting in the lifting up – attainment of greater 
power. Both Nietzsche's will to power and Hegel's spirit are conceived as “the essence of 
the cosmos,” consequently they cannot be restricted to  Logik or psychology but can be 
found everywhere (237). Since both principles rely on ceaseless striving, the essence of 
the cosmos lies in the striving of opposing forces. 
However,  for  Hegel  this  principle  is  teleological,  it  tends  toward  the  eventual 
reconciliation of these opposing forces, while for Nietzsche this struggle is open-ended 
(his dialectic is of a different kind): the tension is not resolved, power is not exhausted in 
the attainment of a greater degree. Moreover, while for Hegel the force has an essentially 
rational or intelligible quality,  for Nietzsche this is not the case.  We can note,  in this 
respect, the influence of Schopenhauer who, according to  Valtteri Viljanen, “alters the  
moral standing toward dynamistic metaphysics by claiming that the fundamental dynamic 
factor  underlying everything is  far  removed from rationality,  intelligibility,  design,  or 
providence. The world in itself is purposeless striving that manifests itself as a field of 
constant contest with no intrinsic value; the proper thing left for us to do is the unfaltering 
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acknowledgement of this”  (Viljanen 2009, 329).24 In presenting never-ending strife or 
constant contest as the animating principle of the world, Nietzsche essentially suggests a 
“dynamic interpretation of the world” (Will to Power, section 618, p. 332). This attitude, I 
believe,  is  inherited  by  Foucault  and  becomes  apparent  in  his  discussion  of  power 
relations,  constituting a dynamic social  ontology.  In other  words,  Nietzsche's  “will  to 
power” (the single, non-teleological principle inherent to all living beings or the soul of 
the  world,  defined by domination and overpowering,  as  well  as  self-overcoming and 
purposeless  striving)  lies  at  the  basis  of  Foucault's  view of  power,  especially  in  his 
affirmation of its multiple and conflictual character.25
I suggest that, despite the differences, the Nietzschean notion of the “will to power” and 
the Foucaultian conception of power in terms of force relations similarly open onto the 
problem of  ontopolitics.  Once  force  is  conceived  as  irreducibly conflictual  and  as  a 
multiple  relationality that  is  never  at  rest,  it  presents  a  possibility for  a  “primordial” 
conception of politics: insofar as conflict and strife define politics, the soul of the world is 
inevitably political. This is not to suggest that Nietzsche himself conceived of the “will to 
power” as essentially political, but to emphasize an important way in which Nietzsche's 
thought can be appropriated for the sake of defending the primacy of the political against 
24 However, the will to power in Nietzsche does not seem to be totally removed from intelligibility, as it  
was for Schopenhauer. As I noted above, Nietzsche sees the “intelligible character” of the world in the 
will to power. In a similar manner, Foucault views relations of forces as a “grid of intelligibility” of the 
social order. In contrast to Schmitt, whose concept of the political implies irrationality (or at least it  
can be argued so), Foucault's politics is necessarily invested with a rationality of its own. This will  
become most evident in Foucault's discussion of Greek dunasteia and its contrast with “the political,” 
exemplified by the thought of Claude Lefort (Foucault 2010, 159).
25 Nevertheless, several important differences can be identified between the two thinkers (for a more 
detailed  discussion  of  them  see  Ansell-Pearson  (1991,  280)  and  Sluga  (2005,  231–233).  Most 
importantly, as Hans Sluga points out, Foucault's notion of power is primarily nominalistic, resulting 
in his denial of a single phenomenon to be called the will to power (2005, 231). Power is always the 
multiplicity of particular relations of forces, the multiplicity of their struggles, and not an expression of 
an  underlying  principle  or  drive,  i.e.,  the  will  to  power.  A good  example  here  is  Nietzsche's 
appreciation of Greeks. As Walter Kaufmann suggests, Nietzsche's initial proposition for analysis of 
Greek culture through the notion of contest  (agon) changes with his discovery of the will to power: 
Nietzsche concludes that  agon itself  is  but  a manifestation of  the will  to power  (1974, 192).  For 
Foucault, on the contrary, the battle of multiple forces is not an expression of an underlying principle;  
this multiplicity itself makes up what he calls power relations and politics. Another possible point of 
contest between Nietzsche and Foucault is the question of domination or overpowering and its relation 
to  power.  Sluga  claims that  Foucault  rejects  the Nietzschean  assumption that  power relations are 
primarily relations of domination (2005, 232).
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the 'threat' of depoliticization. We will see in the subsequent chapters how Nietzschean 
“will  to  power” may be used for opposing purposes: either  to suggest  a prospect  for 
different politics (e.g., Thomas Mann, Massimo Cacciari and Roberto Esposito) or the 
possibility of the unpolitical as such (e.g., Michel Henry). This ambiguity regarding the 
political  nature  of  Nietzsche's  thought  and,  especially,  of  the  “will  to  power,”  is 
exemplified by Nietzsche's proclamation of himself as “the last anti-political German.” 
The meaning of this statement remains a point of debate in Nietzschean scholarship (see, 
for example, Cominos 2008; van Tongeren 2008).
Politics as struggle for power
Inasmuch  as  force  relations  are  everywhere,  power  as  their  strategic,  immanent 
integration is everywhere. Once an extra step of identification of power with politics is 
made, one may be inclined to conclude that politics is everywhere or that everything is 
political: a general economy of the political is constituted as a general economy of power 
(cf.  Protevi  2010,  11). As I already noted,  it  is  hard to  clearly outline how Foucault 
envisioned the relationship between the notions of 'power' and 'politics'. It is not possible 
to conclusively support their identification in Foucault's works, yet it is also not possible 
to  do  the  opposite.  On  several  occasions  Foucault  brings  politics  and  power  closely 
together. For example, in a debate with Giulio Preti in 1972, when asked to express his 
view  on  the  difference  between  political  and  social  relationships,  Foucault  initially 
replies:  “I  label  political  everything  that  has  to  do  with  class  struggle,  and  social 
everything that derives from and is  a consequence of the class struggle,  expressed in 
human  relationships  and in  institutions”  (Foucault  1996b,  104).  When challenged by 
Preti's  suggestion  that  “politics  is  everything  connected  to  the  struggle  for  power,” 
Foucault modifies his answer: “If we give to the term 'political' the meaning you attribute 
to it – and yours is the more precise definition, I must admit – then my definition cannot 
stand. I also want to give politics the meaning of a struggle for power; but it's not power 
understood  only  as  government  or  state,  but  economic  power  as  well”  (104;  my 
emphasis). We see a sort of a definition of politics (which is rare for Foucault since he 
was not fond of defining things): politics is a struggle for power. The understanding of 
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power here is reminiscent of the one from  Discipline and Punish  and  The History of  
Sexuality: it extends beyond the Marxist prioritization of class struggle as well as beyond 
an identification with state and government. What Foucault labels as “economic power” 
should be interpreted not only in terms of economy as market exchange, but in its wider  
meaning as  oikos. The latter refers not only to a household but, more generally, to the 
domain of the private, which has been excluded from the political for a long time (e.g., in  
ancient  Greece as  well  as in  modern liberal  societies).  So,  Foucault's  suggestion that 
power and its struggles transcend the space traditionally allocated to them implies that 
politics  extends  throughout  the  social  fabric,  regardless  of  the  distinction of  life  into 
public and private. 
Furthermore, politics is not just power but a struggle for power. What does this actually 
mean?  If  we  go  back  to  Foucault's  definition  of  power  as  the  multiplicity  of  force 
relations and their strategic integration, then we can suggest that politics is a struggle for 
power in terms of a power game that oscillates around the possibility of multiple strategic 
situations. Power is “the process which, through  ceaseless struggle  and confrontations, 
transforms, strengthens, or reverses them [multiple force relations]; ... the  strategies in 
which they [multiple force relations] take effect, whose  general design or  institutional  
crystallization is embodied in the state apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the 
various social hegemonies” (Foucault 1990, 92–93; my emphasis). Politics is a strategic 
game or struggle for the integration of the multiple force relations that can,  at  times, 
become fixed or crystallized (but never permanently) in the form of stable institutions. 
We have three levels of analysis here: force relations, their strategic integration as power, 
and  their  fixation  as  institutions.26 The  latter  is  what  Foucault  refers  to  in  terms  of 
“Power”: “permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing ... simply the over-all effect 
that emerges from all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and 
seeks  in  turn  to  arrest  their  movement” (93). While  “power”  is  nothing like that:  its 
organization is not fixed in institutions, it does not arrest the movement of forces but 
26 John Protevi, in a similar way, speaks of these multiple levels in terms of grids of intelligibility: “the  
'multiplicity of force relations' is  the grid of intelligibility for power,  which is in turn the grid of  
intelligibility of the social field” (Protevi 2010, 7). 
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directs them in a non-totalizing way, resulting in “a complex strategical situation in a 
particular society” (93), which is “nothing other than the instant photograph of multiple 
struggles  continuously  in  transformation”  (Foucault  1996a,  260).  So,  power  must  be 
understood as a constant modification and rearrangement of the multiple force relations, 
as a perpetuum mobile of the social order, as well as a mobile grid of its intelligibility. 
Since politics is a struggle for the strategic integration of force relations, it cannot be 
identified with the institutional stabilization of the mobile field (since this would mean at 
least a temporary cessation of struggle), neither it can be equated with the mobile field 
itself, because it has to do with the overall design of the relations between these forces 
and not with them as singularities. As a result, we can identify politics with the 'second 
level' of analysis – power relations as a strategic integration of forces. I believe, Foucault 
suggests such an understanding of politics when he writes that “this multiplicity of force 
relations can be coded – in part but never totally – either in the form of 'war,' or in the 
form of 'politics'; this would imply two different strategies (but the one always liable to 
switch into the other) for integrating these unbalanced, heterogeneous, unstable, and tense 
force relations”  (Foucault 1990, 93; my emphasis). This codification is not fixed, so it 
does not refer to the institutions of state government (though it does not exclude them). 
Foucault presents politics in terms of a strategy, while power is also defined in terms of 
the strategic integration of force relations. We can conclude, consequently,  that power 
relations and politics are certainly closely connected with each other,  if  not identical. 
They both  operate  at  the  level  of  strategy.  If  power  relations  refer  to  the  immanent 
organization of the multiple force relations, and politics is seen as a never-ending struggle 
for power and its strategic codification, then we can distinguish two kinds of strategies 
here:  the  strategy of  power  and a  'meta-strategy'  of  politics.  Even though it  remains 
unclear how these two strategies relate to each other, it is apparent that one cannot be 
understood without the other, which leads to a fairly common identification of power and 
politics in Foucaultian scholarship.27
27 Maurizio Lazzarato's  (2002) work is an example of an attempt to distinguish between power and 
politics in Foucault, however, not as such but through a call to distinguish between “biopower” and 
“biopolitics.” This line of argument works as long as it is understood that Foucault's analysis of power 
is historically situated, meaning that when he speaks of power he does so in the context of his analysis  
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Such an identification or, rather, lack of a clear distinction between power and politics has 
an enormous effect on political thought, dominated by political science and traditional 
political philosophy. Insofar as politics is no longer confined to a sphere or a distinct 
social domain, and extends toward its conditions of possibility or field of constitution 
(power and multiple force relations), it exhibits a totalizing ambition that bears important 
consequences for the disciplinary study of politics. In this respect, Foucault suggests that 
“[i]t is in this sphere of  force relations  that we must try to analyze the mechanisms of 
power.  In  this  way we will  escape from the  system of  Law-and-Sovereign  which has 
captivated political thought for such a long time” (1990, 97; my emphasis). The object of 
political thought is at stake here: initially limited to the domain of the state and law, it is 
transformed into a wider field of power and force relations. As a result, I will speak of  
decentralization of political thought rather than of a mere change in its object. Foucault's 
thought contributes to the an-archization of political  thought,  to the destruction of its 
foundations  and grounds and,  ultimately,  questions  the  disciplinary boundaries  of  the 
social  sciences.  As Paul Brass puts it,  Foucault  steals  political  science: “[t]he subject 
matter  of  what  has  been traditionally  considered  central  to  political  science,  namely, 
power and government, has been stolen by Foucault...” (Brass 2000, 305). In other words, 
the study of politics can no longer be privatized by any discipline, including political 
science.28 Like Nietzsche, who in his thought altered political theory by way of going 
beyond its 'disciplinary' constraints (cf. Ansell-Pearson 1991, 271), Foucault disrupts and 
explodes the political thought of his time. 
Wendy Brown  (2002) similarly suggests that the disciplinary challenge for politics has 
come from a reconceptualization of “what [Max] Weber called 'the lifeblood of politics': 
power” (561). It is to this point that we can address the question of the totalizing ambition 
of politics in Foucault. As Brown puts it, “[i]f the political is signalled by the presence of 
any human relations organized by power ... then it is inevitable that we would find the 
political everywhere today – in cultural, familial, economic, and psychosexual relations, 
of a specifically modern mode of power – “biopower.” 
28 On the  implications  of  post-foundationalism and Foucault's  thought  for  the  discipline of  political 
science see also Bevir (2011).
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and more” (569). That is, insofar as power struggles are involved, all relations can be 
rendered political. But is it actually the case in Foucault that the political is potentially 
everywhere? Does politics, as potentiality, invest everything? Politics, in terms of power 
relations, can arise anywhere and everywhere, thus Foucault's insistence that power is 
omnipresent not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere 
(1990, 93). Power is not a unified totality, however, it seems that nothing can escape it at 
the level of potential: everything may become involved in power struggle, in the play of 
domination of forces, and can become a nodal point through which the lines of forces 
pass. Furthermore, there is no outside of power because there is no inside of it as such. To 
speak of the outside of power would mean, as Foucault suggested, to misunderstand its 
relational character (95). What is usually referred to as the outside of power, for instance, 
resistance, is incorporated into the network of power as its integral part and even as its 
condition of possibility.  “Where there is  power,  there is  resistance,  and yet,  or rather 
consequently, this resistance is never in a position of exteriority in relation to power” 
(95). The  possibility  of  resistance  distinguishes  power  from  violence.  Moreover, 
resistance itself is interpreted by Foucault on several occasions as something akin to 'real'  
politics. (I will return to this point below.) 
Governmentality and resistance: nothing is political, everything can be  
politicized
If it  does not make sense to speak of the outside of power, can we still speak of the 
outside of politics? Are there force relations that cannot be coded in terms of a political 
strategy;  are  there  relations  that  cannot  be  politicized?  In  other  words,  is  everything 
indeed  actually  and  potentially  political?  Foucault  never  addressed  the  problem  of 
“everything is political” in his published writings. However, he makes several remarks 
about it in a manuscript on governmentality of 1979,29 which also gives an interesting 
insight into how he understands the notion of politics in relation to resistance. Before I 
29 In my discussion here I refer only to the part of this manuscript that was quoted and discussed by  
Michel Senellart (2007). In a footnote he explains: “Manuscript on governmentality (untitled, bundle 
of 11 sheets numbered 22 to 24 and then not paginated) inserted between the lectures of 21 February 
and 7 March 1979 of Naissance de la biopolitique” (504). Senellart suggests that this manuscript is the 
only text in which Foucault refers to Carl Schmitt. 
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proceed with the analysis of the ideas expressed in this manuscript, it  is necessary to 
account for its context. There occurs a shift in Foucault's thought (sometime around the 
end of  1970's)  from “power”  to  “governmentality”  as  the major  tool  of  analysis  (cf. 
Lazzarato 2002;  Protevi 2010).  As John Protevi suggests,  in his  lectures on  Security,  
Territory,  Population  Foucault  moves  “to  'governmentality'  as  the  model  for  social 
relations, as its grid of intelligibility. Rather than social relations being seen as war, we 
are asked to see social relations as the 'conduct of conduct', as the leading of men's lives 
in  quotidian detail”  (2010,  7).30 Foucault  moves his  attention away from relations  of 
forces to action: governmentality is defined as “action upon action.”31 What is important 
for my purpose is  that,  despite the shift  in  the primary concept of analysis,  Foucault 
retains the idea of integration of a multiplicity of differential elements and relations in the 
play of power and resistance (cf. Protevi 2010, 7). Governmentality, alongside politics, is 
a name for strategic integration of power relations: it refers to “a strategic field of power 
relations  in  their  mobility,  transformability,  and  reversibility  ...  power  as  a  set  of 
reversible  relationships”  (Foucault  2005,  252).  It  also  refers  to  “a  problematic  of  a 
society’s immanent power relations which, unlike the juridical-institutional system of that 
society,  ensure  that  it  is  actually  governed”  (Foucault  2010,  159).  In  a  nutshell, 
governmentality primarily refers to the strategic exercise of power that enables immanent 
social ordering. 
“Where there is power, there is resistance.” This remains true for Foucault even as he 
moves toward governmentality as the grid of intelligibility of social relations. More than 
that,  the  possibility  of  resistance  that  is  necessarily  present  in  any  governmentality 
(otherwise  it  would  rely on  a  network  of  violence,  not  power,  and  thus  cease  to  be 
governmentality in the strict sense) becomes something like 'true' politics for Foucault. 
As Michel Senellart notes, the notion of resistance (or “counter-conduct”) is at the heart 
of Foucault’s conception of politics. In this respect, he quotes Foucault's manuscript of 
30 For example, in one of his later interviews Foucault defines the relation of power as “a relationship in  
which one person tries to control the conduct of the other” (Foucault 1996c, 441).
31 My aim here is not to discuss in depth what Foucault means by governmentality but to simply provide 
a general context within which Foucault addresses the question of whether “everything is political.” 
For a general discussion of the notion of governmentality and it scholarly reception see, for example, 
Rose et al. (2006).
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1979: “The analysis of governmentality ( ... ) implies that 'everything is political.' ( ... ) 
Politics  is  nothing  more  and nothing  less  than  that  which  is  born  with  resistance  to 
governmentality,  the  first  revolt,  the  first  confrontation”  (Foucault  2007,  259f).  It  is 
interesting that here appear two notions of politics with opposing meanings: first, in the 
sense of “everything is political,” of which Foucault is critical (as I will show below) and, 
second, in the sense of politics that is born with resistance to governmentality. In order to 
elaborate on what Foucault means, let me quote a passage from the manuscript at length: 
The  analysis  of  governmentality  as  singular  generality  implies  that 
“everything is political.” This expression is traditionally given two meanings: 
– Politics is defined by the whole sphere of state intervention, (...). To say that 
everything is political amounts to saying that, directly or indirectly, the state 
is  everywhere.  –  Politics  is  defined  by  the  omnipresence  of  a  struggle 
between two adversaries (...). This other definition is that of K. (sic) Schmitt. 
The  theory of  the  comrade.  (...)  In  short,  two formulations:  everything is 
political by the nature of things; everything is political by the existence of 
adversaries. It is a question of saying rather:  nothing is political, everything  
can be politicized, everything may become political.  Politics is no more or 
less  than  that  which  is  born  with  resistance  to  governmentality,  the  first 
uprising, the first confrontation. (Foucault quoted in Senellart 2007, 505; my 
emphasis)
Foucault's deconstruction and a critique of the proposition “everything is political” relies 
on two major points: first, everything is political by nature, where 'nature' refers to the 
total state. This appears counter-intuitive at first since the state is often opposed to nature, 
or politics-as-state to the state of nature. Probably what Foucault means to suggest here is 
that everything  appears  to be political as long as the state is maintained as the major 
'marker' of political reality. Everything is political as long as the state is everywhere (cf. 
Hakim Bey's suggestion about “the closure of the map”). Furthermore, if we go back to 
Aristotle's view of the human and his politics, we can find a similar suggestion about the 
totality  of  the  polis as  that  which  defines  the  very  humanity  of  men.  According  to 
Aristotle “the state is a creation of nature” and, as a result, “he who is unable to live in  
society or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a 
god: he is no part of a state” (Politics, i. 2. 1253a25-30). To be human means to belong to 
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the polis. Human is zoon politikon, a political animal, whose politics is identical with life 
in the polis. Thus, everything is political not only as a reference to a (modern) totalitarian 
state, but by nature, which determines that being human means belonging to the state.
Furthermore, if we take Foucault's concept of governmentality into consideration (as that 
which makes societies really governable), then, it is indeed hard to find a non-political 
space, since this kind of government reaches deep down into the micro-level of social 
relations, and extends into the very “soul” of an individual, imprisoning her body.32 It 
takes both populations and individuals as its objects, it is “a singular generality,” it is both 
totalizing  and  individualizing  practice;  modern  governmentality  is  a  combination  of 
disciplinary power and bio-power (cf. Foucault 1990, 139). So, when Foucault suggests 
that the analysis of governmentality implies that “everything is political,” he means that 
this  implication is  viable as long as it  rests  on a wrong assumption:  identification of 
governmentality with the total  state.  I  have shown above that this  identification fails, 
since governmentality is a strategic integration of immanent power relations, which are 
always  multiple  and  remain  such  regardless  of  their  'visible'  unification.  Moreover, 
resistance is immanent to power relations resulting in the impossibility of closed totality, 
which the total state would represent. 
The question of resistance is connected to the second way of understanding “everything is 
political”  as  discussed  by  Foucault:  the  omnipresence  of  struggle  between  two 
adversaries. Even though Foucault's reference to Schmitt's “theory of the comrade” is 
very short,  it  seems to point  at  the major  difference between their  approaches to  the 
question  of  struggle.  Foucault  states  that  for  Schmitt  politics  is  defined  by  “the 
omnipresence  of  a  struggle  between  two adversaries.”  However,  even  if  Foucault 
suggested that politics is defined by a struggle for power, the obvious difference here is 
that for Foucault the struggle is always multiple and often unpredictable due to the ever-
present possibility of resistance. It is not confined to a binary opposition between friend 
and enemy, as for Schmitt. From a Foucaultian perspective, the identities of adversaries 
32 “The soul is  the effect  and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body” 
(Foucault 1995, 30).
63
are  themselves  just  effects  of  “underlying”  power  struggle  rather  than  the  generative 
principle of that struggle. So, while for Schmitt, according to Foucault, “everything is 
political by the existence of adversaries,” I suggest that Foucault advocates the view that 
“everything can be politicized” due to the omnipresence of multiple struggles (at least 
potentially). Resistance plays a key role here. 
Foucault argues that nothing is political, meaning that nothing is political by nature (since 
the very idea of nature, similar to human nature, is not reflective of a given but is an 
effect of power and discourse). To say that something is political in reference to the state 
or to the mere presence of adversaries amounts to its depoliticization. So, when Foucault 
states that nothing is political, he means that nothing is really political, in a sense of true 
politics. Nothing is political but rather 'technical'. The presence of multiple governmental 
techniques implies that what is traditionally referred to as 'politics' is nothing but 'political 
economy':  the  ordering  of  life  in  its  slightest  details  guided  by  the  principle  of  its 
preservation and multiplication (i.e., biopolitics). These kinds of practices, then, are akin 
to 'policing' rather than 'politics'.33 
Nothing is political in some true sense but everything can be politicized, that is, may 
become political due to the intervention of resistance. As in Schmitt, we see a dislocation 
of the political to the level of potentiality: power relations may become (and, supposedly, 
this  becoming  is  never-ending)  political  since  politics  is  born  with  resistance  to 
governmentality. Similarly to what I argued above, politics is still distinguished by the 
possibility  of  resistance,  of  the  destabilization  of  existing  strategies  of  power  (e.g., 
governmentality) and the creation of the new ones. Insofar as resistance is immanent to 
power relations (it distinguishes power from violence), we can conclude that power is 
always political; there is no non-political power but only violence. As a result, nothing is  
political  by  nature,  but  everything  is  always  already  becoming  political  due  to  the 
presence of resistance. However, one might object that Foucault proposes that everything 
33 However critical of Foucault's lack of distinction between power and politics, Jacques Rancière will 
take up governmentality is this sense of policing or ordering, as opposed to politics proper – practice  
that interrupts this ordering, resists it by inscribing “the part of no part” (see, Rancière 1999; Rancière 
2001). 
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may become  political,  meaning  that  the  possibility  of  politicization  is  not  always 
actualized.  I  suggest  that  Foucault's  hesitation  in  this  regard  (the  “may”)  refers 
specifically to “states of domination,” in which the possibility of resistance is minimal. 
There  are  situations  where  “power  relations  are  fixed  in  such  a  way  that  they  are 
perpetually asymmetrical and allow an extremely limited margin of freedom”34 (Foucault 
1996c, 441). These states are the opposite of something like 'true politics' born through 
resistance. 
In  the  final  analysis,  it  is  possible  to  distinguish between two notions  of  'politics'  in 
Foucault:  politics  as  governmentality,  conduct  of  conduct,  and  a  specific  strategic 
codification  of  power  relations;  and  politics  as  resistance,  immanent  to  these 
governmental strategies.35 These two registers of the political matter are inseparable; they 
define each other. Where there is power, there is resistance; where there is power, there is 
freedom.  Such a  split  notion  of  politics  in  Foucault  is  reminiscent  of  the  distinction 
between 'politics' and 'the political' in Schmitt: one level of politics is more or less rigid 
and  ordered,  and the  other  arises  as  resistance  to  the  former.  This  is  also  similar  to 
Foucault's analysis of power in terms of multiple force relations, and their “political” 
coding. These mobilities are strategically integrated as politics, where, “'Power', insofar 
as it is permanent, repetitious, inert, and self-reproducing, is simply the over-all effect 
that emerges from all these mobilities, the concatenation that rests on each of them and 
seeks in turn to arrest their movement” (Foucault 1990, 93; my emphasis). The specificity 
of Foucault's account of the relation between different registers of politics lies in the fact 
that “Power,” as that which arrests movement, is nothing but an over-all effect of these 
mobilities,  meaning  that  it  is  not  outside  but  immanent  to  their  field.  “Power,”  as 
'conscious' and 'visible' reality of politics, is never totally separate and independent from 
the  constituting  positive  unconscious  of  the  political  (i.e.,  the  multiplicity  of  force 
relations and their strategies).
34 Freedom here refers to positive resistance. In his later works Foucault mostly abandons the notion of 
resistance and replaces it  with “freedom,” which occupies a structural  position in power relations 
similar to the former: it conditions them. 
35 Arnold Davidson  (2011) suggests that we can, in a similar way, distinguish between the notions of  
“conduct” and “counter-conduct.” I will turn to his argument in more detail below.
65
We can draw a parallel between these two notions of politics (as the strategic codification 
of  forces  and  as  resistance)  and  the  notions  of  “conduct”  and  “counter-conduct”  in 
Foucault.  Arnold  Davidson  (2011) suggests  that  while  power  takes  as  its  object  the 
conduct of individuals, it  always depends (in its very definition) on the possibility of 
resistance, “the correlative counter movements,” “specific revolts of conduct” (27), or 
“counter-conduct  in  the  sense  of  struggle  against  the  procedures  implemented  for 
conducting others” (28). The latter, like resistances, are never in a position of exteriority 
but of immanence to power relations. Consequently, Davidson suggests, “as a counterpart 
to  the celebrated motto ‘Where there is  power,  there is  resistance’,  one could invoke 
Foucault’s remark about the ‘immediate and founding correlation between conduct and  
counter-conduct’, a correlation that is not only historical but also conceptual” (28; my 
emphasis). Insofar as politics in Foucault can be interpreted as the struggle for power and 
the strategic integration of force relations, and as the practice of resistance immanent to 
these power relations, I suggest that these two notions of politics are correlated, in the 
same way as power, the conduct of conduct, is correlated to counter-conduct. The major 
difference, however, between the notions of resistance and counter-conduct,  Davidson 
notes, is that the latter “adds an explicitly ethical component to the notion of resistance ... 
[and] allows one to move easily between the ethical and the political, letting us see their 
many  points  of  contact  and  intersection”  (28).  The  practices  of  care  of  the  self,  in 
particular, emerge as a notorious case of the ethical counter-conduct in Foucault's late 
works.
Two dimensions of politics: “politeia” and “dunasteia”
We can  find  in  Foucault's  later  works  another  example  of  the  double  inscription  of 
politics (that also incorporates the ethical component invoked by the notion of counter-
conduct). It surfaces in his lectures at the Collège de France on The Government of Self  
and Others in  the  discussion  of  two ancient  Greek notions  –  politeia and  dunasteia 
(Foucault 2010, 149–171). These,  I suggest,  can be associated with modern notion of 
politics and, to some extent, compared with the split between 'politics' and 'the political'. 
The major difference between the notions of 'the political' and 'dunasteia', as we will see 
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below, is located in considerations of political practice, normativity and rationality. My 
intuition is that, despite these differences and Foucault's repudiation of 'the political' as a 
notion, his political thought still seems to oscillate around a split notion of politics. The 
clarification of these notions is helpful not just for the present project of discussing the 
modern  political  as  the  total  and  of  a  possibility  of  the  unpolitical,  but  also  for  the 
understanding of Foucault's own political project, that is,  of where he sees a possible 
'location' of an effective political action.
One of the major preoccupations of Foucault's lectures of 1982-1983 is the meaning of 
Greek notion of parrhēsia (that can be translated as free-spokenness, free speech or truth-
telling, however, the very problematic of translating this term interests Foucault in the 
first place). In the lecture of February 2nd 1983 Foucault compares parrhēsia and isēgoria 
(2010, 149–171).  Briefly,  while  isēgoria, an equal right  to speech, is  a  constitutional 
arrangement or institutional framework, a kind of 'legal' provision of an equal right in 
democracy,  parrhēsia  is  “the  free  and,  consequently,  courageous  activity  [that  arises 
within this framework] of some who come forward, speak, and try to persuade and direct 
the others,  with all  the attendant risks” (158). Such an activity is inherently political, 
since its goal is government of others as well as of the self.  This distinction between 
speech as pertaining to right and to government indicates, according to Foucault, two sets 
of  problems  for  Greeks:  the  problems  of  the  politeia and  dunasteia  (158–159).  The 
former are the problems of constitution, the framework that defines the status of citizens, 
their  rights,  the  procedures  for  decision-making  and  the  elections  of  leaders.  The 
problems of dunasteia (the Greek word means power or the game through which power is 
exercised in a democracy), Foucault  suggests,  are,  first,  the problems of  the political  
game: “of the formation, exercise, limitation, and also guarantee given to the ascendancy 
exercised by some citizens over others” (158; my emphasis). So, it describes a kind of 
general field of power relations that constitutes politics as a struggle (with its own rules 
and limitations) for domination of some over others, in a sense of action upon action or 
conduct of conduct. Second, these are the problems of the procedures and techniques, that 
is,  rules  and  instruments,  by  which  this  power  is  actually  exercised  (in  Athenian 
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democracy this is essentially parrhēsia). Third, dunasteia is the problem of ethos of the 
political man himself. Foucault summarizes these various sets of problems of dunasteia 
and suggests that the latter is  the problem of politics: “It [dunasteia] is the problem of 
politics  –  I  was  going  to  say,  as  experience,  that  is  to  say,  the  problem of  politics 
understood as a practice having to obey certain rules, indexed to truth in a particular way,  
and which involves a particular form of relationship to oneself and to others on the part of 
those who play this game” (158). These are 'properly' political problems, as opposed to 
what has been the major concern of political  theory and philosophy: the problems of 
politeia, of the city's constitution. The reflection upon the problems of politeia, Foucault 
points out, have given rise to a whole form of reflection (indexed as political theory) on 
the nature of the law, the organization of society, and what the State should be. What 
remains  outside of this  reflection is  the “political  problems in the strict  sense” –  the 
problems of dunasteia. 
The distinction of  politeia and  dunasteia  is reminiscent of the split notion of politics: 
while the former refers to the institutional dimension of man's political existence, the 
latter indicates its necessary excess which conditions politics, makes it possible in the 
first  place.  It is important to note,  however,  in what way Foucault's engagement with 
dunasteia differs from “the political” as a concept. For Foucault, dunasteia, the excess of 
politeia, of institutional politics, conditions the possibility of governing societies. Like 
'the political', it is the constitutive reality of politics-as-state. However, dunasteia or 'true' 
politics,  contrary  to  'the  political',  is  in  no  way  irrational,  unknowable,  chaotic  or 
unordered. On the contrary, the political game of dunasteia is the experience with its own 
rules and rationality. Foucault comments:
... nothing seems more dangerous to me than that much vaunted shift from 
politics  (la  politique)  to  the  political  (le  politique),  which  in  many 
contemporary  analyses36 seems  to  me  to  have  the  effect  of  masking  the 
36 In  a footnote Foucault  specifies:  “This  distinction is particularly studied by Claude Lefort  in,  for 
example, “Permanence du théologico-politique?” (1981) and “La Question de la démocratie” (1983), 
both reprinted in Essais sur le politique (Paris: Le Seuil, 1986)” (2010, 169f). Lefort is a representative 
of the post-foundational understanding of the political (see, for example, Marchart 2007, 85–108). To 
give an example of what Lefort means by the political let me quote: “The political is thus revealed, not 
in what we call political  activity,  but in the double movement whereby the mode of institution of  
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specific problem and set of problems of politics, of dunasteia, of the practice 
of the political game, and of the political game as a field of experience with 
its rules and normativity, of the political game as experience inasmuch as it is 
indexed to truthtelling and involves a certain relationship to oneself and to 
others for its players. This is politics (la politique), and it seems to me that we 
see the problem of politics (of its rationality, of its relationship to the truth, 
and of the character who plays it) emerge around this question of parrhēsia. 
(159)
As  we  can  see,  Foucault  is  critical  of  the  contemporary  tradition  of  distinguishing 
between politics and the political, not because it has nothing to add to the problems of 
political  thought,  but because it  produces an effect  of masking real,  specific political 
problems. This is the case not only because the political is extended into the condition of 
possibility  of  every  experience,  but  also  because  it  itself  is  denied  rationality  and 
normativity (since the latter are usually attributed to the level of institutional 'politics'). 
For  Foucault,  politics  'proper',  “in  the  strict  sense”  (or  what  I  have  been calling  the 
political), is a field of experience with its rules and normativity, and not an instance of 
irrational  irruption  or  disruption;  if  anything,  it  is  not  a  negative  but  a  positive 
unconscious. Politics is a specific experience of power, of dunasteia that is conditioned 
by truth-telling (parrhēsia) in relation to self and others. Foucault specifies even further 
that the experience of politics (la politique) emerges around the question of  parrhēsia. 
First,  it  is  a  “hinge  between  politeia and  dunasteia”  (since  its  place  is  defined  and 
guaranteed by the constitution), but also “parrhēsia, the truth-telling of the political man, 
is  what  ensures  the  appropriate  game  of  politics”  (159). I  suggest  that  it  is  the 
appropriateness of the political  game that is  at  stake here: the game that manages to 
remain political and does not turn into the violent one or into a situation of domination by 
preserving the space for resistance. As a matter of fact, parrhēsia is a form of resistance 
that defines democratic politics as such and distinguishes it from despotism. Later in his 
lectures Foucault turns to parrhēsia as a practice of philosophical “resistance” (“care of 
society appears and is obscured. It appears in the sense that the process whereby society is ordered and 
unified across its divisions becomes visible. It is obscured in the sense that the locus of politics (the 
locus in which parties compete and in which a general agency of power takes shape and is reproduced) 
becomes  defined  as  particular,  while  the  principle  which  generates  the  overall  configuration  is 
concealed”  (Lefort  1988,  11). So,  while  politics  concerns  a  locus of  competition for  institutional 
positions  of  power,  the  political  is  the  concealed  principle  that  generates  the  overall  social 
configuration and institutes the social. 
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the self,” ethos, “a way of life”) in detail, for example, in the case of Socrates, in Plato 
and  Cynics,  through  which  he  forcefully  asserts  “the  coexistence  and  correlation  of 
political practice and philosophical truth-telling” (289). In this regard, Foucault suggests 
that the relation to oneself is actually the primary point of resistance: “there is no first or 
final  point  of  resistance  to  political  power  other  than  in  the  relationship  one  has  to 
oneself” (2005, 252). This could imply that in truly political communities (as in the case 
of the ancient Greek democracies) this kind of practice is of utmost importance, it is at 
the heart of the specifically political being of humans. Care of the self can be regarded as 
the political experience par excellence. I will return to this point below. 
The  problems  of  governmentality  also  find  their  expression  in  Foucault's  lectures  of 
1982-1983 in the notion of  parrhēsia as the defining feature of the  political game, of 
dunasteia.  “The  problems  of  governmentality  in  their  specificity,  in  their  complex 
relation to but also independence from politeia, appear and are formulated for the first 
time around this notion of parrhēsia and the exercise of power [i.e.,  dunasteia] through 
true discourse” (Foucault 2010, 159). Politics is the exercise of power that leaves the door 
open to resistance (e.g., parrhēsia). To be more precise, its strategy is a form of resistance 
that leaves open the possibility of resistance to itself. In other words, it remains open to 
the challenge of the alternative truths. It is worth noting that for Foucault (similarly to 
Schmitt)  parrhēsia, as a form of resistance and a condition of politics, has a conflictual 
character. Politics is not just power but the struggle for power, and parrhēsia contains this 
dynamism at its core. “The superiority connected to parrhēsia is a superiority shared with 
others, but shared in the form of competition, rivalry, conflict, and duel. It is an agonistic  
structure. Even if it implies a status, I think  parrhēsia is connected much less to status 
than to a dynamic and a combat, a conflict” (156). So, politics is a struggle for power 
which is defined by the rule of resistance, by the primacy of freedom over the various 
strategies of power.37 
37 For example, Foucault writes: “Power is not omnipotent or omniscient ... It is true that so many power 
relationships have been developed, so many systems of control, so many forms of surveillance, it is  
precisely because power was always impotent” (Foucault 1996a, 258). Furthermore, Foucault insists: 
“...  if  there  are  relations  of  power  in  every social  field,  this  is  because  freedom is  everywhere” 
(Foucault 1996c, 441). 
70
Among the “forms of reflection” that accommodate political practices we can distinguish: 
first, traditional political theory (which focuses on the problems of constitution), second, 
thought of “the political” (which Foucault critiques for missing the experiential level of 
politics), and, finally,  the Foucaultian “genealogy of politics as game and experience” 
(159–160). This genealogy is a critical project that stands in opposition to the existing 
tradition of political thought. Furthermore, it relies on a split notion of politics; however, 
it is neither a distinction between 'politics' (la politique) and 'the political' (le politique) 
nor  a  classical  distinction  between 'politics'  (or  the  commonwealth)  and 'the  state  of 
nature'. The Foucaultian distinction, I propose, is between politics in the strict sense, i.e., 
a power game, and politics as the  institutional crystallization of this game. The former 
notion refers to the struggle for power: the experience of the power game (dunasteia) or 
the play of resistances, which is agonistic in its structure but not devoid of rules and 
strategic organization. The latter notion of politics signifies mostly a rigid system (e.g., of 
Law-and-Sovereign) that gives rise to the problems of politeia and which, nevertheless, 
remains immanent to the field of the multiple relations of forces. 
Biopolitics and life that escapes: intimations of the unpolitical
Considering the implications of Foucault's view of politics, that is, its totalizing tendency 
as well as the split notion of politics, it appears difficult to conceive the unpolitical in 
Foucaultian terms. Inasmuch as power is everywhere, and politics is defined as a struggle 
for power, i.e., a strategic codification of the multiple force relations immanent to the 
field of these forces,  I  am inclined to  conclude that  politics  is  everywhere,  that  it  is 
totalizing. Furthermore, if we conceive politics in terms of resistance to the established 
strategies of power, to governmentality, then nothing appears to be, by default, political 
but,  rather,  'technical'.  However,  everything  may  become  politicized  through  the 
intervention  of  resistance,  which  is  “never  in  a  position  of  exteriority  in  relation  to 
power”  (Foucault  1990,  95).  Power  relations,  as  I  already  noted,  depend  on  the 
multiplicity of points of resistance distributed across the power network. Resistances, by 
definition, “can only exist in the strategic field of power relations:” “they are the odd 
term in relations of power; they are inscribed in the latter as an irreducible opposite” (96; 
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my emphasis). Thus, politics as resistance is the irreducible opposite of politics as the 
institutional integration of power relationships. In the end, the notion of politics is split 
into two domains, which account, in political terms, for both power relations and for their 
irreducible excess (resistance). Resistance and freedom, as a result, are never unpolitical 
but always remain an integral part of the political game of power. They present a different 
mode of politics and constitute, at the most, the relative outside of the political. 
Foucault  famously  applied  his  methodological  innovations  to  the  study  of  modern 
society, suggesting that we live in the age of biopolitics. The relations of power that, in 
the first place, are not confined to a specific field of operation, take life as their object. 
Consequently,  politics  exhibits  its  totalizing  ambition  by  attaching  its  operation  to 
individual bodies and populations in an effort to govern and multiply life. Biopolitics is a 
mode of  politics  that  relies  on the new procedures or techniques  of power developed 
through the classical age and employed in the nineteenth century. The specificity of these 
new  procedures  lies  in  their  primary  object  –  life.  So,  modernity  is  marked  by the 
problematization of life  by politics:  “...  what might be called a society's  'threshold of 
modernity' has been reached when the life of the species is wagered on its own political 
strategies. For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with 
the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics 
places his existence as a living being in question” (Foucault 1990, 143). Foucault argues 
that modern politics is no longer an additional capacity of man: merging with biological 
life politics consumes the very nature of humanity.38 Modern political relations are not 
confined to a specific sphere of operation since their object is all-encompassing – life. 
Nonetheless, for Foucault, life as the object of power is not a given upon which power 
applies  and  attaches  itself.  On  the  contrary,  power  relations  discover,  define  and 
reproduce  “life”  as  their  object  through  a  variety  of  discourses  and  disciplines,  in 
38 However, it is questionable if for Aristotle politics was indeed just an additional capacity, since his 
view of man as a political animal and of sociality (life in the polis) as the major characteristics of his 
very  humanity may imply  that  even  for  Aristotle  human  life  and  politics  were  inseparable.  The 
difference  between  an  Aristotelian  politicization  of  life  and  modern  biopolitics  seems  to  reside 
primarily in the definition of life itself: in modernity life is objectified and problematized primarily as  
biological existence. 
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particular,  human  and social  sciences.  “[M]ethods  of  power  and knowledge assumed 
responsibility for the life processes and undertook to control and modify them. Western 
man was gradually learning what it meant to be a living species in a living world, to have 
a body, conditions of existence, probabilities of life, an individual and collective welfare, 
forces  that  could  be  modified,  and a  space  in  which they could  be distributed in  an 
optimal manner. ... [T]he fact of living was no longer an inaccessible substrate” (Foucault 
1990, 142). Western man had to learn what it means to be alive, what it means to be the 
living.  Life,  as  biological  existence,  is  demystified  and becomes  a  material  object  of 
various manipulations and techniques: for instance, care for the life of populations, their 
well-being and multiplication, proper healthcare and welfare. This is achieved through 
the integration of  “an  anatomo-politics of the human body” (mastery over human life 
located  in  the  body)  and  “interventions  and  regulatory  controls:  a  biopolitics  of  
population” (139). Mastery and regulation are at the core of biopolitical techniques. 
In the context of biopolitics, to raise the question of the unpolitical would mean to ask, ' is 
there life beyond biopolitics?' The simple answer would be: as long as politics is defined 
by resistance, as long as politics is born with resistance to governmentality (in this case, 
biopolitical), there is a possibility of different life, of life that resists biopolitics. Foucault 
acknowledges this:  “It  is  not  that  life has been totally integrated into techniques  that 
govern and administer it;  it  constantly  escapes them”  (1990, 143;  my emphasis). His 
project,  especially of the later years,  was to examine these alternative ways of living 
which  positively resist  existing  forms  of  governmentality.  The relation  to  self  in  the 
practice of care, for Foucault, is the primary case of such a resistance, of positive self-
government and self-creation. As he puts it, “there is no first or final point of resistance to 
political power other than in the relationship one has to oneself”  (2005, 252). Life that 
“escapes” the grip of modern (bio)politics assumes the form of the ethical care of the self, 
of self-transformation. However, it remains unclear whether this practice of care is a case 
of 'another' politics or of the real unpolitical experience of living. What does it mean for 
life to escape biopolitics and its power techniques? Does it lead to depoliticization of life? 
Is care of the self a non-political practice, does it lead to an  unpolitical form of life? It 
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seems that insofar as this practice is a form of resistance, it remains necessarily political. 
Insofar as politics is born with resistance, the practice of self-care is a political practice.  
As Amy Allen brings to our attention, according to Foucault, “one of the main political 
problems would be nowadays, in the strict sense of the word, the politics of ourselves” 
(Foucault  in Allen 2011, 43).39 It  seems that there is  no radical outside of politics in 
Foucault, there is only movement from one mode of politics to another, even if these 
modes are immanent to each other: for instance, care of the self as a political practice, as 
a mode of politics, can exist within a biopolitical framework. By being 'inside' of power 
relations one always remains on the outside by the means of resistance, since from the 
point of view of the structure of power relations, the excess of a certain mode of politics 
will  itself  always  remain  political.  More  than  that,  it  will  continue  to  define  politics 
'proper' inasmuch as this excess, by definition, is a kind of resistance and, thus, a political 
practice  par  excellence. It  is  interesting  that  the  structural  position  of  resistance  in 
Foucault's thought as both outside and inside (i.e., immanent to politics) is reminiscent of 
Schmitt's thought of the exception and its relation to the political: the exception remains 
immanent to the political, it defines the political space by withdrawing from it. In this 
respect, Foucault's statement “where there is power, there is resistance” finds its parallel 
in Schmitt – where there is the political, there is the exception.
I believe that a possible objection to my conclusion about the 'genuinely' political nature 
of the practice of care of the self lies in an interpretation of this practice embracing a 
different understanding of life. When Foucault suggests that life always escapes the grip 
of power and that the first and final point of resistance to political power consists in the 
relationship one has to oneself (i.e., in the practice of care of the self), he does not seem 
to envision life merely as a set of biological processes (which constitutes the object of 
biopolitics). His understanding of life extends beyond the purely materialistic domain 
toward  the  realm  of  ethics,  toward  a  real  experience  and  practice  of  living  beyond 
biopolitical determination. It is, ultimately, an “aesthetics of existence.” As a result, we 
39 Interestingly, when questioned whether the problematic of care of the self could be at the heart of “a 
new way of thinking about politics,” Foucault evades answering the question by saying that he did not 
get very far in this direction. However, he suggests that since the 19 th century there is a sense of a lack 
of room for the question of the ethical subject (Foucault 1996c, 443).
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can reformulate the question: if life escapes politics, what 'kind' of life is it? I believe that 
we can find intimations of the unpolitical form of living in Foucault's last lectures at the 
Collège de France (Foucault 2010; 2011). Some cases of care of the self that he discusses 
present a possibility of conceiving of the unpolitical form of life, as, for example, in the 
case of the Cynics in ancient Greece.  Foucault  makes an interesting suggestion about 
them: “The philosophical parrhēsia of Diogenes basically consists in showing himself in 
his natural nakedness, outside all the conventions and laws artificially imposed by the 
city. His parrhēsia is therefore in his very way of life, it is also apparent in this discourse 
of insult and denunciation with regard to power (Philip’s greed, etcetera). ...[I]n the case 
of the Cynics we have a mode of connection of philosophical truth-telling to political 
action which takes  place in  the form of exteriority,  challenge,  and derision...”  (2010, 
287). The art of living of Diogenes may be suggestive of the unpolitical form-of-life. 
Arnold Davidson (2011) similarly singles out Foucault's account of “[c]ynic provocation 
[...] as an emblem of the risks and the intensities of counter-conduct” (39). The ethico-
political practice of counter-conduct, understood as “the 'insubordination of freedom', the 
'rebelliousness  of  the  will  and  the  intransitivity  of  freedom',  the  'art  of  voluntary 
inservitude' and of 'deliberative indocility'” (30), opens up new possibilities for actions 
that modify the existing force relations and that stand up “'against the impoverishment of 
the relational fabric' of our social world” (33-34). In this regard, the counter-conduct of 
care of the self (as a form of 'life that escapes' politics) can be interpreted as a 'revolt' 
against the total politicization (and thus impoverishment) of relationality in modernity. 
This could mean, for example, the return of friendship (which allows one to live “very 
intense  affective  relations”)  as  a  form  of  social relation  (cf.  Davidson  2011,  34). 
Furthermore, insofar as “[p]olitically and ethically, counter-conduct is the invention of a 
new philosophical concept” (39), it might as well signify the advent of the notion of the 
unpolitical in the times when the totality of the political seems to be closing in on us. (I 
intend to return to the question of 'life that escapes' in the last chapter, in which I will 
engage  with  the  problem  of  the  unpolitical  in  relation  to  Michel  Henry's  radical 
philosophy of life.)
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What  are  the  other  steps  that  we  could  take  in  order  to  get  closer  to  thinking  the 
unpolitical?  First,  since power relations are,  by definition,  political,  the unpolitical,  it 
would  seem,  must  be  located  beyond the  relations  of  power.  But  is  this  possible?  It 
certainly would be hard to find something that cannot be described in terms of force 
relations. Alternatively, it might be necessary to define political power relations in their 
specificity (i.e., not all relations of power are political). Jean-Luc Nancy, for example, 
calls for such a redefinition. However, as we will see below, Nancy fails to go beyond the 
political correlationism and to account for the unpolitical as such. Another possibility of 
the unpolitical may consist in the reconceptualization of politics beyond power altogether, 
that is, in the mutual detachment of these two notions. For example, Jacques Rancière 
advocates such a rethinking of politics. Nonetheless, as I will argue below, he too fails to 
go beyond the correlation of politics and the political and does not leave much room for 
the positive experience of the unpolitical. 
1.3. Politics and Police: Inscribing the Invisible, 
Giving Place to Nonplace
Jacques Rancière addresses the question of the excess of the traditional notion of politics. 
Like  many  other  post-foundational  thinkers,  he  begins  with  a  critique  of  political 
philosophy in an attempt to find a way of bringing the unaccounted for to presence. With 
elegance and rigour he comes up with an alternative way to conceptually capture political 
being, and offers a new methodology for political thought. However, it is my suggestion 
that despite the move beyond political philosophy, he fails to address the problem of the 
political correlation in his thought: that is, the negative attachment of his notion of the 
political  to  what  it  intends  to  dismiss.  Moreover,  in  his  attempt  to  do  justice  to  the 
excluded, to “the part of no part,” he does not leave much room for a positive account of 
the invisible, of the limit of both politics and the political. In his critique of “everything is 
political,” he, ultimately, retains the totalizing ambition of the political. The task of the 
present investigation is to show both the success and shortcomings of Rancière's thought, 
specifically  regarding  the  correlation  and  the  totalizing  ambition  of  the  political. 
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However, in no way do I intend to reduce his prolific thought to such concerns. In order 
to show the presence of the correlation in Rancière's thought, I will focus on the analysis 
of his distinction between “politics” and “the political,” as well as “the police order” and 
“politics.” I will, then, address the problem of the totalizing ambition of this correlation 
through an examination of the structural position of the principle of equality and of “the 
part of no part” that seem to give us a glimpse of the unpolitical in Rancière. 
Politics and the political: bringing the political unconscious to  
consciousness
Rancière begins his rethinking of politics with a critique of the preceding, long standing 
tradition of political philosophy. In his view, politics has “to be thought as something 
radically  heterogeneous  to  the  tradition  of  political  philosophy”  (2004,  4).  This 
heterogeneity is due to the difference in the logic of politics and philosophy: while the 
latter,  for  Rancière,  is  defined  by the  logic  of  consensus,  the  essence  of  politics  is 
disagreement [mésentente] or  dissensus. The consensual model of politics relies on the 
presupposition of “an anthropological invariant,” that is, an idea that there is something 
common to humanity in general that results in the constitution of politics. This invariant 
is commonly conceived as “the fear that compels individuals to unite,” the Hobbesian 
model,  or  as  “the  possession  of  language  that  permits  discussion”  (4),  exemplified, 
among others, by Aristotle's, Arendt's and Habermas' political thought. Rancière's major 
point  of  disagreement  with  these  political  philosophies  is  that  such  an  invariant  or 
common  property  of  humanity  is  not  just  simply  given;  on  the  contrary,  what  is 
“common” is  the original  object  of contestation that  becomes fixed or legitimized as 
given within philosophical thought. The traditional search for the essence of politics, or 
what  constitutes politics “proper,” is  often based on the assumption of the inherently 
political nature of the human being as such. An example of such an account is Aristotle's 
definition of human as  zoon politikon,  as a being that possesses  logos,  and so naturally 
organizes its life in the polis in order to secure common good. 
In  his  earlier  work,  On  the  Shores  of  Politics ([1990]  1995),  Rancière  employs  a 
distinction between “politics” and “the political”  in order to  draw a line between the 
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political  philosophy  and  his  own  thought.  He  suggests  that  politics  is  “pacifying 
procedure,” “the simple management of the social,” “the art of suppressing the political” 
(11). Here we encounter a familiar motif of repression or sublimation of the political by 
politics as seen in other thinkers. Regarding 20th century political philosophy (but not 
exclusive  to  it)  which  intends  to  secularize  and demilitarize  politics,  Rancière  states, 
similarly to Schmitt, that the erasure of social divisions and thus the reduction of politics 
to the pacification procedure results in politics' self-diminution, the political suppression 
of  politics  or  the  perfection  of,  paradoxically,  “the  oldest  task  of  politics”  – 
depoliticization (19). The task of traditional political philosophy amounts to protecting 
politics from its immanent contradictions, that is, from the passions and conflicts inherent 
to the social field by founding politics on firm ground or “dry land,” by establishing “a 
politics of conversion which turns its back on the sea” (2). So, politics, as a philosophical 
art, presides over its own decline and produces the social realm that is necessary for the 
continuous realization of this very task. Later Rancière will use different terminology, 
i.e., “the order of police” and “the social,” in order to designate this kind of “politics.”
What is interesting in this earlier conceptual distinction developed by Rancière (“politics” 
as  the  suppression  “the  political”)  is  its  metaphorical  translation  into  the  distinction 
between dry land and the sea: politics turns its back on the sea. The sea here stands for a 
fluid principle as opposed to the rigid one, that of terra firma; moreover, the metaphor of 
the  sea often  stands  for  the unconscious,  the  domain  of  unbound energy that  has  no 
permanent marks, and can only  bear a trace.40 So, what Rancière appears to be saying 
here is that politics turns its back on its own unconscious; that is, it represses its own 
immanent conflictuality resulting in the constitution of the unconscious – the political, 
which is expelled from conscious reality, but is bound to return. The split of the psyche 
into  consciousness  and  the  unconscious  in  the  Freudian  psychoanalysis  (a  source  of 
40 For  example,  Vincent  Aurora  explains,  “These  two  initial  [Freudian]  metaphors  (verticality  and 
visibility), aided by the subconscious' polyvalent metaphorization as “depth,” were further combined 
into the prolific metaphor of the psyche as  water. In his  Interpretation of Dreams, a work in which 
metalinguistic  metaphor  is  generally  avoided,  Freud,  in  opposition  to  the  subconscious'  “depth,” 
expresses the conscious as “surface” (Oberflache), and then, as corollaries of this metaphor, describes 
repression as “submersion” (tauchen) and the conscious realization of formerly unconscious ideas as 
“emersion” (auftauchen, which refers specifically to emergence from water) (Aurora 2001, 39). 
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inspiration for a number of post-foundational political thinkers) is, in a way, parallel to 
the  treatment  of  the  split  between  politics  and  the  political.  For  example,  in  The 
Interpretation  of  Dreams  Freud distinguishes  between  the  “primary processes”  of  an 
unbound  energy  and  the  “secondary  processes”  of  bound  energy.  Furthermore,  in  a 
similar manner, while the unconscious is a domain of free-flowing, unbound and formless 
energy  and  the  drives,  consciousness  is  the  domain  of  reason;  it  is  an  “agent”  of 
repression or congestion of the circulation of free forces, which, in their turn, acquire 
form through such stoppage. The functioning of the latter is similar to the repression of 
the political by politics, of the congestion or the crystallization of the formless tensions 
into an institutional structure, e.g., the order of the state. In the case of both the political 
and  the  unconscious,  their  very  existence  appears  through  a  (negative)  dialectical 
relationship  with  their  antitheses,  and  the  only  way they can  manifest  themselves  is 
through  a  stoppage  or  failure  of  their  opposites,  as,  for  example,  the  unconscious 
manifests itself in dreams and parapraxes. The Freudian unconscious, like the political, is 
not something simply unreasonable or irrational, simply opposed to reason, but rather “a 
glitch of reason, its slip, its inner torsion” (Dolar 2008, 21).
This tension between structured or permanent social ties and their 'undoing' indexes a 
correlation: “the political as a dislocation of the existing social entities, as shifting the 
ground of what holds the existing relations together”  (Dolar 2008, 26). I argue that the 
correlation is an inevitable result of the negative model of the unconscious, the kind that 
we encounter in Freud and Rancière. The negative unconscious (the result of repression, 
of the Oedipal drama) cannot appear as such but only as a failure of consciousness: in its 
manifestation it is always attached to the latter. This negative model of the unconscious is 
different from the Foucaultian “positive unconscious,” which can be brought to presence 
as a field of operation of multiple forces or as a grid of intelligibility of social relations. 
So, when Rancière speaks of the political as the unconscious of politics – the sea that 
meets dry land and forms a shore (thus the name of the book, On the Shores of Politics), 
we  encounter  the  familiar  “sublimation  thesis,”  where  the  political  is  viewed  as  an 
endangered or forgotten primordial kind of relation that manifests itself in the failure of 
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the established order. In short, the political is conceived in correlation with politics. First, 
Rancière's thought of the political is historically attached, in the form of a critique, to 
traditional political philosophy. Second, his project relies on a split notion of politics. 
While  he  develops  an  alternative  conception  of  the  political,  he  retains  the  classical 
notion of politics (i.e., the state ordering) as its necessary complement, which, in fact, 
summons  the  political  in  the  first  place.  We will  see  below,  how in  his  later  works 
“politics,” devoid of its own place, appears only as a reaction to the “order of police.”
Politics versus power
Another important  tradition  to  which  Rancière  opposes  his  project  is  Marxism, 
specifically the Marxist identification of politics with power or with the struggle for its 
possession.  Rancière's  relation  with  Marxist  theories  of  the  political  could  also  be 
compared with his seeming “rejection” of Foucault's thought of power. However, I think 
that  in  his  insistence  on  the  non-coincidence  or  non-identity  of  power  and  politics, 
Rancière does not dispose of the Foucaultian project, on the contrary, he develops it, but 
within  his  own  conceptual  framework.  In  Ten  Theses  on  Politics Rancière  writes: 
“Politics is not the exercise of power. Politics ought to be defined on its own terms, as a 
mode  of  acting  put  into  practice  by  a  specific  kind  of  subject  and  deriving  from a 
particular form of reason. [...] To identify politics with the exercise of, and struggle to 
possess, power is to do away with politics” (2001, Thesis 1).41 In Rancière's view politics 
has to be defined on its own terms, meaning that its principle cannot be derived from any 
other  principle  or  mode  of  action,  but  from a  particular  form of  reason,  action  and 
subject. To assume that politics equals power would mean to subjugate it to power, to 
reduce  it  to  a  means  of  possessing  this  'resource';  in  short,  it  would  mean  to 
instrumentalize politics. A sort of autonomy of the political is at stake here, not in a sense 
41 It is interesting that here Rancière seems to retain a rather old-fashioned view of power (since he has 
specifically Marxist  thought in mind):  he rejects the identification of  politics with the  exercise  of 
power or the struggle to possess it. He appears to treat power substantially, as something that can be 
possessed. In the light of Foucault's critique of the traditional notion of power, one can suggest that 
Rancière's critique in this case fails to address a post-Marxist coincidence or superimposition of power 
and politics in terms of the multiplicity of force relations. We can find a clarification of Rancière's  
position on this point in Disagreement (1999). 
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of its separation into a specific field,  but in a sense of auto-nomos (of giving law to 
itself), of not being derived from anything else except itself. Nevertheless, as I will show 
below,  politics  in  Rancière  does  not  achieve  perfect  autonomy  because  it  remains 
attached,  in its  very definition,  to  the order  of police; it  appears in  opposition to  the 
police. 
Rancière's concern for the necessity to draw a line between power and politics is fuelled 
by his desire to avoid a claim that “everything is political.” He suggests that such an over-
extension  of  politics  results  in  total  depoliticization:  “if  everything  is  political,  then 
nothing is”  (Rancière 1999, 32). Politics, for Rancière, is a specific encounter between 
the  two  heterogeneous  logics  –  police  and  equality.  Consequently,  he  considers  it 
necessary to dismiss a concept of power that might form a connection between these 
logics as well as the resulting substitution of “everything is political” with “everything is 
policing.” In other words, pretending to be a sort of medium through which these logics 
operate,  power relations  threaten to  homogenize these heterogeneous  activities.  Thus, 
Rancière suggests that power allowed “a certain well-meaning militancy” to proclaim that 
“everything is political” because power relations are everywhere. Hence his objection, if 
everything is political,  then nothing is. As a result,  “while it is important to show, as 
Michel Foucault has done magnificently, that the police order extends well beyond its 
specialized institutions and techniques [I believe Rancière has governmentality in mind 
here], it is equally important to say that nothing is political in itself merely because power 
relationships are at work in it. ... But anything may become political if it gives rise to a 
meeting  of  these  two  logics”  (32;  my  emphasis).  Rancière  seems  to  suggest  that 
Foucault's identification of power and politics does not allow for the specificity of the 
political;  however, I believe,  he misreads Foucault by implying the immediacy of the 
political in power relations. As I discussed in the previous section, Foucault similarly 
states that nothing is political in itself, but everything may become political. So, in fact, it  
is  the mode of  politicization that  it  at  stake in  their  'debate':  for  Foucault  it  happens 
through  immanent resistance  (which  defines  power  and politics  in  the  first  place,  as 
struggle); for Rancière “the political only happens by means of a principle that does not  
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belong to it: equality” (33; my emphasis). The real disagreement that Rancière expresses 
in relation to the conversion of power into politics is not the conversion itself, but the 
resulting opening up of “the heroic vision of politics as resistance or the dreamy vision of 
spaces of affirmative action opened up by those who turn their backs on politics and its 
power games” (32). The connection of the political and resistance is indeed characteristic 
of  Foucault's  project,  and  it  is  here  that  the  real  difference  between  Foucault's  and 
Rancière's projects can be located. Resistance is a principle immanent to power, it defines 
power in its difference from violence, that is, it enables politics, as power  struggle, to 
take place. The principle of equality that, according to Rancière, brings forth the political 
is  not  immanent  to  it,  on the contrary,  it  does not  belong to the  political.  This  non-
belonging, I argue, gives us a glimpse of the unpolitical in Rancière's thought. (I will 
return to this discussion in more detail below). 
So, Rancière contends, similarly to Foucault (and also Schmitt), that nothing is political, 
but everything may be politicized. Where Rancière differs the most is in his view that the 
political  is  enabled  by  a  non-political  principle,  but  also  that  the  possibility  of 
politicization leads to only very rare events of politics. While for Schmitt and Foucault 
the  political  is  widely  present  or  possible  (as  the  intensification  of  non-political 
antagonisms, or as resistance immanent to power relations), for Rancière “politics, in its 
specificity, is rare” (Rancière 1999, 139; my emphasis). It is not a principle that is always 
manifest parallel to an opposing one; it is a rare event of inscription of a supplement into 
the  social  or  into  the  order  of  police.  Politics  can  happen  but  it  is  not  necessary: 
“...politics is the outline of a vanishing difference... its existence is in no way necessary, ... 
it occurs as a provisional accident in the history of the forms of domination” (Rancière 
2001, Thesis 6; my emphasis). Consequently, politics does not have a teleology, it is not 
grounded in human nature, but appears only as an accident, an outline of the vanishing 
difference between two ahistorical logics (the logic of police and of equality), or as an 
inscription of an  ahistorical void or supplement. It is important to note right away the 
structuralist quality of Rancière's project. As Michael Dillon suggests, for Rancière “the 
advent of the void” is not a specifically modern occurrence, but “a structural principle 
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that does not owe its existence to the historical, although it may/may not find contingent 
expression there” (Dillon 2003). 
Politics and police: the conflict of logics and the play of correlation
Let us look closer at  Rancière's  distinction between these two logics.  The critique of 
“politics” as the suppression of “the political” is replaced, in Rancière's later works, by a 
concept of “the police” that is opposed to “politics proper.” (The notion of 'the political'  
resurfaces in his writings from time to time, however, it remains unclear what Rancière 
means by it.) Rancière distinguishes between two modes or logics of being-together: one 
“puts bodies in their place and their role according to their ‘properties’” and “distributes 
the bodies within the space of their visibility or their invisibility,” and another “disrupts 
this  harmony  through  the  mere  fact  of  achieving  the  contingency  of  the  equality” 
(Rancière 1999, 27–28; my emphasis). One mode is that of homogeneity and “harmony,” 
the other is a disruptive, or rather reactive force. The former is the order of the police 
(often Rancière uses the notion of police interchangeably with “the social”), the “partition 
of the perceptible” the principle of which is “absence of a void and of a supplement” 
(Rancière  2001,  Thesis  7),  suggesting that  it  presents  itself  as  the order  of  complete 
visibility where everything is accounted for, where nothing escapes. The police is the set 
of  procedures  through  which  consent  in  society  is  achieved;  it  is  the  system  of 
distribution of parts and, simultaneously, of the legitimization of such distribution. (As I 
noted above, such legitimization is often performed by political philosophy that relies for 
support on the ideas of anthropological invariants.)
In a sense, the police order in Rancière is akin to Foucault's notion of governmentality,42 
however, while the latter refers to a mentality of government (as a political reason or 
rationale)  and  a  government  of  mentality  (as  conduct  of  conduct),  for  Rancière,  the 
partition  of  the  perceptible  or  sensory  distribution  (the  aesthetic  dimension)  of  the 
common  is  at  stake.  As  for  the  later  Foucault  freedom is  a  primary  condition  or  a 
42 Oliver  Davis  points  out  that  Rancière  rather  compares  the  sense  of  the  term  “police”  with that 
identified by Foucault in seventeenth and eighteenth-century writings as almost synonymous with the 
social order in its entirety (Davis 2010, 76; Rancière 1999, 28). 
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universal principle of power relations, for Rancière politics and the police are 'grounded' 
in another universality – radical equality. Paradoxically, the order of police or the social – 
of radical inequality – is only possible because of the assumption of equality of everyone, 
since, in order to establish effective domination, the subjects of this hierarchy have to 
understand their assignment to a place of social inferiority (as power-less). As a result, 
any structure of domination, even as it discriminates to the point of exclusion from the 
political  sphere,  depends  on  the  assumption  of  radical  equality  of  intelligence, 
understanding or just “the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being” 
(Rancière 1999, 30). By referring to the equality of any speaking being with any other 
speaking being,  Rancière  points  to  and  subsequently  challenges  the  partition  of  the 
perceptible  (policing)  based  on the  Aristotelian  distinction  between  logos and  phonè. 
Here logos refers to “the articulate language appropriate for manifesting a community in 
the  aisthesis  of  the  just  and  the  unjust,”  and  it  is  opposed  to  the  animal  phonè,  
“appropriate  only  for  expressing  the  feelings  of  pleasure  and  displeasure”  (Rancière 
2001, Thesis 8). A problem with this distinction arises, as Rancière points out, when one 
has to decide what counts as human  logos and as animal  phonè, resulting in political 
inclusion  and  exclusion  respectively.  The  presupposition  of  equality  of  all  speaking 
beings  in  their  immediate  access  to  logos as  the  ability  to  understand  each  other 
challenges the neutrality of Aristotelian distinction and provides the major  principle for 
politics. 
Equality  as  such,  in  the  words  of  Michel  Dillon,  is  “(im)possible,”  it  is  “the  absent 
presence ... that both enables social order and allows its hierarchy of power relations to be 
challenged” (2005, 430). Equality is impossible because it is heterogeneous to any police 
order or the partition of the sensible, meaning that any social order implements inequality 
through the distribution of parts or shares in community. At the same time, equality is 
possible “because every partition of the sensible presupposes equality. It is thus strictly 
(im)possible” (322; my emphasis). Equality is a principle that disappears as soon as it is 
presented, thus, it  remains possible only as a principle,  an assumption,  “the  apolitical 
structural vacuum” (Rancière 1999, 34), but never, according to Rancière's logic, as the 
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reality of the social order. In a way, this principle is reminiscent, in structural and logical 
terms, of the Schmittian unpolitical as an exception, which is politicized the moment it is 
brought to presence. 
The hierarchical order of police of any kind assumes a total count of the parts: it denies 
the miscount, or the presence of a supplement, of a void immanent to it. Nonetheless, 
Rancière argues, such a total inclusion or count is not possible, there is always going to 
be a structural remainder: a part that is unaccounted for, the part that does not have a part  
in government or, in aesthetic terms, a part that is invisible or inaudible within the social 
order.  “Les sans-part.”  He writes:  “Politics arises from a count of community 'parts', 
which is  always a false count, a double count, or a  miscount”  (Rancière 1999, 6; my 
emphasis).  The  distribution  of  parts  in  the  city  contains  or  even  relies  upon  a 
“fundamental miscount,”  blaberon  or wrong: the exclusion of  demos.  It is curious that 
while Rancière denies the anthropological invariants of traditional political philosophy, 
his own thought relies on the persistence of two other “invariants” or universals: equality 
and counting. The activity of counting is  necessarily present in any social order, which 
makes one wonder if it is another sort of anthropological invariant which conditions, if 
only negatively, the emergence of politics. 
Demos, or the people, for Rancière signifies not a specific group but the supplement that 
always emerges as a result of the miscount: “The demos is … an abstract separation of a 
population from itself. It is a supplementary part over and above the sum of a population's 
parts”  (Rancière 2004, 6). He derives this definition, however critically, from Plato, the 
'inventor' of political philosophy. In the third book of The Laws, Plato names the qualities 
that  entitle  one  to  govern;  Rancière  finds  the  seventh  form of  entitlement  the  most 
interesting: it is the government of the radically incompetent, the demos; those, who have 
no other qualification than an “un-qualification ... the fact of having no qualification for 
governing or being governed” (Rancière 2007, 562). As a result, democracy, that was the 
usual name for such government based on no qualification, is not a political regime, one 
among many, but the name of the regime of politics, because “politics as such rests on the 
anarchical power of the un-qualified or un-identified” (562). So, while the order of police 
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denies  the  presence  of  a  void,  politics  emerges  out  of  this  void  as  the  process  of 
verification of equality and as the engagement of demos. 
Guided by the universal principle of radical equality, politics happens as an act or an 
event of inscription of the supplement, the part of no part, into the heart of the police 
order. Yet, it has a logic opposed to that of police. Rancière defines politics as an activity 
“antagonistic” to policing (Rancière 1999, 29), as acting on the police. Politics becomes 
manifest  precisely as  a  disruption  of  the  latter:  it  is  referred  to  in  terms  of  a  break, 
undoing,  disruption and inscription.  There are  always  two worlds present  in  one:  the 
world of police and the world of equality, the former repressing the latter, resulting in the 
appearance of a perfect unity or harmony, with all parts occupying their proper place. 
The essence of politics consists in bringing to light the falsity of such appearance, the 
arbitrariness of the police order, in short, the “essence of politics is the manifestation of 
dissensus ”  (Rancière 2001, Thesis 8). It is a contestation, disagreement about  archè or 
the  stable  ground  of  order:  an-archy  is at  the  heart  of  politics  as  a  claim  to  the 
impossibility  of  ever  stabilizing  the  foundation  for  community,  for  example,  through 
anthropological invariants. The police order is any order that retrospectively intends to 
legitimize  its  own  arbitrariness  as  necessity,  and  thus  to  reinvent  the  conditions  of 
possibility for its hierarchy and the structures of domination, a particular distribution of 
shares  and senses.  Politics  is  an  activity of  disagreement with  any such partitioning, 
since,  in  Rancière's  view,  no  social  ordering  can  ever  meet  the  demands  of  radical 
equality. 
Disagreement  [mésentente]  indicates  a  node  between  two  meanings,  which  are 
untranslatable into English: first, the fact of not hearing, of not understanding each other 
(as, for example, when we say the same thing but mean different things), and second, 
quarrel,  disagreement  (Rancière  2004,  5).  The  combination  of  these  two  meanings 
amounts to the following: the principle of equality by itself or the fact of hearing and 
understanding language (equal access to logos) does not produce any of the effects of an 
egalitarian community. By itself it is a passive principle that does not enact itself out of 
necessity,  consequently,  politics  does  not  appear  out  of  its  intrinsic  necessity  either. 
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“Egalitarian effects occur only through a forcing, that is, the instituting of a quarrel that 
challenges the incorporated, perceptible evidence of an inegalitarian logic. This quarrel is 
politics” (5; my emphasis). Politics is not a principle, not a kind of an unconscious of the 
police order that returns out of necessity (i.e., the inevitable return of the repressed) but, 
rather, an active forcing or intervention into that order. (If we wish to retain the figure of 
the unconscious here, we should remember that even though the repressed or excepted 
part  (the  sans-part)  is  not  simply  erased  through  this  repression;  its  'return'  is, 
nevertheless, a matter of a forceful action, not a given.43) In relation to order, politics is 
always a painful act of transcendence. As a result, Rancière keeps reminding his readers, 
politics  is  rare:  in  potential it  is  always  there due to  the demands of equality but  in 
actuality it is difficult to achieve. 
Even as it occurs, an event of politics leaves a trace rather than a clear line between an 
old police order and a new, supposedly better one. As I mentioned above, politics is the 
outline  of  a  vanishing difference:  an  indication  or  temporary  manifestation  of  the 
irreducible difference of the population from itself, of the void in police order, and of the 
persistent  supplement  that  has  a  potential  to  disrupt  the  harmony of  the  police.  The 
difference vanishes since political interruptions, and its subjects, are always reinscribed 
within  order.  However,  this  very  disappearance  becomes  a  condition  for  a  new 
intervention: “The persistence of the wrong is infinite because verification of equality is 
infinite and the resistance of any police order to such verification is a matter of principle” 
(Rancière 1999, 39). The essence of police is to resist total restructuring, to resist politics, 
as a result,  it  seems to exhibit some plasticity in reaction to the events of politics by 
incorporating,  recognizing  and  establishing  a  relationship  with  that  which  once  was 
excluded, unseen and nonrelational. The “wrong” cannot be resolved or settled but it can 
be “processed” (39), which involves the emergence and recognition of a subject (the ex-
sans-part). It is worth noting that Rancière does not elaborate on this processing or the 
post-political reinspription of the  sans-part. Oliver Davis  (2010) also raises this critical 
43 Rancière's view is particularly close to Badiou's in this aspect, for whom politics is also a matter of  
militancy and  forcing,  for example, as in naming the unnameable or forcing a name upon an event 
(see, Badiou 2005a; 2005b).
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point about Rancière's work: he comments on Rancière's reluctance to probe the police 
order, to think, at least in general terms, about the relationships between different types of 
the police order, types of political subjectivation and demonstration. Furthermore, Davis 
contends (similarly to Peter Hallward) that without an analysis of the process by which 
the sans-part is recognized, and thus ceases to be such, Rancière's account is missing a 
crucial element (96). 
To further this line of critique, I argue that for Rancière politics not only “runs up against 
the  police  everywhere”  (1999,  31),  but  is  also  bound  to  do  so  endlessly,  since  the 
“revolutionary”  overturning of  its  order  is  not  possible.  What  remains  is  the  infinite 
amendment and succession of the social. In order to distance himself from an essentialist 
view  of  politics  and  from  its  traditional  identification  with  public  sphere  (where 
consensus is achieved) and the state, Rancière strongly argues that politics does not have 
its own place, it “has no objects or issues of its own” (31). Since the classical definition 
and distinction of sciences, natural or social, relies on the distinctiveness of their objects 
and  methodology,  Rancière's  suggestion  by  default  is  a  critique  of  any reduction  of 
political thought to a science of politics, resulting in a general economy of the political, or 
the general, as opposed to regional, ontology of politics. The essence of politics lies in 
“twisting the ontology of the social,” and so as “twisted,” Rancière's political ontology is 
“an anti-ontology” (Deranty 2003). 
It  is worth  returning,  at  this  point,  to  an  earlier  question  of  disagreement  between 
Rancière  and  Foucault:  let  us  remember  that  both  thinkers  resist  the  “everything  is 
political” statement. Similar to Foucault, Rancière's “version” of the general economy of 
the political (at least as the project of thought) is not that of actuality but of potentiality or 
becoming: anything may be politicized, may become political if it gives rise to a meeting 
of the two logics – the police and equality. Nothing is essentially unpoliticizable; there is 
no  real limit  to  politics.  Like  for  Foucault  and  Schmitt,  politics  (or  the  political)  is 
potentially everywhere; and since it  is lacking a fixed object, it  is dependent on that, 
which  it  is  not,  on its  own difference  or  negativity.  In  Rancière's  case,  the  essential  
displacement of politics not only establishes a general economy of the political, but also 
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reduces the “autonomy” of politics by attaching it to the primacy of the police order. 
Politics is sustained as an activity, however rare, that is parasitic on the order of police. In 
other words, politics can be thought as well as manifest only in correlation with the order 
of police. Politics exists only as an act of inscription of “the apolitical structural vacuum 
of equality between anyone and everyone” into the heart of the police order. If there were 
no  police,  politics  would  cease  to  exists  both  in  thought  and  action.  As a  result,  as 
Rancière  tries  to  distance  himself  from  political  philosophy  that  relies  on  different 
invariants to derive and explain politics, he seems to end up in a similar place: politics is 
derived from the assumption of the invariant presence of the police. The worlds of police 
and  politics  are  in  endless  relation  with  each  other:  re-ordering  always  succeeds  the 
interruption of order by an event of politics. Since order is, supposedly, always already 
there, politics emerges only in correlation to it, as a disruption, as a re-partition of the 
perceptible, made possible by the inscription of a supplement, of a part of those who have 
no part, that becomes visible through the assumption of radical equality.
Slavoj Žižek  (1999a) presents  a  similar  critique  of  Rancière,  however,  his  remarks 
emerge from within the framework of Lacanian psychoanalysis and thus employ different 
rhetoric.  Upon his  examination  of  Rancière's  (but  also that  of  others',  e.g.,  Badiou's) 
distinction between politics and the police, Žižek suggests that the logic of the former 
includes its own failure in advance, that is, it “considers its full success as its ultimate 
failure [think, for example, of the (im)possibility of equality, or vanishing difference], 
which sticks to its marginal character as the ultimate sign of its authenticity [i.e., politics 
'proper'],  and  thus,  entertains  an  ambiguous  attitude  toward  its  politico-ontological 
opposite, the police Order of Being: it has to refer to it,  it  needs  it  as the big enemy 
('Power')  which  must  be  there  in  order  for  us  to  engage  in  our  marginal/subversive 
activity  –  the  very  idea  of  accomplishing  a  total  subversion  of  this  Order  ('global 
revolution') is dismissed as proto-totalitarian” (233-234). Žižek's critique is similar to my 
critique of correlation discussed above: he notes in Rancière's logic of politics a 'secret' 
attachment or 'need' for the big enemy that happens to always already be there. Žižek, 
who advocates politics as a revolutionary practice aiming at total reordering or renewal of 
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order, eventually contends that Rancière's politics is no more than a “game of hysterical 
provocation” (238).
The critique of correlation of politics and the police, and its Žižekian 'version', raises a 
further question of the fate of the state in Rancière's thought. Since a global (communist) 
revolution is not of concern for him, what remains of the state (which does not equal the 
police), and what is its relation to politics? I suggest that an answer could be found in 
Rancière's  concept  of  “the  political”  (le  politique)  that  occasionally resurfaces  in  his 
works and accompanies some discussions of the distinction between politics (la politique) 
and the  police.  According to  my analysis  (cf.  Rockhill  2006,  89), Rancière does  not 
maintain a strict terminological distinction between politics (la politique) and the political 
(le  politique)  except for the discussion in his  On the Shores of  Politics (1995) that  I 
addressed  above.  However,  in  his  essay  Politics,  Identification,  and  Subjectivization 
(1992) he clarifies the meaning of this concept: “the political is the encounter between 
two heterogeneous processes” (58), between that of governing (“policy,” or what he will 
later name “the police”) and of equality (the set of emancipatory practices, or politics 
“proper”). But it is not just an encounter,  it  is the very place of such encounter.  The 
political  is  “the  place where  the  verification  of  equality  is  obliged  to  turn  into  the 
handling  of  a  wrong”  (59;  my  emphasis).  So,  we  have  three  notions  here:  “policy, 
politics,  and  the  political”  –  the  political  being  the  field  for  the  encounter  between 
emancipation and policy in the handling of a wrong” (59). The political here is the place 
or  the field of  contestation,  dissensus  or disagreement.  In  Rancière's  other  works  the 
notion of “the political” does not appear as such, but, in a way, it is still present as the site  
of politics. For example, in  Disagreement he writes:  “[p]olitics occurs when there is a 
place and a way for two heterogeneous processes to meet” (1999, 30; my emphasis). The 
political in this case is implied by the reference to “a place,” as the site of intersection of 
the heterogeneous logics. Since politics is the staging of dissensus, i.e., “a conflict over 
the existence of a common stage” (26), one might suggest that politics is a conflict over 
the political, the stage or field of dissensus, or over the common. 
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Rancière speaks of the state  in  similar terms,  as the space that contains contestation, 
which makes me wonder if the state is the political or, at least,  its instance. Rancière 
differentiates the state from the homogeneity of the police order. They are not identical, 
however,  they can overlap,  as  in  the case when state  institutions stabilize or become 
linked with the  archè of community: “What is usually posited as the space of politics, 
meaning  the  set  of  state  institutions,  is  precisely  not  a  homogenous  place.  Its 
configuration is determined by the state of relations between political logic and police 
logic. But it is also, of course, the privileged space where their difference is dissimulated” 
(Rancière 1999, 33; my emphasis). So, the space of the state is configured by the relation 
between  politics  and  the  police,  however,  it  is  not  just  a  passive  object  of  such 
configuration: it seems to “act” through dissimulation of difference between two logics. 
As I showed above, the relation of politics and the police is that of constant configuration 
and dissimulation, and the field that hosts this co-relation is “the political.” As a result, it 
is possible to suggest that the space of the state is the political, the place of staging of 
dissensus.  Such a  conclusion  raises  further  questions  about  the  possibility of  politics 
beyond the state. To put it differently, it is curious what other instances of the political, as 
the field that enables an encounter of contestation, we might imagine. It seems that even 
as Rancière attempts to “reinvent politics,” the state remains its important component.44
The totality of the political and a place for the unpolitical
Given the presence of correlation in Rancière thought,  I  would now like to  raise  the 
question of its totalizing ambition. As was noted above, Rancière is highly critical of the 
statement “everything is  political,” specifically as it  results from a lack of distinction 
between power and politics. However, I argue, he re-establishes this totality in terms of 
the totalizing ambition of his correlation. The two modes of being-together, politics and 
44 The lack of rejection of the state is one of the major points of difference between Rancière's  and 
Badiou's projects. Badiou addresses this issue in his critique of Rancière's view of politics  (Badiou 
2005a). Jean-Philippe Deranty sums up on this point: “Rancière is guilty of the same crime as the 
proponents of 'political philosophy' he is so vocal in denouncing, namely that of refusing to prescribe 
and  conclude.  This  becomes  evident  in  Rancière's  reticence  to  take  his  axioms to  their  ultimate  
consequences and to reject the State both theoretically and practically as part of a politics of equality”  
(Deranty 2003).
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the police,  seem to exhaust the account of possible modes of being-together,  without 
presenting any conceptual tools for thinking life outside of both of them. There is no 
account in Rancière of the instability of order as such, outside of its possible interruption 
by politics and thus consequent re-organization. For Rancière, the political re-partitioning 
of  order  is  a  rare  occasion,  while  it  seems  that  the  police  assumes  a  more  or  less 
omnipresent, but not necessarily negative, role in his system – everything is the police 
unless it is politics, which is rare. In a manner similar to other post-foundational political 
thinkers,  Rancière  advocates  “proper”  politics  in  opposition  to  the  police,  and  the 
principle of correlation at the core of his political thinking leaves him, as many others, 
blind to or indifferent to a possibility of a “third” (fourth, fifth...) mode of being-together 
that is neither the harmonious order of police, nor the contingent, disruptive reality of 
politics and equality. However, it is not exactly correct to suggest that Rancière does not 
at all think of life beyond this political correlation; in order to be more precise, let me 
contend that  he does not  give a  positive account of a  mode of being-together that  is 
neither politics nor the police. 
We can catch a glimpse of the unpolitical in Rancière's principle of equality and in the 
political subject (the sans-part). Equality, for Rancière, is “a mere assumption that needs 
to  be  discerned  within  the  practices  implementing  it,”  it  is  “the  apolitical  structural 
vacuum” that lends politics cases to inscribe (1999, 34). As such, the principle of equality 
does not belong to the order of the social or politics, nevertheless, it conditions, makes 
them both possible. In this way, it is outside the correlation: politics and the police order 
rest  on  the  principle  that  does  not  belong  to  them  as  such.  This  non-belonging  is 
unpolitical in principle. However, it becomes meaningful only in relation to politics, that 
is, it is unpolitical only in principle, but becomes politicized once inscribed into order by 
politics.  It  is  thus  (un)political,  in  a similar  way as it  is  (im)possible.  Its  transitional 
position is reminiscent of the Schmittian exception: equality is unpolitical as long as it is 
excepted from the police order, but once it is summoned by politics (decided upon or 
verified by it) is becomes politicized. 
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The part of no part or the supplement of the police order is another case of something like 
the unpolitical in Rancière. It is the people or demos that is excluded from, uncounted and 
unrecognized by the order of police. It is its excess. Guided by the principle of equality, it  
represents the wrong, and as such becomes the political subject, “the people of politics,” 
whose task  is  to  re-inscribe,  re-introduce  equality  into  order,  and thus  to  exhibit  the 
arbitrariness of the foundation of hierarchy and domination (of any particular partition of 
the sensible and distribution of parts). Political subjects are “fluctuating performers” who 
“bring the nonrelationship into relationship and give place to nonplace” (1999, 89). They 
are fluctuating because the position of a supplement is never stable, it not occupied by 
one specific group; like the  demos that does not, for Rancière, signify a defined group, 
but refers to a void, the unqualified, that is not recognized by the order except as that 
which  does  not  count.  As  a  result,  Rancière  argues,  “the  people  of  politics  never 
disappears  into  some  simple  coexistence  of  individuals  and  social  groups  without 
remainder, it  is always replaced by another people”  (2004, 8). The political task is to 
inscribe the  sans-part,  to  make visible  the  invisible  of  the  order,  however,  since full 
visibility or total count is not possible, the remainder persist, making the task of politics  
infinite. “The place of a political subject is an interval or a gap: being together to the 
extent that we are in-between names, identities, cultures, and so on” (1992, 62). The in-
between  persists  despite  any  attempts  of  (re)ordering  and  political  intervention. 
Consequently,  this  in-between,  the part  of no part  is  unpolitical:  like the principle  of 
equality,  this  kind  of  being-together  neither  belongs  to  the  order  of  police  nor  is  it 
political in a full sense, it may only become politicized, involved in an act of political 
intervention. The sans-part is (un)political: “un” as in the uncounted, “political” as in the 
political subject. 
Nonetheless, Rancière seems to give this kind of (un)political life only a negative value, 
meaning that it has to be inscribed, brought to light through politics in order to gain its 
voice as the declaration of its absence. Otherwise, as such it is in a position of exclusion, 
suffering or discomfort, it is invisible and nonrelational. It is representative of the wrong 
or injustice brought about by the police ordering. This description implies the necessity 
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and desirability of its inscription into existing order by means of politicization or the 
political action of the re-partition of the perceptible. In this light, Rancière's project is a 
project  of  thought  that  finds  a  way of  conceptually  expressing  the  possibility  of  the 
excluded, i.e., the part of no part, to partake in being-together through politics. The very 
concept  of  politics  prescribes that  the  nonrelation  must  transform  into  relation  and 
nonplace must  find its  place,  that  is,  become (re)ordered.  Rancière does  not  seem to 
envision a reality beyond the correlation of politics and the police that would sustain the 
“nonrelational” and “nonplace” in positive terms; he does not elaborate a being-together 
of  the  “in-between,”  except  for  suggesting  that  it  gives  rise  to  political  subjects  that 
disrupt the harmonious order of the police. Rancière does not account for a possibility of 
the unpolitical as such, and of a different way that it could relate to both the police and 
politics. 
I suggest that one of the possible ways to think the unpolitical as such in relation to 
Rancière's project is to question the assumption of the persistence of the social, which 
Rancière clearly recognizes as the source of the wrong. Simone Weil might have a point 
when she writes: “Man is a social animal, and the social element represents evil. There is 
nothing we can do about it, and yet at the same time we are not permitted to accept it as 
such, under pain of losing our soul. It follows that life cannot be anything else but a  
spiritual laceration. This world is uninhabitable. That is why we have to flee to the next. 
But the door is shut. What a lot of knocking is required before it opens! Really to be able 
to enter in, and not be left on the doorstep, one has to cease to be a social being” (1956, 
2:466; my emphasis). Rancière, like many others, seems to remain “on the doorstep,” 
without  really  entering  something  like  “the  other  world.”  What  is  the  contemporary 
thought of the political at all if not thought of the threshold and on the threshold? In this  
respect,  I  believe,  the  process  of  becoming-asocial  is  worth pondering upon in  more 
detail. 
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1.4. Retreating the Political: Social Ontology of Being-with as 
Primordial Politics
The works of Jean-Luc Nancy represent another instance of post-foundational political 
thought. Presenting an example of the correlation of politics and the political, as well as 
its totalizing ambition (in a form of rethinking Being and thus political ontology in terms 
of the primordiality of being-with), Nancy also asserts the need to “distinguish politics,” 
to allow for other spheres of reference. Thus, I would like to note from the beginning that 
my critique of correlation and the totalizing ambition of the political in Nancy's thought 
does not mean to suggest an exhaustive account of his project. I argue that the seeming 
presence of the two tendencies in his philosophy – a tendency toward a new totality of 
politics and correlation, and a tendency toward the unpolitical, the outside of the political 
as such – is indicative of the advent of the unpolitical. Nancy's work is an example of 
thought on the 'threshold': still bearing the traces on the modern totality of the political, 
he attempts to extend beyond it, however, he seems to remains unsure of the effects of 
this extension. While looking at the unpolitical, Nancy's gaze seems to remain attached to 
the space of the political. In order to elucidate this double tendency in Nancy's thought, I 
will, first, attend to the analysis of correlation and the totalizing ambition of the political.  
Next, I will take up in some detail Nancy's 'intuition' of the unpolitical. 
The modern totality of the political and its “retreat”
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy  (1997) in their cooperative work at the 
Centre for Philosophical Research on the Political (1980-1984), put forward the notion of 
“the retreat  of  the political”  (la  retrait  du politique).  This  retreat  was meant  to  be  a 
response  to  the  historical  situation  of  that  time,  to  what  they  called  a  “closure”  or 
“completion of the political.” To think the “closure” as “retreat” is not only suggestive of 
a kind of withdrawal and thus absence but also of a more positive re-treating, in a sense 
of re-thinking, re-consideration of “the essence of the political.” The task of such a retreat 
is acknowledged by Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy: “the question of the political evokes the 
necessity of dwelling on what makes the social  relation possible  as such” (180n1; my 
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emphasis). As Philip Armstrong puts it, what is at stake here is “the radical re-articulation 
of relationality” (2009, 3). 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy suggest that modernity is an epoch of “the absolute reign or 
'total domination' of the political,” meaning that the political is “completed to the point of 
excluding every other area of reference”  (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 110–111). 
Since the problem of the political as totality is a specifically modern one, the major object 
of their critique is the modern closure of the political or modernity as the closure of the 
political. As such their critique is situated primarily as a response to a specific historical 
constellation (foreclosure of the political), which presents a horizon where a new opening 
becomes possible. That is, re-treating, as a positive gesture for the sake of the future, of 
new thought, emerges as an act of critical negation of what currently is, or the withdrawal 
of and distancing from the “old” political philosophy. 
For  Lacoue-Labarthe  and Nancy  (1997) the  closure  or  completion  of  the  political  is 
coextensive with the slogan “everything is political.” There are two primarily meanings 
of this statement: first, the closure of the “theologico-political;” second, completion of the 
political in political economy or “the techno-social.” The former refers primarily to the 
possibility of a religious (or quasi-religious) legitimation of community, where a God or a 
leader signifies and thus legitimates the 'origin' of the common, or is simply able to say 
“we” for us all. Nancy further suggests that modernity is characterized by the withdrawal 
of  such theologico-political  (modernity as  secularization  of  social  life),  meaning that 
there is no longer the One for community who can embody and represent it, resulting in 
the withdrawal of every possible figure for community. So, we witness “the end of the 
political” in a sense of “the end of religion: the end of an order of given, tied-up sense” 
(Nancy 1997, 91). The closure of the political as political economy simply means that the 
former is reduced to or identified with the latter: the ancient Greek separation between 
the private domain of  oikos,  i.e.,  economy of the household,  and the public,  political 
domain, i.e., the polis, is non-existent in modernity. The polis is viewed as a large oikos, 
resulting  in  the  application  of  the  rules  and  concerns  of  the  latter  to  the  former.45 
45 This interpretation of the extension of economy into politics is reminiscent of Foucault's discussion of  
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However, Nancy notes, such displacement was not simply one of magnitude, it involved a 
qualitative transformation or reinterpretation of the politeia, a knowledge of the affairs of 
the city-state, as an oiko-nomia. Moreover, the latter was reconfigured “no longer only in 
terms of subsistence and prosperity (of 'the good life') but in terms of the production and 
reproduction of wealth (of 'having more')”  (Nancy 2010b, 46–47). As a result,  Nancy 
contends  that  “[i]n  this  respect,  there  is  in  the  final  analysis  no  difference  between 
'everything is political' and 'everything is economic'” (47). 
Another aspect of the reduction of the political to political economy lies in the declaration 
of the self-sufficiency of humanity: the possibility of its self-production, reproduction and 
multiplication outside of any other reference. Humanity, in the absence of God, has “no 
final destination other than its own self-production... 'Everything is political'  thus also 
amounts to affirming that there is a self-sufficiency of 'man' considered as the producer of 
his own nature and, through it, of nature in its entirety” (2010b, 47). Nancy suggests that 
such  representation  of  natural  self-sufficiency continues  to  dominate  the  meaning  of 
'politics' today: never has the primacy of 'political economy' been more devastating. It is 
worth noting that Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy use a few other terms to refers to such 
domination, which add to our understanding of the phenomenon they want to elucidate. 
For  example,  they  suggest  that  we  are  witnessing  “the  total  immanentisation  of  the 
political in the social” (1997, 115), where the political is converted into a form of “banal 
management  or  organisation”  that  defines  the  epoch  of  the  domination  of  political 
economy.  The  art  of  political  government,  reinterpreted  in  terms  of  the  economic 
regulation  of  the  social,  results  in  the  closure  of  the  political  as  “the  techno-social.” 
Nevertheless,  Nancy suggests,  despite  the  total  domination  of  political  economy,  the 
inconsistency  of  its  self-sufficiency  becomes  more  and  more  evident  today  (due  to 
globalization, for example). As a result, what is today called the “end,” “crisis,” “eclipse,” 
or  “paralysis”  of  politics  is,  in  the end,  nothing more than  the  crisis  “of  man's  self-
sufficiency and/or of the nature that is within him” (Nancy 2010b, 48). 
the birth of biopolitics, where the concerns of mere living (health, reproduction, subsistence, etc.),  
which once were confined to the domestic sphere, oikos, become the object of political intervention or 
rationality. The main subjectivity of this epoch is no longer zoon politikon, but homo oeconomicus. 
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So, the modern political, according to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, is “sublimated” under 
the guise of theology and economy; however, this sublimation becomes more and more 
apparent, that is, the political as theology and economy withdraws or disappears, thus 
exposing the 'illusion' of its totality. As Nancy puts it, “[p]olitics has withdrawn as the 
donation (the auto- or hetero-donation, whether human or divine) of a common essence 
and  destination:  it  has  withdrawn  as  totality  or  as  totalization.  In  this  sense,  not 
everything is political” (Nancy 2010b, 50). Not everything is consumed by theology and 
economy, at least not anymore. Once the political withdraws, only the empty space is left 
behind,  which is  similar  to  Claude Lefort's  suggestion that  in  modern democracy the 
“locus  of  power  becomes  an empty  place  [un lieu  vide]”  (1988,  17).  The project  of 
(positive)  re-treating  of  the  political  emerges  within  this  historical  horizon  of  its 
withdrawal: the new thought of the political and its essence, to which Lacoue-Labarthe 
and Nancy dedicated the work of the Centre, is historically conditioned by the emergence 
of the empty space of political philosophy. 
But why would it be at all necessary to rethink the political, once it is withdrawn, once its 
place is vacated; why is its absence to be feared and not to be tolerated? It seems that this 
question is an inquiry into the future of thought as such, due to the essential co-belonging 
of politics and thought. Without the withdrawal of the political there is no space for an 
alternative thought of community as well as an alternative community of thought, since 
“the essential (and not accidental or simply historical) co-belonging of the philosophical 
and the political” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 109) prescribes a 'limited' relation 
of politics and thought. The philosophical questioning about the essence of politics is 
inseparable  from  the  political  determination  of  philosophy,  that  is,  the  political 
determination  of  essence.  In  the  Western  tradition  politics  and  thought  (confined  to 
philosophy or metaphysics) have been inseparable, where Aristotle's description of the 
mutual  and  inseparable  relationship  between  the  polis and  logos is  one  of  the  most 
distinguished examples of such a co-belonging. As a result, the task for thought, in the 
sight of the space vacated by the withdrawal of the political, is to question itself about its 
political  'origins':  “What  remains  to  be thought  by us  ...  is  not  a  new institution (or 
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instruction)  of  politics  by  thought,  but  the  political  institution  of  so-called  Western 
thought” (110). It is worth noting here that the question of co-belonging of politics and 
thought is necessarily bound to the problem of their mutual limitation. In other words, the 
question of the limits  of the political  (i.e.,  of the unpolitical)  becomes essentially the 
question of the limits of thought (i.e., the unthought). (I will return to this question in 
more detail below.)
The  retreat  of  the  essence of  the  political  is  essentially  “the  questioning  of  the 
philosophical as the political” within the horizon of its retreat or withdrawal. What is at 
stake here is not a return to some originary, pure essence of the political that was clouded 
by  theology  or  economy  but,  as  Philip  Armstrong  suggests,  “opening  toward  the 
political”:  “...this  retreat of the political  ...  does not mark a return to the political,  to 
concept of the political that exists in its pure, uncontaminated state or given identity, but 
reopens  the  'open space'  of  the  Centre  to  a  spacing in  which  the  questioning of  the 
political is at once delimited and delimiting” (2009, 3). This opening is the positive re-
treat  of the political  resulting from the double crisis:  the closure of the political  and 
“practical deprivation of philosophy as regards itself and its own authority.” To sum up, 
the retreat of the political is interpreted in two ways: first, as withdrawal in the sense of  
its being “the 'well-known' and in the sense of the obviousness (the blinding obviousness) 
of politics” (i.e., “everything is political”); and second, “as re-tracing of the political, re-
marking it,  by raising the question in a  new way which,  for us,  is  to  raise  it  as the 
question of its essence” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1997, 112). The authors are quick 
to  warn  us  that  such  re-treating  of  essence  does  not  indicate  “a  falling  back  into 
'apoliticism',”46 but renders possible “a questioning which refuses to confine itself to the 
categories ordinarily grouped under 'the political' and probably, in the long run, to the 
concept  of  the  political  itself”  (112).  This  amounts,  in  a  way similar  to  other  post-
foundational  thinkers,  to  the  recognition  of  the  excess  of  politics  or  its  irreducible 
difference  (and  thus  of  the  limited  nature  of  the  categories  of  traditional  political 
46 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, perhaps, have in mind here the traditional opposition between politics  
and philosophy, however, it remains unclear what exactly this falling back into “apoliticism” would 
mean in a view of the essential co-belonging of politics and thought. 
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philosophy), which become a quasi-ground for a new thought of the political. The refusal 
of confinement or the limits of the political is what Nancy would call the “unworking” of 
the immanent horizon of politics  and thought.  “Immanentism” for Nancy,  in the first 
place, refers to the problem of community, that is, “a closed community producing itself 
or its essence as its own ‘work’ ... based on a nostalgia for a lost community: an original 
and immediate being-together that has been lost but whose immanence can be restored” 
(Devisch 2000, 240). Again, Nancy's critique of immanentism is 'grounded' in the idea of 
retreat of the political – raising the question of the political in a new way, and not a return 
to some original community. So, the re-treat as unworking consists of a double movement 
of closure and opening: it does not reveal some pre-existent, hidden essence once it has 
destructed or deconstructed the present one (it is not an unearthing); on the contrary, it 
opens unto a new meaning or sense that is not totalizing. The nature of the re-treat as both 
closure and opening makes it  possible,  for  Nancy,  to  conclude that  “if  'everything is  
political' – in a sense that is neither that of political theology nor political economy – it is  
insofar as the everything [le “tout”] can be neither total nor totalized in any way” (Nancy 
2010b, 51). The investigations into the essence of such a political and the meaning of 
such “everything” lie at the core of Nancy's work: the essence of the political as “being-
with” and of “everything” as “being-in-common.” 
Political ontology of the in-common
While  in  his  earlier  works,  including  those  produced  in  cooperation  with  Lacoue-
Labarthe,  Nancy  is  more  focused  on  the  negative  aspect  of  retreating  the  political 
(pointing out what it is not), in his later works, for example, in  Being Singular Plural, 
Nancy  presents  his  project  in  a  more  positive  way:  thinking  of  the  essence  of  the 
common. The question of this essence (or rather co-essence) is “the ontological question 
of  the  political  (le  politique)  [that]  arises  at  the  moment  of  the  evaporation  of  the 
possibility of a polity that would incarnate such a being-with” (Critchley 1999, 56). That 
is, the question of the political (le politique) can be raised positively and in a new way 
because politics (la politique)  or the 'incarnations'  of the common (e.g.,  communism) 
have withdrawn. 
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Nancy wants to think the common or togetherness in a new way: existence as essentially 
co-existence or being-with,  not subordinated to any other principle.  Consequently,  the 
question of the political is an ontological question: what is the common? I argue that in 
rethinking the political is terms of Being as  in-common Nancy displaces the totality of 
politics (la politique) – “everything is political” – with a new, primordial 'totality' of the 
political  (le  politique)  that  refuses  to  complete  itself.  One  of  the  reasons  for  this 
incompletion of the political  is its never-ending interruption by the opposite principle 
(i.e., politics), which is merely displaced but never eliminated. Oliver Marchart  (2007) 
calls  this  play  “the  political  difference,”  in  the  fashion  of  Heidegger's  ontological 
difference,  which  influenced  many  post-foundational  thinkers  (the  so-called  “left-
Heideggerians”). Marchart reaches a similar conclusion about “the primordial status of 
political ontology,” however, he argues that this primordiality does not amount to total 
politicization  because  neither  politics  nor  the  political  reside  within  all  beings  in  an 
immediate way, but only “by way of ‘mediation’ through the political difference” (169). 
The collapse of the play of this difference would mean either the total absorption of the 
social  being by ontic  'politics'  (la  politique)  –  the “everything is  political,”  of  which 
Nancy  is  critical,  –  or  “a  world  in  which  the  political  (in  the  ontological  sense  of 
antagonism)  is  fully  enacted  on  the  entire  scale  of  the  social,”  which  is  basically  a 
definition  of  the  “universal  civil  war”  (169).  According  to  Marchart,  within  left-
Heideggerian  political  thought  the  irresolvability  of  play between “politics”  and “the 
political” (the play of the political difference) guarantees that neither of the scenarios can 
come true. He concludes: “The claim as to the primordial status of political ontology does 
not  correspond to the commonplace notion of  ‘everything is  political’ – even though 
everything  is  political  in  the  sense  of  being  irresolvably  subverted  by  the 
instituting/destituting moment of the political, as it is indicated in the play of the political 
difference.  ...  Not  ‘everything is  political’,  but  the  ground/abyss  of  everything is  the 
political” (169). I propose that Marchart's defence of the primordial status of political 
ontology as non-totalizing is not very effective, and it is still possible to suggest that the 
primordial status of the political amounts to a  new  totality. He recognizes, as do many 
other post-foundational thinkers (whose works he examines), that the common claim of 
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“everything is political” does not refer to the ontological status of the political, but rather 
signifies the total absorption of the social life by ontic politics, for example, by political  
economy or even theology. So, Marchart successfully clarifies for us that claims toward 
“the primordial  status  of  political  ontology”  and “everything is  political”  are  not  the 
same, and indeed they are not. As I have shown above, many political thinkers begin their 
investigation into a new meaning of “the political” with the deconstruction of the slogan 
“everything is political.” However, they do not seem to question the status of the result of 
such a deconstruction: the status of the political as “ground/abyss of everything.” Like 
Marchart,  they merely argue that the political,  as ontological  primordiality,  is  not the 
political of “everything is political.” 
But what does it really mean to conclude (as Marchart does) that everything is political in 
the sense of being irresolvably subverted by the moment of the political? What does it 
mean to assume that the political, even as it is always interrupted by politics, is basically 
the condition of possibility of everything? How far does this claim stand from assuming a 
new totality of the political? It is my suggestion that while the statement “everything is 
political”  points  to  the  immediacy  of  politicization  (i.e.,  everything  is  political),  the 
political as the quasi-ground or condition of possibility of everything points rather to a 
totalizing ambition of the primordial politics (since an ambition remains an ambition only 
insofar as it is not fulfilled). Nancy's proposition that everything is political insofar as 
“the everything [le “tout”] can be neither total nor totalized” points into a direction of 
such an ambition. This political is a new kind of totality: a sort of 'proper' totality that  
incorporates its own incompletion or openness. I contend that Nancy further points at 
such totality when he writes that “politics must be understood as the specific place for the 
articulation of a nonunity – and for the symbolization of a nonfigure. ... In such a place, 
politics is far from being “everything” – even though everything passes through it and 
meets up or crosses paths in it” (Nancy 2010b, 51). Such politics, or rather the political, is 
a place where everything passes through and meets up, meaning that it is the space where 
all relations are formed and contained. This is reminiscent of Kant's idea of space as an a 
priori condition of the appearance of the external objects (and thus of forming relations 
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with  them).  In  this  regard  David  Ingram suggests:  “With  explicit  reference  to  Kant, 
Nancy allows that a kind of transcendental reflection may be possible which delimits the 
a priori conditions circumscribing the limits of political life – the essence of the political 
(le  politique)  as  distinct  from its  empirical  manifestations  (la  politique)”  (1988,  97). 
Nancy's  thought  is  dedicated  to  the  examination  of  these  a  priori  conditions:  the 
primordial ontology of the political as being-with. This refers to another problem with 
Marchart's argument presented above: he suggests that, due to the antagonistic character 
of the political ontology, the total primacy of the political would mean “universal civil 
war.” While Nancy does not deny the conflictual nature of the political, his major effort 
lies in showing that existence is always already political in a sense of being essentially in-
common.  However,  there  is  no  sense  in  which,  for  Nancy,  being-in-common  equals 
“universal civil war.” 
Worldliness and the political: rethinking “Mitsein” or being-with
Nancy commences his radical re-articulation of relationality with a critique of Heidegger: 
he intends to “rewrite” Being and Time. However, Nancy notes that this question is not 
limited to Heidegger's thought, but “concerns the whole of Western thinking in its way of 
comprehending or failing to comprehend what Heidegger was the first to have elucidated 
precisely: the essential character of the existential with (that is, of the with as condition of 
possibility of human existence – if  not even of the existence of all  beings...”  (Nancy 
2008,  3–4).  Being-with,  as  primordial  politics,  or  the  political  (le  politique),  as  the 
question of “the  being-together  … [that] resists all assignation in empirical factuality” 
(Lacoue-Labarthe  and  Nancy  1997,  134), is  born  out  of  a  rethinking  of  Being  as 
essentially “with” or “in-common.”47 Nancy begins with an examination of Heidegger's 
analytic  of  Dasein and  the  place  of  Mitsein in  it:  he  suggests  that  Heidegger 
simultaneously  opened  and  erased  the  possibility  of  thinking  an  essential “with”  of 
Dasein. The opening is signalled by his positing of  Mitsein as co-essential to  Dasein’s 
47 Nicholas Dungey (2001) makes a similar point about Derrida's relation to Heidegger. He suggests that 
“[w]hat for Heidegger is an ontological structure – being-with-others as being-in-the-world – is for  
Derrida the movement of the political (it)self” (471),  resulting in “being-with-others as primordial 
politics.”
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essence: insofar as we are thrown into the world, our entrance into sociality is not an 
independent decision.  We are inscribed into the world and, thus, the fact that we are 
social beings is not merely an empirical but ontological fact of human existence. In the 
words of Ignaas Devish, “[t]o be thrown into the world implies that I am, as a Dasein, co-
original with a  Mitsein. The ‘there’ (da) makes of me at the same time a ‘with’ (mit)” 
(2000, 242). This position asserts the primacy of relational structure, as opposed to a 
solipsistic  view  of  existence.  Nevertheless,  Nancy  further  suggests  that  Heidegger 
foreclosed his own opening toward the radical relationality of  Dasein by subordinating 
Mitsein to  the  distinction  between  the  improper  and  the  proper,  resulting  in  the 
suppression or loss of the “with” between the  Anyone  and the  people (Nancy 2008, 5). 
Anyone refers to the improper (or “inauthentic”) mode of Being-with: common existence 
in the sense of “banal,” indifferent and anonymous. The people represents the proper (or 
“authentic”)  mode of  Mitsein:  Being-with  as  a  community of  destiny,  guided by the 
common cause for which it is necessary to fight (thus, the sacrificial death in combat). It  
is  primarily  the  critique  of  Heidegger's  subordination  of  Mitsein  to  'community'  (the 
proper, authentic Being-with) that drives Nancy's thought of the “with.” He writes that in 
Being and Time “the affirmation of the essentiality of the with is insidiously neglected in 
favor of another category, community, which appropriates the with into a destinal unity in 
which there is no room for the contiguity of the theres, nor consequently any logical,  
ontological or topological room for the with as such” (13). It is the with as such that must 
be thought in order to elucidate the essential quality of existence as co-existence: “the 
primordial, ontological condition of being-with or being-together” (Nancy 2000, xvi). 
Nancy suggests that Heidegger's ontological project must become a “social ontology,” 
where  the  question  of  our  being-with  has  primary  status.  He  is  attempting  “a  co-
existential analytic” that has the ambition of being a first philosophy (Critchley 1999, 53). 
Thinking  of  the  with as  such  leads  to  Nancy's  reconsideration  of  the  notion  of 
community: he is critical of Heidegger's subordination of the question of being-with to 
that of community, but instead of abandoning the latter altogether, he merges the notion 
of community with being-with in a new way, beyond Heideggerian destiny and unity. 
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Since, according to Nancy, plurality is not an added but an essential quality of Being, 
“Being 'itself' comes to be defined as relational, as non-absoluteness, and, if you will ... 
as community” (Nancy 1991, 6). This community “unworks” itself rather than referring to 
some  common  essence;  it  is  not  empirical,  i.e.,  the  polis,  but  ontologically  'given': 
primordial community of being-with-each-other that in its essence is the singular plurality 
of being. In a Heideggerian manner Nancy suggests that singularity is always already 
exposed to  the  outside,  and due  to  this  “primordial  structure,  it  is  at  once  detached, 
distinguished, and communitarian. Community is the presentation of the detachment (or 
retrenchment) of this distinction that is not individuation, but finitude compearing [com-
paraît]” (29). Singularity never appears in solitude: by the very fact of being in this world 
(which  by  definition  is  always  plural,  multiple),  singularity  can  only  co-appear. 
“Community means ... that there is no singular being without another singular being, and 
that  there  is,  therefore,  ...  an  originary or  ontological  “sociality”  that  in  its  principle 
extends far beyond the simple theme of man as a  social  being  (the  zoon politikon  is 
secondary to this community)” (28). Community is “the being-ecstatic of Being itself”: 
insofar as something has being, insofar as something exists, it necessarily extends beyond 
itself in ek-stasis, it is relational in its very essence. Even in solitude one is never alone; 
even in death,  since one always dies for someone, one dies in and for the world. An 
empirical community, the polis as a secondary community of zoon politikon (of political 
animals), is what can be called politics (la politique), while the political (le politique) 
refers to this originary “sociality” – the primordial community of Being as essentially 
with.
It is important for Nancy to assert the radical finitude of such community (cf. “finitude 
compearing”):  only  what  exists  exists,  and  nothing  else.  There  is  no  transcendence 
beyond existence, no driving force that guides and manifests itself  through the finite; 
there is no outside of this world. “There is no 'outside', no getting away from the closure 
of  immanence”  (Nancy 2003a,  75–76).  While  Nancy is  critical  of  immanentism,  the 
cause of the totalitarian claim to total representation and the closure of community, and 
while  he  affirms  transcendence,  in  a  sense  of  the  excess  of  representation  (i.e.,  the 
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political  beyond  politics),  he  is  critical  of  the  notion  of  transcendence  in  a  more 
traditional sense, as something that  exists beyond the world, thus beyond the singular 
plurality of being. Consequently,  he affirms the closure of immanence (immanence of 
existence)  in  opposition  to  totalitarian  immanentism  and  theologico-political 
transcendence. 
Sense as the origin of the world: the sharing of Being
If there is nothing beyond this world, what is within it? There is the world and there is 
sense or meaning: the world is sense, and sense is the origin the world. The notion of 
sense or meaning is very important for Nancy because on it he builds the idea of the co-
existence and co-primordiality of being-with. Sense makes sense only when it is shared; 
like language it is always in-common: “There is no meaning if meaning is not shared ... 
because  meaning is itself the sharing of Being”  (Nancy 2000, 2).  Nancy suggests that 
Being does not have meaning but is “given to us as meaning,” that is, meaning is not an 
attribute, an added quality of existence that can be uncovered, but is given to us insofar as 
we can  say  we.  It  is  between us:  “Meaning  is  its  own  communication  or  its  own 
circulation ... and we are this circulation” (2). Another word for this circulation is sharing: 
primordial exposition of all things to the outside, and of the self (ecstatic, human Dasein) 
as “a pre-cognitive affective disposition towards the world”  (Critchley 1999, 64). It is 
interesting  to  note  that  while  Nancy's  co-existential  analytic  is  mostly  dedicated  to 
Dasein and thus 'human community', he does not fail to indicate the 'infinite' character of 
the circulation or sharing. It goes “in all directions at once, in all the directions of all the 
space-times [les espace-temps] opened by presence to presence: all things, all beings, all 
entities, everything past and future, alive, dead, inanimate, stones, plants, nails, gods – 
and 'humans', that is, those who expose sharing and circulation as such by saying 'we', by 
saying we to themselves in all possible senses of that expression, and by saying we for the 
totality  of  all  being”  (Nancy 2000,  3).  Being as  being-with-one-another  concerns  all 
things, the totality of all being; everything that has being circulates as meaning, which is 
the  ultimate picture of  radical  relationality that  Nancy wants  to  illuminate.  However, 
humans occupy a special place in this circulation: they expose sharing by saying (or being 
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able  to  say)  “we” for  the  totality  of  all  being.  I  believe  that  here  we encounter  the 
ontological question of logos and its relation to specifically human existence as political 
co-existence. Moreover, it is not as much the question of logos as speech, but rather as a 
distinctively  human  capacity  for  thought,  which,  as  I  already noted,  in  the  Western 
tradition is inseparable from the question of the political. 
Insofar as we interpret being-with or ontological “sociality” as primordial politics or “the 
political,”  we  also  ought  to  view  thought  as  political  because,  according  to  Nancy, 
thought is essentially in-common.48 He brings up Descartes'  example to show that the 
very truth of  ego sum is possible only because of the “we.” But this plurality does not 
concern  the  possibility  of  recognition  by  the  other,  as  in  Hegel,  because  “before 
recognition there is knowing: knowing without knowledge, and without 'consciousness', 
that I am first of all exposed to the other, and exposed to the exposure of the other. Ego 
sum expositus:...  The  Cartesian  subject  knows himself  to  be  exposed,  and he  knows 
himself  because he is  exposed”  (Nancy 1991,  31).  The Cartesian  ego sum  counts  as 
“evidence” or the first foundation only because it can be recognized by anyone (Nancy 
2000, 66), so even though Descartes in his pursuit of certainty doubts everything, he must 
assume community, “the stage of the 'we',” he must be already exposed or co-appearing 
for his thought to reach certainty in potential  recognition by anyone. In this way, the 
methodological  pretence  of  thought  (of  “thinking with”)  is  “neither  substantialist  nor 
solipsistic: it uncovers the stage of the 'at each time' as our stage, the stage of the 'we'. 
[The] 'theater of the world', as Descartes also liked to call it...” (66). So, thought finds its 
confirmation  and  certainty  on  this  stage  of  singular  plurality;  like  sense  it  gains  its 
meaning due to the essential sharing. Consequently, the political and thought, for Nancy, 
are  at  some  level  indissociable.  However  critical  he  is  of  the  indissociability  of  the 
political and the philosophical (i.e., of the polis and logos) in Western tradition, he is not 
trying  to  dissociate  them  but  to  merely  question,  deconstruct  or  “unwork”  their 
relationship to the point of opening up the thought of community to the new possibilities, 
48 It would be interesting to compare Nancy's vision of the affinity of thought and the political with Alain 
Badiou's view of “politics as thought”  (2005a), both of which imply inseparability of thought and 
politics, but in different ways. 
107
such  as  the  thought  of  community  beyond  any  organicism  (e.g.,  philosophical 
determination of the essence of community in communion). As Ignaas Devish puts it, “if 
we want to frame a political space where the ‘with’ is not an oppressive force anymore, 
we also have to take into account how community is (un)thought, how the Western logos 
is  operating  not  as  an  idealistic  structure  of  our  thinking,  but as  the  material  finite 
condition we live in” (243). Nancy is deconstructing the traditional thought of community 
and  politics,  of  being-together  as  destiny  or  communion,  and  points  toward  the 
'unthought' of this thought – 'the political' as essential being-with, as the unworking of the 
immanentist (totalitarian) horizon of politics. 
For Nancy “the political” designates “not the organization of society but the disposition 
of community as such”: against its dissolution in the sociotechnical, the political “must 
inscribe  the sharing of community”  (1991, 40; my emphasis). This inscription is not a 
project of regaining a communion lost or still to come, but signifies a kind of communal 
ordering  based  on  the  conscious experience  of  sharing.  However,  Nancy  notes,  the 
political as such a conscious experience does not solely depend on so-called “political 
will” (which is often a determining factor in what is called “politics”), but “implies being 
already engaged  in the community, that is to say, undergoing, in whatever manner, the 
experience of community as communication” (40; my emphasis). Here we can note how 
in his definition of the political Nancy basically engages with two principles, reminiscent 
of  those  found  in  other  post-foundational  thinkers:  the  political  is  defined  by  the 
correlation between the conscious inscription of the unconscious principle of sharing and 
the consequent and never-ending interruption (or in Nancy's words “unworking”) of this 
conscious ordering by the unconscious or the primordial being-with (as “being already 
engaged in the community”). 
The political as collective unconscious
We can trace the 'identification' of the political as being-with with the unconscious in 
Nancy's  engagement  with  psychoanalysis  in  The  Sense  of  the  World (1997,  46-49). 
Acknowledging  Jacques  Lacan's  contribution,  Nancy  writes  that  “the  'unconscious' 
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designates  ...  the  inexhaustible,  interminable  swarming  of  significations  that  are  not 
organized  around  a  sense  but,  rather,  proceed  from a  significance  or  signifyingness 
[signifiance]  that  whirls  with  a  quasi-Brownian  motion49 around  a  void  point  of 
dispersion,  circulating  in  a  condition  of  simultaneous,  concurrent,  and  contradictory 
affirmation, and having no point of perspective other that the void of truth at their core...” 
(46-47).  The  unconscious  is  a  swarming  of  significations  around  a  void,  and  this  is 
exactly what,  according to psychoanalysis,  the subject must become able to bear:  the 
simultaneity of contradictory affirmation. I suggest that Nancy undertakes this task on the 
scale of the 'collective' unconscious and its 'subject' – community. The whirling of the 
unconscious and circulation of contradictory significations is evocative of what Nancy 
says about meaning: it is its own circulation, and “we” are this circulation. Furthermore, 
the  “we”  here  stands  for  the  singular  plurality  of  being  –  the  basic  contradictory 
affirmation that community needs to become able to sustain. 
The unconscious is the world without a centre, the world that revolves around nothing: it 
is “not at all another consciousness or a negative consciousness, but merely the world 
itself. The unconscious is the world as totality of signifiability, organized around nothing 
other that its own opening. For psychoanalysis, this opening opens on nothing...” (Nancy 
1997, 47). The unconscious or the world, is an open totality: organized around its point of 
irreconciliation, the void. This opening as an essential feature of the world-unconscious 
translates into the thought of community: as “transcendental of the polis,” being-together 
is  “not  an organicism, whether  that  of  a  harmony or  of  a  communion,  nor  that  of  a 
distribution of functions and differences. But no more is it an anarchy. It is the an-archy 
of  the  archè  itself”  (Lacoue-Labarthe  and  Nancy  1997,  119).  Being-together  as  the 
primordial political is defined by its opening, its absence of a final ground or foundational 
principle. It is the unconscious of the polis, its an-archic archè: “being-in-common [être-
en-commun] is very much the concern of psychoanalysis (it is the “unconscious”), and 
49 Brownian motion is a phenomenon whereby small particles suspended in a liquid or fluid tend to move 
in pseudo-random or stochastic  (non-deterministic)  paths  through the  liquid,  even  if  the liquid in 
question  is  calm.  It  is  interesting  to  note  how  'fluidity'  finds  its  way  into  Nancy's  view  of  the 
unconscious. As I noted in the previous section, the unconscious is often metaphorically referred to in 
terms  of  a  liquid,  e.g.,  the  sea.  In  Nancy's  case,  the  “quasi-Brownian  motion”  represents  the 
'movement' of the unconscious: the whirling of a significance around a void. 
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this is why psychoanalysis is a privileged witness or symptom of the end of the world-
cosmos and the birth  of  the  world  ”  (Nancy 1997,  48).  While  the world-cosmos,  by 
definition, is organized around an  archè, the view of the world, which Nancy presents 
here, affirms the nothingness or the void as its 'centring' principle or, in other words, it 
affirms the irreducible plurality of archè as the plurality of the origins of the world. 
The play of “the political difference” (as the correlation of politics and the political) in 
Nancy parallels the play between consciousness and the unconscious (also found in other 
post-foundational thinkers): the political as community organized around the  conscious 
experience  of  sharing  is  necessarily  “grounded”  in  the  political  –  the  unconscious 
disposition of community as such, or being-with. Nancy, then, uses “the political” in two 
ways,  which  are  inseparable  from  each  other:  the  political  as  ontic  or  conscious 
organization  of  community  that  takes  into  account  or  springs  from  the  ontological 
principle of the political as being-together (the unconscious). The former sense of the 
political  is  close  to  what  would  be  usually  called  'politics',  but  it  seems  that  Nancy 
reserves this term mostly for designating the traditional view of politics as the polis, or 
technosocial. However, he would sometimes use the term 'politics' to speak of his vision 
of “'the political' as the  place of the in-common;” for example, he writes that “politics 
must be understood as the specific  place for the articulation of a nonunity [of the an-
archic archè]”  (2010b, 51; my emphasis). Consequently, we can identify two correlated 
registers of the political in Nancy, rather than strictly two correlated terms (i.e., politics 
and the political) since their usage is not consistent throughout his works. 
These two principles can be identified as the fluid and the rigid or rather,  if  we use 
Nancy's  own  words,  as  the  undifferentiated  and  the  punctual,  or  the  play  between 
disappearance  and  appearance.  In  order  to  clarify  his  view  of  the  political  as  the 
“unconscious” or the fluid, undifferentiated principle, Nancy compares and opposes it to 
love. He warns us that “[t]he political ... must not be the assumption or the work of love 
or of death” (Nancy 1991, 40), and further explains that “[t]he political is the place of the 
in-common [le lieu de l'en-commun] as such ... the place of being-together [le lieu de 
110
l'être-ensemble],”  while  love  is  “the  place  of  being-with  [l'être-avec]”  (Nancy 1997, 
88).50 The “with” of love, according to Nancy, refers to “a contradiction as such..., played 
out between two punctualities;” two in the sense of “everyone for him- or herself, none 
being reducible either to the self or to a third term” (88). Thus is the formula of love. 
Love for Nancy appears to be on the side of truth (or rather the play of truth between two 
truths). Truth is punctual, a point of fixation or certainty, and consequently it is at the 
limit of sense, because sense is always in-between, and thus it is the prerogative of the 
political. Insofar as existence “does not take place for one alone or for two but for many,” 
it  is  in-common  or  as  being-together  it  is  essentially  political.  For  the  political  or 
together,  contrary  to  the  with of  love,  “the  common  concern,  beyond  'two,'  is  the 
numerous as such and even in principle the innumerable...” (88). So, while love is binary, 
the political  involves the innumerable:  the open totality of the world that has infinite 
number of singular plural origins, and thus refuses to differentiate itself or to account for 
itself. The political, consequently, as the place of the in-common, is basically the place of 
“indistinct anonymity whose grouping is given, while its tie [lien] properly so-called is 
not” (88). The appraisal of such anonymity is suggestive of Nancy's initial task of re-
writing  Heidegger's  Being  and  Time:  while  the  latter  considers  the  anonymity  of 
“anyone” to be the sign of the inauthentic being-with, Nancy suggests that the genuine 
philosophical radicality of Heidegger's work lies precisely in the existential analytic of 
such inauthenticity (cf. Critchley 1999, 54). 
Love and the political are opposed to each other as “pure truth”51 (“punctuality, myth”) is 
opposed to “pure sense” (“undifferentiated and vague being-toward”) (Nancy 1997, 89). 
These two principles, in order to last, must penetrate each other: love must come to make 
sense and the political must punctuate itself into myth. “For this reason, they have been 
set up, in our tradition, as two interconnected and antagonistic paradigms, each exposed, 
50 It is interesting to note that in  The Sense of the World (1997) Nancy differentiates between 'being-
together' and 'being-with' as the places of the political and of love, accordingly. However, in  Being 
Singular  Plural (2000) he  uses  these  two  notions  interchangeably,  they  both  refer  to  the  same 
condition: “the primordial, ontological condition of being-with [l'être-avec] or being-together [l'être-
ensemble]” (xvi). 
51 An interesting comparison emerges again between Nancy and Badiou: while the former opposes truth  
to the political, Badiou defines politics as “truth procedure” (2005a). 
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in a sense, to the other, each attracting and repelling the other” (89).  'The punctual' and 
'the undifferentiated' represent two “registers” of the political in a more general sense: as 
being-with and being-together that come together in the world, or as the world formed 
through the relation of repulsion and attraction.52 They are essentially correlated. This 
correlation can be further explicated as the play between not only two principles, but also 
two 'modes of presence' – appearance and disappearance, which again points us toward 
the  relation  between  consciousness  and  the  unconscious.  This  play  is  apparent,  for 
example, in Nancy's conception of community as inoperative, that is, 'ordered' around its 
own unworking, as well as in his conception of singularity that is always 'dissolved' in an 
undifferentiated and vague being-together (i.e., singular plurality). “...[T]he singular only 
has a place when it has place. It is bound up with a sudden  appearance that implies a 
correlative  and consecutive  – in  truth,  a  quasi-simultaneous  –  disappearance (Nancy 
2003b, 101; my emphasis). So, I suggest that the play of correlation is characteristic of 
Nancy's  thought,  since  it  contains  at  its  heart  the  unbreakable  relations  between,  for 
example,  the  given  and  the  “not,”  presence  and  absence,  archè  and  an-archy,  
consciousness  and  the  unconscious,  binary  and  innumerable,  punctual  and 
undifferentiated, singular and plural, all of which define existence at large. Furthermore, 
Nancy's work is historically conditioned: as I showed above, he situates his project of 
retreating or  rethinking the political  against  the background of  the modern retreat  or 
withdrawal  of  the  political  as  totality.  This  opposition is  not  just  an incidental  but  a 
necessary condition for the positive retreating of the political. 
Advent of the unpolitical: the limits of the political totality
Is  there  something  beyond  this  correlation,  beyond  the  endless  play  of  the 
undifferentiated and the punctual, of repulsion and attraction? Not likely, insofar as Being 
52 A good example of such relation can be found in Freud's psychoanalysis, specifically in his analysis of  
relationship between the primary processes of  an unbound energy and the secondary processes  of 
bound energy, or of consciousness and the unconscious, but also in the Romantic roots of the Freudian 
“invention.” For example, Friedrich Schelling in his third version of The Ages of the World speaks of 
the existence of an “eternal antithesis” of two principles, two conflicting “modes of activity.” One is  
“outpouring, outstretching,  self-giving being,” it  is  formless  and freely mobile,  and the other  is  a  
“force of selfhood, of retreat into self,” of inhibition and repression (2000, 6). 
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is singular plural: being-with is itself “a third” term that defines existence as such. This 
question  is  similar  to  the  one  posed  to  other  thinkers  of  the  political,  especially  to 
Schmitt: is there a place for the neutral or the unpolitical as such (which is not the same 
as apoliticism or apathy)? In Schmitt's case I have come to the conclusion that his view of 
the  political  does  not  leave  room for  the  unpolitical  as  such  beyond  the  very much 
despised “neutral sphere” of liberalism or beyond the exception. Nancy has a different 
view of the exception; for him is it everywhere, it  is coextensive with existence, “the 
'ordinary' is always exceptional” (Nancy 2000, 10). Each singularity is an exception, thus 
the rule of “a universal coexception” (Nancy 2003b, 104).53 For Nancy, then, the question 
of the unpolitical should be posed differently; not in terms of the relationship between the 
neutral,  the  political  and  the  exception,  but  in  terms  of  the  limits  of  being-with  as 
primordial  politics,  as well  as of the limits  of thought,  inasmuch as the political  and 
thought are at some level indistinguishable. 
The  with for Nancy is  “a third” indicative of the common concern beyond the 'two,' 
beyond the simple distinction of self and other, as in the case of love (but also as in the 
case of Schmitt's friend and enemy distinction). It is the place of the political as such, and 
as long as being is essentially singular plural or in-common, this very being is essentially 
political.  As  a  result,  I  contend  that  Nancy in  his  radical  rethinking  of  relationality 
institutes a correlative thought of the political that exhibits a totalizing ambition: it leaves 
no room for the thought of the unpolitical. Simon Critchley makes a similar point about 
Nancy's project; he suggests that Nancy presents being-with in “absolutist terms,” as the 
“must” for thought (Critchley 1999, 59).54 But “[p]erhaps, the co-existential structures of 
being-with  overlay  a  prior  level  of  'being-without',  a  being-without  the  other  that  is 
without being” (66). More than that, I argue that as long as thought itself is subjected to 
53 For further discussion of Nancy's view of the exception and its comparison with Schmitt's see, for 
example, Ojakangas (2005a).
54 “Comparution  means  that  the  'appearing'  –  the  fact  of  the  world,  of  coming into  the  world,  the  
symbolic constitution of the real – is inseparable from the cum, from the with. It is here that we can 
begin to detect a (or the) fundamental ontological  structure,  described in absolutist terms with yet  
another  il  faut,  'Que l'être, absolument,  est être-avec, voilà ce qu'il  nous faut penser' ('That being,  
absolutely, is being-with, this is what we must think') (83-84). As Nancy rather candidly puts it in the 
penultimate paragraph of his book on Hegel, 'L'absolu est entre nous' (Nancy 1997, 117)” (Critchley 
1999, 59).
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the imperative of the with, it fails to think that which is without (leaving it unthought). I 
agree with Critchley who suggests that it is a matter “not of thinking without the 'with',  
but of thinking the 'without' within this 'with'” (66). That is, it is a matter of thinking the 
unpolitical, the radical outside of the political totality manifest in the correlation between 
the primordial  politics of being-with and the political  as conscious inscription of this 
ontological sharing. 
Does Nancy conceive of anything akin to this unpolitical? Certainly not in relation to the 
primordial ontological structure of being-with. However, as I mentioned at the beginning, 
there is a sense in Nancy of something beyond politics: distinct forms or figures of being-
together.  When  Nancy  asks  himself  whether  today  we  are  free  from  the  statement 
“everything is political” (due to the retreat of the political), his answer is uncertain. This 
phrase, he writes, “no doubt constituted and consolidated the horizon itself [the horizon 
of our thinking] during a very long period from 1789, perhaps, right up to our own time,  
though we ourselves are unable to determine whether 'our own time' is still circumscribed 
by this horizon” (2010b, 45). I sense that we are indeed still within this horizon. First, the 
very energy of the contemporary critique is dependent upon the opposition toward this 
horizon,  this  is  what  I  referred to  as  its  historical  conditioning.  Second,  this  critique 
results  in  a  new,  ontological  totality  of  the  political  (or  primordial  politics)  that 
acknowledges  its  void  but  still  leaves  little  room for  thought  of  the  radical  outside. 
Nancy's thought is situated within this horizon or, to use Foucaultian notion, this modern 
episteme, from which we, and our critical thinking, are not fully liberated. Nevertheless, 
there is a sense of the advent of the thought of the radical 'beyond' of the political and, in 
this respect, contemporary thought stands in the doorway, on the threshold. 
Nancy is hesitant to cross this  threshold: against  the background of a quasi-totalising 
ontology of the political, there is an attempt to delimit or “distinguish politics,” but the 
question  of  the  limits  of  the  political  as  the  real  limits  of  thought  is  not  addressed 
effectively. In his attempt to distinguish politics, Nancy proclaims that “[p]olitics is born 
in the separation between itself and another order ... (through ... art, love, thought, and so 
on)” (2010c, 18), that order whose 'task' is to give figure or form to the sharing or to the 
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common. Thus, Nancy argues that initially politics, as well as philosophy, is founded “in 
the field of an essential withdrawing: that of the gods, that of being-together (the gods 
were custodians of the totality and the totality was assembled by their own gods), or, to 
put it better, in the withdrawal of presence” (Esposito and Nancy 2010, 76). Politics is, by 
definition, a continuous withdrawal from the representation of being-together, from the 
in-common  as  totality.  Consequently,  it  is  the  space  of  preservation  of  the 
incommensurability between multiple senses of sharing (produced, again, in the place or 
experience  of  art,  love,  thought,  etc.).  Politics  is  the  space  of  nonunity.  While  it  is 
distinguished or separated from other registers of experience, politics “gives them their 
space and possibility”  (Nancy 2010c, 26), meaning that even though politics does not 
subsume them, it conditions and prepares space for them, thus revealing its ultimate and 
unbreakable relation with them. Consequently,  Nancy suggests that what lies 'beyond' 
politics is not another (e.g., a- or anti-political) reality that takes responsibility for the in-
common,  but  rather  the impossibility of any unitary representation.  “Politics must  be 
understood through a distinction from – and a relation with – that which cannot and must 
not be assumed by it,  not, to be sure, because this should be assumed by some other 
activity (art or religion, love, subjectivity, thought ... ), but because this must be taken 
charge of by all and by each in ways that must remain diverse, indeed divergent, multiple, 
even heterogeneous” (21). Sharing happens through a variety of experiences that intersect 
in the political space. As a result, for Nancy, politics (as the space of such sharing) stands 
on guard against the reduction of this heterogeneity to a specific reality, unitary principle 
or symbol. However, 'politics' does not appear to be radically distinguished from itself: it 
remains ultimately attached to 'the political', which defines or encompasses 'everything' in 
the open ontological system. In Nancy's words, “'everything is political' ... – in a sense 
that is neither that of political theology nor political economy – insofar as the everything 
[le “tout”] can be neither total nor totalized in any way”  (Nancy 2010b, 51). The 're-
treated' political is presented by Nancy as the condition of possibility of 'everything'. In 
this way, it remains unclear how anything can be radically outside of politics, how this 
distinction is not just another kind of political distinction, or how this other order is really 
unpolitical. It seems that as long as being is essentially with, and the real “without” is not  
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acknowledged, and insofar as leaving the “world,” in Nancy's sense, remains 'forbidden' 
or merely unthought, politics remains not radically distinguished, but maintains itself as a 
primordial totality (however open), especially as it subordinates the ontic other (who is 
simply  outside  the  walls  of  the  city)  to  the  ontological  otherness-difference  or  the 
political as the place of being-together (cf. Critchley 1999, 64). 
Furthermore, for Nancy,  politics is “the place of an 'in common' as such,” “the specific 
place for the articulation of a non-unity,” “a place of detotalization” where everything 
passes, meets up or crosses paths  (2010b, 50–51). “The in-common of the city has no 
identity other than the space in which the citizens cross each other's paths” (1997, 104). 
In other words, everything shares the political space and is shared (as sense) in this space, 
while this space itself is not everything – a nonunity. “Politics is in charge of space and of 
spacing (of space-time), but not in charge of figuring” (Nancy 2010b, 50). Everything is 
conditioned  by  it  and  gains  its  form  or  figure  through  it,  though  politics  itself  is 
figureless. What figures or gives form to the sharing is exactly not politics, but the “other 
places of existence [...] where incommensurability is in some way formed and presented: 
they can go by the names 'art', 'religion', 'thought', 'science', 'ethics', 'conduct', 'exchange', 
'production',  'love',  'war',  'kinship',  'intoxication'”  (50).  These  other  places  are  distinct 
from politics, however,  they are conditioned by it:  politics guarantees,  without laying 
claim to it,  the sharing out of the incalculable.  The city is a multiple localization, the 
space of circulation and sharing (Nancy 1997, 104). The polis, then, is not the figure of 
the political but only its space that, nevertheless, it is 'forbidden' to leave. “[T]he polis is 
only the place from where (rather than 'where'), the place from which – though without  
leaving it, without leaving the world that conjoins cities, nations, peoples, and states – it 
is possible to sketch out, to paint, to dream, to sing, to think, to feel a 'good life' [where 
'good' is 'not determined in any way, by any figure or under any concept']”  (2010c, 27; 
my emphasis). I believe, that it is precisely this “leaving” (cf. Dubreuil 2006) that must 
be accomplished for the political to finally resolve its totalizing ambition and to give way 
to the unpolitical. In order to approach the unpolitical, what remains to be thought, then, 
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are the real limits  of thought,  the 'without'  of being-with,  the 'non-relation'  of radical 
relationality, and a possibility of leaving the polis. 
***
It  is my contention that a strain of contemporary political  thought centred around the 
conceptual  distinction  between  politics and  the  political  is  characterized  by  two 
tendencies:  correlation  and  totalizing  ambition.  Drawing  on  Quentin  Meillassoux's 
critique  of  correlationism,  I  reached  a  conclusion  that  conception  of  the  political  in 
opposition to the traditional, specifically liberal, view of politics-as-state is necessarily 
attached to what it wants to dismiss. In this way, contemporary thought of the political is 
historically attached to liberalism; moreover, in the endeavour to take politics beyond the 
state, this thought remains negatively attached to its predecessor. Furthermore, within the 
various conceptions of the political we can note a correlation: many authors recognize the 
distinction  between  two principles  or  two modes  of  political  matter  (fluid  and  rigid, 
mobile and immobile, unconscious and conscious, invisible and visible, etc). These two 
principles are conceived as inseparable or correlated, as the essential parts of the political 
difference. As I have shown, in Schmitt, the political is opposed and correlated to the 
state. In Foucault, politics in the strict sense, as the struggle for power and resistance, is 
correlated with politics as the institutional crystallization of the power game. Rancière, in 
this regard, distinguishes between the police order and politics 'proper' that necessarily 
emerges as a reaction to the wrong upon which policing relies. For Nancy, politics, as 
community  organized  around  the  conscious  experience  of  sharing,  is  necessarily 
correlated to and emerges from the political – the unconscious disposition of community 
as such, or being-with. 
As a result of the correlation, the exteriority of 'politics' remains relative or bracketed; 
and, in this way, the political exhibits its totalizing ambition. There seems to be no place 
for the unpolitical, the radical outside of politics. The unpolitical is only acknowledged 
negatively,  or  as  reality  that  presents  itself  only in  the  form of  the  exception,  or  as 
experience and practice that can be hardly sustained as such and thus is in a need of the  
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political inscription. Like the neutral in Schmitt, the unpolitical remains overshadowed by 
the concept of the political. Like the 'outside' of politics in Foucault, the unpolitical is not 
radically affirmed. Insofar as politics is born with resistance to power, the positive form 
of resistance (the practice of care of the self) is, by definition, involved in the game of 
power and, thus, it remains essentially political. Like 'the part of no part' and the principle 
of  equality  in  Rancière,  the  unpolitical,  conceived  as  a  negative  and  insufficient 
experience, requires politicization. Like Nancy' politics that, supposedly, emerges through 
the distinction from the non-political,  but essentially underlies  the very possibility of 
relationality.  As a result,  unpolitical experience is not radically distinguished from the 
political; it remains ultimately subjected to the political space that pretends to condition 
or 'contain' all encounters.
My critique of correlation and totalizing ambition of the political difference, I believe, 
suggests at least two tasks for further investigation.  First,  this critique illuminates the 
essential co-belonging of politics-as-state and the political; in other words, it points to the 
fact that many contemporary theories fail in their attempt to effectively rethink politics 
beyond the state. As a result, in order to extend the thought of politics beyond the state, 
the critique of correlation has to be taken into account. This is a political task for political  
thought. Second, the evident absence of the unpolitical as such, the radical outside or the 
“great outdoors” of politics, calls for a different project, which is not exactly political and 
might  not  even be a  project  for political  thought.  This is  the task I  undertake in  the 
following chapters: to think the unpolitical as such, of 'life beyond politics'. While the 
thinkers, discussed above, focus their efforts on the question of the primacy and 'essence' 
of the political and, thus, approach the unpolitical only with their back to it, in the next 
chapter, I will look at the contemporary attempts to confront the unpolitical directly, with 
a deliberate purpose of limiting politics.
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Chapter II. Confronting the Unpolitical: 
The Categories of the “Impolitical” and “Bare Life”
[F]or politics is a terrible force: if one only knows  
about it, one has already succumbed to it. One has  
lost one’s innocence.
Thomas Mann
This  world is uninhabitable. That is why we have  
to flee to the next. But the door is shut. What a lot  
of knocking is required before it opens!
Simone Weil
What is beyond politics and the political? And how is it possible to think this outside, the  
unpolitical,  positively,  without  getting  trapped  in  the  correlation  of  the  political 
difference? These are the general questions that will guide my discussion in the present 
and the following chapter. The question of being outside politics, primarily in the terms 
of a natural allocation of duties, deliberate apoliticism or contemplative withdrawal, has 
consistently been present in political philosophy, at least since Plato and Aristotle. For 
example, the distinctions between  oikos and  polis,  theoria and  praxis,  bios theoretikos  
and  bios  politikos,  vita  contemplativa  and  vita  activa  have  contributed  to  the 
establishment of a fairly rigid delimitation of the political and non-political spheres of 
human activity. Furthermore, liberal development of the ancient conceptual distinctions 
resulted, again, in a more or less clear understanding of what constitutes the space of 
politics  (the  public  aspect  of  social  relationships)  and  what  must  remain  essentially 
apolitical, confined to private concerns. Thus, the distinction between politics and non-
politics is established in correspondence with a distinction of the outer and inner aspects 
of human life. Ultimately, the modern individual is split between the rational, outward-
oriented activity that, in the interaction with others, constitutes politics, and the inner 
119
activity of his 'soul', 'spirit', passion or emotion,55 as well as the mundane necessities of 
everyday life, that remain non-political insofar as they do not enter the domain of public 
rational deliberation about the common good.
As I showed in the previous chapter, these traditional distinctions between what is politics 
and  what  is  non-political  have  been  widely  challenged  and  rethought  within 
contemporary political theory. Politics is no longer strictly confined to the public sphere 
and  the  domain  of  state  activities  but  extends  toward  what  once  was  considered  its 
outside:  economy,  passions,  desires,  conflicts,  etc.  As  a  result,  politics  consumes 
relationality in its generality and leaves no room for the radical unpolitical.  However, 
despite the fact that politics is no longer clearly distinguished from the non-political, the 
ghost of the latter lingers on. As I have argued, something like the 'unpolitical'  keeps 
reappearing negatively, as a side-note of political theory and its concerns, in the form of, 
for example, the imminent threat of depoliticization or the exception. In a nutshell, in its 
attempt  at  rethinking  politics,  contemporary  political  thought  turns  its  back  on  the 
unpolitical. 
Nevertheless,  two  instances  of  thinking  or  directly  confronting  something  like  the 
unpolitical stand out against this background. First is the category of  “the impolitical” 
(l'impolitico),  developed  by  Italian  political  thinkers  Massimo  Cacciari  and  Roberto 
Esposito. Second is the notion of  “bare life” (nuda vita) formulated by another Italian 
thinker Giorgio Agamben. Overall, it seems that the emergence of questions in political 
theory  directly addressing  the  outside  of  politics  is  somehow  specific  to  the  Italian 
intellectual landscape. This can be partially explained, perhaps, by the events in the post-
WWII Italian history, including the spread and popularity of Marxist ideas as well as the 
operaismo movement, and consequent radical politico-philosophical developments (often 
referred  to  as  “the  Italian  difference”)  such  as,  for  instance,  Paolo  Virno's  (1996) 
“political theory of exodus.”56 Cacciari's, Esposito's and Agamben's engagement with the 
55 Consider, for example, the attention to such apolitical realities of something like the inner spirit in the 
Romantics.  This  Romantic  theme  of  apolitical  purity  can  be  also  traced  in  Thomas  Mann's 
Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man), to which I will return below.
56 For a  further  discussion of  “the Italian difference” see,  for  example,  Chiesa and Toscano  (2009), 
Lotringer and Marazzi (1980), Virno and Hardt (1996).
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impolitical emerge within the context of so-called “negative” or “weak” thought in Italy, 
prepared by these political and philosophical movements. 
In this respect, even though Cacciari's and, later, Esposito's notion of the impolitical can 
be described as the instances of negative politics, a significant positive element is present 
in  their  rendering  of  this  notion,  which  gives  us  a  valuable  insight  into  what  may 
constitute a positive account or thought of the unpolitical as the radical outside of politics. 
First  of all,  the very name that Cacciari  gives to the excess of modern politics – the 
impolitical – is indicative of his intention to not submit it  to the political,  both in its 
essence and in its function. The ultimate task that Cacciari undertakes is to displace the 
political (understood as the state) as the value of modern society. The modern valorization 
of the political extends so far as to penetrate all relationships and aspects of human life, 
and to define them in political  terms. As a result,  Cacciari  proposes a critique of the 
political and its value through the impolitical perspective. The latter is there to remind the 
political of its essential finitude and absence of foundation. What we see here is a reversal 
of the perspective from which the excess of politics is addressed: the value of politics and 
its primacy with respect to the impolitical is challenged. The impolitical is no longer a 
side-note  of  the  political  but  constitutes  the way  of  transition  from  one  political 
'consciousness' to another. Like many post-foundational thinkers, Cacciari still wants to 
attain a kind of new politics, i.e., “grand politics” based on the Nietzschean will to power, 
but  a  passage  to  these  politics  is  essentially  impolitical.  In  sum,  Cacciari  presents  a 
distinctively positive understanding of the impolitical, insofar as it is not something to be 
feared  and  eliminated  but,  rather,  cherished.  Esposito's  account  of  the  impolitical  is 
similar to Cacciari's in its positivity: it is conceived of as a tonality, a way of looking at 
the political from its limits. The impolitical gaze is directed at the political and constitutes 
its critique. As in Cacciari, the political is neither prior nor constitutive of the impolitical.  
On the contrary, the impolitical is called to constitute the 'authentic' politics by bringing 
to the attention of the modern political its essential inessentiality or the absence of its 
foundation (previously found in the idea of representation and in political theology). The 
political  no  longer  projects  its  condescending  gaze  upon  the  impolitical  and  thus, 
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obscures it; in Esposito, the impolitical becomes illuminated and even assumes a certain 
primacy in relation to the political.
The  primary aim of  this  chapter,  then,  is  to  reverse  the  perspective  from which  the 
unpolitical is viewed, that is, to challenge the value and primacy of politics through a 
reading of Cacciari and Esposito on the impolitical. In other words, I will bring forth and 
elucidate the positive aspect of the impolitical in the works of Cacciari and Esposito in 
order to create the ground for my further discussion of the unpolitical as such. However, I 
will  suggest  in  this  respect,  that  despite  its  positivity,  the  notion  of  the  impolitical  
ultimately fails to account for the radical outside of politics. As a result, throughout the 
analysis of Cacciari's and Esposito's works, I will point out the insufficiency of their view 
of the impolitical and show that both of these authors eventually submit or reduce the 
impolitical  to  a  function  of  transformation  of  the  political,  and  thus,  resemble  the 
insufficiency  of  the  post-foundational  rethinking  of  politics.  Furthermore,  another 
drawback of the impolitical, as I will discuss, lies in its confinement to the domain of 
thought or theoretical vision. The 'essence' of the impolitical is addressed primarily in 
terms of a critique of politics and does not extend toward considerations of the impolitical 
as experience.
Critical assessment of Cacciari's and Esposito's thought of the impolitical will be further 
enriched by the analysis of another prominent concept in political thought of the last two 
decades – “bare life,” which Giorgio Agamben presents as the only available impolitical  
experience  today.  Sheldon Wolin writes that “political philosophy constitutes a form of 
'seeing' political phenomena and that the way in which the phenomena will be visualized 
depends in large measure on where the viewer 'stands'” (2004, 17; my emphasis). It is my 
suggestion that an exchange between an “impolitical gaze,” presented by Esposito, and 
“bare life” in Agamben addresses this  particular interplay of 'seeing'  and 'standing'  in 
political  thought:  the  relation  between  a  perspective  and  a  place  that  the  observer 
occupies. Can this place be located or is it only an ontological anomaly? I believe that 
Agamben  raises  this  question  through  the  superimposition  of  the  notions  of  “the 
impolitical” and “bare life.” Life here stands for the 'place' from where the vision arises 
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and, as a result,  it  engages the experiential aspect of the impolitical,  which Esposito's 
account  seems  to  be  lacking.  Another  important  difference  between  these  two 
engagements with the impolitical lies in Agamben's explicitly negative account of this 
notion. While Agamben  speaks of “bare life” as the “zone of indistinction” of politics, 
consequently raising the question of the impolitical in terms of the experience of life as 
well as positive  space that it occupies, I will argue that he reduces this life to a purely 
negative experience that has to be eliminated or, rather, adjusted in the advent of new 
politics.  The  impolitical,  for  Agamben,  remains  the  threat  against  which  the  coming 
politics defines its tasks. 
Consequently, the second aim of this chapter is to present an outline of the impolitical in 
Agamben in terms of bare life and to explicate its necessary, structural negativity in his 
account of the origins of Western (bio)politics. Furthermore, I will maintain that despite 
the persistent negativity attributed to the impolitical, Agamben's notion of “form-of-life” 
can  be  polemically  interpreted  as  an  account  of  the  unpolitical  as  such.  Despite 
Agamben's  proclamation  of  form-of-life  as  essentially  political,  I  will  show  how  it 
contains the seeds of unpolitical life that extends beyond and even conditions politics. 
However, these intimations of the unpolitical as such are lost by Agamben because, in his 
project, he primarily focuses on the imminent necessity of 'redeeming' politics imposed 
upon us by the horrors of biopolitics. The “coming politics” become the major point of 
concern in Agamben's rethinking of bare life in terms of form-of-life. As I will explain 
below, the 'redemption' of bare life in Agamben happens through the redemption of its 
politicalness, while its radically unpolitical character remains undeveloped. 
The impolitical thought of Cacciari, Esposito and Agamben not only forms the basis for 
my further discussion of the unpolitical, but in its very appearance, I believe, it signals 
the advent of the unpolitical in contemporary theory. More and more, as we will discover, 
this advent is manifest in the emergence of the new “philosophies” of life that take this 
experience beyond a negative definition, as a struggle with death, toward a more positive 
view of life as the indivisible experience of living. Thus, at the end of this chapter I will 
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briefly look at some of these theories of life as a precursor to my further engagement with 
life in terms of the unpolitical as such.
2.1. Introducing “Impolitico”: Rejection versus a Critique of the 
Political
The notion  of  the impolitical  (l'impolitico) was introduced into  politico-philosophical 
debate in 1978 by Massimo Cacciari in his essay L'impolitico nietzschiano, translated into 
English as Nietzsche and the Unpolitical (2009a).57 Cacciari's work is important for my 
exploration of the positive account of the unpolitical, since he was the first to employ the 
term independently from the notion of politics or the political.  The unpolitical  is  not 
immediately,  in  its  very  definition,  subsumed  under  the  political  but  signals  the 
recognition of the outside of politics. Through this concept Cacciari tries to outline the 
space of the unpolitical as a space of critical thought or critical engagement with politics,  
as “the radical critique of political reason” (2009b). The unpolitical is a gaze directed at 
politics from its limits or outside. In this way, Cacciari attempts to present a positive 
understanding of the unpolitical, insofar as he suggests that it neither negates the political 
nor  is  simply derived from it.  However,  despite  his  innovative  endeavour,  Cacciari's 
account of the unpolitical remains unsatisfactory inasmuch as he fails to push his own 
conclusions to the limit and place the unpolitical radically beyond the necessary relation 
with politics. It  is,  ultimately,  impolitical rather than  unpolitical.  In the end, as I will 
argue, the work of the unpolitical in Cacciari is reduced to the 'redemption' of politics in 
terms of “grand politics.”  That  is,  the unpolitical  remains primarily a function of the 
transformation of the modern political totality into post-foundational politics of the will 
to power or Nietzschean “grand politics.” As a result, the success but also ultimate lack of 
strength in Cacciari's notion of the unpolitical call for its further rethinking in terms of the 
radical outside of the political. The task of the following discussion of Cacciari's crucial 
essay is, then, to show the development of his notion of the unpolitical, to point out its 
57 I will address below the problem with translating Cacciari's l'impolitico as 'the unpolitical'. For now, 
however, to avoid confusion, I will adhere to this translation of the term. 
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initial positivity but, most importantly, to suggests a critique of his view of the unpolitical 
as a mere function of transformation or deconstruction of politics. 
The unpolitical as a critique and deconstruction of the political
Cacciari  derives  the  term  l'impolitico  from  Thomas  Mann's  provocative  critique  of 
democracy written in 1918  Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen,  published in English as 
Reflections of a Nonpolitical Man (1987). Cacciari's essay starts as a response to Mann's 
reading of Nietzsche as “the symbol of hatred for the political,” as “the center of German 
Kultur precisely because he is unpolitical” (2009a, 93–94). According to Mann, German 
higher culture resists politicization, it is essentially unpolitical, and Nietzsche recognized 
this fact as well (Mann 1987, 78). As such, he, who called himself the “last nonpolitical 
German” is, according to Mann, “a national spokesman” that “concurs precisely with all 
exemplary  German  thought  and  desire”  (175-176).  This  thought  and  desire  are 
unpolitical,  which  in  Mann's  understanding  essentially  corresponds  to  the  rejection, 
refusal or lack of desire for politics. He writes: “I do not want politics. I want objectivity, 
order and decency. If this is philistine, then I want to be a philistine. If it is German, then 
in God's name I want to be called a German...” (189). Such hatred for politics is derived 
from the  very  understanding  of  what  politics  is:  for  Mann,  it  embodied  revolt,  the 
disorder and destruction of traditional values, and contained the danger of a journalistic-
rhetorical vulgarization  (Craig 1995, xi). It is not surprising, then, that Mann identifies 
politics with democracy, a regime where everything is subject to debate and exchange of 
opinion. As a result, his unpolitical rejection of the political domain takes the form of a 
critique of democracy.
According to  Cacciari,  Mann attributes  to  Nietzsche  a  similar  attitude  to  politics:  he 
understands the unpolitical as a rejection of the political dimension, “as the idea of the 
will to power as heroic process of  askesis, of renunciation in the Protestant sense. The 
political  is  for  Mann  a  nonvalue”  (Cacciari  2009a,  94).  The  unpolitical,  then,  is  an 
affirmation of an alternative value or rather of those values the unfolding of which is 
hindered  and  even  perverted  by  politics.  Cacciari  suggests  that  Mann's  Reflections, 
125
especially his use of Nietzsche, raise a number of crucial questions, most importantly, 
“what should we understand by the unpolitical?” and “[w]hat is the 'thing in itself' that 
Nietzsche thinks in the question of the unpolitical?” (94). Cacciari's essay is dedicated to 
outlining “the Nietzschean origins of this process of unpoliticization” (2009b, 261) and to 
carefully distinguishing it from a depoliticization of the Mannian type.
While Mann's reading of Nietzsche is geared toward a rejection of the political, Cacciari 
refuses to identify Nietzsche with such an attitude. He suggests that Mann's interpretation 
relies  on  reduction  and  misunderstanding  of  the  antihistorist  direction  of  Nietzsche's 
thought, meaning that the latter cannot be considered an expression or spokesman of the 
German history and spirit.  Instead  of  standing for  the  German unpolitical  culture,  as 
suggested by Mann, Nietzsche breaks with the tradition by questioning the  meaning of 
the political, instead of merely rejecting politics as something given and obvious. As a 
result, the Nietzschean unpolitical is nothing like heroic askesis or renunciation (i.e., the 
process  of  depoliticization);  it  is  rather  questioning  and  critique  –  “the  work  of 
deconstruction” (Cacciari 2009a, 96). 
What  is  there  to  deconstruct?  According  to  Cacciari,  the  unpolitical  is  the  work  of 
deconstruction of political totality in pursuance of “grand politics.” There are three major 
terms that he utilizes in his analysis of Nietzsche: “the political,” “the unpolitical” and 
“grand politics.” According to Cacciari (and here he is similar to many other political 
thinkers),  modernity  is  characterized  by  the  absolutization  of  the  political:  “[i]n  the 
process of politicization, the political tends to represent itself as total concept. [...] The 
political intervenes everywhere – its logic constitutes the method of any social relation” 
(2009a, 96), it becomes absolute. The situation of total politicization that arises from the 
interaction of multiple forces culminates in modernity in total state. This state is total 
insofar  as  it  presents  itself  as  a  “neutral  [and  thus  only  possible]  form of  political 
organization,”  surpassing  the  historically  determined  work  that  led  to  its  own 
configuration. The modern state proclaims the absolutization of the political: total state 
and total politicization become synonymous. 
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The initial move toward total  politicization,  as well  as the successful coupling of the 
political and the state, become possible due to the theological valorization of the political. 
Cacciari  suggests  that  the  absolutization  of  the  political  (both  in  its  democratic  and 
socialist  version)  relies  on eschatology:  it  “presupposes  a  human nature that  is  to  be 
liberated from the alienation to which the institutions of civilization have presumably 
condemned it”  (Cacciari  2009a,  97).  In  a  semi-religious  manner  it  claims  to  be “the 
redemption of the totality of man, the overcoming of the empirical, contingent immediacy 
of  his  figure”  (97).  The  promise  of  'salvation'  through  politics  (redemption  from 
alienation) forms the ethical foundation of the absolutization of the political proclaimed 
by  the  modern  state.  Such  foundation  facilitates  valorization  of  the  political,  and 
specifically of its greatest expression – the state. “[T]he state […] defines itself as value: 
its functions become values” (96). The state is the token of value, and as such it pretends 
to regulate the totality of exchange, i.e., of social relations. At this point in Cacciari's 
essay an interesting turn occurs that is different from many post-foundational thinkers. 
While the latter in their critique of something like 'inauthentic politics' take recourse to its 
immediate juxtaposition with some 'authentic politics' (thus preserving and reiterating the 
value  of  politics,  i.e.,  the  necessity  of  its  'purification'),  Cacciari,  in  his  reading  of 
Nietzsche,  speaks  of  the unpolitical  as  a  critique of the political.  Eventually he does 
introduce post-foundational or 'authentic' politics in terms of “grand politics,” but it is 
specifically the unpolitical that enables the passage from the total state to grand politics. 
If,  for  the  thinkers  discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  very critique  of  traditional 
politics is itself a political act and cannot be logically otherwise, Cacciari's Nietzschean 
critique  of  the  political  acknowledges  the  unpolitical  as  constitutive  of  the  very 
possibility of this critique. 
The unpolitical is “the critique of the political as affirmation of value” (Cacciari 2009a, 
95). To be more precise, the unpolitical “represents the critique of values on whose bases 
alone  such totality [the  political,  the  state]  is  conceivable”  (97).  It  deconstructs  (i.e., 
exposes)  the  theologico-ethical  foundation  upon  which  this  totality  rests,  and  thus 
devalorizes  the  political,  affirms  its  nontotality  by  pointing  at  the  absence  of  any 
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foundation to guarantee it. We can see clearly here how Cacciari's unpolitical is different 
from Mann's  unpolitische:  it  is not a  rejection but a  critique of the political as value. 
Moreover, Mann's hatred (which is essentially a devalorization) of politics results in the 
subsequent advocacy for (i.e., valorization of) the nonpolitical. In this simple reversal of 
values unpolitische exhibits its dialectical nature: it is still attached to what it rejects, it 
defends the same values that lie at the foundation of politics, however, they appear not to 
be political insofar as they were not yet subject to the process of disenchantment (95). 
Cacciari  argues that the Nietzschean unpolitical,  contrary to Mann's, is not dialectical 
because it does not simply mirror the political and establish itself as an alternative value. 
More than that, it is intrinsically nihilistic and disenchanted, it is the critique of value per 
se. The unpolitical develops separately from both the political and the polar nonpolitical; 
it is “an  analysis  of the authentic  genealogy of the process of  politicization and of the 
premises contained within it of grand politics” (95; my emphasis). The notion of value or 
evaluation is thus alien to the unpolitical  as a critique that embraces the Nietzschean 
method of genealogical analysis. 
The unpolitical as exposition of the internal contradictions of the political
According  to Cacciari,  a  double  tendency  is  apparent  in  modernity:  the  process  of 
politicization and the simultaneous decay of the political as totality due to the internal 
contradictions  of  this  process  that  signal  the  imminent  advent  of  grand politics.  The 
unpolitical, then, performs a double function: first,  it  is a genealogical analysis of the 
political as totality leading to a critique of the values that ground this political; second, it 
is an exposition of the internal contradictions of politicization as well as an exposition of 
the premises of grand politics that become perceptible due to the 'double' decay of the 
political  as  totality.  Cacciari,  partially  relying  on  Nietzsche's  critique,  presents  an 
interesting argument about the self-destructive extension of the political. He suggests that 
we need not fail to see, through an unpolitical perspective, that modern absolutization of 
the political contains its own destruction: it is destined to disappear due to decline of trust 
in absolute authority (e.g., God, the state). “'[Total politicization] is destined to disappear, 
because  its  foundation  disappears,  namely,  trust  in  absolute  authority  and  in  divine 
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truth...' (Human, All Too Human, I:245). […] This undermines from the foundations the 
ancient  'relation of reverence and piety toward the state'”  (97).  Moreover,  democracy 
contributes  to  such  a  “desacralization”  of  the  political  by decentralizing  the  political 
ordering of social life: it grants any subject the 'right' to express and organize its own 
force, thus multiplying the centres of force in the social field. The political is no longer 
reduced to the functions of the state, but is comprised of multiple 'subjects'.
However, Cacciari warns us, such decay of the political as totality, manifest in the decay 
of  the  total  state,  is  filled  with  its  own contradictions.  The  decay,  promoted  by the 
democratic idea, “is at the same time the greatest extension of the political, the perfection 
of  the  Politisierung  [politicization]:  everybody  makes  politics  and  organizes  himself 
politically – but only because the political has lost any aura, because it revealed itself as 
devaluation and despiritualization” (2009a, 98; my emphasis). Instead of depoliticization, 
critique  of  the  total  state  opens  up  the  space  for  further,  even  more  encompassing 
politicization because  from the political as totality (oriented around the state) we move 
toward  the  extension  of  the  political  to  an  individual,  to  “everybody.”  Even  though 
Cacciari  does not really specify what it means to organize oneself politically in such a 
situation, we can infer that at least partially it means the subjection of oneself to self-
policing or ordering. This, I believe, is the meaning of “the perfection of Politisierung” of 
which he speaks. Cacciari's analysis, in a way, is similar to the argument presented in the 
previous chapter: the critique of total politics, specifically the state, does not in itself lead 
to  depoliticization;  on  the  contrary,  it  opens  space  for  even  more  encompassing 
politicization since politics is no longer attached to any proper space or agent, but extends 
to everything and everyone, including (biological)  life itself.  In this regard,  Cacciari's 
analysis  can be compared to Rancière's  and Foucault's.  The greatest  extension of  the 
political that results in the perfection of the  Politisierung, of which Cacciari speaks, is 
similar to Rancière's argument that if everything is political then nothing is, meaning that 
the extension of politics to 'everything' actually signals the decline of authentic 'politics' 
and its substitution by 'the police'. The nature of this policing, as I suggested earlier, is 
best  explained  by  Foucault's  notion  of  biopolitics  and  governmentality.  Foucault's 
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analysis traces the transformation of the sovereign mode of power into the disciplinary 
and biopolitical modes of power in modernity, which is similar to Cacciari's suggestion 
about the real effects of the decay of the total state. The extension of the political, or 
policing, feeds off the lack of the central agent of political action (formerly the state), 
resulting in the construction of a political economy of the body and its discipline, as well 
as proliferation of the population management techniques.
What distinguishes Cacciari's analysis  the most from Rancière's and Foucault's,  is the 
'prognosis' of the fate of the post-state politicization. As a Marxist, Cacciari speaks of the 
emergent contradictions of this 'second-stage' politicization – it contains its own demise: 
“this  very  same  process  that  appears  as  absolutization  of  the  political,  defines  it  in 
actuality as a field of heterogeneous forces, of contradictions – as a space where endless 
differences occur. The absolutization occurs through a loss of centrality and a constant 
weakening  of  the  system.  Far  from  leading  to  unity,  to  common  origins,  the  total 
politicization increases the entropy of the system” (Cacciari 2009a, 97–98). This process 
is  analogous to  imperial  overstretch:  an empire,  as  it  extends by incorporating  many 
'foreign' territories, multiplies local centres of power and eventually becomes ridden with 
multiple  upheavals  and  revolts  leading  to  the  loss  of  control  over  its  own territory. 
Extension of politicization reveals the field of the multiple, heterogeneous and tense force 
relations  that  the  state  once  claimed  to  conceal  in  its  form.  This  further  reveals  the 
political to be a space of contradictions and differences, and no longer the space of total 
ordering. The acknowledgement of the inherent entropy of the political system and the 
multiplicity  of  the  forces  that  constitute  it,  makes  it  no  longer  possible  to  deny the 
conflictual nature of the political. This 'revelation' is similar to the propositions of many 
post-foundational thinkers: the political is defined by multiple conflicts, struggles, desires 
and  passions  rather  than  by  the  necessity  to  reconcile  the  opposites.  Furthermore, 
similarly to Cacciari, they view 'failure' as a defining feature of the political: the process 
of politicization must contain its own limit. 
However, we can note a significant difference concerning the operation and functioning 
of this  failure in Cacciari.  For him, the absolutization of the political  (relying on the 
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unpolitical reflection) conditions or prepares the ground for the passage from the political 
as  totality  (oscillating  around  'the  state')  to  grand  politics  (revolving  around  'will  to 
power'). Even though the former represents a necessary stage on the way to the latter, 
their  co-dependence  does  not  seem to  reproduce  itself  indefinitely,  meaning  that  the 
passage  does  not  endlessly remain  as  such,  but  actually  leads  to  something  like  the 
transformation of the 'political consciousness'. The state can be left behind; as a result,  
grand  politics  is  not  really  correlated  with  the  political.  For  Rancière  and  Foucault, 
representatives of post-foundationalism, the 'failure' of the political does not lead to some 
new  stage  of  'consciousness'  (e.g.,  grand  politics)  but  rather  reproduces  itself  as  an 
inherent characteristic of 'authentic' politics. That is where the correlation is rooted: the 
passage beyond the modern totalization of the political is considered impossible; all we 
can do is endlessly deconstruct (and re-construct)  this  totality,  without rooting out its 
origins, such as a 'secret' dedication to the preservation of the state order. For instance, as 
I showed earlier, Rancière interprets the play between the logics of police and politics as 
mutually necessary, that is, these two realities exist in correlation with each other and 
there is no passage into some other world where their struggle is over. Passage into the 
reality of 'pure' politics or just absence of politics is not considered. Of course, Rancière's 
argument  remains  similar  to  Cacciari's  in  one  major  way:  the  extension  of  policing 
conditions the events of politics in the same way as the absolutization of the political 
conditions grand politics. That is, the contradictions of the political space or the order of 
police  (i.e.,  injustices  brought  upon by the  logic  of  inequality)  call  forth the  acts  of 
politics. As with Rancière and Cacciari, Foucault acknowledges the ever present struggles 
or  inconsistencies  within  the  political  order  (e.g.,  multiple  resistances  and  freedoms 
within biopolitical regime of modernity) that define politics in its proper sense. However, 
he does not envision a passage into a different 'world' due to these contradictions: in the 
end,  there  is  only  the  'recycling'  of  these  resistances,  freedoms  and  lives  in  power 
relations that persist within the current mode of governmentality.
Contrary to  Foucault  and Rancière,  Cacciari  seems to  believe  in  the  possibility  of  a 
Nietzschean-Marxist transformation (or even revolution) of consciousness in which the 
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unpolitical is assigned the leading role. This process is inevitable because the completion 
of politics coincides with its final entropy and thus disappearance (cf. Carrera 2009, 22). 
The unpolitical is “the critical stage of grand politics” (Cacciari 2009a, 96): the crucial 
stage  of  passage  from  'the  political'  into  'grand  politics'  through  the  critique of 
politicization. It points the political to its finitude, to the inevitability of its disappearance. 
Furthermore,  as  a  critique  of  political  totality,  Cacciari  notes,  the  unpolitical  is  not 
something like Marxist “critique of ideology,” which reveals and rejects the political as 
“false consciousness.” As already noted above, the unpolitical is genealogy, the work of 
deconstruction of the totality insofar as it shows that the political is “historically marked 
and produced the forces of its own crisis” (96). The task of the unpolitical, then, lies in 
naming the multiplicity of forces that make up the crisis of the political and, as a result of 
the recognition of this multiplicity, it becomes possible for the unpolitical to critique the 
values on the basis of which alone such totality is conceivable. 
The passage from the modern totality of the political to grand politics
As a result, it is my argument that the unpolitical for Cacciari is primarily defined by its  
function, that is, as an attitude and a critique it is solely oriented toward the facilitation of  
passage from the political to grand politics. He speaks of the unpolitical always in the 
sense of a mediator, stage, passage, etc., which makes it possible to conclude that it is but 
a process with one outcome: politicization of a different kind. “Grand politics has, as its 
condition, the unpolitical acknowledgement of the nontotality of the political: a radical 
critique  to  the  state-worshipers”  (Cacciari  2009a,  102).  The  ultimate  end  of  the 
unpolitical is new politics that is not grounded in any value system and that contains will 
to power at its core. Thus, Cacciari ultimately advocates “politics without foundation” 
(102) that revolves around its own failure, finitude or nontotality. This politics retains at 
its core the  entropy that produced it: while the political aims at centralization and total 
ordering of the energy circulating in the system, grand politics is essentially this entropy 
manifest in the Nietzschean will to power. In this regard, Cacciari's argument is similar to 
that  in  other  post-foundational  projects  where  politics  is  'redeemed'  through  the 
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introduction  of  the  non-ordered,  contingent  and conflictual  components  (an increased 
level of entropy) into its system. 
As  a  result,  I  suggest  that  the  work  of  the  unpolitical  in  Cacciari  is  reduced  to  the 
redemption of 'politics'.  His definition of  the unpolitical  is  purely functional:  it  is  an 
attitude or a critique the task of which is to illuminate the contradictions that arise in the 
field of the political as totality, to deconstruct it and its founding values, to reveal the 
political its finitude and nontotality. The unpolitical is a  nihilistic acknowledgement of 
the loss of the centring principle, of the impossibility of eliminating entropy in politics, 
which ultimately paves the way for the advent of grand politics or, as an attitude, defines 
the new 'consciousness' of politics without foundation. The unpolitical is thus a critical 
distancing from the political,  a  gaze from the margins or, in the words of Alessandro 
Carrera, a “'sublime' limitation of politics” (2009, 17). Cacciari further suggests that the 
recognition of such limitation remains the only option for critical reflection and (political) 
thought  in  the age when the political  and the state  are  no longer  credible:  “the only 
glimmer,  the  only  narrow door  left  to  us  in  the  era  of  the  demythologization of  the 
political, is to keep one's eye's open and to watch and observe well what is going on in 
the world, in order to work out that dissolution of values of the state that is the intuition of 
the 'philosophy of the morning'” (2009a, 103; my emphasis). The unpolitical is both the 
process of “watching” and “observing” as well as of “working out” the deconstruction of 
the values of the state and the political in the wake of the Nietzschean “philosophy of the 
morning” – grand politics, a philosophy of finitude. 
So, the unpolitical is a critique and deconstruction of the political as a value and as a 
totality; it is a gaze from the margins or limits of the political, but most importantly, it is a 
recognition of the very existence of these limits; in other words, it is an affirmation of the 
finitude of the political.  Such affirmation not only destroys the ground of the modern 
politicization but also facilitates the transition toward “politics without foundation.” More 
than  that,  it  seems that  grand politics  itself  is  such a  rejection  of  foundations.  “The 
unpolitical brings the political back to the acknowledgement of its intrinsic nihilism. This 
key direction opens up, above all, by attacking the concepts, the forms, and the conducts 
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that  are  the substance of the political  as  value.  But  this  very same  pars  destruens  is 
already a construction of grand politics insofar as it is a nihilistic devaluation” (Cacciari 
2009a, 96; my emphasis). The unpolitical points out the seeds of grand politics that the 
political supposedly always already contains. The unpolitical destruction of the political 
totality is the construction of a new politics that embraces its finitude, nontotality or void.
This raises a question about the relationship between the unpolitical and grand politics: 
since both are essentially characterized by Cacciari as nihilistic devaluation, can we really 
distinguish them? Can we actually say that the unpolitical is anything more than a mere 
operation or function of grand politics? In the light of these questions, let us reread one of 
Cacciari's  conclusions:  “The unpolitical  in Nietzsche shapes up,  we could say,  as the 
critical stage of grand politics”  (2009a, 96). Earlier, I suggested that we could deduce 
from  this  statement  that  the  unpolitical  is  a  process  of  passage  from  one  political 
'consciousness' to another. However, it seems plausible to argue here that the unpolitical 
is  indeed  nothing  more  than  an  important  stage  of  grand  politics,  meaning  that  the 
unpolitical is essentially just a component of post-foundational politics. The limits, which 
the unpolitical critique points at, are not the 'real' limits of politics, but rather a dividing 
line  between  its  two  modes:  foundational  and  post-foundational  politics.  Unpolitical 
reflection,  then,  refers to an ability to tell  one from the other;  it  does not define and 
construct a space of its  own, be it  an actual material  space,  a territory or a space of 
thought. The unpolitical, as the process of the critique of the political, is grand politics or 
rather  grand  politics  is  itself  always  a  multiplicity  of  processes,  among  which  the 
unpolitical  is  a  'rite  of  passage'  from 'small'  to  'grand'  politics.  In  the  end,  Cacciari 
succeeds  in  showing that  the  Nietzschean unpolitical  proves  to  be  not  a  rejection  of 
politics  (i.e.,  apolitics,  antipolitics,  nonpolitics),  as  Mann interpreted  it  to  be,  but  the 
project of 'redemption' of the political or, in other words, of construction of new, finite 
politics. Alessandro Carrera reaches a similar conclusion when he writes that Nietzsche's 
“unpoliticalness” is not an alignment against  the decadence of politics,  but “the most 
radical criticism of politics. It is, ultimately,  a call for grand politics, which is another 
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name for  total  disenchantment,  accepting nihilism and groundlessness  as  unavoidable 
features” (2009, 22; my emphasis).
Cacciari's Nietzschean unpolitical does not extend beyond politics, but rather partakes in 
its  evolutionary or  even  revolutionary  transformation.  Similar  to  the  correlationist 
political thinkers, Cacciari assigns the unpolitical a place of the outside-within: outside of 
the political due to the critical attitude, but inside 'other', grand politics, as its critical 
stage. This interpretation, I believe, calls for a brief reflection on the translation of the 
Italian term  l'impolitico into English as the  unpolitical.  Alessandro Carrera, the editor, 
and Massimo  Verdicchio, the translator of Cacciari's collection of essays  entitled  The 
Unpolitical: On the Radical Critique of Political Reason, note that they prefer to translate 
l'impolitico as the unpolitical (Carrera 2009, n. 10, 241). Cacciari derives his use of the 
term from Mann's unpolitische, which current English edition translates as nonpolitical, 
yet  Carrera and Verdicchio prefer to adopt Mark Lilla's translation of the term as the 
unpolitical,  which  they  believe  is  closer  both  to  the  German  and  the  Italian  (241). 
However, we do not find any discussion of the reason why they think the  unpolitical 
would best reflect Cacciari's argument. Basically, it seems that Carrera and Verdicchio 
merely prefer the term unpolitical to nonpolitical (the latter, as we saw, is indeed contrary 
to  Cacciari's  argument),  without  considering  an  alternative  to  both  of  them  –  the 
impolitical.  Getting  ahead of  myself,  I  would  like  to  note  that  a  similar  question  of 
translation arises with Roberto Esposito's term l'impolitico, which he explicitly borrows 
from Cacciari. Bruno Bosteels (2010) addresses this problem of translating impolitico as 
either unpolitical or impolitical by examining the Latin root of the prefix 'in-'. The latter, 
he notes,  has both a negative and a more positive connotation (opposed to 'un-'  that, 
supposedly, has only a negative one): negative “as in the existing English term 'impolitic', 
attested  to  for  many centuries  and  meaning  roughly  what  we  would  call  'politically 
incorrect' today,” and positive “as in 'immanence', from the Latin for 'staying or standing 
inside', 'remaining within'” (222). As a result, the translation of impolitico as impolitical, 
rather than unpolitical, better reflects the topology of the outside-within that characterizes 
Cacciari's reading of Nietzsche on the unpolitical. 
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In the end,  it  appears  that  Cacciari's  take on the  unpolitical  is  similar  to  other  post-
foundational thinkers: he assigns to it the place of the outside-within. However, Cacciari's 
political thought does not readily exhibit the correlationist tendency: he does believe in 
and proclaim the inevitable advent of the end of the political and the state, as a result, 'the 
political', of which he is critical, is not involved in the never-ending play with 'other', 
grand politics. The political is finite and destined to disappear to the benefit of 'politics 
without  foundation'.  While the outside of the political  in  post-foundational thought  is 
epitomized in the exception, Cacciari's unpolitical gestures toward a possibility of the real 
limits of political thought and critique: the unpolitical is supposed to signify a space of 
thought  that  is  not  immediately  political,  at  least  not  in  terms  of  the  traditional 
understanding of politics. Nevertheless, this space is re-politicized once politics itself is 
re-defined in terms of grand politics. It is worth noting that even though the outcome of 
Cacciari's reflection is similar to those presented in the first chapter, there is an important 
difference between them: Cacciari's 'invention' of the term itself, which is supposed to 
signify the real limits of politics, raises the question of the political status of thought in a 
new way. If, for the correlationist, thought is not able to reach the outside of politics as 
such, it is always political, Cacciari's unpolitical, as a critical reflection and thought, as 
the work of deconstruction of the political, is presented as such an outside, at least as long 
as we ignore its re-politicization in the service of 'other', nihilistic politics. As a result, 
Cacciari is successful in positing the question of the relationship between politics and 
thought differently, however, in his reflection on the unpolitical he does not seem to go 
beyond the impolitical, i.e., beyond the logic of immanent transcendence or the outside-
within.
Despite its failures, Cacciari's essay Nietzsche and the Unpolitical remains an important 
event in Italian (but not only) political thought: ever since its introduction in 1978 'the 
unpolitical' has become an important concept in Italian thought, as well as a symptom of 
a move of the Italian intellectual landscape (primarily its leftist part) toward “negative” 
(cf. Perry Anderson in Luisetti 2010, 6) or “weak”  (cf. Chiesa and Toscano 2009, 4–5) 
thought.  The  next  to  follow  in  Cacciari's  steps  was  the  Italian  political  philosopher 
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Roberto Esposito, who dedicated much attention to 'the impolitical' in his book Categorie  
dell'impolitico (Categories of the Impolitical) published in 1988, and who ultimately was 
the one to popularize this notion in political theory.58
2.2. The Categories of the Impolitical: Roberto Esposito's 
Philosophy of the Threshold
Roberto  Esposito's  contribution  to  the  thought  of  'the  impolitical'  (l'impolitico)  is 
currently  the  most  prominent  and  has  attracted  much  attention  as  well  as  criticism. 
However,  though  he  acknowledges  Cacciari's  prior  use  of  the  category,  he  does  not 
explicitly  build  his  own  engagement  with  the  impolitical  on  Cacciairi's  work.  The 
importance of Esposito's thought for the present project lies in the fact that he was the one 
to popularize the impolitical in (Italian) political theory. Furthermore, his and Cacciari's 
works on the impolitical are unique in contemporary political theory: first, they 'invent' 
the very concept of the impolitical; second, they present its positive account, in a sense 
58 It is worth briefly noting a contribution of a French political philosopher Julien Freund on the notion 
of  the  impolitical.  A year  before  the  appearance  of  Esposito's  Categorie in  Italy,  Julien  Freund 
published  in  France  his  work  entitled  Politique  et  impolitique (1987).  Freund  coined  the  term 
impolitique, which is best translated as “impolitical,” to name the sort of politics undertaken by those 
who  do  not  understand  what  politics  really  is.  In  this  sense,  contrary  to  Cacciari's  unpolitical,  
“impolitical”  has  a  negative  connotation,  however,  it  still  does  not  coincide  with the  negation  of 
politics. Freund cautions us, as Cacciari did and Esposito will also do, not to confuse “impolitical”  
with  “apolitical”  (apolitique),  “antipolitical”  (antipolitique)  or  “nonpolitical”  (non  politique).  The 
activities are non-political if they are not concerned with politics ( la politique) directly; antipolitical 
actions  oppose  or  reject  politics;  and  apolitical  being is  exterior  to  politics  or  disinterested  in  it.  
Impolitical being is none of the above: it necessarily involves participation in political life, “but lacks 
judgement  or  skill  in  performing  its  function,  because  it  lacks  the  sense  of  discernment  [of 
understanding]”  (Freund 1987, 1; here and below, the translation of Freund’s work is my own). So, 
Freund's “impolitical” is firstly distinguished by lack: lack of skill, understanding of political goals 
and limitations;  but also it  is  an active offence and violation of the intelligence and relevance of  
political  action. In  other words,  it  is  an injury to the spirit  and vocation of politics,  meaning that 
“impolitical” considers “politics for itself and not in its function of service to society and its citizens,  
to whom it is accountable” (3). It consists “in reasoning in terms of power and not those of society [...]  
in politicizing everything, both in subordinating other human activities to politics and in considering 
autonomous activities only from the political point of view” (4). “Impolitical” is thus indicative of  
total politicization and of a political action oriented toward the questions of power and, as a result, 
ignorant of the essential function of politics, i.e., social service. While Cacciari's “un-(im-)political” is  
the  critical  deconstruction  of  the  political,  Freund's  “impolitical”  is  an  obstacle  to  the  proper  
functioning of politics (la politique), the latter being understood in a more or less traditional way as 
the institutional  ordering of social affairs and interactions. This politics has to be rejuvenated and 
redeemed against the impolitical 'threat'. 
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that they treat the impolitical not as something to be avoided but, rather, fostered. There is 
a  seeming  lack  of  engagement  with  Esposito's  early  works  in  English-speaking 
scholarship due to the absence of their English translations, but also due to the popularity 
of Esposito's later works. The impolitical, thus, is often subsumed under other rubrics of 
popular discussions in political theory, such as biopolitics and community. As a result, 
one of the goals of my engagement with Esposito will be an exposition or an exegesis of 
his early writings dedicated solely to the impolitical. In other words, I will present his 
account of the impolitical before I proceed with a critique of it in the attempt to further 
the task of thinking the radical outside of politics. 
In what follows below I will argue, first of all, that Esposito's category of the impolitical 
is  the first  major step on the road to the unpolitical  because, as I noted,  he not only 
introduces the notion itself into the theoretical debates of his time, but also 'invests' it 
with  a  positive  meaning.  The  impolitical,  instead  of  an  instance  of  problematic 
depoliticization, rejection or withdrawal from politics, becomes, for Esposito (similar to 
Cacciari),  a tool  of a critique of the modern political.  The impolitical  is  the political 
viewed  from  the  outside,  from  its  limits.  It  is  a  gaze,  perspective  or  tonality  that 
illuminates the margins and borders of the modern political instead of obscuring them. 
The impolitical  reminds  the  political  of  its  essential  and necessary limitations,  of  its 
finitude. In this way, the impolitical deconstructs political totality, opens it up to a self-
critique; it (re-)introduces difference, conflict and unrepresentable plurality at the heart of 
the political. As a result, the impolitical remains structurally not outside but inside the 
political:  the  impolitical  is  the  outside-within  of  the  political.  The  impolitical,  as  a 
critique of traditional politics, is constituted as the shadow of the political and, ultimately, 
coincides with it. I will further suggest, in this regard, that Esposito's impolitical, despite 
its  innovative  features,  resembles,  in  many ways,  post-foundational  political  thought. 
Like  the  (post-foundational)  political,  it  is  opposed  to  the  representational  model  of 
politics (i.e., the state), to (liberal) depoliticization (i.e., the elimination of conflictuality), 
and to a theological grounding of politics or, rather, to grounding of politics altogether. 
Thus,  the impolitical,  as I will  show, is primarily a means of transition from modern 
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(theological)  politics of representation and depoliticization to a (new) politics without 
foundation.  It  is  not  a  rejection  of  the  political  but  its  radicalization.  Thus,  Esposito 
'conceptual' innovation ultimately outlines or encircles something like impolitical politics 
that  stands  in  opposition  to  the  apolitical  politics  of  modernity.  Consequently,  I  will 
elaborate how Esposito's category of the impolitical, despite its positivity, gestures toward 
but ultimately fails to acknowledge and account for the radical outside of the political. 
The impolitical, rather, remains, to use Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's term, the re-treated 
political or, as a gaze, a continuous re-treating of the political confined to the topology of 
the outside-within.
The impolitical gaze
Esposito  initially  develops  the  idea  of  the  impolitical  in  his  book  Categorie  
dell'impolitico (Categories of the Impolitical) published in 1988. The work consists of the 
analysis  of the writings of a number of 'impolitical'  authors that  forms the basis  and 
culminates in Esposito's concept of the impolitical. As Esposito notes, the term emerged 
gradually (starting with Cacciari's essay and continuing into his own work) by seeking 
inspiration across the range of works of diverse thinkers. Among the latter are Romano 
Guardini, Carl Schmitt, Hannah Arendt, Hermann Broch, Elias Canetti, Simone Weil, and 
Georges Bataille. Esposito's vision of the impolitical, however, is not elaborated much in 
the book, which is mostly dedicated to a close reading and discernment of something like 
the 'impolitical'  in the works of the above-mentioned authors (who themselves do not 
employ the term as such). We get a much better understanding of what he means by the 
impolitical in his original introduction of 1988 to Categories of the Impolitical and, most 
importantly, in the Preface written for the second edition of the book in 1999. As a result, 
in my analysis I will primarily focus on these texts. Furthermore, it it worth  clarifying 
right away that in my engagement with Esposito I will consistently translate the Italian 
term  impolitico  as impolitical rather than  unpolitical. As we will see below, Esposito's 
impolitical, similar to Cacciari's, reproduces the topology of the outside-within. And, as 
Bruno Bosteels (2010, 222) points out, the prefix 'in-' better guides our understanding of 
l'impolitico toward such a topology. 
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My  interest  here  will  primarily  be  in  Esposito's  early  work,  oscillating  around  the 
Categories,  where  biopolitical  concerns  are  barely  present.  In  his  later  works,  there 
occurs,  in Esposito's  own words,  a certain development or rather displacement of the 
semantic centre of gravity:  from the impolitical  toward  communitas,59 and toward the 
biopolitical. The notion of community and its essence become of the most importance for 
Esposito,  but  also  the  project  of  something  like  the  affirmative  biopolitics  that 
prominently figures in his later or 'post-impolitical' works.60 Instead of trying to draw a 
genealogy of Esposito's works and finding ways of connecting them (i.e., looking for the 
traces of the biopolitical in the impolitical of Categories or vice versa), I will focus on the 
impolitical in its initial distinction from questions of biopolitical life. This strategy has a 
potential of better elucidating the place of Esposito's notion of the impolitical and its 
possible relation with different, non-biopolitical, life. 
Esposito  notes  at  the  beginning  that  Categories  of  the  Impolitical is  situated  at  the 
intersection of two important works of the 20th century – Thomas Mann's Reflections of a  
Nonpolitical Man and Carl Schmitt's The Concept of the Political. The title of Esposito's 
book speaks to this  double reference.  However,  Esposito is quick to distance himself 
from both authors suggesting that the impolitical  of which he wants to  speak can be 
identified with neither Mann's apoliticism nor with Schmitt's total politics and politico-
theological  argumentation.  Moreover,  regarding  Schmitt,  Esposito  notes  that  his  own 
discourse starts exactly where Schmitt's stops: at its exteriority (Esposito 2005, 5).61 After 
that Esposito goes on to let his readers know that his engagement with Schmitt is going to 
be  limited  to  one  of  his  earlier,  less  known and often neglected works  –  Römischer 
Katholizismus  und politische  Form  (1923) (Roman Catholicism  and Political  Form). 
However, I suggest that Esposito's fleeting disclaimer regarding Schmitt's The Concept of  
59 Esposito notes in particular that his later book Communitas: The Origin and Destiny of Community  
([1998] 2010) constitutes such a development of Categories as well as “displacement of its semantic 
center of gravity” (Esposito 2009, 112). 
60 See,  for  instance,  his  'trilogy'  Communitas ([1998]  2010),  Immunitas ([2002]  2011),  Bios ([2004] 
2008).  It is interesting that Esposito's later works were among the first to be translated into English, 
which seems to give even more reason for me to consider his earlier works separately from currently 
popular biopolitical concerns. 
61 Here and below, the translations from this work of Esposito's are my own.
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the Political is more important for our understanding of his 'impolitical' project than it 
might seem at first. 
Let us  recall  the discussion of  Schmitt's  concept  of the political  and,  specifically,  its 
constitutive  'blindness'.  As  Michael  Marder  notes,  the  political,  as  a  self-grounding 
phenomenon, “begins with the cognitive-perceptual elimination of the neutral third. [...] 
[I]t arises from a pronounced blindness [...] to everything that surrounds or falls outside 
of it” (2005, 18–19; my emphasis). The only 'visible' spot within this neutral field is the 
exception,  the  inclusive  exclusion,  the  figure  of  neither  friend  nor  enemy  that  is 
'recognized' by the political as unpolitical. While the political as the total is characterized 
by  blindness  (or  partial  blindness)  toward  its  own  exteriority,  Esposito's  impolitical 
engages this exteriority. To be more precise, the impolitical is described by the author in 
terms of the “vision” and “gaze” directed at the political: “the impolitical is the political 
viewed from its external limit”  (Esposito 2005, 18). That is, the outside of the political 
field is no longer eliminated but illuminated as the impolitical gaze. 
It  is interesting  to  note  that  while  Esposito  denies  his  works  the  status  of  political 
philosophy, he refers to them as political  thought.  'Thought' as contemplation, vision or 
spectatorship has the original Greek meaning of theoria (θεωρία), which is, for instance 
by Aristotle, contrasted to praxis – a realm of action driven by desire (manifest in politics 
and ethics). As a result, one may interpret Esposito's recourse to the figure or metaphor of 
'vision' as a gesture toward the classical distinction between 'theoria' and 'praxis', where 
the term 'impolitical' stands for the reflective (theoretical) distancing from the political 
praxis. (The same seems to be the case for Cacciari, who suggested that it is necessary to 
step back in order to be able to see political reality as it is, as will to power.) However,  
regardless of the similarity, there is a significant difference between Aristotelian theoria 
and Esposito's  impolitical  vision: the former is  concerned with the unchangeable and 
eternal,  the  truth  or  the  real  (philosophy,  mathematics  and  theology).  The  latter  is 
concerned with exactly the opposite: the impolitical gaze illuminates (political) reality as 
it is, in its 'essential' changeability, difference and conflictuality. Thus, Esposito concludes 
that “all the great political realism – that is to say non-theological thinking on politics – 
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was impolitical,” even if its impolitical orientation remained only unconscious (Esposito 
2005, 18). As a result, Esposito's 'impolitical thought' seems to imply a different kind of 
theory: a 'vision' that is not guided by the search for the unitary principle or essence of the 
political  or  itself,  but  rather  by  the  perception  of  difference  and  illumination  and 
affirmation of its “irreparable inessentiality” and absent origin (see, Esposito 2009, 110). 
Esposito's impolitical thought, then, falls within the field of post-foundational theory and 
critique, and is opposed to traditional political philosophy (see, Esposito 1993a; Esposito 
2009). 
What is the 'essence' of the impolitical for Esposito? As I noted above, it is the outside-
within of the political. Even though, in this way, the impolitical occupies the paradoxical 
place of the exception, its structural position, however necessary, is not geared toward 
normalization of the political as, for example, in Schmitt. If we recall, the exception for 
Schmitt  reveals “the decision in absolute purity,” meaning that through a decision on 
what  constitutes  an  exception  the  sovereign  establishes  “a  homogeneous  medium,”  a 
“normal situation” or “frame of life” to which the norm (i.e., general codification, for 
instance, in the form of law) can be applied, since “there exists no norm that is applicable 
to chaos” (Schmitt 2005, 13). Structural integration of the exception makes possible the 
establishment  and maintenance  of  a  normal  situation.  Contrary to  Schmitt,  Esposito's 
impolitical gestures toward the 'essential'  impossibility of the normal situation, that is, 
impossibility of the total representation of its elements and elimination of the void. The 
impolitical,  as  the  exception  to  the  political,  constantly  challenges,  destabilizes  or 
deconstructs this political. Moreover, it manifests the 'originary' rupture of any political 
order: at the heart of any normalcy lies abnormality, of regulation, irregularity. In other 
words, the “impolitical perspective” points at the absence of foundation of the political 
and, as in Cacciari, it affirms politics without foundation. This is the 'proper' function of 
the impolitical exception to the political – affirmation of its originary 'impropriety'. 
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The other of representation, depoliticization and political theology 
The affirmative project of the impolitical, Esposito clarifies, emerges out of an opposition 
to  the  dominant  modes  of  operation  of  the  modern  political:  representation, 
depoliticization and political-theology. The impolitical is “...other than representation. Or 
rather the other, that which remains stubbornly outside. But this unrepresentability is not 
that of modern depoliticization. Its refusal is not refusal of the political. In this sense it is 
radically removed from Mannian semantics.  It  is not the value that is opposed to the 
political. It is exactly the opposite. It is the refusal of the political as invested with value, 
of any 'theological' valorization of the political” (Esposito 1999, 14).62 The impolitical is 
the  other  of  representation,  which  for  centuries  has  constituted  the  essence  of 
(democratic) politics in the West, for example, in the form of the statist representation of 
the common good and interests. The impolitical points toward the persistent remainder or 
the outside of the domain of the representable, accountable and immediately visible in the 
political  space,  as  well  as  itself  remains  stubbornly  unrepresentable  as  a  category. 
Esposito recurs to Hannah Arendt to further elaborate on these traits of the impolitical. 
Her  conception  of  politics  in  terms  of  plurality  contains  the  necessity  of 
unrepresentability, since it is not possible to represent plurality without reducing it to a 
unity.  So,  any attempt to  represent  it,  whether  through politics of representation or  a 
decision, involves a reduction resulting in the effective suppression of this plurality and 
consequent inversion of a  political form into the technical (e.g., political economy and 
management)  or  totalitarian.  For politics  to  remain authentic  (and not to  reverse into 
technology  or  totalitarianism),  it  has  to  acknowledge  the  essential  impossibility  of 
representing the multiple: there are always elements that escape the indexing procedure 
of  representation.  So,  the  impolitical,  in  this  regard,  is  that  which  is  politically 
unrepresentable  (here  politics  refers  to  the  traditional  model  of  representation  as 
delegation). For instance, as in Hobbes, whose ultimate solution to the existence of the 
inactive (thus apolitical) multitude ultimately lies in its submission to or representation by 
the sovereign. 
62 Here and below, the translations from this work of Esposito's are my own.
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Since the impolitical is other than representation and emerges in opposition to it, Esposito 
notes that it is very hard to speak of it, that is, to represent it linguistically. Nevertheless,  
this does not mean that we cannot speak of it at all. We can do so in terms of that which 
does not represent. As a result, Esposito prefers to refer to the impolitical not so much as 
a 'category' but rather as “a perspective, a mode of gaze, a way of looking at politics.” 
Because a  category “already gives  an  idea  of  some completed,  defined thing  –  of  a 
concept, let us say. While it [the impolitical] is, in this case, more precisely a tonality, a 
mode  of  looking”  (Esposito  1993b).63 The  impolitical  is  not  a  defined  thing,  but  a 
colouring, a specific tonality of the gaze from the outside of the political space that resists 
representation and definition. Thus, the language of the impolitical needs to remain itself 
impolitical, in a sense of affirming its essential inability to define anything in the last 
instance  or  to  delegate  meaning.64 Esposito's  discourse  on  the  impolitical,  then,  is  a 
project of encircling conceptually what escapes any direct definition or proof. 
Esposito further warns us that the impolitical is not the same as depoliticization, i.e., the 
refusal of the political in favour of another, apolitical reality that establishes itself as an 
alternative value, that is, as a better, preferable mode of existence or as mere apathy or 
withdrawal. The impolitical is far removed from the Mannian  unpolitische – valorized 
apoliticism. Like Cacciari, Esposito suggests that the impolitical is a different kind of 
refusal: it is the refusal and critique of the political as value or, in Esposito's words, of its  
“theological”  valorization.  Political  theology is  opposed  to  the  impolitical  on  several 
levels. First of all, it refers to political thought and, more specifically, to Catholic political 
philosophy that confuses power and Good, and thus creates the ground for valorization of 
the political (the political being reduced to the operations and relations of power) – an 
'object' of the impolitical refusal. Political theology, Esposito argues, coincides with the 
modern secularization movement: it translates the concepts with theological origin into 
politico-juridical language, which effectively results in the theological justification of the 
63 Here and below, the translations from this work of Esposito's are my own.
64 This  idea  of  impotence  of  language  to  define  the  impolitical  is  similar  to  the  Lacanian  view of  
language, specifically, of the relationship between the signifier and the signified. The latter, for Lacan, 
is  altogether  absent,  resulting  in  the  never-ending  proliferation  of  signifiers  around  the  void  of 
meaning  –  the  real  that  cannot  be  accessed  in  language except  as  a  failure  of  speech.  Similarly, 
language cannot capture the meaning or represent the essence of the impolitical.
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existing  order.  For  example,  Esposito  shows  how  in  Romano  Guardini's  political 
Catholicism theological conception of Good undergoes political translation in terms of 
power:  “the  Good  is  representable by  power”  and  “power  can  produce  the  Good.” 
Guardini  also presents  an “affirmative conception of  power” (“power as  potenza  is  a 
determination of being”) and the “must” of power: “man must exercise power to obey 
God,  because  it  is  God  who  imposes  on  man  the  exercise  of  power,  and  who  thus 
sanctifies it. That is why power is good: it is its political translation” (Esposito 2005, 9). 
Furthermore, such a translation of the operations of power in terms of the Good produces 
an eschatology,  in which another reality is  affirmed and awaited.  For the impolitical, 
however, there is no other reality, except for the reality of politics as it is, meaning that it 
does not present an apology of the political based on its justification by theological or any 
other  transcendent  principles.  The  impolitical  affirms  the  essential  finitude of  the 
political, that is, its foundation in nothing else except itself, in the actual absence of any 
foundation, in the constitutive, unrepresentable void.
The impolitical further opposes the politico-theological reduction of plurality to unity, 
more specifically, it restores the thought of conflict to its 'proper place' at the heart of the 
political  (which  was  denied  to  it  by  various  modern  political  philosophies  of 
depoliticization). Traditionally, the plurality that is characterized by tensions is resolved 
into  a  unity of  sovereign representation,  for  example,  as  in  the contractual  model  of 
society.  This  idea  of  the  repression  of  conflict  in  political  philosophy  was  already 
introduced  in  my earlier  discussion  of  post-foundational  political  thought.  Esposito's 
position  here  is  not  much  different  from the  other  thinkers  who  aim at  restoring  or 
establishing something like 'the state of nature' as the core of the political. He suggests 
that the central theme that lies behind “all  the great conceptions of politics” (i.e.,  the 
'impolitical  tradition'  starting from Nietzsche and continuing in Weil,  Arendt,  Canetti, 
Bataille, etc, and which also can be found in earlier instances such as in Plato, St. Paul, 
St.  Augustine,  and  Machiavelli)  is  that  of  “irreducible  conflict  and  irreconcilable 
contradiction”  (Esposito 1993a).65 This current of thought is in direct opposition to the 
65 Here and below, the translations from this work of Esposito's are my own.
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modern political based on the contractual model, of which Hobbes' Leviathan is a pivotal 
example. The latter, Esposito argues, cannot resolve contradictions except at the price of 
progressive  neutralization:  exclusion  of  conflict  from  the  'civil'  order,  of  complete 
depoliticization of society in favour of the sovereign (2005, 6). So, Esposito concludes, 
political theology that requires the submission of political reality to a unitary principle 
(e.g., the Good) actually depoliticizes it by affirming the necessity and possibility of the 
resolution  of  conflicts  and  contradictions.  It  is  effectively  “[p]olitical theology,  but 
politics  of  depoliticization”  (12),  the  act  of  repression  of  the  reality  and memory of 
conflict. As a result, political realism for Esposito is nothing else than the non-theological 
thought of politics, thought that does not confuse politics and ethics, and that does not 
contain apologetic justifications of a certain Good on the basis of which reality must be 
transformed into something other than what it is (conflict and contradiction). 
The shadow of politics: the coincidence of the political and the impolitical
Impolitical refusal is not that of radical separation from the political but rather of critical 
attachment to it, deconstructive of both political theological and depoliticizing tendencies 
that define the modern political. The impolitical does not draw a line between itself and 
the political, and thus does not establish separate spheres of operation. This would be the 
case if it were to coincide with  apolitical or anti-political attitude, but it is exactly the 
opposite:  it  is  in  “direct  opposition  to  all  forms  of  depoliticization,  and  thus  in  a 
relationship totally other than simple opposition to the political” (1999, 20). Drawing on 
Canetti, Esposito argues that the impolitical is rather the  shadow of politics and not its 
outside, and as shadow it is intimately attached to but also distinct and separated from its 
figure – the political. Esposito writes: “It is not sufficient to say that the impolitical does 
not refuse the dimension of the political. It must be said that it is, from a certain point of 
view – as in Canetti, situated precisely behind it – coincides with it. In other words, the 
impolitical  is  the political viewed from its external limit [confine esterno]. It is its [the 
political]  determination,  in  the  literal  sense of  tracing  the  terms (coinciding with the 
whole reality of human relations)” (20). The impolitical is the political. Obviously, it is a 
different  kind  of  the  political  (not  that  of  representation,  depoliticization  or 
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theologization) with which the impolitical coincides.66 It is my suggestion, in this regard, 
that 'the impolitical' is Esposito's term for something like 'political politics' (contrary to 
apolitical  or  depoliticized  politics)  which  is  similarly  advocated  by  many  post-
foundational authors.
The impolitical  is the 'authentic'  political,  and it is not the same as apolitical or anti-
political attitude. Esposito emphasizes this distinction again and again. He notes that a 
number  of  scholarly  reservations  toward  his  book  concern  exactly  this  point:  they 
assimilate  the  impolitical  to  the  anti-political,  suggesting  that  “the  impolitical  is  a 
filiation, albeit a fairly sophisticated one, of the 'antipolitical' which is dominant today” 
(2009, 101). Esposito argues that the fundamental difference between the impolitical and 
any sort of a- or anti-political attitude is that while the latter  implies the modality of 
opposition to or indifference and disinterest in the political, the former implies “neither a 
weakening nor a discontinuation of attention to the political” but, on the contrary, entails 
“its intensification and radicalization” (102). This project of intensification is what I call 
the  construction  of  'political  politics',  of  the  political  'proper',  even  though the  latter 
ultimately  consists  in  the  absence  of  properness,  illuminated  by  the  impolitical 
deconstructive gaze.  “[T]he political  has neither propriety [proprietà] nor essence [...] 
what is proper to it lies in the absence of propriety, as its essence lies in an irreparable 
inessentiality”  (110).  This  is  the  problem  of  the  origin  in  political  philosophy  that, 
Esposito  maintains,  modernity  conceptualizes  (but  does  not  invent)  beginning  from 
Machiavelli.  This  problem  is  that  of  “the  constitutive  'demonic'  of  the  political;  its 
irreducibility to a single 'symbol'”  (110).  In other  words,  what is  at  issue here is  the 
66 Esposito suggests that the anti-political coincides with the political as well, but in a different way. By 
rejecting the political the anti-political attitude assumes the very strategy of the political: opposition,  
struggle, conflict, war, etc. So, by trying to eliminate the political, the anti-political ends up becoming 
nothing more than what it aims to reject. In this respect, Thomas Mann says something very similar to  
Carl Schmitt: “antipolitics is also politics, for politics is a terrible force: if one only knows about it, 
one has already succumbed to it. One has lost one’s  innocence”  (Mann in Esposito 2009, 102; my 
emphasis).  It  is  interesting  that  the  outside  of  politics,  whichever  way  it  is  conceived,  is  often 
identified with certain purity or innocence, as in Mann. Another example of such an identification is 
Herbert Read's view of “the politics of the unpolitical”: “the politics of those who desire to be pure in 
heart” (1964, 327; my emphasis). Giorgio Agamben's bare or naked life is also suggestive of certain 
purity, in this case a removal from the political or, rather, of the self-purification of the political. The 
idea  of  'the  state  of  nature'  points  us  in  a  similar  direction  of  originary  innocence,  purity,  
uncontaminated nature as opposed to the artifice of culture and political society. 
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irreducible conflictuality, unrepresentability and finitude of the political that add up to the 
problem of its non-originary origin. One can notice the similarities between Esposito's 
argument  and  Lacoue-Labarthe  and Nancy's  discussion  of  the  an-archic  archè of  the 
polis.67 Politics, as being-in-common, affirms the void as its 'centring' principle or rather 
it  affirms  the  irreducible  plurality  of  archè  as  the  plurality  of  origins  of  the  world. 
Esposito  points  in  the  same direction  when  he  suggests  that  the  polis as  “a  unitary 
cosmos” never existed, “[o]n the contrary, from the very beginning the nomoi of the polis  
were reciprocally in conflict” (110), signalling the plurality of the political origins, their 
an-archy and irreducibility to a single “symbol.”
Another important trait that constitutes the political 'proper' is the acknowledgement of its 
constitutive  “demonic”  and  finitude.  The  “demonic”  aspect  refers,  vaguely,  to  the 
irreducibility of the conflictual aspect of the  polis  that is often overlooked, denied or 
repressed  by modern  political  philosophy,  perpetuating  “a  politics  of  neutralization.” 
Esposito  argues,  similarly  to  many  other  post-foundational  thinkers,  that  “[t]he 
impolitical,  far  from conflicting  with  political  conflict  and  negating  the  political  as 
conflict, considers it as the only reality and the entirety of reality, adding, however, that it 
is  only reality. Not in the sense that outside of this there exists another space, time, or 
possibility [...] Rather, in the sense that this non-opposition is precisely a 'non': neither an 
apologetic assumption of the political, nor an impossible withdrawal from it. This 'non' is 
the limit that determines the political, circumscribing it within its specific terms – which 
are  finite” (2009,  103).  The  impolitical  affirms  conflict  (polemos,  agon)  as  the  only 
reality of the political, meaning that there is no alternative reality to the political. There is 
no outside of the political as such, but only as an ideological illusion (such as apolitical 
attitude whose conflict with the political is, by definition, dialectically attached to what it 
tries to  deny)  or  as  the impolitical  (which is  not  the other  of the political  but  rather 
coincides with it). So, Esposito's work falls within the tradition of political realism that 
affirms the political for what it is, but does not present an eschatological alternative to it. 
67 Esposito notes on several occasions the similarities between his notion of the impolitical and Lacoue-
Labarthe and Nancy's “retreat of the political,” though developed independently (cf. Esposito 1996a, 
59). In his later works, he also points out a number of similarities between his and Nancy's thought, 
specifically regarding the view of community as sharing (cf. Esposito 2009, 25). 
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Opposed to politics of depoliticization and a variety of a- and anti-political attitudes, the 
impolitical affirms the political as inescapable. It “defines the whole of reality in political 
terms. ... [F]or the impolitical there is no entity, no force, no power that could contest the 
political from within its own language” (103). Thus, the impolitical does not contest the 
political but radicalizes it, which means that it identifies the reality of politics for what it 
is without attributing to it any values  (cf. Esposito 1993b). The impolitical determines 
and delimits the being of politics,  coinciding with the reality of human relations in its 
entirety: conflict and difference, absence of foundation and, most importantly, finitude. 
Similarly to Cacciari, Esposito writes that the political is not always aware of its void or 
“constitutive finitude,” and the impolitical “does nothing but 'remind' the political of its 
finitude, returning it to the very heart of the political: not only at its margins, but at its  
center – which is itself  impolitical...”  (2009, 104). The impolitical  is at the heart  and 
centre of the political as its absent foundation: it coincides with the political precisely 
because it does not negate it but constitutes its unrepresentable origin.
Consequently, the impolitical is strictly the “non” of the political: neither an apology, nor 
an impossible withdrawal from the political. The latter point requires further elaboration 
since it might imply that the political is still a totality, just of a different, open kind, as I  
proposed in the previous chapter. It seems that what makes it impossible to withdraw 
from the political,  for Esposito, is the very conception of 'withdrawal' presupposing a 
given, identified unity from which one has to take distance, resulting in correlationist 
dynamic. Esposito wants to avoid such implications by identifying the apolitical attitude 
with such a withdrawal, while the impolitical affirms its impossibility. I argue that as a 
result of such reasoning Esposito ultimately leaves us with only two possible choices: to 
be  apolitical,  remaining  dialectically  or  negatively  attached  to  politics,  or  to  be 
impolitical, based on the impossibility of the radical outside of the political (i.e., located 
beyond  the  relative  outside  of  the  impolitical  gaze).  Both  choices  suggest  the  same 
impossibility of the radical outside of the political. But what is the value of identifying 
the impolitical as a limit and not envisioning a way of crossing it? Is this akin to the 
problem that  Simone Weil  identified:  for  how long will  we not  be able  to  cross  the 
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threshold and become truly “asocial”? I have a sense that if we manage to think a kind of 
'detachment' from the political not in terms of another reality strictly produced by the 
withdrawal from the political but, rather, as 'indifferent' to the political (and to the very 
idea of withdrawal) in the first place, we might be able to conceive of a possibility of 
crossing this threshold into an un-political outside. I will return to this important question 
below.
Let us now further examine what Esposito means when he suggests that the impolitical is 
the heart of the political. The impolitical, supposedly, reminds the political of its finitude, 
locating it, simultaneously, at the margins and at the core of the political, since the only 
limits the political has are its internal limits. Consequently, the outside circumscribed by 
these margins is necessarily within. The impolitical is both the limit and the heart of the 
political: by reminding the political of its finitude, the impolitical essentially points out 
the reality of its limits, its non-totality and separation from any other order that could 
guarantee 'infinity' to the political. In this respect, Esposito engages with Simone Weil's 
argument that “[t]here is no other force on this earth except force”  (Weil in Esposito 
1996a, 68). Weil is situated in the realist tradition since she suggests that there is no other 
force in this world that is opposed to force. There is no recourse to another reality  in  
relation (of opposition) to this world. “As for the force which is not of this earth, contact 
with it cannot be bought at any lesser price than the passing through a kind of death” 
(Weil  in  Esposito  1996a,  68),  which  for  Weil  is  “Justice.”  Following  Weil's  logic, 
Esposito writes that “there is no other political but the political. But also that precisely for 
this reason the political is concluded – or, more accurately, determined – by this identity 
with itself.  It is  nothing other than itself.  Its potential  [potenza] is  only what it  is.  It 
cannot transcend itself toward any end or completion beyond its own bare being-such. 
The impolitical  is  the end of every 'end of the political'  (2009, 104). However,  Weil 
further admits that force is not absolutely sovereign: as real, it is its own limit, meaning 
that it cannot cross beyond reality, it cannot transcend into something else beyond this 
world. 
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There is no other force that is opposed to force; it is force itself that reaches its limit. So, 
force is not absolutely sovereign because it is subjected to a stronger necessity – Justice. 
“What is sovereign in this world is determinateness, limit”  (Weil 2002, 279). In other 
words,  force  is  subjected  to  its  own  finitude,  limit  which,  according  to  Weil,  is  a 
necessary attribute  of  any  force.  “Every  visible  and  palpable  force  is  subject  to  an 
invisible limit which it will never cross. In the sea, a wave mounts higher and higher; but 
at a certain point, where there is nevertheless only space [vide], it is arrested and forced to 
redescend” (Weil in Esposito 1996a, 69). For Esposito, the impolitical occupies the place 
of justice in Weil: it  is stronger than the force of the political  not in the sense of an 
opposition, but in a sense of “waiting for that which is necessary. It is the force stronger 
than force because it is force without the power of thought”  (Esposito 1996a, 69). The 
impolitical  is  not another  force or reality opposed to  the political,  but rather an eye-
witness  attesting  to  the  limits,  finitude  and  reality  of  the  political.  It  is  an  invisible 
internal threshold which the political cannot cross, unless it passes through death and thus 
no  longer  belongs  to  this  world.  The  question  that  arises  in  this  respect  is  about  a 
possibility of crossing the threshold of worldliness that is not conditioned by the passage 
through death. In other words, what we might need to consider further is the reality of the 
unpolitical  which is not that of the world and which is  not constituted as a result  of 
worldly death, but is rather manifest prior to the world. I will return to this question in my 
discussion of the radical philosophy of life of Michel Henry in the next chapter.
So, in Esposito we can find two major interrelated aspects of the impolitical: it is the limit 
of the political and its core. It is the limit insofar as the political cannot cross it, and it is 
the core since this limitation is internalized by the political 'proper' as its quasi-origin or 
quasi-foundation. In the first instance the impolitical is presented by Esposito as “the 
limit, the border, the margin which the political cannot determine precisely because it is 
in turn determined by it – just as the voice is by silence” (2009, 111). This is the point I 
discussed above in relation to Weil: the impolitical determines the political in its finitude, 
attesting  to  the  internal  limits  of  political  reality.  It  is  not  the  political  that  tries  to 
establish or imagine its own borders and exteriority, as was, for instance, the case with 
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the Schmittian political that tends to outline its outside in terms of the exception. It is the 
impolitical  gaze that  determines  the political  and its  limits  in  the literal  sense of  de-
termination, of drawing up the terms for the totality of human relations.  It is not the 
political that brings its own finitude and being to consciousness but the impolitical.  I 
might go as far as to suggest that the impolitical is not only the silent unconscious of the 
political but rather its reflexive consciousness: it is the mirror at the limit of the political 
that reflects nothing other but the political itself.  In Esposito's words, “the impolitical 
defines the whole of reality in political terms” (103), that is, the impolitical opens up the 
angle of refraction through which the reality acquires its full visibility in political terms.
Internal difference, threshold, and sharing of the political space
The  impolitical  is  also  the  difference  inherent  in  the  political:  it  differentiates  and 
subtracts the political from itself, from its “fullness,” without constituting a dialectical 
opposition. As I already indicated, the impolitical coincides with the political; thus, it 
does not appear 'as such' but only in its vanishing as a trace or threshold. The threshold is 
an ontological anomaly, a space outside of space, existing only in its disappearance. I 
believe that Esposito refers to the impolitical as such an ontological anomaly when he 
suggests that the work of deconstruction performed by the impolitical turns back onto 
itself, resulting in the loss of any identity of the impolitical, “[a]s if it could not manifest 
itself except by cancelling itself in the pure 'taking place' [aver luogo] of the political” 
(2009, 106). For Esposito, then, there is no impolitical space that does not always already 
coincide  with  the  political.  The  impolitical  exists  as  the  mere  “intensification  of  the 
differentiating limit” (107) of the political, which implies that it might be nothing more 
than  the  internal  differentiation  and  limitation  of  the  political  (e.g.,  the  political 
difference). 
The impolitical as threshold has another important distinctive feature: as a limit or border 
it not only separates but also unites. Esposito does not fail to emphasize this quality by 
suggesting that the impolitical has an affirmative side: it is “a division but  at the same 
time a union of that which it divides” (Esposito 2009, 107). If there were only separation, 
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then we would inevitably end up with two separate and opposing spheres, however, this is 
not the case for the impolitical; it necessarily connects that which it separates. Esposito 
notes  that  “'sharing'  [condivisione],  or,  in  Bataille’s  French,  partage” is  the term that 
better than any other conveys this “liminal co-presencing of separation and connection” 
that the impolitical refers to. And so, “the impolitical is not divided from the political but 
shares its space. It is the sharing of the political, or better still, the political  as sharing” 
(108).  The  idea  of  sharing  becomes  very  important  for  Esposito's  later  thought  of 
communitas, where munus is understood as “nothing in common,” as the “spacing” or the 
void established by the “operative impossibility of community” (cf. Nancy's “inoperative 
community”), which is nevertheless the heart of community.68 In this aspect, Esposito's 
thought is similar to Nancy's vision of community as 'sharing', who as well borrows this 
term from Bataille. Furthermore, the affirmative side of the impolitical is reminiscent of 
Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy's “retreat of the political” which implies both withdrawal, 
deconstruction of the political and its positive re-tracing. 
Another important aspect of the impolitical  as limit  is  that it  is  not only the limit  of 
politics but also the limit of itself, of its own being a limit. The impolitical vision of the 
political from its borders is not interested in the constitution of these borders. Neither is it 
interested in itself, meaning that what is at stake for the impolitical perspective is not its 
own representation. As a result, as I noted above, it is hard to speak of the impolitical 
since it is opposed to the representational mode of thought (and of the political), since it 
resists its own representation as a unitary force or as identifiable thing and space that 
counterpoints the political.  The impolitical, rather, coincides with or shares the political 
space: it is the political as sharing, which refers back to the aspect of the impolitical as 
the  heart of the political, and not just its limit. In this regard one might suggest, in the 
vein of Lacanian political thought, that the impolitical for Esposito is 'the real'  of the 
political – its unrepresentable, inexpressible void. Esposito suggests that “the 'outside' – 
68 In  Communitas, Esposito suggests that it is necessary to think community as always “implying the 
impolitical,”  meaning  that  one  has  to  accept  the  unrepresentability  of  the  political  or  rather  the 
impossibility of its historical representation: “The  community is and needs to remain constitutively 
unpolitical in the sense that we can correspond to our being in common only to the degree in which we 
keep it away from every demand for historical-empirical actualization ...” (2010a, 97).
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or more accurately, the void of substance to which the impolitical refers – is situated 
resolutely within the political. Or perhaps one could say that it is the very same 'political' 
without its mythico-operative 'fullness'” (2009, 111). The subtraction of the political from 
this  “fullness” nicely recaps  Esposito's  initial  point  about  the opposition  between the 
impolitical and the regime of political theology and representation that tend to reduce the 
political and its origins to a unitary “symbol.” The impolitical as the void of the political, 
on the contrary, can manifest itself only as a failure, absence or rupture of the political but 
never as such; it remains unrepresentable in its own identity.  In this respect, Esposito 
writes that the impolitical is not “an external reality, which does not exist as such,” but is 
the “negative” of the political, the “wound that cuts or interrupts it” (1996a, 62).69 It is the 
“immemorial background” or “forgotten origin” of the political, “the inactive heart which 
political  action unconsciously carries within itself  as its  objective limit  or its  internal 
contradiction”  (64).  Even  though  Esposito  draws  the  two  aspects  of  the  impolitical 
closely together, the emphasis here still falls on the internalization of political exteriority: 
the impolitical is the inactive heart and internal contradiction rather than a gesture toward 
the (radical) outside. Esposito notes that while his earlier formulations of the impolitical 
focused on the exteriority and limit,  his  more recent  elaboration “has proceeded in a 
direction which ever more explicitly interiorizes its exteriority, its being outside, its limit 
–  in  the  sense  in  which  Bataille  called  his  passion  for  the  'outside'  precisely  inner  
experience, thereby alluding to a perfect overlapping of immanence and transcendence. 
Transcendence – as is already largely set out in the final chapter of  Categories of the  
Impolitical – is not the opposite of immanence, but its interruption, or its exposure to its 
own 'outside'. It is the transcendence of immanence, not from immanence” (2009, 111).
So,  the  impolitical  is  the  exposition  of  the  political  to  its  own  outside,  which  is 
superimposed  onto  the  inside  as  its  interruption,  as  its  immanent  transcendence  (cf. 
Bosteels 2010, 222). It is a kind of impossible inner experience of being outside that 
cannot be  located due to its anomalous threshold ontology. This understanding of the 
impolitical is characteristic of Esposito's later works that pick up on the points already 
69 Here and below, the translations from this work of Esposito's are my own.
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found in the last chapter of Categories dedicated to Bataille. It is interesting that Bataille, 
according to Esposito, is representative of the “ecstatic register” of impolitical thought, 
while Weil is representative of its “ascetic register” (Esposito 2009, 107; Esposito 1996b, 
22–23). It seems plausible to draw a parallel here: the ascetic register of the impolitical 
emphasizes the more radical limit or exteriority of the political, while the ecstatic register  
circumscribes the impolitical in terms of the relative outside, i.e., the constitutive outside 
of the political.70
It is not surprising, then, that Esposito's later works, with their terminological shift from 
'the  impolitical'  toward  'community',  are  situated  within  this  ecstatic  dimension.  The 
impolitical as ecstasy (from Greek ek-stasis – displacement) refers, in the first place, to 
dis-placement  of  politics  as  traditionally  conceived  by  political  philosophers  (as 
representation, depoliticization, political theology). The impolitical is the displacement of 
the political that opens the latter to its essential inessentiality. That is, while displacing the 
political through its deconstruction, devalorization and by reminding it of its finitude, the 
impolitical  simultaneously  illuminates  that  which  remains  of  the  political  after  this 
displacement  –  unrepresentable  elements,  void,  emptiness  or  silence.  But,  most 
importantly,  impolitical  ecstasy is  indicative of  the  political  as  sharing  (cf.  Bataille’s 
notion of partage as an inspiration for Esposito's and Nancy's thought of community).71 
The  impolitical  shares the  space  of  the  political,  meaning  that  it  both  de-limits  the 
political as well as coincides with it. Esposito's impolitical shares in the ecstasy  of the 
political or, in other words, it shares in the political as ecstasy. The impolitical is ecstatic, 
70 It seems that a possibility of the more or less radical 'beyond' of the political is ultimately articulated  
through the ascetic register of the impolitical, which Esposito does not seem to be developing is his  
later works. He rather follows upon and unpacks the ecstatic register (initially articulated in his chapter 
on Bataille) as he develops his later philosophy of community. The ascetic aspect of the impolitical  
that was 'practised' by Simone Weil Esposito associates with “passive power” (Esposito 2005, 150): a  
way of  relating  to  the  force  of  this  world,  the  “non-agent  action”  that  is  a  kind  of  “shrinkage, 
contraction, reduction of the person, in favor of the impersonal” (Esposito 1996b, 22; my translation). 
Person here being the usual agent of political action, thus the impersonal is the non-agent of 'passive  
politics',  which basically consists in the “passive attitude of waiting or attention,” in the power of  
“passion,  patience,  forberance  [passione,  pazienza,  patimento]”  (22).  This  attitude  is  effectively 
'abandonment' (an action not motivated by outcomes, reminiscent of Galassenheit) that is opposed to 
renunciation (abstinence from action motivated by desire) that, according to Esposito's logic, would 
effectively amount to the anti-political attitude rather than passive politics.
71 On the relationship between the impolitical, community and ecstasy see, for example, Esposito (2010a, 
86–111).
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it  reaches toward the outside, transcends the political while still  remaining immanent, 
inside, and actually partaking in the being of the political. In this respect, I suggest that 
the  quintessence  of  Esposito's  notion  of  the  impolitical  is  expressed  in  his  early 
pronouncement that “the impolitical is the political” (cf. Dubreuil 2006, 89). Even though 
the full  statement  reads  as  follows – “the impolitical  is the political  viewed from its 
external limit” – what in the end makes the most sense is precisely its first part. The 
impolitical  is  the  political  and nothing more,  at  least  that  is  what  Esposito  wants  to 
emphasize in his later career, as if apologizing for a potential 'misunderstanding' of his 
earlier works that could suggest otherwise: that there is indeed something 'beyond the 
political' in the radical sense.72 
So, the impolitical shares in the space of the political. But what does this sharing mean 
once we take into account the understanding of the impolitical as vision, gaze, theory and 
thought? It is my contention that in this regard Esposito's impolitical is similar to Nancy's 
affirmation of the indissociability of thought and politics. As we recall from the previous 
discussion, Nancy reformulates Descartes' ego sum as ego cum, where cum suggests that 
thinking is always in-common, resulting in the view of politics and thought as sharing or 
as conditioned by such a space of sharing. Esposito's impolitical as vision of the political 
from its borders seems to refer to such sharing as well, that is, the impolitical consists in 
de-limiting  the  political,  in  subtracting  it  from  itself,  in  pointing  out  its  “non,”  its 
constitutive void or outside. The impolitical is the political as sharing, inasmuch as it is 
the shared vision or the vision of sharing (in its double meaning), of the in-common and 
its limit, finitude. The impolitical vision or thought is the constant reminder and guard of 
the sharing, the simultaneous differentiation and connection that constitutes the political 
space.  The task  of  the  impolitical  is  to  sustain  the  political  as  sharing,  without 
representing or giving itself or the political a form or a figure. The impolitical thus, as I  
showed above, is the limit of the political as well as the limit of itself being a limit. The 
72 Bruno Bosteels similarly (2010) attests to this difference between Esposito's earlier and later works, 
suggesting that the move toward the impolitical as the outside-within or as the constitutive outside of 
politics was seemingly preceded by an attempt to explore the possibility of going 'beyond politics', for 
example, in an anthology titled Oltre la politica [Beyond the Political] edited by Esposito (212).
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impolitical  is  the  political,  it  shares  its  space,  and  it  is  the  space of  sharing.  The 
impolitical is an articulation or a vision of the space of the in-common.
Impolitical politics
We cannot do otherwise here but notice a number of motives in Esposito's impolitical 
thought that are similar to many other post-foundational thinkers, especially regarding the 
nature of  the  relationship  between 'the  impolitical'  and 'the political'.  This  relation  is 
reminiscent  of  the  correlationist  dynamic  involved  in  the  movement  of  'the  political 
difference'.  First  of  all,  Esposito's  thought  revolves  around  the  unbreakable  relation 
between two principles or notions of politics: “the political” and “the impolitical.” To put 
it  differently,  Esposito's  project  aims  at  distinguishing between 'apolitical  politics'  (of 
representation,  depoliticization  and  political  theology)  and  '(im)political  politics' 
revolving around an impolitical heart, or between the foundational politics (politics of the 
political  philosophers)  and  politics  without  foundation  (politics  of  the  impolitical 
tradition).  Politics  of  the  impolitical  tradition  distances  itself  from  the  political  of 
philosophers  which,  according  to  Esposito,  is  founded  on  the  repression  of  the 
unrepresentability  and  conflictuality.  In  this  distancing,  the  impolitical  remains, 
nevertheless,  indebted  to this very tradition of political  philosophy because it  initially 
articulates  itself  in  opposition  to  this  tradition.  This  applies  particularly to  Esposito's 
notion of the impolitical, which is historically situated against the background of modern 
politics of depoliticization. However, a further clarification is needed here. If we agree 
with Esposito that the impolitical tradition, or at least its major elements (such as the 
affirmation  of  conflictuality  or  contradiction  at  the  core  of  politics),  extends  beyond 
modernity (to Plato, St. Paul, St. Augustine, etc.), then its historical background appears 
not as important. In this regard, Esposito argues that the impolitical does not arise simply 
as a reaction to modern politics, remaining necessarily attached to this modernity (as its 
internal  contradiction)  and  its  political  language  (2009,  108–110). The  impolitical 
tradition, according to Esposito, articulates the limit of the political as the “ahistorical 
element of history” (109); as a result, such political is never reducible to its historical-
empirical actualization. Esposito is not alone here: other post-foundational thinkers see, 
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for  example,  the  relation  between  the  fluid  and  the  rigid  principles  of  politics  in 
ahistorical terms. For instance, Rancière's politics appears as an outline of the vanishing 
difference between two ahistorical logics, police and equality, or as an inscription of an 
ahistorical void or supplement. The 'advent of the void' for Rancière (as event of politics) 
as well as for Esposito (as the impolitical) is not a specifically modern occurrence but a 
structural principle that does not owe its existence to history. Nevertheless, I suggest that 
even though the impolitical as a  principle of politics is not historically conditioned or 
reducible to modernity, its terminological articulation is historically situated. This is the 
way in which Esposito's impolitical remains indebted to modernity. 
Esposito's project  remains,  at  the  same  time,  different  from  other  post-foundational 
thinkers because of his explicit and positive use of the notion of the impolitical to signify 
the internal limit of the political, that is, the differentiation of the political from itself,  
from its assumed principles and history. What others would still refer to as the political 
principle, Esposito calls the impolitical, thus, seemingly gesturing toward a possibility of 
going beyond the political.  However, in this nomination Esposito does not escape the 
horizon of modernity or, rather, the horizon outlined by thought that aims to overcome the 
modern political, but remains attached to it insofar as he fails to conceive of the radical 
outside of politics. It appears that modern political thought is somehow limited to the 
constant re-working rather than transcending of the political (thus, the proliferation of 
prefixes  of  politics:  in-,  un-,  infra-,  ultra-,  meta-,  etc).  'Prefix  politics',  including 
Esposito's impolitical, emerge within the correlationist horizon of thought: the thought of 
the political finitude that is coextensive with a rejection of the radical outside of politics, 
in  its  ideal  and  material  sense.  Let  us  recall  that  what  is  specific  to  modernity  is 
disappearance  of  terra  incognita,  the  space  outside  the  polis,  outside  'the  state'  (the 
expression, form and quintessence of the modern political). Such a total occupation of 
space by politics was not conceivable for early 'impolitical thought', so it is possible to 
argue that its 'vision' of the political outside could not be limited to the topology of the 
outside-within. The outside was strictly outside, for example, as oikos, slavery or simply 
the space beyond the walls of the city-state. With the rejection or closure of the outside 
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or,  to  use  Meillassoux'  words,  of  the  Great  Outdoors,  the  only apparent  outside  that 
remains available to modern thought is the relative outside. As a result, post-foundational 
thought, to which Esposito's project belongs, remains attached, in its inability to think the 
radical outside of politics, to the modern political and its representational form (e.g., the 
state). Insofar as the impolitical, in a truly post-foundational manner, is thought of not as 
exteriority but mere rupture or wound of the political, it can become manifest only as a 
failure of the latter, again pointing in the direction of the relative outside that empowers 
the  inside,  even  without  valorizing  it.  The  impolitical  remains  a  political  project  for 
Esposito, as it was for Cacciari, akin to many other contemporary attempts at re-thinking 
or re-working politics rather then enquiring into its 'beyond'. 
Despite my conclusion that Esposito's impolitical and its logic effectively resemble the 
outside  of  'the  political  difference'  (the  relative  outside),  there  are  several  intriguing 
elements of Esposito's impolitical thought that might be useful for further investigation 
into  the  possibility  of  the  radical  outside  of  politics.  First  of  all,  the  terminological 
distinction  of  Esposito's  project  is  important.  Esposito,  contrary  to  other  post-
foundational thinkers, names the excess of the modern political (its inessential essence or 
non-originary  origin)  the  impolitical.  It  seems  to  me  that  regardless  of  its  eventual 
submission to the logic of the 'outside-within' or to the position of the 'relative outside', 
the  name itself,  without  failure,  keeps  extending  beyond Esposito's  intentions:  on  its 
surface,  untouched by an etymological analysis,  and in its  immediate appearance,  the 
prefix 'in-' of the impolitical gestures toward the outside of politics or toward a possibility 
of  “leaving  politics”  (cf.  Dubreuil  2006).  It  is  important  that  Esposito  speaks  of  the 
impolitical and not merely of some new kind of the political, politics, meta-politics, ultra-
politics, etc. As a result, it is still worthwhile using Esposito's notion, thus to some extent 
engaging in the 'prefix politics' characteristic of the late-modern rearticulation of political 
philosophy. 
However, in order to limit the scope of my project to the considerations of the radical 
outside of politics, I prefer to use the term unpolitical instead of  impolitical in order to 
avoid a potential  misreading of my intentions and to distance myself  from Esposito's 
159
work. The prefix 'un-' does not carry the double meaning of 'in-', consequently, I employ 
it to signify the radical outside of the political. It is important to note right away that my 
'unpolitical' project does not call for an ultimate rejection or negation of Esposito's though 
of the impolitical (in the same way as the affirmation of the unpolitical as such does not 
dispose of the importance of politics). What I am rather suggesting is that the thought of 
the  impolitical  is  'incomplete'  or  problematic  insofar  as  it  does  not  'account'  for  the 
possibility  of  the  radical  outside,  of  the  unpolitical.  To  put  it  differently,  for  the 
impolitical vision to be 'complete', it has to account for the fallibility of its vision, that is, 
to accept its own limit. One of the sources of such a 'fallibility' of Esposito's project, its 
blind  spot,  could  be  located  in  the  abandonment  of  his  initial  consideration  of  the 
impolitical in terms of exteriority. Furthermore, Esposito's engagement with the thought 
of Simone Weil remains unsatisfactory,  since it is she who proclaims that the limit  is 
everything and who speaks of  'force'  beyond this  world,  of  'force'  disentangled from 
thought. It is Weil who is curious about our ability to cross the doorway of society and 
become truly asocial, without endlessly remaining on the threshold. She cries out: “This 
world is uninhabitable. That is why we have to flee to the next. But the door is shut. What 
a lot of knocking is required before it opens! Really to be able to enter in, and not be left 
on the doorstep, one has to cease to be a social being” (Weil 1956, 2:466). But does this 
cry actually affirm the possibility of stepping outside, of the unpolitical, or does it merely 
point out the impossibility of doing so, as Esposito seems to suggest? This is the question 
that remains to be answered. 
In the final analysis,  it  appears that Esposito indeed suggests that there is no way of 
crossing into something like the real outside of the political, since this kind of outside 
simply does not exist without an immediate relation to politics. The impolitical is, thus, 
the outside-within of the political, it is a vision, a gaze, a domain of contemplation and 
thought that enables the constitution of politics without foundation. The impolitical is a 
theoretical engagement with the political, it is a 'corrective' political project that aims at 
bringing politics to its origin,  which ultimately consists in the absence or plurality of 
origins, in the originary an-archy of the political. That which is unmediated by thought, a 
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possibility of the unpolitical experience, seems to remain beyond the scope of Esposito's 
impolitical project developed in his early works. 
The impolitical in Esposito appears not only as the silent unconscious of the political that 
secretly testifies to the absence of the ground of the political, but functions almost like its 
reflexive consciousness, as a mirror at the limit of the political that reflects nothing other 
than  the political  itself.  The  impolitical  does  not  oppose a  totalizing politicization of 
human relationality, on the contrary, it aids in the renewal of this process: the impolitical 
opens up the angle of refraction through which the reality acquires its  full visibility in  
political  terms.  Consequently,  the  impolitical  disappears  with  the  appearance  of  the 
political, it manifests itself only in cancelling itself in the taking place of the political. 
The impolitical is never radically beyond or prior to politics, it is not unpolitical, insofar 
as it shares (i.e., coincides with and differentiates) the space of the political, cuts it open 
without  ever  leaving  it.  In  the  end,  the  impolitical  is  merely  constitutive  of  politics 
without foundation, of the political deprived of its fullness.
2.3. Impolitical and Unpolitical: “Bare Life” and “Form-of-Life”
Giorgio  Agamben presents  a  contrast  to  Esposito's  approach  to  impolitico in 
contemporary theory, insofar as his vision of the notion remains primarily negative: the 
impolitical,  as  bare  life  (nuda  vita),  is  the  originary  problematic  aspect  of  Western 
(bio)politics  that  needs  to  be  addressed  in  order  to  contain  its  destructive  power. 
However, despite the obvious negative rendering of the impolitical, I will argue that we 
can  get  a  glimpse  of  something like  the  positive  impolitical  in  Agamben's  notion  of 
“form-of life” (or “happy life”) that is supposed to form the basis of “coming politics.” In 
other words, “form-of-life” (forma-di-vita), which Agamben so readily politicizes, can be 
interpreted as the unpolitical  as such  (especially given Agamben's attention to the “as 
such”): an integral notion of life that gains more and more importance in contemporary 
thought in contrast to a variety of its 'differential' conceptions. In view of this task, I will,  
first, present an analysis of the use of the impolitical in Agamben's works and suggest 
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how it is related to the notion of “bare life;” then, I will sketch out his view of “form-of-
life” (even though he does not present a consistent theory of this notion) and show how it  
can be interpreted as containing the unpolitical elements that we are after.  Due to the 
enormous amount of literature and studies dedicated to Agamben's  oeuvre, I will only 
focus here on distilling his notion of the impolitical in its relation with 'life', leaving the 
general,  more  comprehensive  investigation  of  the  various  themes  in  his  philosophy 
beyond the scope of my present endeavour. I will also briefly discuss Foucault's synthetic 
notion of life and of life as the domain of error, as well as Esposito's and Deleuze's notion 
of “impersonal  life” as a point  of comparison to Agamben's  notion of “form-of-life.” 
Most importantly, these discussions constitute not just mere cases of comparison but echo 
what Agamben calls “the coming philosophy” and pave a way toward something like the 
coming unpolitical thought of life. 
Life and politics
Consideration of life in its relation with politics is not unique to Agamben, of course. The 
most obvious examples of other thinkers, discussed here, that posit life at the centre of 
their thought are Hobbes, Schmitt and Foucault. Hobbes famously defines the state of 
nature in terms of war of all against all, where the major criteria of this very war lies not  
in actual fighting but in the permanent threat of (potential) death. Thus, mere survival, 
preservation of life or struggle with death seem to be the major concern of humans in 
such a state. In a similar way, Schmitt brings life to our attention in his discussion of the 
concept of the political as well as in his writings on sovereignty. First of all, the political  
is defined by Schmitt through the struggle between friend and enemy which, as I showed, 
oscillates,  in  a  Hobbesian  manner,  around  the  threat  of  real  killing  or  death. 
Consequently, for Schmitt and Hobbes life comes to attention mainly through its opposite 
– death, and their 'definition' of life could probably be exhausted in terms of struggle with 
death. Furthermore, many post-foundational thinkers also consider life primarily in its 
relation with death, however, in not exactly the same terms as Hobbes and Schmitt. The 
real threat of death and killing, as the ultimate limit as well as drive of life, is replaced by 
the considerations of  finitude in more general terms, i.e., non-specific to any particular 
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situation  of  human interaction.  The  struggle with death is  translated  into  facing  and 
coming to terms with finitude, with the absence of the ultimate foundation of human life 
and thus of any politics and community. The resulting affirmation of void or finitude at 
the 'core' of the new conceptions of community is evident. 
An important  'source'  for  Agamben's  project  is  Foucault's  investigation  of  modern 
biopolitics. However, even though Agamben pays homage to Foucault in his Homo Sacer 
(1998), it would be hard to conceive of Agamben's work as a direct engagement with 
Foucault's. Mika Ojakangas  (2005b) describes this situation as an “impossible dialogue 
on bio-power,” implying that Agamben's view of biopolitics, except for the term itself, 
has little in common with Foucault's. If for the latter biopolitics is a modern 'invention', 
the result of transformation of the previous mode of power relations, i.e.,  sovereignty 
with its right over life and death, for Agamben bio-power has been with us since the very 
inception of Western politics: “before impetuously coming to light in our century,  the 
river  of  biopolitics  that  gave  homo  sacer  his  life  runs  its  course  in  a  hidden  but 
continuous  fashion”  (1998,  121).  Foucault's  work  is  thus  dedicated,  according  to 
Agamben, to the study of “growing inclusion of man's natural life in the mechanisms and 
calculations of power” (119; my emphasis), implying that Foucault's biopolitical inquiries 
were limited to the study of modernity, which does not 'introduce' biopolitics (as Foucault 
would suggest) but rather brings it to light by explicitly recognizing life as the object of 
politics. 
Furthermore, Agamben's view of biopolitics (contrary to Foucault) hinges on the figure of 
“bare life,” that is,  he proposes that Western (bio)politics is founded on the originary 
exception  of  naked  life  from the  polis.  What  is  of  the  most  importance  is  the  very 
definition of this excepted life: bare life is life exposed to an unconditional power or 
threat of  death (Agamben 1998, 88, 90). In Agamben's view, the biopolitical regime is 
purely negative, it contains death as its animating principle: biopolitics in its essence is no 
more  than  thanatopolitics.  As  Ojakangas  argues,  Foucault's  conception  of  biopolitics, 
however, is of a more positive character since its main principle is no longer the threat of 
death, as it used to be in the case of sovereign power (and of which Agamben apparently 
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gives an accurate account), but “the care of 'all living'” (2005b, 6). 'Make live and let die' 
is the operating principle of bio-power. In this regard, Ojakangas reminds us that “[i]n 
order to function properly, bio power cannot reduce life to the level of bare life, because‐  
bare life is life that can only be taken away or allowed to persist ... Bio power needs a‐  
notion of life that corresponds to its aims. ... Its aim is not to produce bare life but, as  
Foucault  emphasizes,  to  'multiply  life',  to  produce  'extra life'”  (14).  As  a  result,  she‐  
suggests  that  Foucaultian  biopolitics  already presupposes  as  its  ground a  “synthetic” 
notion of life, for which Agamben is only searching with his notion of “form-of-life,” 
which would apparently announce the end of biopolitics.  Consequently,  it  seems that 
Agamben's project might have been born out of the misreading of Foucault's account of 
bio-power in The History of Sexuality. 
The impolitical as bare life
Whatever  the  'origins'  of  Agamben's  ideas,  what  interests  me  here  is  his  explicit 
connection  between life  and the  notion  of  the  unpolitical,  which  is  not  found in  the 
authors  discussed previously (except,  perhaps,  in Esposito's  later  works).73 Impolitico, 
variously translated into English as “unpolitical,” “nonpolitical” or “impolitical,” is not a 
major notion in Agamben's works as such, however, it  is intimately connected with a 
pivotal concept of his political philosophy – bare life. As a matter of fact, for Agamben 
the unpolitical  is bare life. In this respect he follows Schmitt's structural logic asserting 
that “the political is the total, and as a result we know that any decision about whether 
something is unpolitical [unpolitische] is always a political decision...” (Schmitt 2005, 2). 
Agamben  slightly  adjusts  the  content  of  this  statement,  thus  radically  reorienting  its 
perspective,  by adding that “something  unpolitical” refers solely to bare life.  Starting 
with a similar quote from Schmitt's another work, Staat, Bewegung, Volk, he writes “'It is 
general knowledge among the contemporary German political generation that precisely 
the decision concerning whether a fact or a kind of thing is apolitical [apolitico] is a 
specifically  political  decision'  (ibid.,  p.  17).  Politics  is  now  literally  the  decision 
73 Of course, let us not forget the impact of Hannah Arendt's ideas, especially her discussion of naked 
humanity in The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951), on Agamben's development of the notion of bare 
life. 
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concerning  the unpolitical  [dell'impolitico]  (that  is,  concerning  bare life  [nuda vita])” 
(1998, 173; my emphasis). Agamben translates that which Schmitt proposed a while ago 
in terms of life, and not just any life, but naked, impolitical life that, in fact, is always 
already politicized through its  exposition to  death in the originary state of exception, 
springing from the sovereign decision. “Not simple natural life, but life exposed to death 
(bare life or sacred life) is the originary political element” (88). 
On several other occasions Agamben refers to something like bare life in terms of the 
unpolitical or impolitical  (1998, 131; 2004, 76, 77). Let us consider another example 
here. He writes: “[t]he political ... is drawn out of the living being through the exclusion – 
as unpolitical  – of a part  of its  vital  activity”  (2007, 6). The unpolitical,  bare life,  is 
clearly presented here as only a part of the vital activity of the living being. What is this 
part, and what is the rest of it? Agamben famously starts his investigation into the history 
of  Western  biopolitics  by  suggesting  that  the  ancient  Greeks  did  not  have  a  unitary 
concept to signify life, as we do nowadays, but differentiated between two kinds of life: 
zoē and  bios, “the simple fact of living common to all living beings (animals, men, or 
gods)”  and “the  form or  way of  living  proper  to  an  individual  or  group”  (1998,  1), 
respectively. In other words, the Greek notion of life was based on the distinction and 
apparently clear  separation  between the mere fact  of  living,  often also referred to  as 
nutritive or vegetative life isolated from logos (cf. Agamben 1999, 231), and qualitative 
life  proper to (some) human beings –  bios politikos, life organized or manifest in the 
polis for the sake of 'good life'. Corresponding to the linguistic distinction, the Greeks 
maintained a separation of spaces dedicated to these different kinds of living: oikos or the 
domain  of  the  household  was  the  space  of  zoē's  confinement,  devoted  solely  to 
maintenance and reproduction of natural life, while the polis was the space where logos 
was exercised for the attainment of 'good life'. 
Following his reading of Aristotle, Agamben suggests that this distinction between  zoē 
and bios, even though no longer preserved in contemporary European languages, does not 
disappear  but,  on  the  contrary,  forms  the  foundation  of  Western  politics;  it  is  its 
ontological presupposition. “In contrasting the 'beautiful day' (euemeria) of simple life 
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[zoē] with the 'great difficulty' of political bios ... Aristotle may well have given the most 
beautiful formulation to the aporia that lies at the foundation of Western politics” (1998, 
11). This irresolvable internal contradiction that contaminates a transhistorical ontology 
of politics is bare life, which is “included in politics in the form of exception, that is, as 
something that is included solely through an exclusion” (11). As exception, impolitical 
life is not simply opposed to politics, like zoē might be opposed to bios, and it does not 
preexist politics, as the state of nature might precede the state, but rather it is co-originary 
with  politics.  The  latter  is  constituted,  according  to  Agamben,  through  an  originary 
decision,  split,  distinction  and  separation  between  inside  and  outside,  between  the 
political  and  unpolitical:  politics  emerges  in  the  delimitation  of  its  own  outside,  in 
drawing its border.  As a result,  due to the dialectic nature of a limit,  which not only 
separates but also unites, the outside of the political space always faces the inside. More 
than  that,  it  is  'domesticated',  incorporated  into  the  inside  through  the  status of  the 
outside.  “Exteriority  [i.e.,  impolitical  life],”  Agamben  writes,  “is  truly  the  innermost 
centre of the political system, and the political system lives off it in the same way that the 
rule, according to Schmitt, lives off the exception” (36). Consequently, this exteriority is 
never truly outside, it is only relative outside epitomized in the excepted figure of homo 
sacer.  In  his  own  terms  Agamben  seems  to  address  here  the  problem  of  modern 
correlation  between  political  inside  and  outside,  pointing  out  the  impossibility  of 
conceiving  something  like  the  radical  outside  of  the  political  space  from within  the 
categories of this very space. In order to go beyond this correlationism one would have to 
rework the very distinction between the inside and the outside: to 'collapse' one into the 
other, but not in the same way as modern biopolitics turns the exception into the rule 
everywhere. This redefinition would have to occur, according to Agamben, in rethinking 
the notion of life in terms of its immanence to itself – as “form-of-life.”
This new notion of life is 'integral' (cf. Prozorov 2009, 343), meaning that it precludes the 
possibility of distinguishing life from itself, or rather of separating living from its form (or 
zoē from bios), as in the case of bare life. This does not suggest, however, a return to 
some prior  state  of  innocence  of  zoē  or the  state  of  nature,  that  is,  to  the  state  not 
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contaminated by sovereign politics. It is important to understand, Agamben reminds us, 
that the 'purity' of zoē or 'truly' unpolitical life is not available to us; all that we know of it 
is bare life, which is not natural life, but a product of politics. As William Rasch puts it, 
“[t]he  political  ...  does  not  replace  nature;  it  creates  it”  (2007,  101). This  'nature'  or 
'outside' of the political is “not simply natural reproductive life, the zoē of the Greeks, nor 
bios,  a qualified form of life. It is, rather, the bare life of  homo sacer [...],  a zone of 
indistinction  and  continuous  transition  between  man  and  beast,  nature  and  culture” 
(Agamben 1998, 109).74 The topology of exteriority of Western politics is thus nothing 
else but the zone of indistinction, the outside-within, the exception. It has the topology of 
a Mobius strip or a Leyden jar, where what is presupposed as external reappears as the 
inside (37). 
As for Esposito, Agamben's impolitical is the “threshold,” space outside of all space, “the 
always present and always operative presupposition of sovereignty [i.e., of the political]” 
(1998, 106).  The political  does not replace the unpolitical,  it  is not opposed to it but 
creates it. Impolitical life, for Agamben, is not independent of politics, on the contrary, it 
is a political product: the threshold which the system invents and continues to reinvent, 
and through which  it  declares  itself  always  different  from (or  nonidentical  to)  itself. 
Agamben refers to Blanchot in this respect suggesting that “[c]onfronted with an excess, 
the system interiorizes what exceeds it through an interdiction and in this way 'designates 
itself  as  exterior  to  itself'”  (18;  my emphasis).  (This  is  true  not  only for  Agamben's 
analysis of sovereign relation with life, but also for correlationist thought in general that 
emphasizes the difference or exteriority of politics insofar as it can be interiorized or re-
incorporated into it as, for instance, 'the political', 'exception' or 'outside-within'.) We can 
conclude that the impolitical does not have positive connotation for Agamben (as it has 
for  Esposito  and  Cacciari),  but  designates  life  resulting  from  a  prohibition  or 
abandonment through sovereign decision and withdrawal. 
74 Catherine Mills suggests that there are altogether “four categories of 'life' operating in Homo Sacer: 
zoē or biological life,  bios or political life, 'bare life' (sometimes rendered as 'naked life', from the 
Italian term 'nuda vita'), and a new 'form-of-life', ...” (2005, 219). 
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Bare life is “a destroyed or degraded  bios from which all positive determinations have 
been  subtracted”  (Prozorov  2009,  341).  The  sovereign  gets  a  hold  of  life  not  by 
conquering it but by withdrawing from it, meaning that the law applies to this life in its 
abandonment. The impolitical is not simply left outside of political space but is rather 
“taken outside” or banned by the sovereign from the 'inside' and thus from being subject 
to law of any order, sacred or profane. As Agamben puts it:  “The rule applies to the  
exception in no longer applying, in withdrawing from it. The state of exception is thus not 
the chaos that precedes order but rather the situation that results from its suspension. In 
this sense, the exception is truly, according to its etymological root,  taken outside  (ex-
capere), and not simply excluded”  (1998, 18). In other words, the exception, on which 
Western  politics  is  found,  is  not  “real”  but  “fictional”:  the  structure  of  the  juridico-
political  order  is  that  of  an  inclusion  of  what  is  simultaneously  pushed  outside,  an 
inclusion through abandonment.  The figure of  homo sacer,  according to  Agamben,  is 
representative of this structure: homo sacer not simply exists in the anomie of the state of 
nature, where the way of killing is the way of survival and so anyone can kill him without 
committing a homicide. The state of nature is a political creation, it does not (pre)exist in 
non-relation with politics, and so the condition of  homo sacer  is not indicative of pre-
political chaos but can appear only as a result of exclusion from the political order, of 
stripping bios down to naked life. However, this abandonment of life to exteriority does 
not sever its link with politics: bare life is never fully outside or really excepted, but is 
placed  within  the  political  order  as  a  structurally  necessary  element  of  presupposed 
exteriority. Agamben's analysis, in this regard, is very similar to Schmitt's, from whom he 
obviously  derives  many  of  his  arguments:  first,  the  exception  (the  impolitical)  is  a 
structurally necessary element of political order, and not contingent or disruptive, as it 
was,  for example,  in  Esposito's  view; second, the unpolitical  is  reduced solely to the 
status of the exception, acclaimed positively by Schmitt and negatively by Agamben. 
In Agamben's work, the notion of 'impolitical' remains attached solely to 'bare life' (an 
excluded part of vital activity) and is not 'redeemed' in the messianic coming of the new 
politics  envisioned by him.  His  main  task consists  in  a  redefinition  of  the  notion  of 
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'politics', while 'the unpolitical' serves only as the negative background against which this 
urgent necessity of redefinition is posited. As a result, while for Agamben the state of 
exception  is  the  ahistorical  negative  foundation  of  political  order  in  the  West,  the 
reduction  of  'the  unpolitical'  to  'bare  life'  is  the  negative  foundation  of  Agamben's 
messianic  political project.  The 'redemption'  of bare life  in  Agamben's  work happens 
through its politicization and is thus reminiscent of, for example, Rancière's solution to 
the problem of 'the part of no part'. Let us now look at how this happens in more detail. 
Coming politics and form-of-life
Agamben suggests that it is a specifically modern biopolitical regime that posits the acute 
necessity  of  rethinking  politics  in  a  way  that  would  prevent  the  multiplication  and 
reproduction of bare life as the sole ground of sovereignty.75 He writes: “[o]ne of the 
essential  characteristics of  modern biopolitics  (which will  continue to increase in  our 
century)  is  its  constant  need  to  redefine  the  threshold  in  life  that  distinguishes  and 
separates what is inside from what is outside. Once it crosses over the walls of the oikos 
and  penetrates  more  and  more  deeply  into  the  city,  the  foundation  of  sovereignty  – 
nonpolitical life [l'impolitica vita naturale] – is immediately transformed into a line that 
must  be  constantly  redrawn”  (1998,  131).  The  task  of  modern  biopolitics  lies  in 
maintaining  and redrawing its  own foundation:  unpolitical  zoē which,  contrary to  its 
originary confinement in the household, has penetrated (as Foucault also suggested) the 
centre of the political, and, as bare life, has become the sole foundation and object of 
politics. As a result, following Walter Benjamin, Agamben argues that while earlier in 
history the exception (as well as bare life of  homo sacer) emerged at different specific 
times during the states of emergency and was confined to them,76 nowadays the exception 
has  become the  rule  and bare  life  now coincides  with  the  biological  life  of  political 
subjects, citizens. “If today there is no longer any one clear figure of the sacred man, it is 
perhaps because we are all virtually homines sacri” (115). 
75 In this respect, the pressure of the necessity to rethink modern politics is clearly expressed in the 
phenomenon of the camp that encompasses and manifests the horrors of the “biopolitical paradigm” or 
“'nomos' of the modern.” 
76 In addition to Agamben's study of the state  of  exception in  Homo Sacer (1998),  see his  State of  
Exception (2005).
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Furthermore, since the exception (bare life) is impolitical, Agamben seems to advance a 
thesis  similar  to  Schmitt's  and  many  post-foundational  thinkers'  suggesting  that  the 
political is threatened or taken over by the unpolitical, or rather that politics has become 
apolitical, depoliticized. He argues that for the humanity of the 20th century, which in 
various totalitarianisms has reached its historical telos, which “has become animal again, 
there  is  nothing  left  but  the  depoliticization of  human  societies  by  means  of  the 
unconditioned unfolding of the oikonomia, or the taking on of biological life itself as the 
supreme political (or rather  impolitical) task. ... [P]osthistorical humanity seems to take 
on its own physiology as its last,  impolitical mandate” (2004, 76, 77; my emphasis). In 
modern biopolitics the political has been completely reduced to the impolitical, life has 
been reduced to bare life that is defined through the struggle with death (as in 'the state of 
nature' or as in the biopolitical care for life that consists in prevention of death by any 
means), rather than by happiness as the 'proper' orientation of life in the polis. 
It is this turn from death to happiness that defines Agamben's search for new politics and 
community. In order to advance the coming of the latter he proposes to begin not with the 
rejection  of  the  present  condition  but  to  work  from within  it,  to  take  it  to  its  limit. 
Consequently, through his reading of Walter Benjamin he attempts to turn the 'fictitious' 
exception  that  defines  modern  sovereignty  (politics)  into  the  'real'  exception,  which 
Benjamin associated with “divine violence”  (Agamben 1998, 63–65). Or, to use Louis 
Althusser's words, “the inner darkness of exclusion” has to be transformed into “the outer 
darkness of exclusion.”77 In the same way, the abandonment of bare life has to be not 
negated but rather “appropriated” (cf. Prozorov 2009). These transformations essentially 
address the problem of correlation between the political inside and the outside, where the 
77 “In the development of a theory, the invisible of a visible field is not generally  anything whatever 
outside and foreign to the visible defined by that field. The invisible is defined by the visible as  its 
invisible, its forbidden vision: the invisible is not therefore simply what is outside the visible (to return 
to the spatial metaphor), the outer darkness of exclusion – but the inner darkness of exclusion, inside 
the visible itself  because defined by its  structure.  In  other  words,  the seductive metaphors  of  the 
terrain, the horizon and hence the limits of a visible field defined by a given problematic threaten to 
induce a false idea of the nature of this field, if we think this field literally according to the spatial  
metaphor as a space limited by  another space outside it.  This other space is also in the first space 
which contains it as its own denegation; this other space is the first space in person, which is only  
defined by the denegation of what it excludes from its own limits. In other words, all its limits are  
internal, it carried its outside inside it” (Althusser 1970, 26–27). 
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solution is defined by the assertion of the as such of the outside, thus taking it beyond the 
mere status of exception. Agamben's project, thus, deals with the question that I initially 
posed: a possibility of the unpolitical as such, beyond exception. However, as I already 
mentioned,  even  though  Agamben  attempts  to  takes  the  notion  of  politics  beyond 
correlation, he stops one step short in rethinking the unpolitical in the same vein. In this 
respect, I suggest that what Agamben calls political life or “form-of-life” is bare life or 
the unpolitical as such, even if he does not interpret it in these terms. 
Against the background of his initial critique of sovereignty, Agamben's project consists 
in the search for the “coming” or “post-sovereign politics,” “the guiding concept and the 
unitary  center”  of  which  is  no  longer  the  exceptio of  bare  life  but  “form-of-life” 
(Agamben 1996, 155). Through “emancipation” from the division of life into worthy and 
unworthy of living, i.e., political and bare life, and the “exodus” from any sovereignty, 
the possibility of “a non-Statist politics” is presented: “[a] political life, that is,  a life 
directed toward the idea of happiness and cohesive with a form-of-life ... a life for which 
living itself [is] at stake in its own living ... a life of power (potenza)” (153). Politics is no 
longer a means to an end of survival (as it is often presented in the various social contract 
theories),  but rather emerges as a  submission to potential  (power)  and happiness,  the 
essential  human  features.  Agamben  writes  that  every  form of  human  living  “always 
retains the character of a possibility; that is, it always puts at stake living itself. That is 
why human beings – as beings of power who can do or not do [...] are the only beings for 
whom  happiness is  always  at  stake  in  their  living,  the  only  beings  whose  lives  are 
irremediably  and  painfully  assigned to  happiness”  (151;  my  emphasis).  The  natural 
sweetness of zoē or the simple “beautiful day” of life, to which Aristotle opposed life in 
the polis, becomes the guiding principle of the coming politics for Agamben, since human 
happiness does not require a submission to a historical telos or higher goal, a good life, 
that can be achieved only through thorough purification of bios from zoē. The so-called 
goodness of life lies in the living itself; bare life 'as such' (not as an exception but as 
form-of-life) is the political  life of happiness. As a result, form-of-life is a new politics 
and new politics is form-of-life. What is redeemed in bare life or the unpolitical is its 
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politicalness: insofar as in form-of-life it is impossible to isolate something like naked 
life, that is, to depoliticize it, this constitutes it as “political life” (151).
Human beings are beings of power (potenza) that are assigned to happiness, and thus a 
completely new politics, according to Agamben, corresponds to such an assignment: it is 
“a politics contained in the sheer experience of existence (bios as zoē) that does not strive 
to attain any identity or realize a vocation” (Prozorov 2009, 346). It is a politics of means 
without end  (cf. Agamben 2000). This allows Agamben to explain anew why  there is  
politics in the first place. Within the Western political “paradigm,”78 Agamben argues, 
“[t]here  is  politics  because  man  is  the  living  being who,  in  language,  separates and 
opposes himself to his own bare life and, at the same time, maintains himself in relation 
to that bare life in an inclusive exclusion”  (1998, 8; my emphasis). Western politics is 
founded  on  the  possibility  of  separating  life  from itself,  on  the  distinction  between 
various kinds of life, where the attainment of 'good life' acquires the status of the political 
end.  In  opposition to  this  paradigm,  Agamben proposes  that  “[p]olitics  is  that  which 
corresponds to the essential inoperability [inoperosità] of humankind ... There is politics  
because human beings are argōs-beings79 that cannot be defined be any proper operation 
– that is, beings of  pure potentiality  that no identity or vocation can possibly exhaust” 
78 I borrow the notion of “paradigm” from Roland Barthes' lectures on  The Neutral, who defines it as 
“the opposition of two virtual terms from which, in speaking, I actualize one to produce meaning”  
(2005, 7).  As in Saussure's  linguistics,  meaning arises  from the opposition of terms and not their 
intrinsic values. Paradigm in Agamben's case refers to the originary relation between bios and zoē that 
forms the basis of Western politics and, more generally, of meaning insofar as  logos is indissosiable 
from the political bios. Barthes speaks of the “the desire for the Neutral,” the desire to go beyond the 
opposition of  the paradigm.  In  a  way,  it  is  a  desire for  rest,  but  not  in  the sense of  “grayness,”  
“neutrality”  or  indifference”;  it  is  rather  a  “burning  activity”  that  outplays  the  paradigm  (7). 
Furthermore, the overcoming of the “struggle of angry forces” in opposition “does not occur through 
suspension, abstention, abolition of the paradigm, but through invention of a third term: complex term 
and not zero,  neutral  term” (55; my emphasis).  “The Neutral” for Barthes is such a “third term,” 
“tertium,” a structural position that is beyond and outplays the paradigm. For Agamben, the task of 
thought lies in the creation of tertium, more specifically, in creation of a new notion of life, form-of-
life, that outplays the traditional paradigm of Western politics – opposition and interdependence of 
bare life and political existence. 
79 Agamben borrows the notion of “argos” from the reading of Aristotle’s  Nicomachean Ethics, where 
the latter wonders if there is such a thing as an ergon, a work proper to man, or whether “man as such 
might  perhaps  be  essentially  argos,  that  is,  without  work,  workless  ...”  (Agamben  2000,  141). 
Agamben suggests that man indeed is workless, a being of pure potentiality that is not exhausted by 
any identity or work and is not limited by proper function and sphere of action (as, for example, “a  
carpenter and a shoemaker have their own proper function and spheres of action”). It is this essential  
worklessness of humankind that allows its irremediable and painful assignment to happiness (142). 
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(2000,  141;  my emphasis).  In  other  words,  human beings  are  essentially assigned to 
happiness, which cannot be achieved through any work, insofar as work presupposes an 
end product, a certain  telos  (and often a stable, unitary definition of happiness). “[T]he 
issue of the coming politics is the way in which this argia, this essential potentiality and 
inoperability, might be undertaken without becoming a historical task, or, in other words, 
the way in which politics might be nothing other than the exposition of humankind's 
absence of work as well as the exposition of humankind's creative semi-indifference to 
any task, and might only in this sense remain integrally assigned to happiness” (141-
142).80 Agamben's view of politics here, as an exposition of the essential worklessness (or 
essential inessentiality) of humankind, is reminiscent of other post-foundational thinkers', 
especially  Nancy  and  Esposito,  who  follow  a  similar  path  in  their  rethinking  of  a 
possibility of community that would not be reduced to a unitary identity but rather would 
hinge on its impossibility and thus absence. Another interesting comparison to Agamben's 
view of the coming politics is Karl Marx's 'imagination' of the imminently approaching 
communist society that will not only abolish exploitation and wage labour (including its 
necessary identitarian attachment to a 'profession' or proper function) but also liberate 
human  desire  and  creativity  that  would  always  remain,  as  it  is  for  Agamben,  semi-
indifferent  to  any task.  Only when “nobody has  one exclusive  sphere  of  activity,”  it 
becomes possible for me to do as I wish: “to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to 
hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, 
just  as  I  have  a  mind,  without  ever  becoming hunter,  fisherman,  herdsman or  critic” 
(Marx and Engels 2004, 53; my emphasis). In the same way as for Agamben, in Marxian 
communist society I am essentially 'workless'. 
Moreover, “the coming being,” a “whatever (qualunque) being,” is a singularity that is 
“reclaimed from its having this or that property, which identifies it as belonging to this or 
that set, to this or that class (the reds, the French, the Muslims) – and it is reclaimed not 
80 Another aspect of life defined by happiness, for Agamben (2004, 89–92), is its exteriority with regards 
to the man and animal distinction and, thus, to being. In the words of Catherine Mills, “[t]his [happy] 
life is not simply redeemed or reconciled in the sense of simply re-integrating natural and non-natural 
life through, for instance, reducing one to the other. Instead, it is 'outside of being' – that is, external to  
the Heideggerian opposition of animal and man on the basis of the openness to being, and instead  
characterised by beatitude or happiness” (Mills in Murray and Whyte 2011, 125–126).
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for another class nor for the simple generic absence of any belonging, but for its being-
such,  for belonging itself”  (Agamben 1993, 1). As in Marx, then, a whatever being can 
hunt but is not a hunter, can critique but is not a critic, etc., that is, this singularity is 
“expropriated of all identity, so as to appropriate belonging itself” (11). This belonging of 
the  singularity,  when  exposed as  such,  is  “whatever  you  want”  (2),  referring  to  “an 
original relation to desire” of whatever being (1), which is similar to the Marxian project 
of liberation of desire in communist  society.  The greatest  difference between the two 
thinkers, in this respect, is that whatever being, according to Agamben, is not able to form 
a societas, while Marx speaks of the communist society to come. In a way reminiscent of 
Nancy's  and  Esposito's  thought  of  community,  Agamben  suggests  that  whatever 
singularities form a community without affirming an identity, and that they “co-belong 
without  any  representable  condition  of  belonging”  (86).  This  'community'  is  “the 
principal enemy of the State” (87), since the latter can recognize any claim for identity 
but  cannot  come to terms with an absence  of  such a  claim.  Consequently,  Agamben 
argues that 'whatever',  insofar as it  refers to the expropriation of all identity and thus 
never  belongs  to  a  set  of  qualities  or  to  a  societas, is  “a  pure  exteriority,  a  pure 
exposure ... the event of an outside” (67). This outside is not another space beyond a 
determined space, but is the passage or threshold – the  ek-static  “experience of  being-
within an outside” (68). What is distinct about Agamben's view of exteriority as threshold 
here is that it seems to exist as such. In other words, there is no inside or outside that the 
limit mediates, and the passage itself, as 'whatever' life, is all there is. This being-within 
an outside is not an outside-within, an expropriated exteriority of correlationism, but is 
more akin to the outside which, as Meillassoux puts it, “thought could explore with the 
legitimate feeling of being on foreign territory – of being entirely elsewhere” (2008, 7). I 
will return to the discussion of the relationship between the 'outside', 'life' and 'thought'  
below.
Life of “whatever being” is “whatever life” or “form-of-life”: life not assigned to work or 
common identity but happiness.  Following Agamben, let me emphasize once again that 
one cannot work toward the attainment of such happy life (through politics) but can only 
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experience or  live it  as such in the very act of living (as politics). Thus, the grounding 
concept of the coming politics is the “form-of-life” or “happy life” of whatever being, life 
that is not separate or distinct from its form (as was the case with bare life). It is important 
to keep in mind that Agamben's use of hyphen in the term “form-of-life” is deliberate 
(and inspired by Heidegger), as opposed to just speaking of some form of concrete life, 
which  he  does  on  occasion.  The  use  of  the  hyphen  points  out  a  specific  kind  of 
relationship  between  life  and  its  form:  “the  hyphen  is  ...  the  most  dialectical  of 
punctuation  marks,  since  it  unites  only  to  the  degree  that  it  distinguishes  and 
distinguishes only to the degree that it unites” (Agamben 1999, 220). As a result, we can 
interpret  form-of-life  as  an  expression  of  a  dialectical  unity  of  what  has  been  long 
separated in the Western tradition – of bare  life and its political  form. Form-of-life is, 
thus, a name of a “being that is only its own bare existence” and of “life that, being its 
own form, remains inseparable from it”  (Agamben 1998, 188). This integral life is still 
bare life but no longer in the sense of excepted, abandoned or degraded form of life, but 
rather in the sense of life that affirms itself as such, that is, it affirms in every being its 
manner or form of being, its inoperativity and potentiality  (cf. Prozorov 2009, 347). I 
argue that this form-of-life is not only strictly political life (due to its indivisibility, as 
Agamben  claims),  but  also  unpolitical.  The  unpolitical  is  no  longer  impolitical,  an 
outside-within or immanent transcendence: the distinction between inside and outside is 
renounced,  abandoned  altogether.  Politics  and  its  outside  or  exteriority  become 
“absolutely immanent” to each other. As a result, in Agamben's work political life (form-
of-life)  can  be  also  interpreted  as  unpolitical  (life)  as  such  (however,  they  are  not 
identical, as we will see). 
In The Coming Community (1993) Agamben elaborates on the notion “as such” (tale  
quale),81 which is related to the notion of “whatever” (qualunque) that I touched upon 
above.82 From different  perspectives,  both  of  these  terms  refer  to  “an  absolute  such-
quality that does not refer back to any presupposition” but only indicates “being-such, 
81 See the corresponding French term tel quel.
82 Note that Agamben uses “the being-such” and “the thing itself” interchangeably  (see, for example, 
Agamben 1993, 100). 
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[...] manner of being” (96). The 'suchness' does not refer to any presupposition or quality 
but is exposed in itself in the same way as I, as a singularity, am never “this or that, but 
always  such,  thus” (96). Consequently, Agamben suggests, “[t]he category of  suchness 
is ... the fundamental category that remains unthought in every quality” (98). Given these 
considerations, what would it mean to speak of the unpolitical  as such or rather what 
would it  mean to speak of bare life  as such  as the unpolitical  of Agamben's  coming 
politics? First  of all,  it  is no longer the negative foundation of sovereign politics but 
exposed as such, not referring to any other quality, entity or sphere. In other words, the 
unpolitical is neither an interruption of the political (its wound, crack, lack or void, etc), 
nor it is a dynamic principle of politics. It is a 'third term' of any political opposition that 
itself is not attached to any of these oppositions. I suggested above that bare life 'as such' 
(i.e., form-of-life) is unpolitical; however, insofar as there is actually nothing 'naked' or 
'stripped' in this life (since it cannot be distinct from its form, which 'dresses' it), I further 
propose that bare life 'as such' or the unpolitical is nothing less than  life as such:  an 
immediate  sweetness,  as  Aristotle  and Agamben  might  say,  and the  unthought  of  all 
possible politics. Here we can note the difference between Agamben's view of form-of-
life as political life, the core of coming politics, and my interpretation of this life as the 
unpolitical – the unthought of politics that persists and is exposed only 'as such'. It is the 
“great outdoors” of politics that can be thought only as unthought, and which this thought 
explores with a feeling of being entirely elsewhere. Perhaps, as in the case with bare life 
of sovereignty (as well as pure Being of metaphysics), 'life as such' (the unpolitical) is 
“an unthinkable limit” that reason cannot think except “in stupor and in astonishment” 
(Agamben 1998, 182). While Agamben is interested in redeeming politics through a new, 
integral notion of life – form-of-life or political life – my concern here is rather with the 
unpolitical, which for Agamben still remains lost in the net of sovereign politics, since he 
suggests that  in  what  is  to  come there will  be only the 'happy life'  lived  as politics. 
Accepting Agamben's argument concerning the integrity and indivisibility of form-of-life, 
I would like to take this notion further and think of its inverse 'quality', which, actually, 
lies beyond any quality, i.e., of the unpolitical as the unthought of any politics, no matter 
how  the  latter  is  rethought  and  redefined.  This  'unpolitical-as-such'  combined  with 
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Agamben's  specific concern for the 'form-of-life'  or 'happy life'  renders a question of 
another  possibility  –  of  'the  unpolitical  form-of-life'  (an  oxymoron,  if  one  applies 
Agamben's argument, insofar as the 'form-of-life' or 'happy life' is, by definition, political 
life). Thinking the unthought of political life 'as such' is what is at stake here. 
Politics, thought, life
First,  it  is  necessary to  clarify the place of  'thought'  in  Agamben's  project  and,  most 
importantly, the intimate relation between this 'thought' and 'form-of-life'. Similar to the 
experience of life 'as such', in its 'purity', thought belongs to this kind of experience: “[t]o 
think does not mean merely to be affected by this or that thing, by this or that content of 
enacted  thought,  but  rather  at  once  to  be  affected  by  one's  own  receptiveness  and 
experience in each and every thing that is thought a pure power of thinking” (Agamben 
1996, 153). This pure power of thinking refers to the potential (power as  potenza) that 
form-of-life stands for: thought cannot be reduced to an object (a thing) as life cannot be 
exhausted  in  some identity  or  'work'.  To put  it  differently,  the  notion  of  form-of-life 
asserts the inseparability of (bare) life from its form in the same way as thought, in its 
potentiality, is indistinguishable from itself and is thus “able to think itself” (153), i.e., to 
coincide with itself as life coincides with its form. The object of thought is “the potential  
character of life and human intelligence” (153). As a result, Agamben calls thought “an 
experience,  an  experimentum” and “the nexus that  constitutes the forms of life  in  an 
inseparable  context  as  form-of-life”  (153).  Thought  constitutes form-of-life;  it  is  not 
separate from and more valuable than mere living, as, for instance, in ancient Greece bios  
theōrētikos, the domain of thought and philosophy, was considered more advanced over 
concerns of both oikos  (the sphere of  zoē) and bios politikos (cf. Arendt 1992, 21). For 
Agamben,  not  only do  the  latter  two  coincide  with  each  other,  but  thought  itself  is 
inseparable from them. Thus human life, as form-of-life, is 'totally' indivisible. This leads 
to a conclusion that thought not only  constitutes form-of-life, it is not an instrument, a 
means  toward  an  end,  'happy  life',  as  has  been  the  case  with  traditional  political 
philosophy that  took charge  of  politics  by trying  to  design the  best  model  for  being 
together. To the extent that Agamben's coming politics is politics without an end but of 
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pure means, thought is form-of-life and form-of-life is thought. “Thought is form-of-life, 
life  that  cannot  be  segregated  from  its  form;  and  anywhere  the  intimacy  of  this 
inseparable life appears, in the materiality of corporeal processes and habitual ways of 
life no less than in theory, there and only there is there thought. And it is this thought, this  
form-of-life ... that must become the guiding concept and the unitary center of the coming 
politics” (155; my emphasis). 
By placing thought at  the centre of politics,  Agamben emphasizes here the difference 
between  classical  thought,  which  had  made  of  “contemplation,  bios  theoretikos,” “a 
separate and solitary activity ('exile of the alone to the alone'),” and modern political 
philosophy that begins with “the thought of the one and only possible intellect common 
to all human beings, and, crucially, with Dante's affirmation – in De Monarchia – of the 
inherence of a multitude to the very power of thought” (1996, 155). Agamben adheres to 
this modern affirmation of man's potential for being intellectual, referring to it as “the 
diffuse intellectuality” (or the Marxian notion of a “general intellect”), that constitutes 
“the experience of thought ... [as] always the experience of a common power” (154, 155). 
In this  respect,  we can compare Agamben to Rancière,  who grounds the principle  of 
equality in the equality of human intelligence and understanding, as well as to Nancy's 
assertion of thought as always multiple, as thinking-with. Similar to Nancy, but also to 
Foucault,  Agamben  argues  that  when  I  think,  i.e.,  exercise  the  power  (potenza)  of 
thought, I always belong to the multiple, I am 'with', I am involved in the multiplicity of 
power relations. “After all,” he writes, “if there existed one and only one being, it would 
be absolutely impotent. ...  Where I have power, we are always already many  (just like 
when, if there is a language, that is, a power of speech, there cannot be then one and only 
one  being  who speaks  it)”  (154;  my emphasis).  As  a  result,  Agamben  suggests  that 
community and power are identical, meaning that a communitarian principle inheres to 
any power due to “the necessarily potential character of any community” (154). Insofar 
as human beings are never fully enacted (i.e., they are essentially workless), this enables 
their  communication with others  that  consists  in  communication not  of  something in 
common (an identity) but “of communicability itself” (154). Due to the always already 
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multiple  character  of  thought  and  power,  as  well  as  the  origin  of  communication  in 
potentiality and not in identity, that is, due to the potential character of the community as 
such,  similarly  to  Nancy  Agamben  views  this  “coming  community,”  according  to 
Prozorov, as “a genuinely universal and non-exclusive” (2009, 347). However, insofar as 
Agamben assigns the power of thought and its potentiality to “human life” (1996, 151), 
the question of universality of such a 'human community' and life remains open.
But let us now return to the question of the unpolitical. If thought and form-of-life are at 
the 'foundation' of completely new politics, then how is it possible for us to think the 
unpolitical? Would not that amount precisely to a renewed attempt at separating life from 
itself?  I  believe  this  is  not  the  case.  Insofar  as  form-of-life  is  power  (potenza)  and, 
according to Agamben, “[o]nly a power that is capable of both power and impotence 
[adynamia  or 'the potentiality to not-be' (dynamis me einai)], ... is the supreme power” 
(Agamben 1993, 35, 36), then the unpolitical is rather an exploration of this 'potential to 
not  be'  of  form-of-life,  that  is,  an  exploration  of  the  unthought  of  the  political 
life/thought.  While  'form-of-life'  is  'thought',  the 'unpolitical-as-such'  is  its  'unthought' 
that can be thought only 'as such', as unthought. The multitude, the supreme “power of 
thought as such,” of “pure potentiality,” is manifest in the unpolitical.  The unpolitical 
must remain the 'foreign territory' for political thought in order to avoid a drift back to 
correlationism  and  a  return  to  the  state-centred  (or,  in  Agamben's  terms,  sovereign) 
politics and thought. I believe that the unpolitical, that is, life as such, is among the few 
notions that we can still explore with a feeling of being altogether elsewhere, regardless 
of the accumulation of scientific knowledge about something that is called 'life', insofar 
as we can imagine or even experience 'some life' that exists 'before' and 'after' thought, 
that  is  not  correlated to  it.  In  this  respect,  I  can certainly agree with Agamben,  who 
pronounces that the concept of “life” is the point of departure and the subject of “the 
coming philosophy” (cf. 1999, 220, 238). More specifically, it is the various elaborations 
of the concept of something like  integral  life that Agamben refers to, having in mind 
several contemporary projects, for instance, Foucault's and Deleuze's last endeavours, as 
well as his own work. I would also add Roberto Esposito's notion of “the impersonal” and 
179
Michel Henry's notion of “life” as important examples of such an elaboration. While the 
former  can  be  closely  compared  to  Agamben's  'form-of-life',  the  latter  presents  an 
opportunity to explore further the notion of the unpolitical-as-such by taking it beyond 
thought. I will return to this question in detail in the next chapter.
Echos of the coming philosophy of life
Life in Foucault
Agamben suggests that in the last text published before his death (“Life: Experience and 
Science”) Foucault sought after the “different way of approaching the notion of life,” that 
is, for the notion that would take him beyond his initial understanding of the idea of life. 
According to Agamben, starting with  The Birth of the Clinic  Foucault  was under the 
inspiration of “Xavier Bichat's new vitalism and definition of life as 'the set of functions 
that resist death',” however, he ended by “considering life instead as the proper domain of 
error”  (Agamben 1999, 220). That is, by taking life beyond its reduction to “bare life” 
(i.e., the dynamism of constant struggle with death, of exposition to death). This is the 
essence  of  Agamben's  own endeavour.  However,  something  like  'form-of-life',  which 
Agamben sees as the centre of coming politics, is for Foucault, according to Ojakangas 
(2005b),  already the basic  or  grounding notion of  modern biopolitics  – a “synthetic” 
notion of life. It is no longer the Aristotelian notion that differentiates life into levels, nor 
is  it  “the classical  taxonomic notion,  differentiating species  according to their  visible 
properties,” but rather “a synthetic notion, unifying both the levels and the species in the 
'invisible  focal  unity'  of  life”  (12).  In  The  Order  of  Things  Foucault  writes  that  the 
transition from the Classical age to modernity saw the transformation in the notion of life 
from “taxonomic” to “synthetic”: life no longer appears as the deployment of the visible, 
“as the effect of a patterning process” (Classical taxonomy) but, starting with Cuvier, as 
“depth”  hidden  from  view  and  concealed  in  the  body,  as  “the  enigma  of  a  force 
inaccessible in its essence, apprehendable only in the efforts it makes here and there to 
manifest and maintain itself. ... [L]ife, on the confines of being, is what is exterior to it 
and also, at the same time, what maintains itself within”  (Foucault 1994, 273). Against 
180
the suggestion that such a distinction between surface and depth in the synthetic notion of 
life can be interpreted as differentiation of life (as in the case of zoē and bios), Ojakangas 
argues  that  for  Foucault  it  is  not  the  case,  insofar  as  modern  notion  of  “life,”  the 
“untamed” or “wild” ontology, can be conceptually distinguished but cannot be isolated 
from its  “visible surface.” Life,  this  “distant,” “fundamental  force” resides  within  the 
surface  (Ojakangas  2005b,  13).  Nevertheless,  Ojakangas'  argument  for  the  'integral' 
nature  of  the  synthetic  notion  of  life  can  be  challenged on the  ground that  the  very 
distinction between the 'surface' and 'depth' is enough in order to separate life from itself,  
which is what, as Foucault seems to suggest, becomes possible for the first time with 
Cuvier. It becomes possible to “separate the being from itself,” that is, to view “life” as 
both exterior and interior to being, as the outside-within (Foucault 1994, 272–273). This, 
obviously, is reminiscent of Agamben's critique of the separation of (bare) life from its 
form (as well as separation of pure Being from beings), however, not only in modernity, 
but at the very foundation of Western politics.
Ojakangas'  argument  points  into  an  important  direction  that  is  useful  for  the  present 
endeavour: it is useful for situating 'historically' the possibility of thinking the unpolitical-
as-such. I will keep in mind Foucault's analysis of the emergence of the modern notion of 
life as the “enigma,” “the great, mysterious, invisible focal unity”  (Foucault 1994, 269) 
that enables the living beings to be alive but at the same time kills them. In this respect 
Foucault writes: “The experience of life [of that “inexhaustible force”] is thus posited [in 
modernity] as the most general law of beings, the revelation of that primitive force on the 
basis of which they are; it functions as an untamed ontology, one trying to express the 
indissociable being and non-being of all beings. But this ontology discloses not so much 
what gives beings their foundation as what bears them for an instant toward a precarious  
form and yet is already secretly sapping them from within in order to destroy them.  In 
relation to life, beings are no more than transitory figures...” (278; my emphasis). Life 
here refers not so much to some static foundation of the living but to the process of 
becoming of  living  beings  (cf.  Ojakangas  2005,  13),  to  the  process  of  life's  own 
revelation. Furthermore, contrary to the ancient Greek notion of life, as Michel Henry 
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(2003) will argue, that represents life as “less than man,” life is viewed in modernity,  
perhaps, as “more than man,” meaning that the latter, as Foucault puts it, is no more than 
a transitory figure in relation to life. (I will return to this discussion, as well as to further 
implications of Foucault's discussion of life in The Order of Things, in more detail in the 
next chapter.)
Impersonal life
Roberto Esposito's notion of “the impersonal” presents another example of something 
like form-of-life in Agamben, at least  it  compares to the latter  in its  attempt to think 
'integral' life that cannot be separated from itself. The major difference between the two 
authors lies in the perspective that Esposito takes in order to approach this problem: it is 
the notion of the 'person'.  Timothy Campbell argues that Esposito's later focus on the 
problem of the person is grounded in his earlier consideration of 'the impolitical'  (2010, 
136), which I discussed above. That is, the impersonal has an impolitical nature. As I 
showed, an impolitical perspective, similar to Agamben's form-of-life, is 'grounded' in 
thought or rather it is a different  theoria or vision that illuminates what could not have 
been  seen  from the  traditional  perspective  of  political  philosophy.  For  Esposito,  the 
'impolitical  perspective'  constitutes 'the  impersonal'  (resulting  in  the  “thought  of  the 
impersonal”), in a way similar to Agamben's 'thought' which constitutes the forms of life 
as form-of-life. Furthermore, the impolitical is a critique of valorization and of the forms 
that  the  political  tends  to  assume.  As  Campbell  suggests,  based  on  his  reading  of 
Esposito's  Terza persona: Politica della vita e filosofia dell’impersonale  (2007) (Third 
Person: Politics of Life and Philosophy of the Impersonal (2012)), today “no form is 
more central to the political than that of the person” (Campbell 2010, 138). Consequently, 
the impolitical,  viewed against Esposito's  later  attention to the impersonal,  presents a 
perspective that opens up a space “in which the limits of the personal as a privileged form 
of the political are uncovered” (138).
While Agamben's  form-of-life  emerges  as  a  result  of  the  critique  of  sovereign 
abandonment of life and, thus, against the division of life into bare and political life in the 
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sovereign regime of Western biopolitics, thought of the impersonal arises as a reaction to 
“the  dispositif of the person” that, according to Esposito, is responsible for “separating 
life  from itself”  (2010b,  128).  This  dispositif (rather  than  sovereign decision)  is  “the 
mechanism of separation and exclusion”: that is, awarding personhood is the “symbolic 
door,”  “the  threshold,  the  decisive  means  by  which  a  biological  material  lacking  in 
meaning becomes something intangible” (121). Similar to Agamben's view of the origin 
of Western politics, i.e., its constitution against the negative background of bare life, the 
concept of person emerges in “negative fashion from the presumed difference” (125) with 
respect to the nonpersons or, more generally, to the domain of the thing. “No one is born 
a person. Some may become a person, but precisely by pushing those who surround him 
into the dimension of the thing” (126). Thus, any act of attribution of the personal is at 
the same time an act of depersonalization, i.e., reification of “the impersonal biological 
layer” of the living (127). The result of this process is obvious: one part of humanity is 
pronounced truly human, possessing “juridical capacity,” and the other bestial, owning 
only “the quality of naturalness” (126, 128), which is very close to Agamben's argument 
about the separation of bare life from political existence through the former's degradation 
and exposition to death. While Agamben does not seem to identify a single notion that 
regulates  the  distinction  between mere living and its  qualitative form (except  for  the 
human  rights,  perhaps),  Esposito  argues  that  it  is  the  concept  of  the  'person'  that 
“distinguishes  each  one  from his  or  her  own mode  of  being,”  and that  enables  “the 
noncoincidence ... of being with respect to its mode of being” (126). Like for Agamben, 
for Esposito the problematic aspect of the Western political (dominated by the personal) 
lies in its foundational distinction of life (being) from itself, i.e., from its form or mode of 
being. The consequent task arises against such a reality: the urgent need for a “thought of 
the impersonal” that would present “a radical critique of that process of depersonalization 
or of reification that inheres in the ... dispositif of the person” (129). The roots of such a 
critique,  Esposito  notes,  are  already  implicitly  present  in,  for  example,  various 
contemporary philosophical and artistic practices of deconstruction of personal identity. 
In his turn, Esposito endeavours to develop a notion of the impersonal, pursuing three 
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horizons  of  its  meaning:  justice  (based  on  his  reading  of  Weil),  writing  (following 
Blanchot's thought) and life (inspired by Deleuze).
Following Weil's engagement with the impersonal  (Weil 1962), Esposito suggests that, 
like the impolitical, the impersonal is not a simple negation of the personal but is “that 
which, from within the person, blocks the mechanism of distinction and separation” with 
respect  to  nonpersons  (2010b, 130–131).  Applied to  life,  the impersonal  prevents  the 
separation of life from itself, of being from its mode of being. Like Agamben, Esposito 
finds  the  primary  inspiration  for  his  investigation  of  the  impersonal  life  in  Gilles 
Deleuze's  last  text,  Pure  Immanence:  Essays  on  a  Life (2001) (however,  they  both 
mention  Foucault  as  another  important  contributing  figure).  More  specifically,  both 
thinkers engage with Deleuze's notion of “a life” that refers to the conjunction of the 
impersonal life and immanence. This life, Esposito clarifies, is common to all those who 
live but is never general: it is always of someone in particular (a life). Furthermore, this 
“undefined life” is “absolute immediacy,” meaning that it is non-separable, it is one with 
itself:  “life  constitutes  the  indivisible  point  in  which  the  being of  a  human perfectly 
coincides with its  mode, in which the form, precisely of life,  is  the form of its  own 
content. This is what Deleuze means when he associates it with what he defines as 'level 
of immanence'” (Esposito 2010b, 132; my emphasis). Life, for Esposito and Agamben, is 
impersonal power or potentiality, that which never exhausts itself; in other words, it is 
“always-moving fold” (133), “immanent movement, a striving that obstinately remains in 
itself”  (Agamben  1999,  236;  my  emphasis). Like  form-of-life,  impersonal  life  is 
immanent to itself: it is integral life where being cannot be  separated from its mode or 
form. Life is absolute immanence (“pure power” (Deleuze 2001, 30))83 which, Agamben 
suggests, “describes the infinite movement of the self-constitution and self-manifestation 
of Being” (1999, 235; my emphasis). Life is, then, more than being (“man”), since it is 
83 Deleuze suggests that an example of such an impersonal life of a singularity, “pure power” or “bliss,” 
is small children (2001, 30), which is similar to Agamben's suggestion that “whatever singularity” 
comes “from limbo,” the place where “unbaptized children who die with no other fault than original 
sin” are dwelling. These beings “that have left the world of guilt and justice behind them ...  persist 
without pain in divine abandon,” “they are infused with a joy with no outlet” (Agamben 1993, 5–6). 
We will  see further on, in the discussion of Michel Henry, the recurrence of this identification of 
immanent life with the infantile experiences. 
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infinite, common to all as well as “everywhere” (Deleuze 2001, 29), “in all the moments 
that  traverse  this  or  that  living  subject  and  that  measure  lived  objects”  (Deleuze  in 
Agamben 1999, 233), but at the same time it coincides with a living being, since it is 
always someone's life. Thus, the mystery of life is never really hidden (as in Foucault's 
analysis of modern notion of life as “inner darkness”) but manifests itself as such in the 
living beings. Impersonal life thus consists in its own mode of being. 
In  this  respect,  Esposito  borrows  Deleuze's  notion  of  “becoming-animal”  in  order  to 
further speak of the impersonal, immanent life as “a mode of being human (uomo) that no 
longer moves toward the thing, but ultimately that coincides only with itself”  (2010b, 
133; my emphasis). What is really at stake for Esposito in the notion of the impersonal 
life is, then, a possibility to think different political forms (modes of being) that are not 
limited to  the person;  and the notion of the impersonal  presents the ground for  such 
thinking. According to Campbell  (2010), Esposito's ultimate goal in  Third Person is to 
present  a  notion of  “relationality among all  living phenomena” or,  put  differently,  of 
“shared  bios,”  “ecumenical”  or  “nonsocial  relationality,”  which  is  not  limited  to  the 
relations  between  persons  but  is  grounded  in  the  impersonal  life.  As  a  result,  the 
impersonal,  once  the  threshold  of  the  personal  is  traversed,  names  an  “openness  to 
relationality with forms not limited to the person” (141). This form of openness of the 
impersonal  is  becoming-animal:  a  form  of  life  that  “puts  in  relation  completely 
heterogeneous terms like human, animal, and microorganism. ... [T]he becoming animal 
of human alludes to a mode of being human that does not coincide either with person or 
with thing” (Esposito in Campbell 2010, 145–146). While the notion of impersonal life 
refers to life common to all living and thus to an ecumenical relationality to the world, the 
human  mode of being that springs from this impersonal life Esposito calls “the living 
person.” The latter is “not separate from or implanted into life, but coextensive with it as 
an inseparable synolon of form and force, external and internal,  bios and zoē.  The third 
person, this figure that has yet to be fathomed, points to this unicum, to this being that is 
both singular and plural – to the non-person inscribed in the person, to the person open to 
what  has  never  been  before”  (Esposito  2012,  151).  The  living  person,  as  Campbell 
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summarizes once again, is “one who lives to the degree he or she is open to a larger  
horizon of relations not encompassed by the social form of the person” (2010, 147). 
As was the case with Agamben's 'form-of-life', Esposito's thought of 'impersonal life' and 
'living person'  is  a political  or, rather,  impolitical  project and, as I  argued before,  the 
impolitical stands for the search for different politics, and consequently, for an alternative 
political mode of being that is not limited to the person. Thus, Esposito's thought is that 
of  affirmative  biopolitics (cf.  Campbell  2010,  147), a  new  politics of  life.  It  is  an 
investigation of a possibility of alternative conception of  political life and its  political 
form beyond the personal. This, in its turn, raises for me the question of the unpolitical-
as-such: a possibility of thinking that which seems to remain unthought in Esposito's and 
Agamben's political projects – of something like the unpolitical form-of-life. 
***
My analysis of the the impolitical in Cacciari, Esposito and Agamben suggests a reversal 
in the valuation of the political: the impolitical no longer appears as a side-effect of the 
political but is rather seen, in a way, as the condition of possibility of the political or as a 
necessary  element  in  the  constitution  of  new  (authentic)  politics.  In  this  regard,  in 
Cacciari's and Esposito's account, the impolitical functions as a critique of the modern 
political, and thus paves the way for politics-to-come. In Agamben's view, the impolitical, 
as bare life, functions as the originary exception that constitutes Western (bio)politics and 
not just a contingent phenomenon of, for instance, liberal depoliticization. The challenge 
to the primacy of the political in modernity is further evident in Cacciari's and Esposito's 
positive accounts of the impolitical, insofar as it no longer appears as something to be 
feared  but,  rather,  acknowledged  and  encouraged.  The  impolitical  refusal  that  they 
advocate is, then, of a different kind: it is not an apolitical rejection of politics but, on the 
contrary, its radicalization, an extension to its limit. The impolitical is not different from 
the political, but coincides with it or constitutes its heart. Consequently, the category of 
the impolitical fails to address the radical outside of politics and remains restricted to the 
topology of  the  outside-within.  Despite  its  failures,  this  concept  empowers  a  further 
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inquiry into a possibility of the unpolitical as such by presenting a ground from which the 
unpolitical  can  acquire  its  radically positive meaning.  In  this  respect,  my analysis  of 
Agamben's project turns out especially helpful in suggesting an avenue for unpolitical 
thought based in the notion of life. Despite the fact that his account of the impolitical as 
bare life is purely negative, we can trace some intimations of the unpolitical in his notion 
of form-of-life that, ultimately, remain undeveloped in Agamben's 'messianic' project of 
redemption  of  politics.  What  must  to  be  done,  then,  is  to  think  something  like  the 
unpolitical form-of-life that would integrate Agamben's rethinking of bare life (as form-
of-life) with a positive exteriority of politics. 
It this regard, it is important that the notion of the impolitical, as a vision and as bare life, 
brings  to  the fore and articulates  the  relation  between politics,  thought  and life.  The 
impolitical is  a gaze  directed at the political; furthermore, it is  life lived  in its bareness 
outside of the space of politics. However, this living, reconsidered in its unity with itself 
(as  happy  life),  ultimately  coincides  with  thought,  where  the  latter  refers  to  the 
immediacy of an affection or receptiveness and not of a relation between a subject and an 
object. It is the nature of this thought that we need to consider further. What exactly is 
this thought that corresponds to form-of-life, and is it, like Agamben suggests, necessarily 
political in its essence? These questions will come to the fore of my following discussion 
of the unpolitical  form-of-life  as  life and as  the unthought  of politics.  That is,  I  will 
consider a possibility of conceiving differently the relationship between politics, life and 
thought.
Furthermore,  Esposito's,  Agamben's,  Deleuze's  and  Foucault's  thought  exemplifies  a 
double shift in the notion of life: first, it is the shift from divisible life to that of absolute 
immanence with itself (inseparability of life from its form or mode); second, the shift in 
the  orientation  of  the  notion  of  life  away from 'death'  and,  most  commonly,  toward 
something  like  'pure  power',  'potentiality'  and  'happiness',  expressed  in  the  various 
notions, such as, form-of-life, impersonal life, a life, domain of error, worklessness, etc. I 
suggest, in more general terms, that we witness a shift from a dynamic to, what I would 
like to call, phoretic (from Greek phoreo, mere going) model of life. While the former is 
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defined by the  struggle of opposing forces (life and death, friend and enemy, etc.), the 
latter is marked by the movement of self-revelation. This notion of life as phoretic, as I 
will further suggest, is the unpolitical-as-such: the outside which  political  thought can 
explore with the feeling of  being  altogether  elsewhere.  A detailed elaboration of  this 
notion of the 'unpolitical-as-such' in terms of 'life' is what will be at stake in the next 
chapter. In other words, taking Esposito's and Agamben's projects into consideration, I 
will argue that the unpolitical-as-such is life and, the other way around, that life-as-such 
is unpolitical. 
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Chapter III. Living Beyond Politics: 
the Unpolitical Form-of-life
[W]ithin each form of life, even the most unhappy,  
there is accomplished the essence of absolute Life.
Michel Henry
It has been the primary intention of the previous chapters to suggest that contemporary 
political theory does not present a satisfactory positive account of the radical outside of 
politics. While post-foundational political thought strives to bring into the discussion of 
political ontology the excess of traditional politics (understood in terms of the state), it 
ultimately fails to address this excess unpolitically. As I showed in the analysis of works 
by Carl Schmitt, Michel Foucault, Jacques Rancière and Jean-Luc Nancy, such political 
thought is defined by correlationist and totalizing tendencies, both of which contribute to 
the absence of an effective and positive account of the outside of politics. Furthermore, 
even when such an account is attempted, for example, in works of Massimo Cacciari and 
Roberto Esposito, it remains lacking in radicalism, insofar as the impolitical, as a notion, 
remains attached to politics as a function of its internal transformation and critique. Thus, 
it  remains  also  'defined'  as  an  operation  of  thought.  Giorgio  Agamben,  despite  his 
negative view of the impolitical merely as bare life, brings into the present discussion a 
very important element: the outside of politics is no longer seen as merely an operation or 
projection of political thought, but is located at the level of the lived experience of homo 
sacer. His thought leads toward a re-conceptualization of bare life in terms of integral, 
happy  life  or  form-of-life.  However,  this  bare  life,  for  Agamben,  is  redeemed  only 
through its ultimate politicization: inasmuch as it is not separate from its form, form-of-
life is essentially political life. My task, then, begins where Agamben's thought remains 
insufficient: I will try to conceive of a way of 'redeeming' bare life unpolitically through 
the notion of the unpolitical form-of-life. 
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In order to do so, I will attempt to push the questions of political theory to the original 
points of contention. In this regard, I will deal with the following questions: what is life?; 
is political life different from mere life?; what is happiness?; what is thought and what is 
its relationship with politics and life? Only by dealing with these questions it is possible 
to address the problems of correlation and the totalizing ambition of the political, as well 
as to present a way of conceiving its radical outside – the unpolitical as such. First, I will 
argue that in order to take life outside the correlationist circle, it is necessary to 'locate' it 
beyond both thought and being. In this aspect, I will turn to the radical philosophy of life 
of Michel Henry, who shows us a way of doing just that: he contends that life does not 
manifest itself in the world (i.e.,  as being) or in a relation to it (i.e.,  as thought), but  
remains  radically  immanent.  Life  reveals  itself  as  the  certainty  of  its  self-affection 
precisely in the absence or reduction of the world and its light. As a result, I will suggest 
that  such life  is  non-correlationist  and, thus,  it  remains indifferent  to  the play of  the 
political difference. Insofar as life is acosmic, it remains radically unpolitical: life cannot 
be  brought  to  the  political  world,  either  as  thought  or  experience,  without  losing  its 
essence. As a result, I will further assert that the modern 'forgetting' of the unpolitical 
relies on the forgetting of life, its substitution for the objectivity of material processes 
studied by sciences, which ultimately amounts to the murder of life. In this way, modern 
(bio)politics  is  nothing but  thanato-politics.  A possibility of  resistance  to  the  modern 
political lies, then, in an advancement of an unpolitical project of 'remembering' life, but 
also, perhaps, in a political project of reinventing politics based on the primacy of life, in 
the affirmation of life's  a priori  in relation to politics. Life, I will argue, is that which 
persists in its positivity and non-relation 'prior' and 'after' politics and its world. Life is, 
thus, essentially unpolitical. 
By taking life beyond politics, I hope to achieve a redefinition and affirmation of life as 
an immediate given and shared experience of self-affection that is not conditioned by 
anything else and cannot be separated from itself. Life cannot be a human 'right' since the 
human does not define or determine life,  but,  rather,  on the contrary,  life defines the 
human as the living. However, the living is in no way limited to the human form. As a 
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result,  such  a  universalist  understanding  of  life  presents  an  opportunity  of  affirming 
unpolitical community that is radically open to all 'forms', to all the living, to all that 
'suffers' and 'bears' life. Since life is not a right that is manifest in and guaranteed by the 
political world, we can see further 'practical' applications of my notion of the unpolitical 
form-of-life. It affirms positively what has been seen primarily negatively: living located 
outside of the system of political  states. Agamben names it bare life,  but others have 
conceived it similarly, for instance, in terms of the “correlative other” of the state political 
order. These lives are often indexed as the lives of the refugees and the stateless, the 
populations that have lost their attachment to the social and political texture that used to 
define their being in the world. These figures are often portrayed only negatively, similar 
to the way the apolitical excess of politics in post-foundational thought is portrayed as a 
threat of depoliticization or as exception. I will  suggest that the figure of the refugee 
appears in its specificity not as an aberration of 'normal' political being within the state 
(e.g.,  of  citizenship),  nor  in  correlation  with  politics,  but  as  a  figure  of  'becoming-
unpolitical'. In the reduction of the refugee's political world, life manifests itself, but not 
as bare life, a diminished and degraded life deprived of its political form and, thus, of its 
quality and happiness, but as an immediate and irreducible given of life's self-affection 
and self-revelation that remains 'indifferent' to the disappearance of the political world. 
The recognition of this positivity affirms life in its inseparability from itself, and calls for 
'respect'  of  life that is  neither mediated by nor dependent on its  political  status. As a 
result,  this  affirmation  is  'ecological',  because  it  is  radically  open  to  all  the  living. 
Furthermore, once we take into account life's essential movement, we can suggest that the 
movement  that  appears  in  the  world  as  displacement  has  its  origin  in  life's  pure 
movement  of  self-revelation  and  self-transformation:  prior  to  displacement  in  space, 
movement is manifest in self-affection. More than that, we can suggest that “culture,” as 
opposed  to  “barbarism,”  is  essentially  mobile,  insofar  as  it  is  understood  as  life's 
movement of  self-transformation.  As a  result,  what  is  most  generally at  stake in  this 
chapter is, first, a conception of the unpolitical form-of-life, based on a redefinition of life 
in terms of an immediacy of acosmic self-affection of the living; and second, an attempt 
at integrating this notion with the practical concerns of critical refugee studies. In the end, 
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I do not aspire to give any definite answers to the multiple questions provoked by the 
modern figure of the refugee, but to suggest a sort of 'practical' opening to the question of 
what  might constitute 'life beyond politics'.  What comes below, then,  is  an invitation 
(rather than a conclusive statement) to participate in the important but often overlooked 
discussion about the unpolitical.  However, this does not mean that my discussion will 
lack in a 'programmatic' element: at the very least it is conceived as an affirmation of the 
unpolitical form-of-life, and of the figure of the refugee as a worldly 'projection' of life's 
pure movement of 'becoming-unpolitical'.
3.1. The Unpolitical Form-of-life: 
the Unthought, Life and the Living
In what follows below, I suggest that the unpolitical is 'the unconscious as such' of the 
political, that is, life. In this regard, the unpolitical 'appears' twofold: as the unthought and 
as  life.  It  can  be  objected,  however,  that  what  the  political  difference  has  already 
addressed is the unthought of politics: that which extends beyond the visible, conscious 
reality of the state and institutionalized order. It can be further argued that this unthought, 
for instance, in the form of the concept of the political, accounts for some sort of 'life', as 
a mobile, dynamic principle that animates immobile political structures or, in Schmittian 
terms, as the exception that breaks through the crust of repetition. I argue that what we 
need to do here is not only introduce the notion of the unpolitical into discussion, but also 
rethink the relationship between the unthought and thought, between the unconscious and 
life. My initial task, then, will be to determine what kind of unthought and life define the 
unpolitical and how they are different from those employed by the political correlation. In 
order  to  do  so,  I  will  turn  to  Foucault's  exploration  of  the  relationship  between  the 
unthought and life as it emerges in the modern episteme, which, as I will show, basically 
outlines  the correlationist  dynamic  in  thought  since Kant.  Most  importantly,  Foucault 
exposes how the unthought and life emerge as doubles of the cogito. Thus, his analysis 
outlines a tendency that needs to be avoided in the presentation of the unpolitical as the 
unconscious  (or the unthought)  of the political:  we need to  avoid a definition of  the 
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unpolitical-as-life as a mere negative of consciousness and consider it in an autonomous 
way. Furthermore, what Foucault's analysis draws out is a crucial difference between two 
prominent ways of thinking life regrading its 'availability' to experience. In other words, I 
will argue that despite himself and his interpretation of life in modernity as an enigmatic, 
blind force devoid of substance, unavailable to experience and, thus, a mere correlate (or 
even  an  illusion)  of  the  cogito,  Foucault,  in  his  recourse  to  Nietzsche,  intimates  a 
different understanding of life, revealed in the experience of will. 
This view of life, life as real experience, points us into a direction of a non-correlationist 
notion  of  life  developed  by Michel  Henry.  In  this  respect,  I  will  maintain  that  life, 
conceived as  self-revelation in  the immediacy of self-affection,  is  unpolitical  as  such 
insofar as it appears through the radical reduction of the world. That is, life appears, in 
relation to thought, only as its radical unthought or as the unconscious as such, never 
blind or empty but full of self-feeling, self-suffering and self-enjoyment. Considering the 
implications  of  Henry's  radical  philosophy  of  life  for  my  critique  of  the  political 
correlation, I will further suggest that politics is always secondary to life, consequently, 
unpolitical-as-life is the a priori of politics. The shift of emphasis from the political to the 
unpolitical necessarily implies a rethinking of humanity and human community. Human 
being is no longer defined through its relation to  logos but is recognized as essentially 
living, who experiences life immediately, in its very living. Consequently, I will speak of 
the unpolitical form-of-life as an expression of this unity of life and its form, the living, 
that takes place prior to the constitution of any world, politics and political community. 
Furthermore, I will show that since every living shares in gift of life, we can conceive of 
the unpolitical community of life, where everyone is equal in her access to life and, thus, 
to  community.  From  this  perspective,  life  is  not  a  right  guaranteed  by  a  political 
community, but is itself an  a priori  community, an immediate bond of pathos of every 
living with every living.  In the end, I  will  propose that the modern forgetting of the 
essence of life and its unique mode of acosmic manifestation is parallel to the forgetting 
of the unpolitical in political thought. In sum, what will be at stake in this section is an 
articulation  of  life's  positive  non-relationality  (solitude  or  being-without)  and 
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unpoliticalness in its relation to the world. However, I will also consider a possibility for 
a renewal of political thought based on the recognition of the primacy of the unpolitical in 
relation  to  politics,  and  revolving  around  an  exploration  of  the  positive  relationship 
between life and its worldly projection, for instance, in terms of the art of living. 
The unthought, life and the 'cogito' in Foucault
Foucault's  archaeological  analysis  of  the  modern  episteme in  The  Order  of  Things 
provides us with an interesting outline of the structural role of the unthought, but also life, 
as coincidental or co-originary with 'the cogito'. In other words, the unthought, he argues, 
functions  as  the  irreducible  double  of  the  cogito  or  rational  thought.  I  suggest  that 
Foucault's analysis of the modern episteme is an excellent presentation of the problem of 
correlationism  (which  he  prefers  to  name  “phenomenology”84)  that  comes  to  define 
modern  thought  since Kant.  More than that,  Foucault,  in  his  outline of  the  limits  of 
modernity,  despite  himself,  is  giving  us  a  clue  on  how  to  proceed  with  thinking  a 
different, non-correlationist unthought and life. 
Similarly to Meillassoux's diagnosis of modern thought as correlationist beginning with 
Kant, Foucault suggests that the Kantian critique “marks the threshold of our modernity; 
it questions representation [...] Thus it sanctions for the first time that event in European 
culture  which  coincides  with  the  end  of  the  eighteenth  century:  the  withdrawal  of 
knowledge and thought outside the space of representation” (1994, 242), that is, outside 
the space of visibility. This outside, however, is not discovered as a result of the progress 
of human knowledge; it appears in correlation with the knowing subject, “man” – the 
being that “has thoughts.”85 “[T]he forms of the unthought in general, have not been the 
84 Stéphane Legrand convincingly argues in this regard that phenomenology is present in Foucault's work 
not simply as a criticized theory or a set of arguments but, in much wider terms, as a “problem” or  
rather “as a symptom of our historical a priori (not to be described in its totality, but unavoidable in its 
presence)”  (2008, 286). As a result, it  might be suggested that  “phenomenology-as-a-problem” for 
Foucault is a stand-in for the modern episteme – “something unthought in  the way we think, ... this 
unknown or unconscious dimension of our knowledge” (285). “Phenomenology” is, then, Foucault's 
name for the same “symptom” of modernity that Meillassoux calls “correlationism.” 
85 Foucault famously argues that man is only a recent invention: “abandoning the space of representation, 
man enters in his turn, and for the first time, the field of Western knowledge. ... [M]an is only a recent 
invention,  a  figure  not  yet  two centuries  old,  a  new wrinkle in  our  knowledge,  and  that  he  will  
disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form” (1994, xxiii).
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reward  granted  to  a  positive  knowledge  of  man.  Man and  the  unthought  are,  at  the 
archaeological level, contemporaries” (326). That which is beyond representation is the 
unthought that is intimately attached to “man” or the 'cogito'. Representation as well as 
what represents is co-originary with its Other – the absence of representation, the absence 
of thought. 
Thought  that  emerges  at  the  threshold  of  modernity  (in  its  investigation  of  “man”) 
'discovers' or rather acknowledges “what could never be reached by his [man's] reflection 
or  even  by  his  consciousness”  (Foucault  1994,  326), but  in  this  very  discovery  it 
prescribes a task for itself: the unthought has to be thought, “the veil of the Unconscious” 
has to be lifted, man's alienation from himself has to be ended. This project of modern 
thought, which Foucault vaguely names phenomenology, resolves itself “into an ontology 
of the unthought that automatically short-circuits the primacy of the 'I think'” (326), and 
which,  nevertheless,  remains  no  more  than  the  cogito's  “insistent,”  “inexhaustible 
double,” the Other and the shadow that “has never been the object of reflection in  an 
autonomous way” (326; my emphasis). It is my suggestion that it is this reference to the 
autonomy of reflection about the unthought that will eventually be at stake for Foucault, 
and is  also crucial  for  us  to  consider  in  the pursuit  of  the  unthought  as  such of  the 
political.  In  modernity,  the  unthought,  the  outside  of  man's  cogito  (of  a  domain  of 
consciousness and representation), is attached to the 'inside' in “an unavoidable duality”: 
this obscure space is both exterior and indispensable to thought. As a result, “the whole of 
modern thought  [a new form of reflection – phenomenology-as-a-symptom] is imbued 
with the necessity of thinking the unthought – of reflecting the contents of the In-itself in 
the form of the For-itself, of ending man's alienation by reconciling him with his own 
essence, of making explicit the horizon that provides experience with its background of 
immediate  and  disarmed  proof,  of  lifting  the  veil  of  the  Unconscious,  of  becoming 
absorbed  in  its  silence,  or  of  straining  to  catch  its  endless  murmur”  (326). Modern 
thought faces the unthought as its indispensable Other, thus returning this unthought to 
itself, to the domain of visibility and consciousness as its negative origin. The unthought 
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doubles thought: they are correlated. What we need to do, then, is to take this unthought 
beyond the correlation, to consider it autonomously.
Psychoanalysis, Foucault contends, is an example of 'correlationist' reflection or function 
common to all  the “human sciences” insofar as it  sets  itself  “the task of making the 
discourse  of  the  unconscious  speak  through  consciousness”  (1994,  374).  Just  as  I 
discussed in the case of political correlation, the invisible, mobile and fluid principle of 
'the political', often analyzed in terms of the unconscious of the visible, ordered and rigid 
domain of 'politics', comes to presence only as a gap, wound, rupture or failure of this 
very 'consciousness', i.e., of politics-as-state. However, psychoanalysis, similarly to post-
foundational political thought, does not approach the unconscious with its back to it as, 
Foucault suggests, all the human sciences do, “waiting for it to unveil itself as fast as 
consciousness is analysed... [P]sychoanalysis, on the other hand, points directly toward it, 
with  a  deliberate  purpose – not  toward  that  which  must  be  rendered  gradually more 
explicit by the progressive illumination of the implicit, but towards what is there and yet 
is hidden, towards what exists with the mute solidity of a thing, of a text closed in upon 
itself, or of a blank space in a visible text” (374). Like psychoanalysis, the thought of 
political  difference  is  focused  on  pointing  out  these  blank  spaces  (e.g.,  the  lack  of 
foundation) in  the visible text  of traditional politics.  Such function earns it  the name 
'post-foundational',  while  psychoanalysis  is  rendered  by  Foucault  a  “science  of  the 
unconscious” or rather a “counter-science.”86 It can be suggested that post-foundational 
political thought is a science of the political unconscious, characterized by a correlation – 
an intimate and unbreakable relation and co-dependence (doubling) of the visible and the 
invisible. And thus, just as modern thought, according to Foucault, fails to reflect on the 
Other of representation (e.g., the unconscious) in an autonomous way (not just in terms of 
a blank space of the visible),  political  correlationism fails to thinks of its outside,  its 
unconscious – of the unpolitical as such. 
86 Ethnology (mainly represented by the works of Levi-Strauss) is another counter-science for Foucault.  
He  explains  that  “[i]n  relation  to  the  'human  sciences',  psychoanalysis  and  ethnology are  rather 
'counter-sciences'; which does not mean that they are less 'rational' or 'objective' than the others, but 
that  they flow in the opposite direction, that they lead them back to their epistemological basis, and 
that they ceaselessly 'unmake' that very man who is creating and re-creating his positivity in the human 
sciences” (1994, 379).
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Foucault  further  argues  that  we  owe  the  phenomenological  project  of  modernity  the 
discovery of the domains of “life, work, and language” that, in their own ways, stand for 
this 'unconscious' region of thought with which “man” has to be reconciled. My main 
interest here lies with the notion of life. Foucault's analysis seems to suggest that the 
notion of life that emerges in the modern episteme is correlationist: life occupies the same 
structural position as 'the unthought', and thus the experience of something like 'life-as-
such' is rendered impossible. As I noted previously, Foucault traces the transformation or 
rather displacement of the Classical, “taxonomic” notion of life, which appeared as “the 
effect of a patterning process” in “the deployment of the visible,” meaning that life was 
“a  mere  classifying  boundary,”  a  continuous  totality  established  between  the  visible 
entities,  natural  beings  (all  subject  to  extension,  weight,  and  movement):  life  was 
confined  to  the  domain  of  representation.  The  modern,  “synthetic”  notion  of  life, 
according to Foucault, is purely functional: it emerges out of the separation of the visible,  
superficial features and organs from the invisible depth of the body and its functions. The 
development of comparative anatomy marks this decisive break: once it becomes possible 
to literally penetrate the invisible, inner darkness of the body, it becomes necessary to 
establish a foundation upon which the visible can be related to the invisible, upon which 
“superficial organs” can be related to those “whose existence and hidden forms perform 
the essential functions”  (1994, 228). In other words, at stake was the reconstitution of 
“the unities  that  underlie  the  great  dispersion  of  visible  differences.”  The established 
correspondence  between  the  exterior  and  interior  forms,  which  both  constitute  the 
animal's essence, is life. However, life, this enigmatic center of identities, itself receives 
no essential definition, it is rendered “non-perceptible” and “purely functional”: life can 
be experienced, perceived or known only through the observation of the multiple “plans” 
for the maintenance of life. “[L]ife withdraws into the enigma of a force inaccessible in  
its essence, apprehendable only in the efforts it makes here and there to manifest and 
maintain  itself”  (272;  my  emphasis). Life  here,  I  suggest,  is  a  function  of  its  own 
maintenance; and as such life escapes it own essence, it is paradoxically excluded from 
its  own field,  which is  in the end occupied by the visible  bodies – organisms – that 
presuppose a common identity in something called 'life', in the force that moves them but 
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itself  remains  nothing,  a  void.  It  can  be  argued  that  life  has  no  being  except  as  a 
conceptual artifact, fiction or a mere nomination of an abstract idea of the Other of the 
domain of the representable, i.e., observable organs and material processes. As Thomas 
Hall puts it, “[n]amed abstractions possess a notorious tendency to take on an illusory 
concreteness. Inadvertently, we begin to operate conceptually as if something (life) were 
there, some unitary entity, agent, or act, that biologists should try to explain – whereas, 
what is there in fact may be nothing more than an interactive ensemble of observed or 
inferable material changes” (1969, 2:376). So, let me sum up, life in modern episteme is 
“the great, mysterious, invisible focal unity,” the a priori, the foundation of all experience 
and knowledge that is, nevertheless, non-material, beyond all experience and knowledge, 
and thus it can be eventually reduced to a fiction, a convenient abstraction. The only way 
life appears is in its  efforts to manifest  itself,  that is,  in the appearance of the living 
organisms;  consequently,  the  notion  of  life  makes  sense  only in  correlation  with  the 
visible  domain.  Like  the  unconscious  that  only  speaks  through  consciousness  or  the 
unthought that shadows the cogito, life manifests itself through visible arrangements for 
its own preservation. This life, then, I argue, is a great contradiction, an aporia: it is what 
gives, i.e., founds the experience of the living, but itself is never given. It remains “the 
enigma of force inaccessible in its essence,” beyond the reach of the experience of the 
living. 
Life, this enigmatic, inaccessible store outside of representation that nevertheless founds 
it is thus, like the unthought, outside but also within “man”: life, on the confines of being, 
is what is exterior to it and also, at the same time, what maintains itself within” (Foucault 
1994, 273); it is “that not-known from which man is perpetually summoned towards self-
knowledge” (323). Foucault suggests that the emergence of the synthetic notion of life, of 
vitalist  themes in the early nineteenth century,  from the archaeological point of view, 
signal  the  establishment  of  “the  conditions  of  possibility  of  a  biology”  (269)  and 
consequently, one should add, of biopolitics. The incitement to self-knowledge thus takes 
a specific (political) form in modernity – biopower. The human sciences that emerge at 
this time are supposed to aid “man” in his journey toward the 'discovery' of life and, thus, 
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his  own  self  (disciplinary  power),  eventually  resulting  in  the  formation  of  various 
biopolitical  governmentalities,  guided  by the  task  of  the  care  for  life.  However,  the 
content of care, the multiple techniques used to 'enhance'  something like life, and the 
tools used to measure its progress, cannot obscure the fact that what is stake is never life-
as-such but its primarily biological representation through the visible, material processes 
that converge on the void point of life – the presupposed inexhaustible,  invisible and 
inaccessible founding force,  the root  of all  existence.  In other  words,  as I  will  show 
below, biopolitics arises as a result to the forgetting of life, and derives its power from the 
obscuration of the question of life's 'real essence'  through the scientific study of life's 
processes.
It is interesting to note that regardless of his analysis of the notion of life in the modern 
episteme primarily in terms of enigma, force inaccessible in its essence and beyond all 
experience, Foucault writes the following in his discussion of death: “The experience of 
life is thus posited as the most general law of beings, the revelation of that primitive force 
on the basis of which they are; it functions as an untamed ontology, one trying to express 
the indissociable being and non-being of all beings. ... In relation to life, beings are no 
more than transitory figures, and the being that they maintain, during the brief period of 
their existence, is no more than their presumption, their will to survive” (1994, 278; my 
emphasis). What is apparent and distinct here is that Foucault speaks of the experience of 
life as the most general law of beings; however, he does not elaborate much on the nature 
of this experience, except, perhaps, for suggesting that it becomes apparent or takes the 
form of the will to survive.87 Foucault, despite himself, seems to imply that the experience 
of life, the (material) revelation of this primitive force, is will. This implication might be 
leading  us  toward  Foucault's  own  project,  his  'desire'  to  look  beyond  the  modern 
phenomenological project without abandoning the question of life and the unthought.88 
87 We can note here the recurring theme of 'struggle with death' which defines the dynamic notion of life 
that, as I earlier suggested, dominates modern political thought. However, for my purposes here the 
recurrence  of  the  Nietzschean  notion  of  the  will  is  more  important.  Moreover,  in  his  last  essay 
Foucault himself rethinks life beyond struggle with death, nevertheless, something like “will” remains 
in his discussion of life toward the very end, for instance, in the notion of “courage.” 
88 Foucault seems to abandon this task in his works following The Order of Things, however, I would 
argue, he explicitly returns to this problem of the real experience of life, not delimited by the empty 
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Alternatively, we can interpret his intriguing statement as a clue for the investigation of 
the unpolitical as the unthought and life: it would require rethinking both of these notions 
beyond correlation with  the domain of  representation  and thought,  as  well  as  further 
thinking through the possibility of the experience of life that is more than an abstract 
notion.  So, in order to proceed with the discussion of the unpolitical-as-such and the 
unpolitical form-of-life we need an exposition of the non-correlationist notion of life and 
the unthought; we need to consider them in an 'autonomous' way. Furthermore, we will 
have to consider how these  notions relate to the  experience of life  as unthought, which 
would  essentially  establish  a  task  for  a  renewal  of  political  thought  or,  rather,  the 
development of the thought of the unpolitical. I should note right away here an apparent 
difficulty  of  thinking  the  unpolitical:  how is  it  possible  to  think  the  unpolitical  (the 
unthought as such) without immediately politicizing it (turning it into thought), and if it is 
impossible,  what,  nevertheless,  are  the  implications  of  this  impossibility  for  political 
thought.  Another  aspect  of  this  difficulty  is  historically  determined;  as  Deleuze 
(following Foucault)  reminds us,  insofar  as  the  notion of  life  is  the  object  of  power 
(which is the case in modern biopolitical regime), any thought that considers life shares 
its  object  with  power  and must,  consequently,  confront  this  power,  and thus  become 
political. More than that, life itself becomes political: “[l]ife becomes resistance to power 
when power takes life as its object. Here again, the two operations belong to the same 
horizon ... When power becomes bio-power resistance becomes the power of life, a vital 
power that cannot be confined within species, environment or the paths of a particular 
diagram” (Deleuze 1988, 92). This 'life' that Deleuze mentions in his reading of Foucault 
is obviously not that enigmatic and inaccessible force of the modern episteme; it rather 
speaks  to  my  previous  suggestion  that  Foucault  views  'real'  life  as  'will',  of  which 
'resistance' could be but just another name. So, two major questions that we are facing 
are:  first,  what  is  the  experience  of  the  unpolitical-as-such  in  terms  of  life-as-such; 
second, what is the nature of the apparently necessary and unavoidable relation of the 
unpolitical experience or form-of-life and the thought of this experience, which seems to 
modern (biopolitical) notion of life, in his late 'ethical' works, especially in his public lectures at the  
Collège de France of 1982-1983 and 1983-1984.
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remain essentially political (at least in the present historical junction). In other words, 
what is the experience of the unpolitical and what is its relation to politics and thought?
(Bio)politics and the acosmic a priori of life
Eugene Thacker identifies “the three major modes in the philosophical engagement with 
'life'  today  –  the  affective-phenomenological,  the  biopolitical,  and  the  politico-
theological” (2010, xiii–xiv).89 The first is represented by the so-called “new vitalisms” of 
affectivity,  process, and self-organization, stretching from the philosophies of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Michel Henry to the philosophies inspired by Deleuze and Bergson. 
For the second strand, life is explicitly “politically at stake” (in the conjunction of biology 
and politics), such as in the works of Agamben, Esposito and Foucault.  The politico-
theological  mode  of  engagement  with  life  builds  on  the  prior  work  on  religion  by 
Heidegger and Derrida, noting the relationship between the qualified political life (bios) 
and  the  spiritual  life  (Mark  C.Taylor,  Luc  Ferry,  Jean-Luc  Marion,  Slavoj  Žižek). 
Thacker's  classification  is  helpful  in  that  it  highlights  the main  contemporary themes 
concerning life, however, it is hard to distinguish these modes from each other once the 
question of politics is raised. As I noted above, once life is at stake for any thought, it is 
impossible to avoid at least some political engagement. In this sense politics still remains 
a totality (at least for the contemporary thinking of life); or, as Jean-Luc Nancy argues, 
everything  crosses  its  paths  in  politics.  In  this  respect,  Thacker  notes  too  that  these 
“contemporary strands find their point of tension in political reflection on 'life', where 
what is at stake is not just the thing or the self, but the qualified life, the life worth living,  
the life that is part of the body politic” (xiv). In the end, any reflection on life today tends 
to converge on the question of life's relation to politics. In what follows below, I will, to 
some extent, engage with the examination of such a convergence.
While biopolitical and politico-theological reflections on life engage politics directly, I 
would like to turn here to Michel Henry's phenomenological reflection on life that, at first 
89 Thacker also addresses the question of what he calls “a vitalist correlation” and the possibility of a 
non-correlationist notion of life. For a detailed discussion of this problem, see Thacker (2010, 254-
257). 
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glance,  might seem almost irrelevant to the problems raised in the previous chapters. 
However, I will suggest that Henry's thought addresses the problem of correlation and 
presents one of the ways, available to us today, for thinking the unpolitical-as-such in 
terms of life. First, I will show how the problem of correlation is constituted in Henry in 
terms  of  the  paradox  of  modern  thought  that,  in  its  attempt  to  free  itself  from the 
dominance  of  consciousness  and thought,  ends  up  in  a  negative  relationship  with  it. 
Similar to Foucault, Henry illuminates how the correlationist unconscious emerges as a 
mere  double  of  the  cogito.  Consequently,  Henry's  thought  allows  us  to  extend  the 
question of the unpolitical to the space of the unconscious as such, which is no longer 
constituted as a correlate of thought. Most importantly, the content of this unconscious is 
positive, it is the real experience of life, and not a mere void point of convergence of 
modern scientific thought. Life, Henry argues, has two major 'characteristics': immanence 
to itself (an integral notion of life) and affectivity (it immediately 'knows' or experiences 
itself in its self-feeling). Contrary to Foucault's observation, life is not beyond experience, 
however, it  is beyond any form of vision, specifically thought, insofar as the latter is  
conceived as a form of relation to the world. Life is acosmic. Objects of consciousness 
appear within the ecstatic horizon of the world to which life does not belong because it is 
not and cannot become an object: in its immanence life cannot be ob-jected, separated or 
distanced from itself. Life, in its essence, is radically separate from being-in-the-world.90 
More than that, life is prior to the world, to thought, and to any other kind of relation 
appearing in the world. Nevertheless, it does not constitute another world, it does not 
appear as the Other or the outside of the world, but only as such: life manifests itself in its 
own revelation,  and not in the knowledge, thought or vision of the world.  Insofar as 
politics, however defined, is constituted by the relation to the world and in the world, I 
will argue that life, in its acosmism, is unpolitical as such. It is the unthought that can 
never be brought to light as thought. So, Henry brings to the fore an important and often 
overlooked question of the relationship between politics, as a form of being-in-the-world, 
and its outside, which I call the unpolitical, that is not just another 'form' of worldly being 
90 Much  of  Henry's  argument  is  built  on  a  critique  of  modern  phenomenology;  of  Heidegger,  in 
particular. 
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but accounts for the experience of life that is not mediated by the world. As a result, the 
question of the unpolitical will be addressed along the line of life's relationship to the 
world and, thus, of life's relationship to any form of politics. 
An  important  clarification  or  even  a  correction  of  terms  in  necessary  at  this  point. 
Throughout this work I have put the question of the unpolitical as such in terms of the 
radical outside of the political correlation. However, the notions of the out-side as well as 
the  un-political  seem  to  imply  a  structural  position  similar  to  'the  outside'  that  is 
correlated to 'the inside', amounting to the play of the political difference. Unpolitical life-
as-such, I propose, is not strictly out-side, since it is radically immanent, it does not share 
'a side' with anything except itself. The outside that I have been speaking of refers not to 
life itself, but rather to the notion of the unpolitical that is not correlationist, that does not 
belong to the political correlation. Meanwhile, the experience of the unpolitical as life is 
not outside but prior to politics – the unpolitical is the a priori of politics. Such a reversal 
further challenges the primacy of the political: it is no longer the condition of possibility 
of all experience; politics itself (including the thought of the political difference) finds its 
possibility in the unpolitical,  i.e.,  in life.91 So, politics is always secondary to what is 
unconscious as such – life. It is important to remember that this a priori is not historical, 
it is not a return to some 'state of nature' or an affirmation of some other kind of sociality 
that  is  chronologically  prior  to  politics;92 we  should  rather  say  that  life-as-such  is 
ahistorical becoming-asocial that affirms the non-relational as such. I will return to the 
question of the non-relationality of life in more detail below.
91 We can  recall,  in  this  regard,  Foucault's  suggestion  that  life  always  escapes  and  that  freedom is  
somehow 'prior' to power relations, as well as Deleuze's affirmation of the primacy of the “lines of 
flight” in relation to systems of power, which are always secondary. “[A] society, a social field ... first 
and foremost, it leaks on all sides. The first thing it does is escape in all directions. These lines of 
flight are what come first (even if first is not chronological)” (Deleuze 2006, 127). 
92 However, there are some accounts of something like the unpolitical as  historically prior to politics. 
Patricia Springborg  (1990), for example, presents an interesting argument regarding the historically 
secondary nature of politics. She argues that politics, i.e., the polis of ancient Greece, comes to replace 
a prior, primarily female, non-political sociality: politics is 'invented' in order to accommodate and 
occupy the male soldiers returning from wars. “[T]he ekklesia, as a space for political assembly and 
participation, was created for those soldier citizens whose real services to the city had no adequate  
recognition in the structures of everyday life. But it soon came to displace those everyday, or 'private' 
institutions in importance. And yet the polis was really no more that a club for the socially excluded: it 
took in male householders who spent too long on campaigns away from home” (Springborg 1990, 3). 
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'Real' life does not arise in opposition to politics or as resistance to politics (or, for this 
matter, any other principle, e.g., death). Immanent in its essence, life-as-such is phoretic: 
it  is  an  abundant,  eternal  movement  of  self-revelation,  of  its  own living.  Dynamics, 
borrowing its definition from physics, describes  the relation of  forces of attraction and 
repulsion;  it  is  “the science which treats  of  the action of force,  whether  it  maintains 
relative rest, or produces acceleration of relative motion. The two corresponding divisions 
of Dynamics are thus ... Statics and Kinetics” (Kelvin and Tait 1912, 1:vi). The political 
correlation  resembles  this  science  of  dynamics,  where  the  major  focus  lies  on  the 
investigation of relation between the immobile or static and mobile or ekstatic principles. 
The dynamic framework of the political difference comprehends movement primarily in 
its correlation with a relatively static order, thus motion remains attached and attracted to 
what  it  interrupts or disturbs,  never  extending into radically non-relational,  immanent 
movement.  Life,  within  this  framework,  assimilated  into  the  active  principle  of  the 
political,  is  often  defined  as  some sort  of  resistance  to  or  struggle  with  its  Other  – 
immobility and death.  Phoretics refers to the science of “pure motion,” insofar as the 
Greek word phoro is “expressive of the idea of mere going, without any reference to the 
cause of motion” (Besant 1892, 462).   So, phoretics (or phoronomy) refers to the study 
of pure movement,  while  dynamics focuses on the relational  aspect  of the motion of 
forces.93 Consequently, the phoretic notion of life addresses the political correlation by 
asserting  the  primacy  of  the  immanent  movement  of  life  over  (dynamic)  political 
relationality,  in other words,  it  views mere life-movement as pre-ontological (prior to 
being, to being-in-the-world) action or force that conditions and enables relations to be 
established in the world and as the world. Insofar as the dynamic framework of political 
difference relies on the radical relational ontology, the phoretic framework of life points 
in the direction of 'non-relation' and 'being-without.' 
93 We can  also  find an elaboration of  the  notions of  dynamics and phoronomy in Immanuel  Kant's 
Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science.
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Life-as-such: correlation and the unconscious as such
Let us recall that the problem of the correlation of thought and being, of subject and 
object in modern thought, applied to politics, is twofold: first, politics and what exceeds it 
are  mere  doublets,  inseparable  masks  and  negatives  of  each  other,  resulting  in  the 
unavoidable  reestablishment  of  the  centrality  of  politics-as-state;  second,  'the  great 
outdoors'  of  politics  is  non-existent,  replaced  by the  relative  outside.  As  I  suggested 
above, Michel Henry's philosophy of life addresses the problem of correlation in modern 
thought  (however,  without  naming  it  such)  in  a  way  that  allows  me  to  project  its 
'solutions' onto the political concerns here at hand. Henry posits a question similar to that 
posed by Foucault and Meillassoux: is there some experience or being that is not a mere 
double of thought, that is not determined and revealed only in relation to the domain of 
visibility and knowledge. Using the language of psychoanalysis, Henry asks if there is 
something  like  the  unconscious  as  such. He  argues,  in  a  way  almost  identical  to 
Foucault's, that the concept of the unconscious makes its appearance in modern thought 
“[s]imultaneously with and as the exact consequence of the concept of consciousness” 
(1993,  2).  In  other  words,  what  in  modernity  comes  to  challenge  the  realm  of 
representation, visibility and thought appears only as its shadow, the Other, the obverse 
that can never manifest itself independently or as such but only in subtraction from 'the 
conscious'. “There is no irreconcilable opposition between conscious and unconscious. 
The only true opposition is between them and life” (61). Henry's task, then, consists, in 
my view,  first,  in  bringing to  light  “the  unthought  ground” from which this  modern, 
correlationist doctrine proceeds and, second, in affirming life as the unthought and the 
unconscious as such – a non-correlationist experience.94
94 It can be argued  (cf. Williams 2008, 273) that Henry does not solve the problem of correlation but 
rather represents a case of “fideism,” of “strong correlationism” that in its search for the 'beyond' of  
consciousness and intentionality must turn to kinds of mystical and pious donation, something forever 
beyond human thought. As Meillassoux puts it, “This is a piety that has been evacuated of content, and 
that is now celebrated for its own sake by a thinking that has given up trying to substantiate it. For the 
apex of fideism occurs at the point where it becomes the thought of piety's superiority to thinking,  
without any specific content being privileged, since it is a matter of establishing through thinking that  
it  is  the  prerogative  of  piety,  and  of  piety  alone,  to  posit  its  own  contents.  Accordingly,  the 
contemporary devolution towards the wholly-other (the otherwise empty object of the profession of 
faith) is the strict and inevitable obverse of interpreting the obsolescence of the principle of sufficient 
reason as reason's discovery of its own essential inability to uncover an absolute – thus, fideism is 
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Henry  speaks  of  correlation  in  terms  of  the  paradox  of  modern  thought:  “the  more 
representation is criticized and contested in its pretension to equal reality and its ability to 
make reality, and the more our epoch defines itself against representation, increasingly 
understanding  itself  as  the  'era  of  suspicion',  the  more  the  empire  of  that  same 
representation expands to include everything and the more it appears as the principle of 
all knowledge, hence of all possible salvation. This is because more than ever, at the very 
moment it seems to be called into question, it continues to constitute the unique essence 
of  manifestation  and  being.  Thus  an  astonishing  reversal  of  values  occurs,  which 
concludes with Freudianism:95 calling representation into question ends in establishing its 
absolute dictatorship” (1993, 159).96 This reversal is conditioned by the forgetting of life 
in  modernity;  however,  this  forgetting is  not  absolute  since from time to time life  is 
“rediscovered.” Unfortunately, Henry argues, even when we manage to get a glimpse of 
life, it is often lost again. 
Descartes' introduction of the concept of consciousness into modern philosophy, Henry 
argues, in its essence was the first “effort toward a radical phenomenology” (Henry also 
calls  it  “beginning  Cartesianism”)  that  was  eventually  superimposed  by  Descartes' 
“scientific  aim” and consequently lost.  Contrary to  the  conventional  interpretation  of 
consciousness in Descartes as the certainty of the cogito,  of the “I think,” Henry argues 
merely the other name for strong correlationism” (2008, 48). We can see at least two major objections 
to such an argument: first, this “piety” (i.e., life) as Henry wants to think it, however inaccessible to 
thought, is, nevertheless, not evacuated of content or an attempt at substantiation, it  is not a mere  
obverse or incapacity of reason; life is a real, positive experience of self-affection. A second objection 
is  presented  by  James  Williams  (2008),  who  points  out  the  incompatibility  between  fideism's 
devolution to “wholly-other” and Henry's position that is “explicitly and firmly opposed to any notion 
of the ‘Wholly-Other’. Quite to the contrary, his argument for the association of transcendental life 
with Christianity is based on immanence rather than absolute transcendence. ... For Henry, faith is not 
at all a question of a mysterious transcendent donation, but rather stems from the argument that life is  
given to itself as auto-affectivity determining a selfhood which is given to itself” (274).
95 Henry suggests, due to the scope of his particular work,  The Genealogy of Psychoanalysis,  that this 
paradox concludes with Freud. However, this does not mean that the problem disappears after Freud; 
this paradox, this unthought ground of thought, Henry notes, “will, if we don't take care, determine 
everything that may come after” (1993, 2).
96 This statement becomes increasingly political once we substitute 'representation' for 'politics'. We end 
up with an outline of one of the major problems of the political correlation: in its denial or rather  
deconstruction of the traditional notion of politics, post-foundational thought fails to really go beyond 
'the state', conceiving something like 'the political' as the negative, the shadow or the unconscious of 
the latter.
206
that  Descartes  gave  this  concept  its  “ontologically  radical  significance”  in  which  it 
“designates appearance considered in itself  – not just  some thing but the principle of 
every thing, the original manifestation in which everything that can exist comes to be a 
phenomenon and so into being for us” (Henry 1993, 2). So, we can discern two notions of 
consciousness or appearance that are repeated throughout Henry's work in terms of the 
“duplicity of appearance”: first, it is the more familiar notion of the cogito as thought and 
representation, i.e., what appears in the visibility of the world's horizon; second, is the 
'deep' notion of consciousness (pre-intentional consciousness97) – the cogito as life. 
The radical beginning in Descartes: life's revelation in self-affection
In his search for radical beginning, Descartes begins by doubting everything, including 
the visible world (to which he himself belongs) as well as eternal truths. As a result of the 
reduction  of  everything  to  potential  nothing,  of  the  rejection  of  all  things  and  their 
appearance,  Descartes  is  able  to  consider  what  remains  in  itself:  pure  appearance, 
abstracted from everything that appears in it (Henry 1993, 12). He calls this appearance, 
this radical foundation of being “thought”: I think therefore I am, he declares. In response 
to Heidegger's objection in Being and Time, who suggests that the Cartesian beginning is 
not radical, since it must presuppose an “ontological pre-comprehension” of the “I am,” 
of being, Henry emphasizes the importance of “therefore” in Descartes'  affirmation (I 
think  therefore I  am):  thought,  i.e.,  appearance,  is  “the  indispensable  precondition 
necessary to the proposition of being. [...] This precondition's determination is cogito's 
content. 'We are, only in thinking'” (13). So, the certainty attained by Descartes through 
his doubt has nothing to do with sum; the Cartesian precondition of being is appearance 
which reveals itself to itself in the radical epochê of the world. “[T]he cogito is fulfilled 
only with the epochê of the world, with the exclusion not only of everything that is but of 
the phenomenality of the world as such, that is, the ecstatic dimensionality from which 
thought borrows its possibility, and with which it has coincided ever since the Greeks” 
97 In this regard, Henry tirelessly questions whether “the manner in which intentionality is given to itself  
[is] itself intentional” (Barbaras 2012, 40). His ultimate discovery is that “intentionality cannot give 
itself  to  itself  intentionally,”  thus  returning  “the  ecstatic  appearance  to  its  ultimate  condition  of  
possibility” (53).
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(2).  This  “thought,”  which  borrows  its  possibility  from  the  world,  is  essentially 
“understanding” (the ultimate basis of the modern theories of knowledge and science), 
while “the cogito” here refers to the radical certainty of pure appearance, “more ancient 
revelation,”  “ek-stasis's  [world's]  wholly other”  arrived  at  only by the  epochê of  the 
world. As a result, for Descartes “'I think' means anything but thought. 'I think' means 
life, what the author of the second Meditation calls 'soul'” (3). 
Let us look closer at what is this “life” which Descartes calls “thought” and “soul,” and 
which is attained through the epochê of the world. Henry suggests that as a result of the 
exclusion of the ecstatic dimensionality what remains is exteriority's radical interiority. 
However, “this interiority cannot be maintained in the problematic as a simple concept or 
structure,  as  the  formal  anti-essence  of  ek-stasis”  but  must  be  based  on  “an  actual 
apparition ... something like a total self-exhibition in the mode of its actual presentation 
and in the pure phenomenological materiality of that presentation ... [Then we can] affirm 
that such a manifestation is absolute and indubitable, escaping every reduction”  (1993, 
27). What we see here is an attempt at affirmation of the non-correlational manifestation 
(prior to being and thus independent of the world and its thought) in its actual apparition 
as opposed to primarily negative appearance as a conceptual anti-essence of the visible 
(or conscious). Henry suggests that we find in Descartes an elaboration of that mode of 
manifestation, of thought, which ultimately escapes every reduction: we find “the cogito's 
ultimate formulation is the proposition videre videor: I seem to see” (17).98 This assertion 
happens within the context of the radical epochê: after Descartes has doubted everything, 
everything  he  sees,  the  whole  world  that  is  perhaps  just  an  illusion  or  a  dream,  he 
nevertheless sees all of this, even if Descartes himself, his body, his eyes (all subjects to 
the epochê) do not exist: “'At certe videre videor, audire, calescere' (Yet I certainly seem 
to see, to hear, and to be warmed)” (17). What is the meaning of this seeing and seeming? 
As we know Descartes rejects seeing, the domain of visibility, even as mere appearance, 
since it might be otherwise than appears and perhaps not at all. For what is seeing, asks 
98 Considering that the tense of the verb videor is passive, a more accurate English translation of videre 
videor would be “I see myself seeing” or “I have seen myself seeing.” This articulation of the passivity 
of videor better reflects Henry's emphasis on the radical passivity of life in a sense of receptivity. I am 
grateful to Dr. Antonio Calcagno for this note on the translation of the Latin videre videor to English.
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Henry. Due to Descartes' reduction, the human eye is barred and recognized as incapable 
of vision, as a result “vision is given its true nature, the pure fact of seeing” (18). Henry 
notes that what is accomplished for the first time here is “a clear differentiation between 
what appears and appearance itself” (18). Seeing something is essentially an ob-jection, 
“seeing is looking toward and attaining what holds itself before the gaze so that the ob-
ject is seen only through the ob-jection of what is thus thrown and posed before” (18). 
The pure seeing, however, presupposes a horizon of visibility, a transcendent light: before 
the ob-jection of what is seen is “originally that of being-posed-before as such, that of the 
pure horizon.  It  is  the opening of openness as the ontological difference on which is 
founded all ontic presence. Ek-stasis is the condition of possibility of  videre  and of all 
seeing  in  general”  (18-19).  But  the  Cartesian  epochê renounces  both  the  domain  of 
visibility and the pure seeing, this original ek-stasis. What is left then?
Henry argues  that  the  certainty  that  remains  after  reduction  has  a  different  mode  of 
manifestation: it is not that of seeing (videre) in its empirical or transcendental mode, but 
videor, “the primal semblance.” The vision, however false it may be, nevertheless exists: 
“At certe videre videor (at the very least, it seems to me that I see)”; but what is existing, 
what appears, what manifests itself? Not videre (seeing) but videor (seeming):99 “Videor  
designates the primal semblance, the original capacity to appear and give through which 
vision originally presents and manifests itself, regardless of what veracity is accorded it 
as vision, regardless of what it sees or believes itself to see, even regardless of seeing 
itself” (1993, 19). This sensing does not have an ob-ject, it is self-sensing, self-affection, 
opposed to seeing that constitutes itself as seeing through the attainment of its object. As 
a result, Henry argues, this original essence of revelation, as sensing, is not reducible to 
99 An example of Descartes' that Henry uses to raise this question and also suggest an answer to it is that  
of a dream in The Passions of the Soul. Whether asleep or awake, the reality of what is seen or sensed 
in the body is rejected. However, “self-sensing, original affectivity in general, and all of its modalities  
are  suddenly marked  by the  seal  of  the  absolute.  They are  revealed  in  the  substantiality of  their 
phenomenality, in and by their affectivity, as they are in themselves, and no illusion has any power  
over them. 'Thus often when we sleep, and sometimes even when we are awake, we imagine certain  
things so vividly that we think we see them before us, or feel them in our body, although they are not  
there at all.  But even if we are asleep and dreaming, we cannot feel  sad, or moved by any other 
passion, unless the soul truly has this passion within it'” (Henry 1993, 27–28). The passions of the soul 
are this original semblance, seeming, videor that remain despite the epochê of the world.
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the ek-stasis of ontological difference. “I sense that I think, therefore I am,” this is the 
conclusion that Henry reaches upon the close examination of the Cartesian method of the 
radical reduction. “Seeing is thinking that I see [...], but thinking that I see is sensing that 
I see. Videor, in videre videor, designates this sensing inherent to seeing and makes it an 
actual  seeing,  a  seeing  that  senses  itself  seeing”  (21).  Thought's  primal  sensing  is 
radically opposed to the sensing that rules seeing, in other words, “thought's essential 
self-sensing” excludes “ek-static sensing.” Consequently, “[b]ecause self-sensing thought 
excludes ek-static exteriority, it is essentially a radical interiority” (22). And this mode of 
interiority,  as  expulsion  of  all  transcendence,  “constitutes  the  first  essence  of 
consciousness,  original-revelation  ...  'that  type  of inner  knowledge  (cognitione  illa  
interna) that always precedes acquired knowledge' and that is really the basis of all. No 
matter  how it  is  expressed,  the fundamental  texts  [of  Descartes]  refer  to  this  radical, 
almost unthinkable interiority whenever they attempt to unveil  the final possibility of 
appearance's essence as self-appearing, an essence grasped in the cogito as 'thought', or 
more  ultimately,  'consciousness'”  (23). What  is  affirmed  here  is  not  the  reflexive 
consciousness of seeing, but the  immediate impression  of seeing. The double notion of 
consciousness in Descartes becomes apparent: first, consciousness as reflexive thought 
(i.e., understanding), a mode of seeing, of a relationship to the world (representation of 
objects), of knowledge; second, (pre-intentional) consciousness as self-sensing thought, 
an  immediate  inner  'knowledge'  and  impression,  an  original  revelation,  “the  mute 
immanence of its first being-to-self, in the affectivity of pure self-sensing” (33) (attained 
through the retreat from the world), which “deserved another name, a name that indeed 
Descartes gave it, the name of 'soul' or, if you like, 'life'” (40). In this “sensing,” in the 
self-affecting “thought” beyond thought, the Cartesian epochê finds the radical beginning 
it  was  seeking,  which  Henry calls  “life.”100 His  ultimate  conclusion  is  that  “thought, 
100 A question  that  can  be  raised  regarding  Henry's  nomination  of  that  which  deploys  its  essence 
independently of representation, i.e., thought, as necessarily 'life'. Why determine this unthought in 
“vitalistic fashion” and not call it something else (cf. Calcagno 2008, 128)? Perhaps, we get a glimpse 
of Henry's intention in his reading of Descartes when he eventually leaps from “soul” to “life.” Soul, 
viewed as the principle of life in scholastic philosophy preceding Descartes, allows Henry to suggest  
that the principle of inner knowledge 'discovered' by Descartes (immediate consciousness, “knowledge 
of soul”)  deserves  the name of “life.” Henry's leap from identifying that real experience which lies 
beyond thought and representation to its designation as “life” might give us an understanding of a 
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including rational thought, is only ever given to itself in the pathetic auto-revelation of 
life” (2007, 253).
The opposition between videor and videre, Henry argues, signals the division of thought 
according to the two fundamental modes of phenomenality: one is focused on the visible, 
the understanding's seeing, the phenomenality of the world, whereas the other affirms 'the 
invisible', different 'vision' – “the astonishing concept of a vision, an eye, whose essence 
is not light”  (1993, 272). The concept of consciousness doubles itself as it  enters the 
philosophical  stage:  it  designates  both  the  visible  and  the  invisible;  moreover,  that 
revelation of life, arrived at by the reduction of the world by Descartes, instead of leading 
to  important  research  was  simply  lost.  We  witness  in  this  moment  the  “historical 
deviation,” as Henry calls it, which abandons the path toward the original revelation, the 
beginning, and under the name of the “philosophy of consciousness” engages itself “in 
the opposite direction,  moving toward the world and its knowing, to a transcendental 
theory of knowledge and science, which in turn made possible the mastery of things and 
the universe of technology” (3). Descartes deviates from his original insight upon the 
superimposition of his scientific aim onto it. 
Radical immanence of life and transcendence of the world
This historical deviation results in the “forgetting of life.” Henry argues that it was Kant's 
critique of the Cartesian soul that 'sealed' this forgetting and foreclose “to contemporary 
thinkers access to what constitutes both our innermost being and its original essence,” 
i.e.,  life  (1993, 3). Like Meillassoux and Foucault (and certainly many others), Henry 
identifies Kant's philosophy as the moment in the history of philosophy where correlation 
is instituted or rather becomes apparent: Kant raises “the philosophy of consciousness (as 
an ontology of representation; that is, of experience understood as the general rapport 
between subject and object) to an elaborate theory of the objective universe” (3; see also 
normative aspect of his overall philosophic project. As Joseph Rivera suggests,  “Henry’s interest in 
‘Life’ ... reflects an attempt to restore the interior ‘soul’ or spiritual dimension within a philosophical  
tradition which  gradually became parasitic  on  and  complicit  with the  objectification  of  humanity 
effected by modern science and technology” (2011, 208). This intention will become more clear as I 
consider Henry's critique of the modern “forgetting” of life. 
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103-129). I suggest that in his attention to the insights of beginning Cartesianism, but also 
to, however limited, the “rediscovery” of life by Schopenhauer (life as will), Nietzsche 
(life as will to power and the eternal return) and Freud (life as the unconscious), Henry 
addresses the loss of “the great outdoors” of representational thought: he affirms life as 
such, as original self-affection.  “Self-affection,  independent  of the difference between 
'subject and object',  between 'knower and known',  independent of Difference as such, 
constitutes life's essence...” (164). Life is the 'being' “that never becomes ob-ject of or for 
a subject and, by this absolute refusal of obstance, defines reality” (4). So, facing the loss 
of life,  the abandonment of the unthought as such in  the correlationist  philosophy of 
modernity in favour of the establishment of the objective universe (of science), Henry 
offers his philosophical intervention as an attempt at 'remembering' the essence of life as 
such.  His  project  has  important  implications  for  contemporary  political  thought 
(specifically affected by correlationism) since it points politics (the “worldly” affair, the 
polis as cosmos) in the direction of its radical unthought or unconscious, the unpolitical as 
such – an acosmic experience of life immanent to itself, which lies at the bottom of an 
integral notion of life. 
Before  proceeding  with  a  closer  examination  of  the  process  of  'forgetting'  and  the 
possibility of 'remembering'  life, let me articulate in more detail the major points and 
oppositions  that  are  implicit  in  my reading  of  Henry.  First  and  foremost,  there  is  a 
defining opposition between immanence of life and transcendence of the world: life as 
the invisible and the unthought, as radical immanence is opposed to ek-stasis, being-in-
the-world, the domain of the visible, of representation and thought. However, Henry does 
not fail to emphasize that while, in the most general terms, the radical difference between 
life  and the world cannot  be overcome (the world knows nothing about  life  and life 
remains  indifferent  to  the world and its  thought),  their  relationship is  not  constituted 
exclusively by this opposition. Henry aims to affirm the independence of life's mode of 
manifestation from that of the world, but not the other way around: a philosophy of life 
“takes into consideration the very soil in which thought grows” (1993, 4). In his apparent 
(even  Gnostic)  dualism,  in  his  'rejection'  of  the  world  in  favour  of  life,  which  have 
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become the important  objects  of  criticism for  many Henry scholars  (cf.  for  example, 
Rivera 2011; Steinbock 1999; Williams 2008), Henry, I suggest, does not really intend to 
dismiss the world but rather to subject it to its a priori, life. He establishes a “hierarchy” 
of modes of manifestation and experience:101 life is always prior to being-in-the-world. 
Life reveals itself in its immanence before any relation to the world is possible. Invisible 
life is prior to the visible world, but not correlated with it; in other words, life manifests 
itself independently of representation, consciousness and thought, and not as their mere 
opposite or shadow. Life remains in itself, in its radical immanence insofar as it “deploys 
its  essence  independent  of  representation  (independent  of  the  ecstatic  dimension that 
gives  representation  its  light)”  (1993,  169). Despite  the  fact  that  it  is  invisible  and 
acosmic, life resembles “concretely experienced substance – the lived-experience of one’s 
own ipseity, this 'me' that I am. This experience manifests itself deep within the structure 
of interior feelings and thus cannot appear within the exteriority of the physical body or 
the horizon of the world”  (Rivera 2011, 207). This affirmation of the concreteness and 
real substantiality of life's experience lies at the basis of Henry's project of a “radical” or 
“material  phenomenology.”  Its  implications  for  the  thought  of  the  unpolitical  are 
apparent: life as real experience, beyond world and beyond thought, affirms the radical 
outside  of  politics  (in  terms  of  real  experience  that  is  not  correlated  to  the  cogito). 
However, this affirmation is not established as a negation or dismissal of world-politics, 
but rather merely subjects it to the a priori of life. What happens, then, is the unpolitical 
displacement  of  the  political  as  a  non-value  (similarly  conceived  by  Cacciari  and 
Esposito), in a sense of the condition of possibility of all relationality.
Contrary to the idea of being-in-the-world (constituted by the (cor)relation between the 
subject and the object, thought and being) as the only possible domain of experience of 
life, as, for instance, Heidegger suggests (see, Henry 1993, 45–46), Henry establishes his 
view of life as such, of experience that is not only independent of correlation but which 
101 “More important, if this project intends not only to institute  a radical differentiation  between two 
modes of presentation, which present everything that can be presented or come to us, but additionally 
to claim to establish a hierarchy between them so that only what is presented by one of the modes, as 
its pure ontological content, is presented indubitably (in other words, if only one mode of revelation is  
absolute)...” (Henry 1993, 26; my emphasis).
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makes this correlation possible. Life is prior to the relation between thought and being: 
one has to be in life, living, before one can think and be in the world. However, this does 
not establish a necessary relationship between life and thought, that is, one who is living 
is not necessarily thinking (i.e., representing). In this respect, Henry employs the figures 
of  infant  and  animal  (borrowed  from  Nietzsche  and  Freud102)  as  examples  of  the 
immediacy of life's experience, of its inner knowledge of itself that does not equal or 
require reflexive thought (211, 229, 294).103 More than that, life, in the first place, cannot 
represent itself  to itself  as such since it  excludes any form of ek-stasis, of distancing 
which would enable it to make itself into its own object. In the pure self-revelation of life 
thought is excluded or rather is not possible; as immanence, life “expels ek-stasis and 
thus all  possible forms of thought.  Nietzsche represents immanent life as animal, [...] 
expressing an absence of the thought that traditionally defines man's humanity, specifying 
him as the rational animal. Thus it is eidetically necessary that the animal, insofar as it 
represents the essence of life, and life excludes thought, is determined in its being by 
forgetting...” (211). “Forgetting” belongs to life and defines its radical immanence in the 
rejection of the ecstatic dimension in which thought moves; thus, this forgetting is not an 
operation of thought (something that was once present to thought as an object and is no 
longer such) but an originary precondition of life's immanence, of the  inner assembly 
through  which  life  coheres  with  itself.  “In  the  absolute  already  of  Life's  autarchic 
enjoyment lies the Immemorial, the Arch-Ancience that eludes any thought – the always 
already forgotten, that which lies in Arch-Forgetting” (Henry 2003, 151).104 Before there 
102 “Just like Nietzsche's animal, Freud's infant does not refer to a stage in a process; it is the hidden name  
of an essence, namely, the essence of life. This is why its characteristics are found in every stage of  
life, regardless of its age” (Henry 2008, 128).
103 It is interesting to note in this regard the distinction that Henry draws between the language of life and 
the language of the world: he illustrates this distinction by pointing out the difference between a cry of  
pain and the statement ‘J’ai mal.’ The former's potency consists in the way in which “life ... generates  
its own reality in experiencing itself in the Self in which it auto-reveals itself” (in Jarvis 2009, 372); 
the language of life is that of affect while the language of the world appeals to reason. This argument 
is reminiscent of the Aristotelian distinction between phone (the animal cry of pleasure or pain) and 
logos (the language proper, defining a human being); however, for Henry, the relationship between 
these  two  kinds  of  'language'  is  reversed.  Life's  expression  does  not  require  the  mediation  of  a 
symbolic system, reason or thought; life presents itself immediately to itself in suffering and not in  
knowledge.  As Schopenhauer puts it,  “[t]here is  no longer any need to obey the Socratic precept  
'Know thyself'; it is enough merely to cry” (in Henry 1993, 177–178).
104 An interesting comparison  presents  itself  here  between  Meillassoux's  insight  into  the  problem of 
correlation through his notion of “arche-fossil” and Henry's notion of life as “Arch-Ancience.” In both 
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is any thinking ego or any me, there is life. Life is anterior to every living and to thought; 
“only what is alive can be affected by anything else and the world” (Henry 1993, 79). 
Life's embrace precedes everything, it precedes the world and its multiple forces, life is 
“the force prior to all force, the power of all power” (212) that nevertheless cannot think, 
remember  or  represent  itself  in  the  world.  Consequently,  the  “hyperpower” of  life  is 
simultaneously the radical impotence inasmuch as in its radical immanence life cannot 
think and objectify itself, transcend itself, be other than itself and, most importantly, be 
rid  of itself.  To “'suffer oneself'  is  the structure of  life”  (Henry 2003,  199), not  as a 
negative form of experience that has to be relieved or eliminated, but as a mode of access 
to life itself, life's proper mode of revelation. Absolute life, Henry suggests, experiences 
itself  as autarchic self-enjoyment,  while the radical passivity characterizes the way in 
which each living relates to life and thus to itself. The pure fact of experiencing oneself or 
“sensing” oneself, which I discussed above, means being radically passive with respect to 
one's own life: one is living, is in life, not as a result of a choice or an act of will, but 
rather as a 'gift'. “Will's essence contains its anti-essence, its inability to will or not will  
itself. This inability is the greatest force. [...] This force is life. It is the force of being, the 
edifying gathering that presents everything to itself. Such a force, which is neither action 
nor will, which is not action but its opposite, is the passion of being, the primal suffering 
in virtue of which the essence of being is also that of life. After immanence and as its 
ultimate precondition, every philosophy of life inevitably encounters this second essential 
determination:  affectivity”  (1993, 177). Primal suffering, the submission to life at each 
moment  is  “unfreedom;”  the  very  “structure  of  being  [of  life]  is  unfreedom  and 
cases authors refer to the reality prior to the inauguration of human world and thought. However, while 
arche-fossil refers to something like a pre-historical artifact that 'testifies' about  the events that have 
occurred in the past which were not manifest to anyone (thus arguing that  being is not co-extensive 
with manifestation), Arch-Ancience refers to an 'ahistorical' principle, insofar as the essence of life is 
ahistorical, suggesting that that manifestation (original self-manifestation, not as an object to someone) 
is prior to being. Life is the always already forgotten not as something that chronologically preceded 
human history and the world, but what continues (moves) beyond thought in every historical present 
and conditions this thought. The arche-fossil is a visible fact of that which once did not appear to 
anyone (thus was relatively 'invisible') but still is presumed to have existed (since it exists, is visible to  
us  now);  Arche-Ancience,  life,  is  radically invisible  in  its  essence,  it  never  appears  as  an  object 
(visible) to anyone,  neither before nor after the inauguration of the human world and specifically 
human life. Life is a priori, that is, anterior to (not out-side of) every living.
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insurmountable passivity in regard to self” (215). Life's hyperpower is impotence since it 
is ultimately unable to be rid of itself.105 Thus, self-destruction of the inner essence of life 
is impossible.106 
So, the mode of revelation proper to life consists in the pure fact of experiencing oneself 
structured as suffering oneself. Let us look at the nature of this 'suffering'. As I already 
mentioned,  suffering here is  not  viewed negatively but  rather  as  'bearing'  oneself,  as 
pathos, as a 'name' of affectivity, the immanent, non-intentional and universal structure of 
affectivity that encompasses everything that is. This experience of suffering oneself, i.e., 
of  life,  in  its  turn,  has  an  “antinomic  structure”:  Henry  argues  that  two  contrasting 
affective tonalities, suffering and joy, are bound together (rather than opposed to each 
other)  by  reference  “to  a  primitive  unity:  the  absolutely  primitive  original  unity  of 
Suffering and Rejoicing”  (2003, 200). Suffering is a path and condition of enjoying; it 
attains itself through life's process of self-revelation. The two affective tonalities are thus 
possible  only in  life's  self-suffering,  so that  “suffering  takes  place and does  not  stop 
taking place within happiness, as what gives it to itself, as its internal and insurmountable 
condition” (201). Consequently, the pure states of suffering and happiness or joy cannot 
be encountered; they are inseparable from each other, they constitute the structure of life. 
“Happy are those who suffer”  (Henry 2007, 259). The one who suffers, whose form of 
life  appears  to  be  the  most  unhappy,  is  nevertheless  not  separated  from the  happy, 
abundant life of which essence one partakes, as the living: “within each form of life, even 
the most unhappy, there is accomplished the essence of absolute Life” (Henry 2003, 205). 
105 The impotence  of  life  as  'hyperpower'  in  Henry is  different  from Agamben's  suggestion  that  the 
ultimate power lies in the potential not to be. For Henry, life's inability is radical, it cannot not be, it is  
always continuing, outpouring, and embracing everything in its inability to not be, to not be its own 
manifestation. However, if we consider Agamben's statement literally, life is the potential not to be per  
se, insofar as life, the universal structure of affectivity, is prior to being. 
106 As a result, death serves as a reminder that life is not a product of the ego's will (one does not have an 
ability or choice to not live or not die) but is bigger than the living; through death a living being faces  
the hyperpower of life  and comes to terms with its  own radical  passivity in relation to life.  This 
consideration of death opposes the view of death (for example, expressed by Freud, but also by many 
others before and after him) as the internal movement and even the ultimate goal of life. As Henry 
argues, “Freudianism accounts for life only to liquidate it”: life is interpreted as the movement of  
internal self-destruction, the effort and aspiration toward death (the principle of reduction of entropy;  
cf.  Beyond the Pleasure Principle). He quotes Freud: “Everything living dies for internal reasons – 
becomes inorganic once again. ... 'The aim of all life is death'” (1993, 313).
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This absolute life, in its self-suffering, delights in itself: happiness lies in the very simple 
fact of experiencing itself, “in the radical immanence of this experiencing, where there is 
neither 'outside' nor 'world'” (103). Life is thus “self-sufficient” insofar as its foundation 
is self-affection in which life exhausts itself and to which it refers back (see, Henry 1993, 
265). Life in its essence is always sufficient, is always happy life. Suffering and joy, these 
different affective tonalities (but not modes), constitute “the unique essence of being, as 
life, as the original self-experience in self-growth of self-delight” (232). This life, self-
suffering which delights  in itself,  has a second name that,  Henry suggests,  Nietzsche 
gives it: “[d]elight, joy, happiness, intoxication, 'overflow of a primordial delight'” (232). 
In suffering, the self plunges into the power which established it, becomes submerged in 
“the intoxication of life” (Henry 2007, 259). Perhaps, this life's immediate and irreducible 
delight  in  itself  is  what  Aristotle  was  referring  to  when  he  spoke  of  the  natural  or 
immediate sweetness of zoē. The same is true for Agamben's thought of “happy life” to 
which humans “are irremediably and painfully assigned.” Form-of-life is life's painful but 
irremediable assignment to happiness. Agamben wants to call it not just “happy” but also 
“sufficient” (in the sense of good enough) life, which, one can argue with Henry's help, is 
not just that but also an intoxicating and always abundant life (zoē perissōn) that has been 
incorporated into the Christian notion of life.107 
If the experience of life is always both, happiness and suffering, we can see “bare life” in 
a different, more positive light: bare life can never be purely unhappy insofar as it is life; 
as a result, what does its bareness really stand for? Before Agamben can affirm form-of-
life as happy life in opposition and as an answer to the problem of bare life, he might 
need to address the question of the possibility of happiness in bare life, whether life can 
ever be stripped naked and reduced to pure suffering. Not that any form of life should be 
abandoned to any form of worldly suffering in order to be happy, but it is still important, I 
believe, not to reduce something like 'bare life' to pure unhappiness and suffering, fully 
deprived of joy. In this regard, we should question the very notion of bare life: is it a mere 
thought  experiment  (just  like  the  Hobbesian  “state  of  nature”)  that  never  appears  in 
107 As we read in John 10:10b: “I am come that they might have life, and that they might have [it] more  
abundantly.” (ἐγὼ  ἦλθον  ἵνα  ζωὴν  ἔχωσιν  καὶ  περισσὸν  ἔχωσιν)
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experience, or is life, in its essence, nothing but bare life as such, which is exhausted in 
its self-suffering and self-enjoyment and never is more than that. I suggest that Henry's 
thought of life guides us toward the second option: bare life is life-as-such, not different 
in  its  essence  from any other form of life.  There is  no other  life  than life.  A similar 
argument can be applied to Rancière's elaboration of “the part of no part”: regardless of 
the negative situation of being outside the dominant order, of not being accounted for, 
there is a positive side to this 'life beyond politics'. The life of “the part of no part” cannot 
be reduced to mere suffering insofar as it partakes in life; this is an important addition to 
Rancière's political  project of equality.  No living being is  outside of life and thus no 
living is deprived of life's delight; moreover, inasmuch as life is radically immanent, it 
does not have a degree or measure of more or less: everyone has an equal 'share' of life, is 
equally alive.108
The unpolitical form-of-life: the indivisibility of life and the living
At this point it would be hard not to recognize that Henry's notion of life is 'integral',  
especially considering his emphasis on life's immanence. As in Agamben and Esposito, 
the emphasis falls on the inseparability of life from itself. Opposed to the appearing of the 
world, which unveils only in the 'outside of self', in ekstasis, and everything that appears 
in it is thus exterior, other, different, “the first decisive trait of the revelation of life is that, 
because it carries no divide or gap within it and never differs from itself, it only ever 
reveals itself. Life reveals itself. Life is an auto-revelation” (Henry 2007, 247). Life never 
differs from itself; life is independent of “Difference as such.” Consequently, it does not 
make much sense to speak of something like bare life and qualitative life, since in both 
cases we would be dealing with the same life that, regardless of its modalities (even in the 
108 “Now, supposing there are degrees of power, 'quantities of force', and their intermingling and conflict  
are born from inner modifications of these forces. Nevertheless, the power by which they are and in 
which despite their vicissitudes they remain knows neither degree nor quantity, neither growth nor 
diminution, neither modification nor alteration. It is the omnipresent and omnipotent hyperpower in 
every power, turning it over to itself, making it ready to be what it is. All its power is in each thing, the  
weakest as well as the strongest. Thus we understand that no force, no matter how insignificant and 
derisory, fails to bear the incommensurability of that hyperpower, which in fact is not a measure for  
any force, since it cannot be measured by any, being in each before its action, taking and giving its  
measure, the incoercibility of its self-grasping bond” (Henry 1993, 209–210). 
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most humble of its impressions, i.e., visible representations) remains life. Furthermore, 
life is not only one with itself (self-revelation) but also one with that which reveals itself 
in it (248). And what reveals itself in life is the living. I maintain that the only real 'form' 
that life takes is 'the living', and insofar as there is no living outside of life as much as 
there is no life without the living, we basically encounter here an example of 'form-of-
life': life that is not separate from its form, and form that is not separate from life. Life is 
anterior to the living, but there is no life without the living: “[t]here is no life without a 
living being” as there is no living without life, since “life ... resides inside, in every living 
being, as that which causes it to live and never leaves it for as long as it lives” (249, 250). 
It is important to keep in mind that “the living” or “a living being” here is used “in the 
sense of life which experiences itself, and not just a complex set of material processes 
which  know  nothing  of  themselves”  (250).109 This  is  one  of  the  crucial  oppositions 
established by Henry: life and the living (life that experiences itself) are invisible and 
have nothing to do with the visible, objective processes described as 'life' by sciences, for 
instance,  biology.  The  scientific  substitution  of  material  processes  for  life  constitutes 
nothing but forgetting or even murder of life, and not knowledge and study of life. Living 
is possible  only outside the world, but neither living nor world are possible apart from 
life. The relationship between life and the living, then, is not that of scientific knowledge 
or thought, it is not a relationship between a giving subject and a constituted object but an 
immanent,  immediate  relation  of  oneness.  However,  this  unity  does  not  mean  total 
identity;  the  living  is  one  with  life,  but  life  is  always  more  than  the  living.  Henry 
describes  this  relationship  between  life  and  the  living  in  terms  of  “generation”  and 
“birth”: the living is constantly generated in life.110 If there is any knowledge involved, it 
is that of an immediate self-'knowledge' of life that knows everything without speaking a 
word;  “[l]ife  is  what  knows  itself  without  knowing  it”  (Henry  2003,  232).  Life  is 
'knowledge'  only  in  the  same  sense  as  it  is  'thought':  immediate  self-sensing  or 
109 “The living” and “a living being” are common translations of the French term vivant. The translation 
of  vivant  as “a living being” might seem to be less accurate considering Henry's emphasis on the  
distinction between life (vie) and being (être); as a result, it  is worth keeping in mind that in this  
translation the emphasis falls on “living” rather than on “being.”
110 The relation between life and the living is called, from life's  viewpoint,  generation, and from the 
living's viewpoint, birth  (cf. Henry 2003, 51). Joseph Rivera  (2011) presents an excellent study of 
Henry's notion of generation and its theological implications.
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consciousness  of  itself  that  does  not  require  and  pass  through  representation  or  the 
process  of  objectification.  Taking  this  into  consideration,  I  can,  to  some  degree, 
retrospectively agree with Agamben who argues that thought constitutes form-of-life or 
that thought is form-of-life, insofar as this 'thought' is but another name for life's self-
revelation.  As I already noted,  for Agamben,  “[t]o think does not mean merely to be 
affected by this or that thing, by this or that content of enacted thought, but rather at once 
to be affected by one's own receptiveness and experience in each and every thing that is 
thought a pure power of thinking” (1996, 153; my emphasis).
I speak here of life's relation with the living in terms of form-of-life in order to emphasize 
their immediate relationship and indivisibility; life is not separate from its only possible 
'form' – the living – and the living finds its condition only in life, and never in anything 
else,  such as politics. So, as opposed to Agamben's suggestion that form-of-life is by 
definition  political,  I  suggest  that  the  relation  (unity)  between  life  and  the  living  is 
unpolitical, since life manifests itself in something like the inner certainty of the living 
and  not  in  the  world,  and,  as  a  result,  never  in  politics.  Thus,  I  will  speak  of  the  
unpolitical form-of-life: the relationality that is acosmic and embracing everything there 
is, prior to as well as the condition of being-in-the-world and its political relationality. 
There is more than the world. Life. The living being is living not by having a world but 
by being generated in life. 
The universal relation of life and the living regardless of the world (the unpolitical form-
of-life) which Henry presents, I argue, is a positive account of the non-relational; positive 
in a sense that it 'allows' this non-relation to subsist as such. From the perspective of the 
world, the relationality of life is a non-relation; from the perspective of being-with life is 
solitude, something like 'being-without'. The experience of the living self emerges only in 
life: “[t]he living being is thrown into life, inasmuch as life, by throwing itself into life, 
throws the living being into life”  (Henry 2008, 132). The relation of the living self to 
itself is, then, posited by “an other,” i.e., life; however, we can argue so insofar as “we 
understand that this relation to oneself designates the absence of any relation, if the other 
[life] is in the first place nothing posited or thought of as other, and if the other is nothing 
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that goes beyond what emerges within this relation to oneself” (132; my emphasis). The 
other is nothing but the self; the living is nothing other but life. “The ground on which I 
stand is never larger than the two feet that cover it. That is the mystery of life: the living 
being is coextensive with all of the life within it; everything within it is its own life. The 
living being is not founded on itself; instead, it has a basis in life. This basis, however, is 
not different from itself; it is the auto-affection in which it auto-affects itself and thus with 
which it is identical” (132; my emphasis). Life does not become other than itself; even in 
the living being it  retains the unity of its  own essence,  it  “remains alone  with itself” 
(Henry 1973, 284). This 'relationship' of life to itself is a 'non-relation', inasmuch as there 
is  no  other  toward  which  life  extends  itself.  To  be  more  precise,  the  other  of  this 
relationship is life itself: what relates and what is being related to are the same. Life's 
relation to itself and the living is that of an  immediate bond,  of unity. Henry calls this 
unity of life's essence “solitude”: “the relation of the essence with itself ...  is a relation 
such that in it the essence rejoices concerning itself, has the experience of itself, reveals  
itself to itself in that which it is, such as it is. That which has the experience of self, that  
which enjoys itself and is nothing other than this pure enjoyment of itself, than this pure  
experience of self if life. Solitude is the essence of life” (285; emphasis in original). The 
relationship inherent in the unpolitical form-of-life is solitude, there is no 'other' or 'with' 
involved in this  relation; considering that  the world is  constituted through relation to 
objects, to an other, that it involves an extension of the self toward this other, the acosmic 
relation of life to itself in solitude is a 'non-relation' from the perspective of the world. It 
is important to note, however, that this immediate relation that characterizes life or form-
of-life, once it is mediated through the world, requires an elaboration in different terms, 
which, I believe, constitutes a political problem or rather a problem for political thought. I 
will  return  to  this  question  below.  For  now,  let  us  examine  how  life's  non-relation 
presents the ground for a different, unpolitical notion of the human and community.
The interpretation  of  the  human as  inherently political  being  is  a  familiar  motive  of 
political thought, from Aristotelian  zoon politikon111 to the Heideggerian affirmation of 
111 Let us recall that according to Aristotle belonging to the polis defines the very humanity of man: “the 
state is a creation of nature” and, as a result, “he who is unable to live in society or who has no need  
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Dasein as  essentially  Mitsein.  If  we follow Michel  Henry in  his  affirmation  of  life's 
essential solitude and its inseparable 'relation'  with the living, we end up with a new, 
unpolitical conception of “man:”112 the cogito, which used to define 'man' through the 
activity  of  thought,  is,  as  I  showed  above,  exhausted  in  videor and,  as  a  result,  it 
“demands the exhaustive phenomenological definition of 'man' as living”  (Henry 1993, 
321). This conception, first of all, implies that the human is understood on the basis of 
life and as constituted by it and not as more than a living or even as a necessary condition 
of life's manifestation.  The former misconception of man, Henry argues, originates in 
Greece: in the classic conception “a man is more than a living, a man is a living endowed 
with Logos, that is to say, with reason and language ... It follows, reciprocally, that life is 
less than man, or in any event less than what makes his humanity” (2003, 50). We can see 
how this conception of man's relation to life lies at the basis of the distinction between 
zoē and  bios:  the mere 'living'  part  of man is  not  enough to constitute his  humanity, 
humanity is defined by man's relation to  logos and, thus, the  polis  and the world. Life, 
Henry argues against this Western tradition rooted in classical thought, is always more 
than man, more than reason and language: life is more than the living, thus life is equally 
more than man understood as a living being. “To the extent that Life is more than man 
understood as living, it is from Life, not from man, that we must begin” (51). So, the 
hierarchy  that  is  preserved  here  is  no  longer  between  the  forms  of  life  that  are 
qualitatively different due to the presence of an added attribute (such as language) but 
only between life and the living. We must begin from life and not from man in order to 
avoid a substitution of man for life or rather reduction of life to man which, according to 
Henry, was Heidegger's mistake: the insertion of man for him became necessary as the 
guardian of the truth of being. “The reception of the ecstatic horizon as the precondition 
of its phenomenological formation, receptivity as the transcendental precondition of the 
truth of being that lights itself in the lighting of exteriority, this is the primary process to  
which  man  lends  his  name,  a  process  wherein  the  lighting  of  being  is  given  its 
preliminary possibility. This is why Heideggerian  being has need of man...”  (1993, 96; 
because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god: he is no part of a state” (Politics, i. 
2. 1253a25-30). 
112 Henry seems to use the term “man” interchangeably with “human.”
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my emphasis).  The living being is substituted for life, meaning that  we have access to 
life only in the human form: “Life, in its own right, is a kind of Being, but essentially it is 
only  accessible  in  Dasein”  (Heidegger  in  Henry  2003,  45). This  refers  back  to 
correlationism:  once  life's  revelation  (or,  as  in  this  case,  being)  is  reduced to  human 
receptivity, it loses its independence and becomes a correlate of human (representative) 
consciousness, not more than an object for a human subject. What Henry suggests, in 
turn, is not a new version of humanism and correlationism but rather an assertion of the 
primacy of  life  where  'man'  arrives  only as  an  addition  to  the  already accomplished 
essence of life. As a result, man cannot add anything more to that life, to its quality; thus 
man himself cannot be more than living. And since living is not possible in the world, 
man  as  living  does  not  refer  to  “the  ecstatically  appearing  individual”  (who  is  ever 
alienated  from and  just  a  stranger  to  himself)  but  rather  to  “the  individual  who  as 
suffering-Self coincides with the foundation of things [i.e., with life's affectivity]” (1993, 
265; my emphasis) and appears in the disappearance of the sphere of thought.113 
The unpolitical community of life: pathos-with
The next question we need to ask is how does such a conception of the human as living, 
as grounded in life's essential affective solitude, translate into a conception of community 
(including human community) or, rather,  how does the essential non-relation manifest 
itself  in relation with others,  in intersubjectivity.  I suggest that the answer lies in the 
notion of “community of life,” the unpolitical community that is prior to any political 
community, to any being-with. As I noted above, there are two kinds of relationality: vital 
relations and relations mediated through the world. Intersubjective relations as well can 
be seen through the prism of these two dimensions. First, we can view relations with the 
113 The conception of the individual as suffering-Self is important for Henry because it involves the notion 
of Ipseity. The suffering-Self is conditioned by life's original Ipseity: “ ...a living comes to life only as 
a living 'me' and thus only on the condition that this life has already constructed the originary Ipseity  
that makes it possible for that  living person  to be a Self and a 'me'”  (2003, 111). In this respect, it 
would be interesting to compare Henry's and Esposito's notions of the living person. Let us recall that 
the latter for Esposito is  “not separate from or implaneted into life,  but coextensive with it  as an 
inseparable synolon of form and force, external and internal, bios and zoē. The third person, this figure 
that has yet to be fathomed, points to this unicum, to this being that is both singular and plural – to the 
non-person inscribed in the person, to the person open to what has never been before” (2012, 151). 
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other  in  the  world  as  an  essential  part  of  being-in-the-world.  These  are  intentional 
relations mediated by perception and thought; as a result, Henry suggests, it is not the 
real other involved in this relationship but “the other in thought,” “the other-thought,” “a 
quasi-other” (2008, 102). Second, since, as Henry argues, the reality that constitutes the 
content of the world is life, concrete relations with others (real others) point us toward the 
invisible essence of life. Vital intersubjective relationships are “nonintentional,” they are 
not based on representation but rather “put Life into play” (2003, 61). And not only the 
terms of this relationship imply life, i.e., as the living implies life, but “it is the relation 
itself that is constituted as a relation with Life, that draws its essence from within it” (61). 
So,  intersubjective  relations  are  formed in life:  before being 'placed'  in  being,  in  the 
world, the living is 'placed' in life; this is where relationship with the other begins. Since 
radical  powerlessness  applies  to  every  living  self,  this  self  cannot  be  the  point  of 
departure for relation with others.  Finding its  origin in  life,  the self  can establish its 
relations with others only in life.  However,  the self can mistakenly take itself for the 
origin of this relation and even of its own life, resulting in the “transcendental illusion of 
the  ego.”  Henry  suggests  that  the  “normal  play  of  intersubjective  relations”  unfolds 
within such a “system of transcendental egoism ... [where] each person is concerned with 
the  other  only  with  a  view  of  himself”  (255).  Against  this  “normal”  situation 
characteristic of modern society, Henry argues that the relation with others can take place 
only in life. 
Such a relation is based on the recognition of the in-common of the living: “[w]hat they 
have in common, in effect, is to be livings, carrying this life in them,” “sharing” in the 
essence of life (2003, 254, 257), in the gift of life. Life is self-givenness insofar as it is 
what gives and what is given; consequently, since it is life that gives, the living beings 
“can only have a  share of this  gift in life. This is what constitutes the essence of every 
possible community. [...] [W]hat is shared in common is not some thing; instead, it is this 
original  givenness  as  self-givenness.  It  is  the  internal  experience  that  brings  to  life 
everything that is and makes what is alive in this very experience become alive in and 
through  it  alone”  (2008,  120;  my  emphasis).  The  essence  of  the  in-common,  of 
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community  is  life:  “every  community  is  a  community  of  living beings”  (119;  my 
emphasis). And every living equally shares in this gift of life, is equally a part of the 
community of life that is original givenness. “Community is  an  a priori” (131). Living 
beings are thrown into life, into the shared experience of living. Among the living there is 
no 'part of no part': every living has an 'equal share' of life inasmuch as it fully coincides 
with it, cannot be separated from life. 
Furthermore,  considering the transcendental  affectivity of  life  and that  every possible 
relation with the other is located in life, it can be inferred that “real being with the other  
occurs in us as an affect” (2008, 115) and not as representation. Each of the members of 
the community is related to the others in life before being related in a world, and since 
life  escapes  thought  and  can  only  be  experienced  as  pure  affectivity,  this  “primal 
experience [of community] is barely conceivable” (133). In the community of life 
the  living  being  is  neither  for  itself  nor  for  the  other;  it  is  only  a  pure 
experience,  without  a  subject,  without  a  horizon,  without  a  meaning,  and 
without an object. It experiences both itself – the basis (fond) of life – and the 
other, inasmuch as the other likewise has this basis. It thus does experience 
the other in itself but on this basis, in terms of the other's own experience of 
this basis. Both the self and the other have a basis in this experience. But 
neither the self nor the other represents it to themselves. The community is a 
subterranean affective layer. Each one drinks the same water from this source 
and  this  wellspring,  which  it  itself  is.  But,  each  one  does  so  without 
knowledge and without distinguishing between the self,  the other,  and the 
basis. (133; my emphasis). 
The  experience of  the  in-common  occurs as  the  pure,  invisible  experience  of  life's 
relentless arrival into itself  and so the arrival of each one into itself.  The essence of 
community as well as life is not something that  is (2008, 133). “Life 'is' not. Rather, it 
occurs and does not cease occurring. This incessant coming of life is its eternal coming 
forth  in  itself,  a  process  without  end,  a  constant  movement”  (Henry  2003,  55;  my 
emphasis).  The  constant  movement  of  life  coincides  with  the  movement  of  the  in-
common, where no living is separated from life's movement of self-revelation. Since life 
is a process without end, the community of life does not have an end, both in the sense of 
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termination and goal. The end of the community of life is life itself. Furthermore, this 
community is unpolitical; this subterranean affective layer never appears as such in the 
visible  world  of  the  'political  game',  neither  as  the  state  nor  as  something  like  the 
movement of 'the political'. The unpolitical community of life is in no way 'pre-political', 
meaning  that  it  tends  toward  eventual  politicization;  life  and  its  community  are 
indifferent to any political expression (i.e., worldly mediation in thought) of its essential 
relationality, even though it always conditions this expression and forms its real content. 
“To those  thoughts  of life, however,  and although they all come from it,  life remains 
indifferent”  (Henry 1993, 10). The pure (unpolitical) experience of life, of community, 
and any (political)  thought  of this  life  and community remain related,  insofar  as  life 
conditions  politics  and  thought,  and  unrelated,  insofar  as  life  remains  essentially 
indifferent  to its  worldly representations (e.g.,  phone of  life  remains  indifferent  to its 
representation in logos). 
The  essence  of  community  is  life,  the  essence  of  community  is  affectivity.  Every 
community is a community of the living beings. Life does not require the human but only 
the  living,  and  the  living  is  not  reducible  to  'man'.  As  a  result,  Henry  argues,  “the 
community is not limited to humans alone. It includes everything that is defined in itself 
by the primal suffering of life and thus by the possibility of suffering. We can suffer with 
everything  that  suffers.  This  pathos-with  is  the  broadest  form  of  every  conceivable 
community” (2008, 133–134; my emphasis). There is one single community of life that 
cannot be known or thought but is intelligible (i.e., available to experience) to others and 
to  oneself  “on  the  basis  of  the  primal  intelligibility  of  pathos”  (134).  This  sort  of 
intelligibility implies  equality of the living (not limited to the human) in their access to 
the single community of life through the primal suffering of life. 
How  does  this  “pathetic  community”  relate  to  the  world?  Henry  argues  that  when, 
“instead of being carried out 'unconsciously' as a pure affect in the immediacy of life, the 
relation between the living occurs through the mediation of the world ... a new dimension 
of experience emerges that must be described in its own terms” (2008, 133). These terms, 
as I suggested above, are political terms. But what kind of politics and on what premises? 
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I believe,  we get a sense of a potential answer to this question in Henry's occasional 
distinction between two kinds of worlds (none of which, importantly, refers to something 
like  the other world in a sense of an  after world):  “the abstract world” and “the real 
world,” “an absolute world” (see, Henry 1973, 291; 2008, 134). While the former is the 
unreal world that excludes life, the world of ekstasis where things are never what they 
are, “the world that does not exist and has put subjectivity out of play” (2008, 134); the 
real world is the cosmos “for which every element – form, color, and so forth – exists 
ultimately as auto-affective” (134). It exists in and through the pathetic community, it 
unfolds on the basis of the immanent movement of life. As a result, when we encounter  
the worldly mediation of the 'unconscious', pure experience of life and community, there 
are two ways we can go about it: we can either affirm the essential opposition between 
life and the world (and eventually fall into a dogmatic dualism), or we can move toward a 
more positive account of a world, the key feature of which relationality is understood not 
on the basis of ekstatic representation but on the basis of life. To paraphrase Henry, it is 
from life,  not from world,  that  we must  begin.  To begin from life  does not  mean to 
exclude the world, it rather calls for a change of perspective. As Simon Jarvis puts it, 
“[w]e do not need to put out our eyes in order to listen to the voice of life; we do not need 
to imagine a dead world in order to protect a living subject” (2009, 374). The world that 
claims its  primacy over life does not know life,  the world that springs from life and 
recognizes its own 'reality' or 'content' in life is a world “without lie” (see, Henry 1973, 
291). We can speak of a different kind of vision here, vision that is auto-affective, that  
always immediately 'knows' itself as a non-vision, which is, however, not just a mere 
negative, mere blindness, but is available to experience. The real world is thus built on 
the assumption that “[i]n seeing, there is always a nonseeing and thus something unseen 
that altogether determines it” (2008, 134). This nonseeing is life. Consequently, in order 
to think the political experience (relationships mediated through the world), and in order 
to avoid the problems of the political correlationism, we must begin with the unpolitical, 
with life. The forgetting of life (through the assumption of the primacy of the world) 
results in “barbarism” that, according to Henry, comes to replace “culture” in modernity 
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(cf. Henry 2012). In a similar way, I will argue, the forgetting of the unpolitical form-of-
life results in total politicization. Let us draw out this parallel in more detail.
The forgetting of life, the forgetting of the unpolitical 
First, we need to note that there is a connection between the 'historical' forgetting of life 
and life as Arch-Forgetting. As I discussed above, life as such, in the first place, is not 
susceptible to being known, to being discovered by reason, thought and its vision; life is 
forgetting.  However,  once  in  modernity  the  scientific  methods  of  knowledge  are 
prioritized, once science becomes the ground of access to truth, this ultimately leads to 
the specifically modern forgetting of life and exclusion of 'real' life from culture, resulting 
in “barbarism.” There are several recurrent themes running throughout Henry's works that 
account for the modern forms of forgetting or “ways of slandering life,” which resemble, 
in a way, the forms of forgetting of the unpolitical (or forms of politicization of life) 
exhibited by the political correlation. The modern forgetting of life can be separated into 
three major approaches that do not, however, represent some pure types but are closely 
interrelated: scientific (prioritization of the objective phenomena and processes, e.g., in 
biology), philosophical (substitution of life for the living being with priority being given 
to the being-in-the-world), and  what I would like to call psychoanalytic (where life is 
rediscovered and lost again; primarily consists in  reduction of life to blind unconscious 
force undermining consciousness). All of these approaches have political implications; as 
a result, we can distinguish between the following corresponding ways of forgetting of 
the  unpolitical  form-of-life:  politicization  of  life  through,  first,  the  'invention'  of 
biopolitics, second, the prioritization of being-in-the-world and thus of being-with, and, 
third,  the  construction  of  the  concept  of  the  political  primarily  as  the  negative 
unconscious of representative politics (i.e., of politics-as-state). 
The inauguration of modern science for Henry is marked by “the Galilean decision” that 
excludes  life  through  the  “mathematization  of  the  universe.”  Science  excludes  the 
sensible qualities (which emerge primarily as pure subjective impressions) that refer to 
life from its field of study and focuses solely on the objects and their visible qualities. As 
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a  result,  “[t]he  Galilean  reduction  ...  leaves  outside  its  field  of  interest  the  decisive 
phenomenological question of knowing whether there exists a mode of revelation other 
than that in which the phenomena of the world give themselves to us”  (2003, 46). In 
short, modern science lays ground for the forgetting of life by giving primacy to the study 
of the phenomena of the world. Such an exclusion of life concerns  biology above all: 
once  phenomenological  life  is  placed  outside  of  the  field  of  study,  it  cannot  be 
rediscovered through research,  even though it  calls  itself  biology,  the science of  life. 
What biology concerns itself with is not life but the objective processes of an organism; 
and once life is reduced to the content of biology, we no longer know anything about it.  
“[T]he infrangible pathētik embrace” of life is reduced to “material particles ... something 
that experiences nothing and is in principle incapable of doing so” (39). Consequently, 
modern science, such as biology, “never encounters life, knows nothing of it, has not the 
slightest idea of it. ... [I]n biology there is no life; there are only algorithms. ... [T]oday, 
despite the marvellous progress of science, or rather because of it, we know less and less 
about life. Or, more exactly, we no longer know anything about it, not even that it exists” 
(38;  original  emphasis).  We live  in  the  age  of  not  mere  forgetting  of  life  but  of  its 
“murder”: depriving life of its essential self-revelation, science is forced to say what it 
really cannot say, it is forced to speak of life when it knows nothing of it. It thus murders 
life by reducing “everything that lives, and experiences itself as living, to a set of blind 
processes [functions like nutrition, mobility, and so on, considered specific to life] and 
death” (39). The reduction of life to objective phenomena implies that it is not really life 
but the living being (or rather an organism separated from its relation with transcendental 
life and thus not exactly 'living') that science studies. In short, confusion of life with a 
living  being means that “what is true of living organisms as objective empirical beings 
appearing in the world ... is attributed without question to life itself” (45).
Foucault marks the inauguration of modern biopolitics by the emergence of biology and, 
further  on,  of  human  sciences.  Considering  that  biology  knows  nothing  of  life, 
biopolitics, which places man's existence as a living being in question, remains only this: 
politics  that never  puts into question or governs life but only the objective processes 
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associated with biological existence of an organism as well as the species. Biopolitics is 
not politics of life but only of “natural” or “biological” life. Since life is never shown in 
the world, absent from it, it is also absent from the field of biology and thus biopolitics,  
which are both worldly ones and which are constituted by the forgetting or murder of life. 
In this sense, biopolitics is always thanatopolitics.  In the forgetting of life, biopolitics 
extends  its  totalizing  embrace,  suggesting  that  politics  has  a  capacity  to  extend 
everywhere, over every 'bit' of life, and thus to divide and separate the latter from itself. A 
strategy of resistance to biopolitics, then, must emerge from 'remembering' life (Henry's 
work, for example, is an attempt at such a 'remembering') and not from the assertion of 
some common objective element across living beings, which would merely recreate the 
very inaugural event of biopolitics – the forgetting of “transcendental” life. Consequently, 
I  see that  an  effective  strategy of  resistance  to  biopolitics  might  be  grounded in  the 
affirmation  of  the  primacy of  the  unpolitical  form-of-life  over  any  form of  politics, 
including biopolitics. Henry's philosophy of life presents an example of such a possibility 
for resistance (in a form of academic thought and practice). 
Philosophical  approach  that  “slanders”  life,  Henry  argues,  “oscillates  between  the 
confusion of the living with a being made manifest through being-in-the-world and the 
definition of the phenomenality proper to the living by attributing to it a ... form of this 
same  being-in-the-world”  (2003,  50).  That  is,  such  an  approach  substitutes  a  being 
manifest in the world for the living or suggests that the only form of manifestation of life 
and  the  living  is  possible  as  being-in-the-world.  We have access  to  life  only in  and 
through the world. Like science, this approach leaves outside the question of an acosmic 
mode of revelation or even negates it; in this way, “the philosophical problematic of life 
resembles the scientific approach more than it might wish” (47). Henry suggests that the 
history of Western thought reaches its “endpoint” in the philosophy of Heidegger, which 
springs from the radical negation of life's essence, of the self-revelation foreign to the 
'outside' of the world, and so “signifies nothing less than the impossibility of any form of 
life, and thus amounts to the murder of life – not accidentally but rather in principle” 
(46). Applied to politics, such thinking contributes to the constitution of modern politics 
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as thanatopolitics, politics built on the “murder” of life. Insofar as access to life is seen to 
be possible only through the world but also in the form of  Dasein (that is essentially 
Mitsein),  we witness a constitution of the ground of a (non-living) community that is 
centred around the principle of being-with in the world. Being is again substituted for 
life, however, in this case the emphasis lies not on the organismic character of this being 
but on its appearance in the world's light: life is essentially only accessible in Dasein. The 
relation between a being and life is thus established only in the world and through the 
world,  and  those  who  do  not  have  a  world  are  not  truly  living.  That  is,  from  this 
perspective, the living “enters  into the condition of living” not thanks to life but “only 
because he is open to the world”; and so their relationship is always mediated by the 
world. As a result, a being does not have an immediate access to life but requires the light 
of the world. “It is only to the extent that a person is open to the world that he is related,  
and can be related, to living beings – to life” (45). Consequently, a gap is introduced 
between the living and life that makes it possible to speculate about the level, degree or 
quality  of  life  within  a  certain  'living'  being.  Access  to  the  world's  horizon  of  light 
becomes the key to the attainment of something like 'qualitative' or 'good' life, or rather 
proper human life in a community (political life), which is the only life that ultimately 
counts.  Reduction of  life's  manifestation  to  being-in-the-world  results  in  its  total  and 
unavoidable politicization where being-with 'commands' over the notion of community. 
Opening up to the truth of life, to “a mode of revelation  other than that in which the 
illumination of the world occurs” presents an opportunity, creates a ground for a positive 
account of a- or non-political forms of life that necessarily find their condition in the 
unpolitical form-of-life, in the essential solitude of life, in its being-without. Moreover, 
even that which does not have a world can be fully living, can be a part of an a priori  
community  of  life.  From  the  perspective  of  transcendental  life,  Aristotle's  classical 
distinction  (that  Heidegger  does  not  overcome)  between humans,  beasts  and gods no 
longer holds; neither does the distinction between zoē, bios and bare life. 
The third  way in  which  the  forgetting  of  life  occurs  in  modern  thought  is  the  same 
approach  that  initially  happens  to  “rediscover”  life  (for  example,  in  the  works  of 
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Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Freud) but that loses it again by, like Descartes, veering 
away from its most significant findings. This strain of thought is similar to the other two 
insofar as it rests on the denial of the specificity of life's mode of revelation. It “makes 
life the metaphysical principle of the universe, but by stripping it of the capacity to reveal 
itself, to experience and live, by stripping it of its essence. Life is only a blind entity, like 
the processes to which Galilean science reduces it”  (2003, 50). This “entity”  is  what 
eventually receives the name of “the unconscious,” defined primarily by its opposition to 
consciousness.  I  will  call  this  approach  'psychoanalytic'  since  the  concept  of  the 
unconscious figures prominently as the inaugural concept of psychoanalysis, even though 
it has a long history before the Freudian institution of psychoanalysis as science.114 The 
major intuition of this approach consists in recognition of the limits of consciousness and 
representation, and the acknowledgement of some 'unconscious' force that is responsible 
for  the  activity  of  the  human  psyche.  Henry  suggests  that  the  'unconscious'  that  is 
discovered by philosophers such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche and later by Freudian 
psychoanalysis is the name of life. What they uncover is in fact a  vital force, a force 
beyond consciousness, i.e., beyond representation in the world. “As a radical refusal of 
ecstatic phenomenality and its claim to define psyche's essence, the unconscious assures 
man of a hold on his most intimate being: the unconscious is the name of life” (1993, 286; 
original emphasis). However, such an affirmation does not go as far as to grant life its 
own mode of appearance: inasmuch as life is alien to representation (and representation is 
still believed to be the only possible mode of manifestation) “it finds itself deprived of the 
power of accomplishing in and through itself the work of revelation – it becomes blind 
and unconscious” (2003, 49; my emphasis). As a result, life claims to define the psyche's 
essence only as blind, as something that secretly moves underneath the surface but never 
shows itself and thus cannot be known; more than that, in the absence of vision it does 
not  even  know  or  experience  itself.  It  is  un-conscious,  the  reverse  of  that  which 
represents, and as such it is “unknown, unknowable, and unknowing, and its mode of 
being is blindness” (1993, 147). Consequently, as, for instance, Schopenhauer and Freud 
114 Henry dedicated a series of lectures to the investigation of this history that was published as  The 
Genealogy of Psychoanalysis (1993). 
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conclude, since the unconscious cannot be experienced as such, in order to unravel its 
mystery, in order for it to be something rather than nothing, it has to be brought to the 
light of consciousness, it has to be represented (never on its own terms but on the terms 
of consciousness). Life is blind because it is defined in the first place from the point of 
view of vision, of representational consciousness. The un-conscious in the end means un-
manifest  in  terms  of  representation,  it  is  un-representable,  it  is  blindness  that,  in  its 
essence,  is  nothing  more  than  mere  absence of  seeing.  The  unconscious  is  thus  by 
definition (negatively) bound to consciousness, it is correlated with consciousness, it is its 
“exact  consequence.”  The  conception  of  life  in  such  a  way,  Henry  suggests,  bears 
important  consequences:  “A blind  and  unconscious  life,  a  life  that  desires  without 
knowing what it desires and without even knowing that it desires, is an absurd life. An 
absurd,  blind,  unconscious  power,  life  can  then  be  charged  with  every  crime.  In  its 
murderous frenzy, entering millions of times into a struggle against itself, it becomes the 
source of all that ravages the universe [...]” (2003, 49). In other words, from the murder 
of life follows the conclusion that life itself is murderous: it is a secret force that kills  
from within, that turns against itself; life is essentially death. 
Contrary to the view of life as negative unconscious, Henry argues that similarly to the 
double  meaning  of  the  concept  of  consciousness,  the  “ontological  concept  of  the 
unconscious” has two different meanings:  “representational  unconscious” that we just 
discussed,  and  “the  unconscious  that  secretly  refers  to  life's  essence,”  i.e.,  “pure 
unconsciousness  as  such”  (1993,  287,  297). The  former  is  nothing  but  the  barred 
consciousness (“the pure and simple negation of phenomenality”), where “the bar placed 
on  phenomenality  concerns  only  representational  phenomenality”;  however,  such  a 
rejection secretly “liberates appearance's original dimension in which being reveals itself 
to  itself  outside  and  independent  of  ek-stasis,  in  the  radical  immanence  of  its  self-
affection  as  life”  (287).  This  concept of  the  unconscious  thus  refers  to  pure 
unconsciousness  as  such,  to  the  experience of  life  as  such  that  in  itself  is  never 
unconscious insofar as affect is never unconscious. The concept of the unconscious that 
secretly  refers  to  life's  essence,  which  itself  is  never  unconscious  (in  a  sense  of  the 
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unrevealed), rather than suggesting the existence of a different kind of the unconscious, I 
argue,  guides  us  toward  the  concept  of  consciousness  defined  as  life.  This  kind  of 
consciousness, of 'conscious' experience of life, excludes representational phenomenality 
which has determined the concept of consciousness for so long, and from this perspective 
can be called pure  unconsciousness as such (it  is  pure because it  is  not mediated by 
representation). Otherwise, as we saw in Descartes, the name of this pure unconscious is 
“consciousness,”  “soul”  or  “life.”  Life,  the  unconsciousness  as  such,  lies  beyond the 
reach of the representational consciousness but is never blind and unconscious since it 
immediately 'knows' and experiences itself. It is an eternal movement of self-revelation 
that desires itself and rejoices in itself. 
Reduction of life  to  blind and unconscious force essentially results  in  murder  of life 
through its ultimate subjection to the power of representation. This unconscious is just the 
limit of consciousness, it is not more than “the horizon of nonpresence” that surrounds 
every worldly presence resulting in “the incessant transformation of one into the other, by 
virtue of which every appearance in the world is also a disappearance” (1993, 286). The 
unconscious,  thus,  freely  transforms  into  consciousness  and  vice  versa;  the  play  of 
correlation is apparent here. Once life is subjected to representation for its manifestation, 
it  becomes  politicized:  that  which  is  essentially  unpolitical  and is  an  a priori to  the 
emergence of any world is deprived of its power to reveal itself except as the obverse or 
the limit of politics that represents. The unpolitical, life-as-such, is manifest as a wound 
of politics-as-state,  a  void,  an  interruption  of the ordered reality.  As I  showed, many 
concepts that intend to signify the excess of politics (such as the political, politics, event, 
etc.) and that could potentially direct us toward the unpolitical, are constructed primarily 
in terms of the negative unconscious of representative politics  (i.e., of politics-as-state). 
Liberation of life's own specific mode of manifestation (the unconscious as such that is 
not correlated to consciousness) presents a possibility for limiting the totalizing ambition 
of the political difference as well as for an effective rethinking of politics beyond the 
state.  Furthermore,  the  thought  of  the unpolitical  allows for  a  positive conception of 
politics that springs from life rather than from a constant redefinition of what politics 
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could or should be in opposition to the state. Ultimately, the reality of the unpolitical 
raises a question for political thought that tends to be self-referential: there is thought 
because there is politics or there is politics because there is thought; alternatively, politics 
is thought or thought is politics. In any case, thought (including political thought) and 
politics that acknowledge their unpolitical 'origin', i.e., life, have a chance (despite life's 
indifference  toward  them)  of  challenging  the  political  correlation  and,  consequently, 
allow for a non-statal conception of politics – something akin to 'living politics'  or 'a  
politics of the living.'115 
So, the continuing forgetting of life characteristic of modernity, as I noted above, tends to 
reduce  life's  movement  to  objective  processes  and  being-in-the-world.  Thus  the  real 
'meaning' of life, i.e., as a movement of self-transformation, as an action and different 
'vision', is often dismissed. As a result, we witness something like a reduction of human 
behaviour to politics, meaning that insofar as the primacy of the world is upheld and 
insofar as “in the world, acting only appears in the form of an external behaviour” (Henry 
2003, 241), life's reality, the reality of the living action, of the unpolitical form-of-life, 
escapes thought's vision. In the end, what remains is “only action's empty shell” devoid of 
its vital content. In this way, the movement of living, an “eternal flux,” “life's internal 
pathetik self-transformation” is reduced to nothing more than a mechanical definition of 
life as movement, an objective displacement in space.116 Henry points out that due to the 
duplicity  of  appearance,  “every  determination  of  the  radically  immanent  force  that 
constitutes  our  own  being  also  presents  itself  to  us,  simultaneous  with  its 
accomplishment,  which  is  our  inner  being,  as  the  appearance  of  an  objective 
displacement in space” (1993, 139). Life and the world, in this case, 'cooperate' by each 
appearing  in  its  own mode.  Once,  however,  life  is  dismissed,  we are  left  only with 
objective  displacement  (or  a  body as  a  mere  object)  that,  in  the  absence  of  its  vital 
115 The latter is Henry's expression. See, for example, his interview Une politique du vivant (2004).
116 Henry calls life's movement of self-transformation “culture” and its impoverishment and a degradation 
“barbarism.” “'Every culture is a culture of life, in the double sense that life constitutes the subject and 
the object of this culture at the same time. It is an action that life exercises on itself and through which  
it transforms itself as it is itself that transforms and that is transformed' ; it is 'the movement through 
which life  does  not  cease to  modify itself  in  order  to  reach the highest  forms of  realisation and  
accomplishment, in order to fulfil itself'” (O’Sullivan 2006, 142).
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foundation, can be manipulated in many ways. For example, movement of a body may be 
defined  in  terms  of  a  political  right  or  a  quality  that  can  be  encouraged,  nurtured, 
sanctioned and suppressed (taken away);  living  may be viewed as  a  set  of  objective 
processes  that  can  be  cared  for  or  terminated  based  on  an  objective  scientific 
determination of the quality of these processes, of the quality of such living; political 
action may be viewed as an action of  ego that  appears to  be self-founding and free, 
resulting in suppression and determination of an 'invisible' action (which is essentially an 
'ethical' action) as unreal, apathetic and indifferent to the concerns of the world and its 
suffering. In the context of the forgetting of life and of total politicization, an attempt at  
'remembering'  life, a turn toward ethics, might be interpreted automatically as turning 
away from the world, as an anti-political project of theology. I argue, with Henry, that 
affirmation of life's invisible essence, however imperfect and impossible this task is, is 
not a rejection of the world but “is the means of access to what is real in that world – to  
the unique reality” (2003, 242). In the words of Karl Hefty, “[t]he phenomenality of life 
provides no way of escape from the world; nor does this phenomenality perform the task 
of 'a formal and empty negation of the world'. [...] On the contrary, Henry sees unfolded, 
at the foundation of the world, 'the horizon of a pure world', not another world, but 'this 
world  without  laceration'  (ce  monde  sans  déchirement),  in  which,  in  his  words,  'is 
inaugurated our vital communication with the Being of nature'” (Hefty 2007, 238–239). 
The “world  without  laceration,”  “the world  without  the  lie,”  “an  absolute  world  [un 
monde absolu]” is a basis for a conception of politics of the living: the relations mediated 
through such a world do not lose the connection with their vital essence.117 
117 I have already mentioned above that there seem to be two notions of world in Henry. While one refers 
to the visible world (resulting in the assertion of life as acosmic), the other – cosmos – is a world of 
life, internal and invisible. “This original, subjective, dynamic, impressionable and pathetic nature,  
this veritable nature whose essence is Life, is the cosmos”  (Henry in Yamagata 1999, 247; original 
emphasis). Henry employs this concept of “the cosmos” in his work on the abstract art of Kandinsky, 
Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky (2009). The real world, the cosmos is not visible but revealed only 
in affect. Henry quotes Kandinsky in this regard: “'The world ... sounds. It is a cosmos of spiritually 
affective beings. Thus, dead matter is living spirit'. This is why painting, for example, is not the figure 
of external things but the expression of their internal reality, their tonality, or what Kandinsky calls 'the 
inner sound', an experience of forces and affects” (2008, 134). Thus, art becomes, for Henry, a unique 
and, perhaps, privileged 'form' of practice that brings life's self-experience to “light” because it always  
springs from life's feeling and not from an object of representation (see, Henry 1993, 269). 
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A renewal of political thought: life and the art of living
I  suggest  that  an  exploration  of  a  positive  relationship  between  the  world  and  life 
constitutes one of the major problems for (renewed) political thought, the thought that, in 
a  way,  engages  life  with  and  after  Michel  Henry.118 An  important  part  of  such  an 
exploration would occur along the line of the relationship between essentially invisible 
life and its visible 'forms', not in terms of another separation between life and its form, 
which is impossible in case of the unpolitical form-of-life, but in terms, for example, of 
the aesthetic expression of the intensity of life's feeling. As I showed above, the invisible 
essence of life conditions and explains the appearance in the world but by no means 
denies this appearance. We find in Henry several suggestions considering the connection 
between  life's  essence  and  its  positive  manifestation  in  and  through  the  world  (see, 
especially,  Henry 1983;  2009).  Even though Henry argues  that,  for  instance,  action's 
visible  form  is  but  an  empty  form  or  shell  of  the  real  action  of  life,  once  life  is 
'remembered', the connection between life and the world, which is always already there 
unconsciously, is reestablished 'consciously': the affectivity of life is no longer rendered a 
blind force. Henry writes: “the more intensely life experiences itself in the pathos of its 
suffering  and joy,  the  more  lively,  the  more  luminous,  the  more  intelligible,  are  the 
images in which it projects itself. This world-truth, affectivity's production and radical 
determination of representation, is brought to light by every form of  art...”  (1993, 269; 
my emphasis). So, invisible and acosmic life is capable to projecting itself in the world 
without  losing itself.  This  raises  an interesting question  for  further  research:  if  art  is 
essentially living art, what does it imply for the art of living, that is, for the visible form 
of living rendered art. Living, from this perspective, is an aesthetic project, a form of art 
that finds its ultimate condition in life. The question of the relationship between invisible 
life and its visible forms, between life's truth and the “lie” of the world can be phrased in 
terms of the return to a problem of “true life,” which for a long time had been a major 
philosophical question but is no longer relevant insofar as science has become the sole 
118 In this regard, Henry writes: “only a mode of thought deliberately opposed to representation, to its 
foundation as well as its forms, the actuality of a praxis, can deliver power from ek-static lighting and 
save its original possibility” (1993, 322).
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legitimate source of access to truth, including the truth of life. Michel Foucault dedicated 
his  last  series of lectures at  the Collège de France  (2011) to the investigation of this 
question of true life or ethical  parrhēsia  (free spokenness, frankness), i.e.,  the way of 
living as an object of care (epimeleia), of “the aesthetics of existence.” Foucault focuses 
on the study of the Cynics' way of living as an example of “true life” understood as “an 
other life” (une vie autre), life that is radically and paradoxically other, striving for “an 
other world” (un monde autre) (244). This way of living (which, in Cynics case, exhibits 
truth of life partially as bareness of life) manifests itself as a constant critique of  this 
world, a world given at any particular time in history. Despite significant differences, we 
can notice here some similarities between Foucault's and Henry's projects, both of which, 
I believe, are dedicated to a search for something like 'true life'  that is defined by its 
relation to “an other” or “an absolute” world. Considering Foucault's later investigation 
of the problem of “true life” in terms of the aesthetics of existence and Henry's assertion 
of art as a 'privileged' way of life's self-projection into the world, it would be interesting 
to further investigate the political potential of life's positive relationship with a world in a 
sense of 'true life' – a visible form of living in which unpolitical form-of-life projects 
itself.  The question of 'true life',  at  the intersection of  Henry's  and Foucault's  works, 
remaining beyond the scope of the current project, opens an avenue for further research 
that would address a possibility of something like 'politics of the living', in terms of both 
collective  and subjective  ethical  experience  of  living  in  the  “world  without  the  lie,” 
without the forgetting of life, which is essentially “an other world.”
For now, in order to prepare a starting ground for a further, more practical, engagement 
with the notion of the unpolitical, let us re-articulate several important points that came 
up in the discussion above. The most important affirmation that I will carry forward in 
thinking of the unpolitical, in the wake of Henry's philosophy, is that life manifests itself 
in the radical reduction (or disappearance) of the world. In other words, in the radical 
reduction of the political  world,  the unpolitical  manifests  itself  as real,  positive,  non-
relational experience of life. Thus, the notion of the unpolitical form-of-life articulates the 
positivity that persists when the world disappears, that is, the positivity of living outside 
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the world of politics and its community. It relocates the experience of sharing into an a 
priori of the unpolitical community of life, where every living has equal share, equal 
access to life, which is given to it as its own essence. In life, there is no 'part of no part'. 
Such a conception of community has important 'ecological' implications: insofar as life is 
not limited to humanity in its manifestation, the community, the sharing of life is not 
limited to human community but embraces everything that “suffers.” In this way, it also 
addresses the problem of correlationism: the emergence of 'man' and his thought is not a 
necessary condition for life's manifestation. Life is 'prior' to man, to being and the world, 
and so it  constitutes their  'great outdoors'  that persists in its positivity even 'after'  the 
emergence of the world. Life is more than the living, thus, life is equally more than man 
understood as living, as a result, we must follow Henry in asserting an a priori of life: it 
is from life, not from the human, that we must begin. This question of where to begin 
becomes very important once we consider such 'practical' issues as living outside of the 
political system of the states. In the absence of a political community, it becomes of the 
utmost importance to assert that life is not a right, not a quality that manifests itself in the 
world, but is an invisible experience of self-affection that is full of itself and rejoices in 
itself even in the most “unhappy” forms of life. To do so means to redeem 'bare life' in a 
positive,  unpolitical  way,  that  allows  it  to  persist  as  such,  without  an  immediate 
incitement to politicization, to salvation through politics (that could have produced its 
apparent misery in the first place).
In the view of these preliminary conclusions, I would like to further consider how my 
conception  of  unpolitical  life  or  form-of-life  can  help  us  redefine  and  rethink  the 
contemporary problematic question of 'life beyond politics', in particular, of the forms of 
living outside the state (or that simply do not fit 'properly' within the system of politics-
as-state), identified, for example, as the conditions of refugeeness and statelessness. I do 
not  endeavour to  redefine these questions  in order  to  find possible  'solutions'  for the 
'problems'  of  the  stateless  and the  refugees,  but  to  present  an  opening to  a  different 
perspective on these 'figures' of modern displacement. Or, rather, to learn from the 'truth' 
that they manifest to us. Refugees, as Agamben rightly suggest, are not just a 'problem' 
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that  emerges after  the World War I;  the 'refugee'  constitutes “the paradigm of a  new 
historical  consciousness.”  The turn to the question of refugees  also follows from my 
critical engagement with the correlationist post-foundational thought over the previous 
chapters. I have outlined and critiqued the recurring tendency of submitting the excess of 
politics  to  re-politicization,  and this  tendency is  clearly exemplified  in  contemporary 
critical refugee studies: the refugee, an 'excess' of politics-as-state, is rendered in terms of 
'the political',  thus,  constantly bringing this figure back into the order of politics that 
produced it.  In other words,  insofar as the refugee stands for the paradigm of a new 
historical consciousness, I will argue that this paradigm has been determined within the 
modern  correlationist  framework.  As  a  result,  an  introduction  of  the  unpolitical 
perspective makes possible an important reversal in the way in which we view the figure 
of  the  refugee:  it  presents  a  possibility of  dismissing the  primacy and totality of  the 
political correlation and its perspective, and offers a positive ground from which we can 
interpret this figure today. 
In more general terms, the question of refugees is taken up below as an attempt at a more 
'practical' application of the notion of the unpolitical form-of-life. I will suggest that the 
figure of the refugee, in its loss of political world, affirms life, the 'remainder' of this loss,  
as sufficient and full of itself regardless of the lack of social and political texture. From 
this  perspective,  something  like  bare  life  is  allowed  to  persist  positively  outside  of 
politics. However, this is not limited to just the extreme cases of expulsion from the state-
system;  life  persists  positively  in  the  living  outside  the  world  under  the  'normal' 
circumstances. As a result, I will look at the refugee as an extreme case that serves as an 
instrument, a kind of magnifying glass that can bring into better focus the unpolitical 
essence of life, which remains blurry and obscured in the 'normal' course of affairs.
3.2. Living Beyond Politics: the Stateless and the Refugee
What would it mean to live beyond politics? What would it mean to be a refugee beyond 
the refugee? In order to address these general questions, I will argue that the refugee 
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appears  in  its  uniqueness  in  the  reduction  of  the  political  world  that  defines  and 
constitutes  this  figure.  Not  only  the  paradigm of  a  new historical  consciousness, the 
refugee  is  a  historically  situated  epitome  of  life's  acosmic  becoming,  i.e.,  of  the 
ahistorical (however, in this case, forced) experience of 'becoming-unpolitical'. Despite 
its historicity and its forced negativity, it gives us a positive insight into what constitutes 
the unpolitical form-of-life. In the first place, for me this figure raises a question of what 
remains when the political world disappears or is taken away. In this way, it begs for a 
positive  account  of  the  remainder  of  the  world,  for  an  unpolitical  account  of  living 
beyond politics. What has been achieved so far in refugee scholarship is primarily based 
on the political assessment of the problem or situation of the refugee. That is, the political 
perspective has been given priority, resulting in such conclusions as that the refugee is 
indicative of the relative or constitutive outside of politics. It is viewed as the “correlative 
other” of the state political system. There is a sense that these approaches only partially 
account for what is going on, relying primarily on a totalizing and correlationist view of 
the  political.  Consequently,  I  will  argue,  first,  that  what  is  lacking  in  contemporary 
refugee scholarship is  a positive account  of the unpolitical,  of living beyond politics, 
which may suggest a way out of the totalizing prescription of the refugee's 'salvation' 
through politics that,  in its forgetting of life,  takes charge of humanity's  being-in-the-
world. Second, following a critical overview of contemporary refugee studies, I will open 
up a discussion of what it would mean to apply an unpolitical perspective to the figure of 
the refugee. (However, the implications of this opening, I believe, are not limited to this 
particular figure.) To be more specific, I will suggest that among the major shifts that this 
perspective allows for are, first,  an affirmation of life not as a human right but as an 
immediate experience available to all the living regardless of their relation to the world, 
and, second, an affirmation of pure, phoronomic movement not as 'resistance' to stasis or, 
again, as a right, but as a projection of life's abundant and incessant movement of self-
revelation, becoming and transformation.
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“Sedentary” versus “nomadic” metaphysics: the tenets of correlation
Today, when one raises the question of the forms of life beyond politics (predominantly 
conceived  in  terms  of  the  territorial  nation-state),  the  mass  displacements  of  people, 
identified, for instance, as refugees and the stateless, are among the first to come to mind.  
And there is a good reason for this: starting with the World War I, unprecedented mass 
displacements as well as the movements of the refugees and the stateless emerge as a 
prominent  'problem'  in  both  the  national  and international  arena.  Never  before  in  its 
history has the state-centred model of the world met a greater challenge. To stand up to it,  
an international refugee regime has been gradually established, the major task of which 
were the definition of these new phenomena, their categorization and management based, 
however, on the premises of the very same system that produced them in the first place. 
The various kinds of displacement and, most  significantly,  the movement of refugees 
have been problematized in terms of the lack, aberration, pathology and anomaly within 
the presumably normal  political  order of the (nation-)state  and citizenship  (cf.  Soguk 
1999, 8, 11).  As Liisa Malkki puts it, in the scholarly and policy discourse on refugees 
“[t]he term 'refugees'  denotes  an objectified,  undifferentiated  mass  that  is  meaningful 
primarily as an aberration of categories and an object of 'therapeutic interventions” (1992, 
34).
Insofar as the state,  with its attributes of bound territory,  sovereignty and population, 
anchors the notion of modern politics, the condition of refugeeness is interpreted as a 
void of politics and as an absence of political subjectivity defined in terms of the state 
citizenship.  Within  conventional  political  and  academic  discourse,  the  figure  of  the 
refugee stands for a problematic excess of being political in terms of belonging to a well-
defined  political  community of  the  state.  The  refugee  is  ontologically  determined  in 
relation to the norm of politics-as-state and is, consequently, represented as a problem 
that needs to be solved, either through repatriation to its original or integration into a new 
political  community.  The  condition  of  the  refugee  is  nothing  but  the  lack  of  state-
belonging. The definition of the refugee in  The United Nations Convention Relating to  
the Status of Refugees is quite representative in this regard. Article 1 of the Convention, 
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as amended by the 1967 Protocol, reads as follows: the refugee is a person “who owing to 
a  well-founded  fear  of  being  persecuted  for  reasons  of  race,  religion,  nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his 
nationality and is  unable  or,  owing to such fear,  is  unwilling  to  avail  himself  of  the 
protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country 
of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such 
fear, is unwilling to return to it” (my emphasis). The refugee is defined in terms of ab-
normality that has to be fixed, put back into place. Since refugees comprise a specific,  
minor  group  in  relation  to  'normal'  communities  of  non-refugees,  their  forced  de-
politicization has to be fixed by similarly forced re-politicization. It appears that politics-
as-state cannot tolerate the existence of that which exceeds it and thus it aims to (often 
violently) re-inscribe this excess. In a nutshell, conventional representation is reduced to 
a view of the refugee as a limited, problematic abject of the normal, all-encompassing 
(i.e., total) system of the nation-states. This view of the refugee as a pathology of the state 
order is exemplary of what Liisa Malkki calls “sedentarist metaphysics” (1992, 31) that is 
arborescent in its structure and which powerfully determines modern thought. 
Contrary to the conventional attitude, there has emerged a trend of thought (to which I 
will further refer as 'critical refugee studies') that reverses the view of displacement: no 
longer  a  sign of  pathology,  the movement of  refugees  is  rendered to  be an essential 
expression of the political as well as of the human condition. As, for example, Agamben 
contends,  'refugee'  is  not  just  a  specific  problem  of  post-World  War  I  international 
politics, but “the paradigm of a new historical consciousness” (Agamben 1995, 114). In 
Arendt's  words,  refugees  and  the  stateless  are  “the  most  symptomatic  group  in 
contemporary politics”  (1951, 276).119 That is,  the figure of the refugee propels us to 
question  and  rethink  the  basic  concepts  of  modern  politics,  and  specifically  to 
problematize the classical identification of political space with the state. In this vein, the 
condition of 'refugeeness'  is pronounced to be the general condition of homelessness, 
estrangement and displacement today. I argue that such a shift in thought occurs primarily 
119 See also Xenos  (1993),  who similarly suggests  that  the refugees  constitute  “the  modern  political 
condition.”
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within the larger framework of political difference, that is, it is indicative of rethinking or, 
rather, the displacement of politics-as-state by the political. As Michael Dillon puts it, 
“the refugee raises  the question of association beyond,  outside,  in the margins,  or  in 
excess of,  established political  sociation,  because the refugee is by definition  asocial, 
apolitical. Being political, or as one might say being of politics, is profoundly at issue 
here, in and through the presence of the refugee” (1999, 117; my emphasis). The refugee, 
then, is one of the prominent figures or manifestations of 'the political' as the principle of 
displacement of 'politics'. As such, it is correlated to politics-as-state. Furthermore, due to 
the totalizing ambition of the political, the existing scholarly approaches to the question 
of the refugee lack a positive unpolitical account of this figure.
Critical refugee studies, as an instance of thought of the political difference, challenge the 
traditional definition of politics by affirming the primacy of mobility and difference: that 
is,  by acknowledging the ongoing disruption of politics by the irreducible  difference, 
otherness, plurality and mobility that inhabits political spaces and 'defines' (as much as a 
definition is possible in this case) what it means to be human. What is suggested in the 
end is that such recognition of difference as such calls for rethinking of politics in terms 
of hospitality to this  difference  (cf.  Dillon 1999;  Kristeva 1991; Nyers 2006; Warner 
1992). The affirmation of  the constitutive role  of  otherness and strangeness  within is 
presumed to result in acceptance of a stranger from  without. We can distinguish three 
major aspects that mark the paradigm shift in relation to the figure of the refugee. First, a 
“sedentary metaphysics” is displaced by something like a “nomadic metaphysics”  (cf. 
Cresswell 2006, 26), where movement, flow and displacement play the defining role.120 
Second, identity is rethought in terms of difference, otherness, resulting in the affirmation 
of the human condition as defined by an innate split or strangeness – we are all refugees, 
strangers  to  ourselves.121 Third,  the refugee is  viewed as an exception or  “correlative 
other”  of  political  space  of  the  state  and  sovereignty122 and,  employing  Agamben's 
120 See, for instance, Bauman (2000), Braidotti (1994), Cresswell (2006), De Certeau (2011), Deleuze and 
Guatarri  (1987), Glissant  (1997), Malkki  (1992; 1995), Nyers  (2006), Said  (1994), Shields  (1997), 
Virilio (2007).
121 See, for instance, Agamben (1995), Arendt (1996), Connolly (1988), Dillon (1999), Kristeva (1991), 
Nyers (2006), Warner (1992).
122 See, for instance, Dillon (1999), Isin (2002), Lui (2004), Malkki (2002), Nyers (2006), Soguk (1999).
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analysis, as a homo sacer.123 In all three aspects the clear-cut distinction between refugees 
and non-refugees (i.e., citizens) is challenged, blurred and even proclaimed non-existent: 
we are all  strangers,  refugees and  homines sacri.  As in the case of post-foundational 
political  thought,  what  once  was  viewed  as  non-political  (e.g.,  the  state  of  nature, 
difference,  conflict,  etc)  is  'placed'  at  the  heart  of  politics  'proper'.  The  condition  of 
refugeeness that,  in its  conventional  representations,  is  suggestive of the condition of 
“savages” or a state of nature124 (cf. Arendt 1951, 300) and is rendered as life “desperately 
simple,  and empty”  (UNHCR in Soguk 1999, 8),  is  re-interpreted,  within a 'nomadic 
framework', as the core of politics, as a manifestation of being political in modernity. No 
longer  viewed  as  a  pathology,  in  many  recent  studies  displacement,  movement  or 
nomadism have been reinterpreted in positive terms and even 'nominated' as a kind of 
virtue and a subversive and creative practice.125 However, what we see in the case of the 
political, as well as the refugee as its manifestation, is the provocation of politics-as-state 
from the 'outside' by the excess of an  already established  political way of being. The 
excess of politics functions as a conceptual tool for the renewal of politics: the figure of 
the refugee supposedly leads politics to its 'authenticity'.  In a nutshell,  the renewal of 
politics  and  its  categories  happens  through  politicization  (i.e.,  re-inscription)  of  its 
outside. As a result, the excess of politics is but a relative outside, the apolitical figure of 
the  refugee  is  but  an  instrument  of  thought  for  the  sake  of  rethinking  politics. 
123 See, for instance, Agamben (1998), Arendt (1951), Biswas and Nair (2010), Bousfield (2005), Decha 
(2010), Diken (2004), Malkki (2002), Nair (2010), Rajaram and Grundy-Warr (2004).
124 The refugees are not unique in such representations. The unpolitical groups that emerged before the 
advent of the refugees in the 20th century were often allotted a status of savages in the state of nature. 
For example, when pirating proliferated in the 18th century, it was described in terms reminiscent of 
Hobbes' state of nature. As William Blackstone puts it in his Commentaries on the Laws of England 
(London: 1769):  “the crime of  piracy, or robbery and depredation upon the high seas, is an offence 
against  the universal law of society;  a pirate being, according to sir Edward Coke,  hostis humani  
generis  [the common enemy against all mankind]. As therefore he has renounced all the benefits of 
society and government, and has reduced himself afresh to the same state of nature, by declaring war 
against all mankind, all mankind must declare war against him: so that every community hath a right,  
by the rule of self-defence, to inflict that punishment upon him, which every individual would in a 
state of nature have been otherwise entitled to do, for any invasion of his person or personal property” 
(in Turley 1999, 28).
125 For example, as Steven Best and Douglas Kellner put it, “[n]omad life is an experiment in creativity 
and  becoming,  and  is  anti-traditional  and  anti-conformist  in  character.  The  postmodern  nomad 
attempts to free itself of all roots, bonds and identities, and thereby resist the state and all normalizing 
powers” (Best and Kellner in Cresswell 2006, 50).
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Refugeeness is affirmed only as “a scandal for politics” (Dillon 1999, 95; my emphasis). 
In view of this, it is my suggestion that recent scholarly efforts to think the movement, 
life and politics of forces migrants, including the refugees, is correlationist in the similar 
way as I see this dynamic at work amongst post-foundationalist thinkers, resulting in the 
closing off of a view of the unpolitical.
In what comes below I do not intend to deny the value of critical refugee studies, since 
they make an important contribution in rethinking refugees beyond lack, anomaly or the 
state of exception. What is at stake here is a critical examination of the figure of the 
refugee  in  contemporary scholarship  from the  perspective  of  the  unpolitical.  That  is, 
insofar as the unpolitical as such is not acknowledged, political thought will tend toward 
totalization  due  to  its  correlational  character.  Affirmations  of  something  like  pure 
movement and nomadism remain (despite their important insights) totalizing, insofar as 
'everything  is  in  motion'  and  'we  are  all  refugees'.  However,  such  radical  assertions 
appear to function primarily as provocations of the state order and not as such, as a result, 
they do not really go beyond the state but merely displace its primacy. As Soguk writes, 
“[i]t seems that to theorize away the sovereign state does not automatically make it go 
away”  (1999, 47).126 Despite the challenges, the task of statecraft is carried on. I will 
show that the theoretical challenges to the state, such as in critical refugee studies (which 
tend to re-inscribe the figure of the refugee as the figure of the political and do not assert 
an outside of politics as such), themselves participate in the modern project of statecraft; 
they do not escape the tenets of correlation.127 As a result, these failures of contemporary 
126 As Kam Shapiro similarly suggests, polemical affirmation of “contingency, excess, or disruption ... at 
the heart of a politics of reason or identity does not suffice to dissolve the power of the latter” (2003, 
9).
127 In addition, there exists a number of other critiques of 'nomadism' today. The most common of them 
incorporate an anti-capitalist perspective and address the fact that mobility should not be considered as 
abstract and unspecified, as “a kind of blank space that stands as an alternative to place, boundedness, 
foundations, and stability” (Cresswell 2006, 2). Nomads, literal or allegorical, are not absolutely 'free', 
they are “overdetermined” by the  conditions of  their  existence:  “[r]ather  than the employment  of 
freedom, is nomadism not a form of obedience to contingencies that are restrictive?” (Glissant 1997, 
12). It is a mistake to literally project ontology onto displacement in space: even if becoming (rather  
than being) is the 'source' of identity, this does not automatically mean that we all are unrestrained in 
our mobility. As Janet Wolff writes, “the problems with terms like 'nomad', 'maps' and 'travel' is that  
they are not usually located,  and hence (and purposely)  they suggest  ungrounded and unbounded 
movement – since the whole point is to resist selves/viewers/subjects. But the consequent suggestion 
of free and equal mobility is itself a deception, since we don’t all have the same access to the road” (in 
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scholarship beg for a different, unpolitical perspective to adequately respond to the basic 
observations that motivated them in the first place. 
What does it really mean to say that the refugee is a manifestation of the (transgressive 
and rebellious) primacy of the political over the state, while the figure of the refugee 
itself is but a product of the state system? Does such an inversion of hierarchy do away 
with the ultimate attachment to or correlation of the refugee and the political with the 
state? I suggest that it does not. I agree with Edouard Glissant when he writes that many 
authors 
extol nomadism, which supposedly liberates Being, in contrast, perhaps, to a 
settled way of life, with its law based upon the intolerant root. Already Kant, 
at the beginning of  Critique of Pure Reason,  had seen similarities between 
sceptics and nomads, remarking also that, from time to time, 'they break the 
social  bond'.  He seems thus  to  establish correlations  between,  on the one 
hand, a settled way of life, truth, and society and, on the other, nomadism, 
scepticism, and anarchy. This parallel with Kant suggests that the rhizome 
concept [and similarly many other concepts, including 'the refugee'] appears 
interesting for its  anticonformism, but one cannot infer from this that it  is 
subversive or that rhizomatic thought has the capacity to overturn the order of 
the  world  –  because,  by  so  doing,  one  reverts  to  ideological  claims 
presumably challenged by this thought” (1997, 11–12).
Cresswell 2006, 54; my emphasis). The capacity for mobility is affected by history, economy, gender, 
class, geography, and so on. Moreover, it is not always freedom of movement per se that is at stake, 
but the right to settlement or residence, the right to stop on the road, the absence of which might make 
this  freedom  itself  meaningless  (cf.  Arendt  1951,  296).  A great  deal  of  criticism  is  directed  at 
nomadism  from  an  anti-capitalist  perspective  which  takes  into  consideration  the  economic  and 
historical determination of flows. What is often noted is that unrestricted mobility is specific to the  
globalization landscape which is “subservient to the absolute mobility of capital (think transit villages, 
global  hotel  chains,  networked financial  institutions,  widespread commuter  infrastructure,  city-like 
airports  and  the  aerotropolis,  outsourced  factories,  etc.),  [while]  the  nomadic  landscape  of  the 
developing world is becoming all the more stationary and enclosed” (Finoki 2008, 73; my emphasis). 
So, flow today defines movement of commodities, raw materials, technologies, ideas, and capital in a 
globalizing world, and in much lesser degree it describes human movement, be it identified as labour, 
the refugees or the stateless  (see, Malkki 2002, 353–354). As Bryan Finoki argues, the mobility of 
populations  is  rounded  up  and  detained  within  a  “nomadic  fortress”  –  “a  mammoth  informal  
hydrology of  migration control  ...  [that  conducts]  the flows and currents of global  nomads into a 
turbulent system of dehumanizing channels and estuaries that extend all over the world” (2008, 74). 
Slavoj Žižek, in  Bodies Without Organs,  presents a similar critique in his engagement with Deleuze 
and  Guattari's  nomadology.  The  bottom  line  is  that,  according  to  Robert  Sinnerbrink,  Deleuzian 
nomadology  for  Žižek  is  “an  ideological  reflection  of  today’s  ‘digital’ capitalism”:  “[f]ar  from 
presenting a marginalised or resistant mode of subjectivity, Deleuzian dissolved nomadic subjectivity 
presents a neat ideological fit with the deterritorialised fluxes of global capitalism” (2006, 78).
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I argue  that the refugee, as a figure of the outside of politics, is re-inscribed into the 
political  order  negatively,  as  an  ever-present  and  even  constitutive  interruption  or 
rupture128 of the political ordering, i.e.,  the state. Refugeeness, as a general condition, 
remains  necessarily tied to the initial  limitation of politics in  terms of  the state.  The 
refugee emerges within the international system dominated by states as an abject of this 
system: those who do not or cannot remain within their own states are left somewhere in-
between. So, refugeeness is initially called into being by the state. Within contemporary 
studies, however, this very condition is turned into a general condition of humanity, and 
displacement  becomes  a  defining  characteristic  of  the  political  space.  But  insofar  as 
displacement implies emplacement (cf. Malkki 2002, 353), how is this different from the 
Aristotelian definition of man as a polis-being (zoon politikon)? What we get is rather a 
re-definition of the human in terms of a being that in its essence resists stasis or, to be 
more precise, of  a being that resists the state  (but in no way resists its own political 
nature). In the end, it is still politics-as-state that anchors the critical notion, as well as the 
presumably transgressive nature, of the political and the refugee. The refugee is presented 
as the paradigm of a new historical consciousness, in which we are all refugees, however, 
this perspective illuminates but at the same time obscures the fact that the refugee is an 
issue at all because of the world-system of states. Refugeeness is seen as subversive of 
state order and as such the refugee appears primarily as a reactive figure. If the state did 
not anchor the notion of modern politics, the refugee would not have become a marginal, 
subversive figure and a figure of difference. As a result, the refugee as a transgressive 
figure  is  determined by its  opposition  to  that  which produced it;  if  it  is  an event  of 
difference at all, it is only a difference from, the relative outside that without failure faces 
the inside and never appears as such. A similar critique applies to the interpretation of the 
refugee  as  homo  sacer, which  reduces  the  unpolitical  and  non-statist  figure  to  the 
originary exception that constitutes politics; as a result, the outside of politics is merely a 
(cor)relative outside.  The refugee,  from this  perspective,  remains a negative figure of 
128 In Michael Dillon's words, it is “a rupture” indicative of “the dramatic, and dramatically disruptive, 
ontopolitical valence of the refugee” (1999, 118; my emphasis).
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politics,  not  more  than  its  “correlative  other,”  even  if  this  other  happens  to  possess 
agency.
Another aspect of refugeeness as an affirmation of the difference or 'relative outside' of 
politics is based, as I noted above, on the recognition of the constitutive role of difference 
for human ontology. This argument relies on the recognition of what Dillon (1999, 115) 
calls  the  “onto-alienness  of  human  being”:  the  constitutive  role  of  estrangement, 
irreducible  otherness  or  difference,  essential  homelessness  and  the  limits  of  self-
knowledge.  William  Connolly's  (1988) reading  of  Nietzsche  on  the  limits  of  self-
knowledge and homesickness  in  modernity serves  as  a  point  of  departure  for  Daniel 
Warner's radical affirmation that the very distinction between “the universal condition” or 
the basic norm (the community of non-refugees) and “the plight of refugees” diminishes 
as we see “the important ways in which we are all refugees” (1992, 367; my emphasis). 
Connolly examines the modern condition of “homesickness” through Nietzsche's works 
and  suggests  that  since  'the  death  of  God'  (or  since  the  Enlightenment,  when  man 
institutes  himself  as  both  the  guarantor  and a  'recipient'  of  knowledge  and  rights, 
including so-called inalienable rights  (cf.  Arendt 1951)) man has lost  a possibility of 
finding 'home' or 'roots' in this world. Worldly estrangement or “uprootedness,” to use 
Simone Weil's term, characterize the modern human condition. Homesickness, which is 
essentially an urge to find a home and be at home with oneself, cannot be fulfilled despite 
the desperate desire to do so; however, it can transform into an 'illness' that expresses 
itself in a wish to expunge all otherness and difference from what is viewed as home and 
self. So, according to Connolly's exegesis of Nietzsche, the modern search for home and 
community  “may  be  a  nostalgic  search  that  has  no  solution,”  the  “drive  for 
integration/self-knowledge can never be fulfilled, either by remaining in or returning to a 
specific place, or in some individual search for self-knowledge” (Warner 1992, 370). In 
the works of Nietzsche we see the recognition of the 'shadow' side of the human identity:  
it is split from within, separated and different from itself, always in excess of what is 
available  to  consciousness,  knowledge  and  understanding.  “So  we  are  necessarily  
strangers  to  ourselves,  we  do  not  comprehend  ourselves,  we  have  to  misunderstand 
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ourselves, for us the law, 'Each is furthest from himself' applies to all eternity – we are 
not 'men of knowledge' with respect to ourselves'” (Nietzsche in Warner 1992, 370). In 
more general terms, the inauguration of modernity is marked by the acknowledgement of 
an unconscious principle that interrupts and often disrupts ordered, conscious reality. As a 
result,  since  (self-)knowledge  is  viewed  as  necessarily  limited,  the  unknown,  the 
unthought  part  of  identity  and  self  are  presumed  to  remain  alien,  strange  and  even 
uncanny (cf. Kristeva 1991). Consequently, since the stranger inhabits the self, since we 
are all strangers to ourselves, the identity of the refugee, insofar as he is human, can no 
longer be presumed to be different from the identity of those who did not experience 
some sort of exile or displacement. Their legal definition and status can remain distinct 
but their condition as humans is the same: to be human means to be impregnated with 
disjuncture, strangeness and difference. 
What this account brings to the fore is the fact that insofar as constitutive difference is 
viewed as the limit of consciousness, knowledge and understanding, it is presumed to be 
essentially unknowable, that is, not available to experience. As a result, human being is 
defined in terms of this unbreachable inner gap and strangeness to itself. First of all, even 
if we accept this argument, it remains unclear how recognition of the unconscious and 
uncanny  strangeness  within  may  result  in  the  outward  hospitality.  As  Rudi  Visker 
suggests,  uncanniness,  as  presented,  for  instance,  in  Kristeva's  work,  receives  “a 
homeopathic  function:  difference  in  us  becomes  a  precondition  for  us  living  with 
difference outside of us” (2005, 428). However, such an argument is very puzzling since 
it  remains  unclear  how  “Freud's  uncanniness”  has  undergone  such  a  drastic 
transformation and has “become surprisingly 'canny', 'comfortable', almost homey.” Such 
transformation,  Visker  argues,  cannot  be  the  work  of  the  individual's  own doing but 
requires  an  intervention  of  politics,  an  imposition  of  a  matrix  for  regulating  human 
behaviour; as a result, the 'problem' of foreigner calls not for an ontological analysis but 
for a change in “the way in which we have arranged our societies” (2005, 439).
Furthermore, I propose, based on the engagement with Michel Henry's work, that the 
affirmation  of  innate  strangeness  and homelessness  is  but  an affirmation  of  a gap  or 
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separation between life and the living. In other words, saying that 'we are all refugees' or 
'strangers to ourselves' effectively amounts to the forgetting of the unpolitical as such, 
i.e., of life. If the living find their foundation in life and are never separated from it, “how 
can one claim,” Henry asks, “that 'each is furthest from himself?” (1993, 249). Pondering 
upon this Nietzschean proclamation, he reaches a different conclusion than, for example, 
William  Connolly.  What  we  see  here  is  indeed  Nietzsche's  radical  mistrust  in  the 
possibility of self-knowledge,  that  is,  a  denial  of possibility of access  to  life  through 
knowledge. However, this does not mean that the unthought – what remains beyond the 
access of knowledge – is ultimately 'unknown'. Rather, as I discussed earlier, it is 'known' 
differently: 'knowledge' of the excess of consciousness is immediate, it is a feeling of life. 
So, the fact that we might not understand ourselves fully, or know ourselves, must not 
necessarily lead to a conclusion that we are all refugees, alienated from ourselves and 
strangers  to  ourselves  or  split  from within,  it  merely points  to  the limits  of  thought, 
knowledge and understanding. And that which is beyond thought is not necessarily alien 
to what we are, to the living experience of life. The alien that inhabits the human, then, is 
not altogether strange since it is available to experience through a mode of manifestation 
other than that of the world. Each one may become a stranger to himself, “to take himself 
for other than what he is” (1993, 249), as a result of the forgetting of life and consequent 
attribution of primacy to the worldly manifestation, to being-in-the-world, that reduces 
one's life to an object with properties and even some rights. Once human being is defined 
through the strangeness and separation from himself, he ceases to be a living or, rather, he 
no longer finds his 'origin' in life since this life, as strangeness that cannot be understood, 
remains beyond his reach, beyond the experience of the living. As a result, a living must 
look  elsewhere  (in  various  add-on  qualities)  for  its  essence  and  its  worth  or  even 
validation for being alive. The living, that believes itself to be separated from life, tries to 
find its refuge in worldly belonging, for instance, to 'humanity' that is viewed as political 
by  nature  and  that  is  endowed  with  rights,  which  are  guaranteed  by the  very  same 
humanity and its politics. Consequently, an expulsion from the polis “becomes identical 
with expulsion from humanity altogether”  (Arendt 1951, 296). This becomes possible 
only when being alive no longer qualifies as enough for being considered human or rather 
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for being an equal member of community. Thus, Arendt proclaims, we are not born equal 
but  attain  equality through politics  (1951,  300).  In  this  situation,  that  which  remains 
beyond politics has no other hope of becoming an equal member of a community than 
through politicization.
“Life” of the refugee: an unpolitical perspective
I maintain that which is lacking here is a positive account of the unpolitical, of  living 
beyond politics, which may suggest a way out of the totalizing prescription of 'salvation' 
through politics that,  in its forgetting of life,  takes charge of humanity's  being-in-the-
world. Let us read a passage from Arendt concerning the stateless: 
The more highly developed a civilization, the more accomplished the world it 
has produced, the more at  home men feel within the human artifice – the 
more they will resent everything they have not produced, everything that is 
merely and mysteriously given them. The human being who has lost his place 
in  a  community,  his  political  status  [...]  is  left  with those qualities  which 
usually can become articulate  only in  the  sphere of  private  life  and must 
remain unqualified, mere existence in all matters of public concern. This mere 
existence, that is, all that which is  mysteriously given us by birth and which 
includes  the  shape  of  our  bodies  and  the  talents  of  our  minds,  can  be 
adequately dealt  with only by the unpredictable  hazards  of  friendship and 
sympathy, or by the great and and incalculable grace of love, which says with 
Augustine, “Volo ut sis  (I want you to be),” without being able to give any 
particular  reason  for  such  supreme  and  unsurpassable  affirmation.  (1951, 
300–301; my emphasis) 
What  we  see  here  is  an  outline  of  a  distinction  between  political  being  and  its 
“remainder,” between “the human artifice” and that which is “merely and mysteriously 
given.” This distinction, Arendt argues, becomes apparent in the refugee who, because he 
has nothing else to fall  back upon except  for his  “natural  givenness,”  exhibits  naked 
humanity. I suggest that what Arendt actually points at here is closer to 'bare' life or, 
rather, the life  as such. The refugees, the stateless, those people who lost their political 
status, “to whom the rules of the world around them had ceased to apply,” who suffered 
“the loss of the entire social texture” that provides material for establishing “a distinct 
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place in the  world” exhibit not bare  humanity but  life as such, what Arendt calls “the 
mysteriously given,” “mere existence” or “the dark background of mere givenness.” Once 
the world no longer 'claims' these peoples'  existence, once they seem to belong to no 
community whatsoever, the only 'thing' that remains is their life (even if for a very short 
time). No wonder that this 'remainder' of the world can be adequately dealt with only 
affectively, as Arendt notes, by friendship, sympathy and love, and in no way politically 
(in Arendt's terms, it remains unqualified in all matters of public concern). In sum,  the 
figure of the refugee suggests to us how in the reduction of the world life manifests itself  
in its acosmic affectivity. The emphasis thus falls not on the nomadic aspect of being-in-
the-world, of which the refugee as a moving and displaced body is a paradigm, not on the 
affirmation of the political as the condition of possibility of relationality in general, but 
on the positive affirmation of life outside the world that the figure of the refugee opens up 
in  its  loss  of  worldliness.  In  other  words,  the  figure  of  the  refugee  appears  in  its 
uniqueness in the reduction of the political world, which initially defines and constitutes 
this figure. Not only  the paradigm of a new historical consciousness, the refugee is a 
historically situated epitome of life's acosmic becoming, i.e., of the ahistorical experience 
of 'becoming-unpolitical'. Despite its historicity and its forced negativity, the figure of the 
refugee gives us this positive insight into what constitutes the unpolitical form-of-life, of 
living beyond politics. 
It is not only the question of mobility (however important it is) that we need to address 
and rethink as we approach the complexity of the condition of refugeeness; what we can 
discern in the flight and plight of the refugees is an illumination of a different kind of 
relationality that remains when political relations, connections and attachments dissipate. 
Arendt  argues  that  for  the  stateless  the  loss  of  political  status,  of  a  polity,  becomes 
“identical with expulsion from humanity” and from any possible community (1951, 296). 
However, insofar as humanity is a political product, defined by the added qualities of 
what  it  means  to  be  human  and  not  just  merely  living  or  existing,  expulsion  from 
humanity is, in a way, an 'experiment' in the radical reduction of the world through which 
life's  own  mode  of  manifestation  is  'discovered'.  Once  the  primacy  of  worldly, 
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specifically  political,  relationality  and belonging  is  challenged,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
stateless and the refugees, another kind of relation comes forth – life's relation to the 
living and relation between the living. Being expelled from humanity and any political 
community  does  not  result  in  the  expulsion  from life  that  holds  every  living  in  its 
embrace. Living does  not  begin  and does  not  cease  with  politics. The 'remainder'  of 
political being is a “subterranean affective layer” of the community of life, of pathos-
with, which is not able, as Arendt rightly points out, to give any particular reason for its 
“supreme  and  unsurpassable  affirmation”  of  itself.  This  inability  is  not  due  to  the 
essential impotence of life; rather, it is an inability defined as such from the perspective 
of reason and argumentation, from the perspective of that which gives understanding in 
thought. The experience of life is not mediated by worldly knowledge but is immediate 
self-affection of the living; as a result,  life affirms itself and its affective relationality 
without being able to give a  reason for this self-affirmation in terms of the world and 
politics. 
Arendt  seems  to  conclude  that,  stripped  from  all  her  qualities  (e.g.,  citizenship, 
profession, opinion, identity, etc) and “deprived of expression within and action upon a 
common world,” “a human being in general,”  who is now marked only by her “unique 
individuality” or the mysteriously given, “loses all significance” (1951, 302). This loss is 
obviously relative to the primacy of political organization of living: since validation of 
the quality of existence is  determined in terms of the belonging to a common world, 
however defined, whatever defies the logic of validation (i.e., the presentation of specific 
reasons) is rendered, in the best case, irrelevant. Thus life, which does not present any 
reasons  for  its  self-affirmation,  becomes  irrelevant:  the  figure  of  the  refugee  makes 
apparent the modern forgetting of life.129 That is why, I believe, Arendt calls affective 
relations (friendship, sympathy and love), which can adequately address the refugee as a 
living  being,  “unpredictable  hazards”:  they defy the  logic  of  validation,  do  not  obey 
reasons and arguments,  and endanger the stability and primacy of political  existence. 
129 We can argue that when Arendt writes that “we actually live in a world in which human beings as such 
have ceased to exist for quite a while” (1996, 118), she actually comments on the modern forgetting of 
life, since, as I argued above, human beings as such are nothing other than the living.
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From the perspective of  the world,  affirmation of life  as  such is  a  hazard because it 
requires a shift of perspective from the primacy of the political, the world and the human, 
to the unpolitical unity of life and the living that, ultimately, seems to challenge the value 
of political action and community. 
This  results  in  the  “suspicion”  of  the  unpolitical,  “a  deep  resentment  against  the 
disturbing miracle”  of  life  (cf.  Arendt  1951).130 As Michel  Henry suggests,  since  the 
Greeks the human has been defined as more than just the living: the living aspect of the 
human is  relocated onto something identified as 'mere existence'  that  is  not  rendered 
enough for being qualified as fully human. What is 'mysteriously given' and of which 
politics cannot get a hold is partially 'tamed' by being included through exclusion, by 
being assigned a place in the polis, even if a negative one. In Arendt's words, “[t]he dark 
background of mere givenness, the background formed by our unchangeable and unique 
nature, breaks into the political scene as the alien” (1951, 300; my emphasis). However, 
life  is  “the  alien”  of  politics  only from the  perspective  of  politics;  insofar  as  life  is 
affirmed as an a priori of the world and as capable of self-manifestation, it is no longer 
the  alien  and no longer  the  dark background that  can  be  subsequently charged with 
various atrocities.131 Suspicion of the unpolitical and its effective elimination through the 
installation of the primacy of the political  is  at  the core of modernity.  The totalizing 
tendency of the political rests on the forgetting of its radical 'outside' – life-as-such – that 
ultimately amounts to the “murder” of life. The empirical and theoretical treatment of the 
figure of the refugee illuminates the tendency toward constant re-politicization of the 
excess of politics, but at the same time presents an opportunity for an affirmation of life-
as-such. The refugee is not primarily a figure of the political displacement of politics, of 
the mobile principle inherent to politics, or of difference and onto-alienness constitutive 
of the human condition.  The refugee,  I argue, is primarily an exhibition of the living 
aspect of the human, of the primacy of life's self-affection and self-affirmation that does 
130 “Since the Greeks, we have known that highly developed political life breads a deep-rooted suspicion 
of this private sphere, a deep resentment against the disturbing miracle contained in the fact that each 
of us is made as he is – single, unique, unchangeable” (Arendt 1951, 300).
131 As,  for  example,  Arendt  suggests  that  the  “alien” is  a  frightening symbol  which “indicates  those 
realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and in which, therefore, he has a distinct tendency 
to destroy” (1951, 300; my emphasis).
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not disappear together with political relationality, community, or being-in-the-world. The 
civilization  that  succeeds  in  the  elimination  of  unpolitical  life  or  in  its  subjection  to 
politics may end, as Arendt rightly suggests, “in complete petrifaction and be punished, 
so to speak, for having forgotten that man is only the master, not the creator of the world” 
(1951, 302). This “punishment” might appear in the form of the humanity's self-produced 
slaughter of the living (including ecological destruction), the murder of that which cannot 
present  a  reason for its  being except  for holding onto the mysteriously given,  which 
cannot explain and speak its truth except for simply living it “as such, in mystery” (Henry 
1973, 18). 
We need not fail to recognize that the figure of the refugee calls for the affirmation of life  
as such and not for a (re-)politicization of the 'beyond' of politics-as-state that this figure 
so clearly demonstrates.  The unpolitical,  life-as-such,  loses significance insofar as we 
recognize politics, a common world, as the only source of such significance. Once the 
priority of politics is taken for granted, this leads to a conclusion (like Arendt's) that the 
mystery of life is not 'functional' in itself, that 'mere existence' (being no more than a 
living) is insufficient. But is not the assumption of such an insufficiency itself a product 
of  politics  and  its  totalizing  tendency?  Just  as  the  camp,  or  a  pitiful,  impoverished 
condition of the contemporary refugee (labelled as  the condition of bare life, of life as 
such) is viewed as undesirable; but is it  not in its essence just a political product, an 
outcome of  the  modern  project  of  statecraft?  If  it  were  possible  to  live  unpolitically 
without being confined to a camp or to poverty, if politics did not appear as the only 
means  of  'salvation'  and  happiness,  how  many,  I  wonder,  would  chose  differently? 
Consequently, I contend that even in the face of the empirical pressures and demands of 
state politics as well as the stateless, we need not further proclaim the necessity of re-
politicization of the 'mere existence', excepted 'bare' life, but, perhaps, we need to push 
forward, to take the thought of unpolitical life to the limit, so as to proclaim and affirm 
something like “the real state of exception.” 
Affirmation through the figure of the refugee of the unpolitical,  of life-as-such is  an 
affirmation of the universal (but not cosmopolitan) community of life, in which (and not 
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in humanity and the political) the living 'grounds' itself. The refugee 'beyond' the refugee 
points to a positive experience of living in the absence of the world, in the removal of the 
world. An account of the unpolitical forms of life from this perspective rests not on a 
reaction to or correlation with politics, state and sedentarism, but on an affirmation of the 
forms of  living that originate in the unpolitical as such, in life. An unpolitical project, 
thus, establishes universality not on the basis of onto-political difference but on the basis 
of life. While a correlationist project of political difference lies in, to use Dillon's words, 
giving  an  “extremely  positive  validation”  of  worldliness  as  “a  certain  modality  of 
alienation” and estrangement “inscribed at the heart of one's existence”  (1999, 115), an 
unpolitical project consists in exploration of the a priori and the 'remainder' of the world 
(of what 'remains' when the rules of the world no longer apply), and in their positive 
'validation'. The refugee, in the first case, is a figure of universal strangeness, while from 
the unpolitical perspective the refugee is a figure of  living beyond politics that can be 
'known' only affectively,  in, for instance, relations of friendship and love that are not 
subjected to politics but remain unpolitical.132 In sum, the figure of the refugee, in the 
reduction of its political world, affirms life not as a human right,  nor as a quality that 
manifests itself in the world, but as an immediate experience of self-affection (that is full 
of itself and rejoices in itself) available to all the living regardless of their relation to the 
world.  This affirmation, in a way, allows something like “bare life” to persist as such 
positively and unpolitically, without the necessity of politicization. 
132 We can notice a growing attention in current scholarship to the question of affective relations,  of  
friendship and love in particular, for instance, as a site of resistance and a way of “leaving politics.”  
On the one hand, for example, we can recall Michel Henry's (2003) affirmation of life in terms of love. 
Furthermore, Laurent Dubreuil argues, in his critique of Agamben and Esposito, that friendship (suzen 
and  sumbioun), already in Aristotle, is distinct from politics, it remains in excess of political being, 
which forms a ground for an  affirmation of “life outside of politics – even today”  (2006, 97). Todd 
May (2012) takes up friendship as a strategy of “resisting the forces of neoliberalism.” On the other 
hand, Jacques Derrida  (1997) takes up the question of friendship but in its relation to politics, as a  
ground for different politics. Similarly, friendship famously figures in Schmitt's work as one of the 
defining categories of the concept of the political. However, it is interesting that even though Schmitt 
categorically subjects friendship to the political, it seems to evade the latter. In his discussion of the  
concept of the political Schmitt pays almost no attention to the role of friendship in politics. It appears 
that in the end it is enmity that defines the political  (cf. Van Der Zweerde 2007), while friendship 
belongs to altogether different, unpolitical reality of life and the living.
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The immanent movement of life: mobile “culture”
Another  important  shift  that  the  notion  of  the  unpolitical  might  be  able  to  bring  to 
contemporary refugee scholarship is a possibility of an affirmation of pure, phoronomic 
movement not as a 'resistance' to stasis or as a right, but as a projection of life's abundant 
and incessant  movement of  self-revelation,  becoming and transformation.  Here I  will 
present merely a sketch of how it might be possible to conceive of pure, phoronomic 
movement  grounded  in  the  phenomenology  of  life,  which  could  account  for  the 
movement  of  “displaced  lives”  in  a  new  way.  A much  deeper  examination  of  the 
implications of the notion of the unpolitical for the study of movement would require 
further research and analysis.
In existing scholarship pure movement is primarily presented as a reaction to, as a way of 
resisting stable order. As Tim Cresswell puts it, “[w]ithin nomadic metaphysics, mobility 
is linked to a world of practice, of anti-essentialism, anti-foundationalism, and resistance 
to  established  forms  of  ordering  and  discipline.  Often  mobility  is  said  to  be 
nonrepresentational or even against representation. Linking all of these, perhaps, is the 
idea  that  by focusing  on  mobility,  flux,  flow,  and  dynamism we  can  emphasize  the 
importance of  becoming at the expense of the already achieved – the stable and static” 
(2006, 47). However, the understanding of movement that I want to present here is not 
altogether  absent  in  critical  refugee  studies.  In  particular,  there  are  some similarities 
between my assertion of the primacy of pure movement and Peter Nyers' argument, based 
on a reading of Deleuze and Guattari. He suggests that “to fully appreciate the politics of 
refugees,  we  must  consider  movement  to  be  an  ontological  activity.  It  is  through 
movement  that  bodies  encounter  and  confront  one  another;  thereby  developing 
relationships that constitute the myriad ways of  being and living in the world” (x; my 
emphasis). Movement is at the basis of identity and relationality: the bodily encounter 
constitutes  the  'raw'  material  for  being  in  the  world;  as  a  result,  it  is  an  absence  of 
movement,  stasis that might be said to be 'pathological'.  The refugee body, then,  is a 
moving body that  is  involved in  the  building  of  its  world as  it  moves along.  It  is  a 
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“volatile body,”133 body that actively reconfigures, re-inscribes, and resists as it moves 
through, across, and between political spaces (x), reshaping them and their identity. The 
state  (a  way of  ordering  movement)  is  but  a  secondary  phenomenon  in  this  regard. 
However, even the state itself does not avoid the effects of mobility: “it is not only the 
refugee's body that is moving but also the sovereign state – the body politic – that is in 
constant motion” (x).134 The strict opposition between the static and moving bodies (such 
as between citizens and refugees, states and nomads) no longer applies; everything is in 
some sort of motion, even if it appears static. As Gilles Deleuze points out, “[t]here is 
nothing more unsettling than the continual movement of something that seems fixed.” 
What differs in my proposition from Nyers' is that I would like to assert movement not as  
an  ontological  but  rather  a  pre-ontological  activity  of  life.  The  'relationship'  that  is 
established on the basis of this movement is not a mere bodily interaction, but it also 
constitutes the essence of the community of life. As a result, the moving bodies of the 
refugees are observed not only as constituting different ways of being and living in the 
world through this movement. Their movement is prior to the worldly relationality: their 
bodily relocation or displacement in space is but a projection of life's movement of self-
revelation and self-transformation. Such movement is necessarily phoronomic insofar as 
life's movement in never dynamic, it does not oppose, rebel against or resist anything, it 
does  not  relate  to  anything except  itself,  and so it  endlessly unfolds  in  its  immanent 
movement of self-affection and becoming, without any transcendent motivation or goal. 
Consequently,  movement cannot  be reduced to a human right,  which can be granted, 
protected  or  withheld.  Reduced  to  a  definition  in  terms  of  right,  such  movement, 
ultimately, relies on the forgetting of life and the unpolitical. As Henry points out, due to 
the duplicity of appearance, “every determination of the radically immanent force that 
constitutes  our  own  being  also  presents  itself  to  us,  simultaneous  with  its 
accomplishment,  which  is  our  inner  being,  as  the  appearance  of  an  objective 
displacement in space” (1993, 139). Once life-as-such is out of the picture, what remains 
133 Nyers borrows the notion of “volatile bodies” from Elizabeth Grosz (1994).
134 Benjamin Arditi (2003) similarly affirms the presence of mobility, i.e., “a continual process of political 
territorialization and re-territorialization,” in  politics-as-state  as  opposed to  the view that  only the 
political is expressive of such dynamism.
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is mere objective displacement, even if it is extended to everyone or everything. From 
this perspective, we cannot affirm movement as an ontological activity, in terms of the 
worldly relationships established through the interaction of the moving bodies, without at 
the same time missing life. This would be an affirmation only of 'intentional' movement 
that is directed and guided by the goal of establishing a political relation. Contrary to this 
view,  I  suggest  that  life's  movement  is  phoronomic,  that  is,  non-relational  and  non-
teleological movement of its self-revelation. Before movement appears in the world as 
displacement, it is manifest as an affect of a living self: the real movement of the living 
never ceases and can be 'known' only affectively. Furthermore, the pure movement of life 
is essentially the movement of its self-transformation, which lies at the core of Henry's 
concept  of  “culture.”  Living  culture,  then,  is  essentially  mobile;  and  is  opposed  to 
“barbarism” that emerges due to the forgetting of life. In this regard, the international 
refugee regime will remain essentially “barbaric” as long as it does not account for and 
respect the 'origin' of the various kinds of 'displacement' – the unpolitical, pure movement 
of life. This concept of 'mobile culture' remains to be further unpacked, which would be a 
task  for  another  study,  perhaps,  a  task  for  a  renewed  political  thought  that  takes 
unpolitical life as its starting point.
What  remains  to  be  done,  and  it  cannot  be  done  easily,  is  a  complete  reversal  of 
perspective through which we view the figure of the refugee and the movement that it 
'represents'. This is a task for a long-standing engagement and cannot be accomplished 
within  the  limitations  of  one  project.  It  also  requires  a  degree  of  perseverance  and 
courage, since it endeavours to stand up to the dominance of the political in a different, 
unpolitical way. In this way, in speaking 'truth', however, one risks much, as Foucault 
suggested that truth always requires courage, since it puts one's 'life' at risk (2011, 11-12). 
There are real, historical, instances of something like unpolitical uprising. For example, 
we can see the traces of unpolitical engagement and reversal of perspective apart from 
politics in the movement of the non-violent disobedience inspired by Mahatma Gandhi, 
or in a variety of artistic engagements that aim at “seeing the invisible”135 and so irritate 
135 See, Henry's Seeing the Invisible: On Kandinsky (2009).
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the political nerve of many. These movements, however, often fail to 'survive' in the face 
of  political  interventions;  their  attention  to  the  invisible  living  force  often  has  tragic 
consequences.  But  why?  Perhaps,  Hannah  Arendt  was  right  to  suggest  that  the 
civilization that represses the unpolitical (or that which is merely given, as she prefers to 
call it), ends up “in complete petrifaction” and in the slaughter of the living. Is this where 
we find ourselves and our Western culture today? Or is it, as Henry wants to suggest, no 
longer “culture” but “barbarism”? Or, perhaps, is it indicative of the presence of the self-
destructive elements of life (that Henry's thought might fail to accommodate) which do 
not define it but, nevertheless, remain inherent to it? I prefer to end with a number of 
questions rather than definite answer in order to emphasize the nature of the unpolitical, 
as I see it: an opening toward a possibility of thinking and living differently beyond all  
forms of politics.
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Conclusion
The  aim  of  this  dissertation  has  been  to  examine  contemporary  political  thought 
regrading its engagement with the possibility of a radical outside of politics and, based on 
this critical investigation, to present a conception of the unpolitical that would account for 
this outside in positive terms. Chapter 1 provided an overview of contemporary political 
theory that, in its attempt to transcend the limitations of politics-as-state, oscillates around 
the  split  notion  of  politics  and  the  political.  Through  a  critical  analysis  of  works  of 
Schmitt,  Foucault,  Rancière,  Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, I have shown that they not 
only exhibit and preserve the totalizing ambition of the political and thus are unable to 
account for the unpolitical, but also are unable to complete the political task they set out 
to undertake: to take the thought of politics beyond the state. However recognized, the 
excess, the outside of politics-as-state remains correlated to what it aims to displace. I 
have shown, in this regard, how the political in Schmitt remains attached to politics; how 
resistance,  i.e.,  real  politics,  in  Foucault  remains  determined by its  opposition  to  the 
stabilized structures of power, i.e., petrified politics; how politics in Rancière ultimately 
originates as an interruption of the order of police; and how the primordial political of 
being-with in Nancy is opposed to but never really abandons the space of the  polis. In 
sum, in its attempt to rethink politics, contemporary, post-foundational political thought is 
characterized by correlation, resulting in the preservation of the totalizing ambition of the 
political and in turning its back on the unpolitical. However, I have also come to conclude 
that despite this, political thought does not rid itself of the unpolitical altogether: it is 
preserved negatively, as a side-note to the concerns of rethinking or revitalizing politics 
and political community. To be more precise, it is primarily either viewed in terms of the 
exception to  the political  field or in  terms of an imminent  threat  of modern (liberal) 
depoliticization or neutralization that has to be ultimately avoided. It is Foucault who 
gives us an indication that life always escapes the grip of power, opening up our thinking 
to the question of what that life might be and how it manifests itself in relation to the  
political field. 
262
Taking these conclusions into consideration, Chapter 2 provides an analysis of the two 
prominent  ways  in  which  the  unpolitical  is  directly  addressed  within  contemporary 
theory: Cacciari's and Esposito's notion of the impolitical, and Agamben's concept of bare 
life. What distinguishes Cacciari's and Esposito's accounts of the impolitical is, primarily, 
their apparent positivity: the impolitical displaces the political through a critique of its 
totalizing tendency and valorization in modernity. It reminds the political of its finitude 
and limitations in the attempt to “found” politics without foundation. Consequently, the 
impolitical  does  not  reject  or  withdraw from the  political  but  deconstructs  and,  thus, 
radicalizes  it.  It  is,  then,  not  to  be  viewed  negatively,  as  something  to  be  feared  or 
avoided,  but  rather  fostered,  as  a  gaze  (a  vision  of  theoria),  that  points  the  political 
toward its “essence” that consists in its irremediable inessentiality. Nevertheless, it was 
my contention that neither Cacciari nor Esposito succeed in taking the impolitical to its 
limit, that is, radically outside the political. It remains attached to the latter as its shadow 
as well as its heart, a void that prevents the completion of the political but is never itself 
radically different from it. The impolitical remains primarily a function of the critique and 
transformation of the political. 
While Cacciari and Esposito delimit the impolitical as a gaze and, thus ultimately,  as 
merely an operation of thought, Giorgio Agamben introduces an interesting and important 
twist  into  this  notion.  He  defines  the  impolitical  in  terms  of  “bare  life”:  originary 
excepted life that unchangeably,  throughout the history of Western (bio)politics,  finds 
itself  placed outside  and,  simultaneously,  inside political  space.  What  is  important  in 
Agamben's  account  is  that  he  introduces  into  the  notion  of  the  impolitical  the  real  
experience  of  living  outside  of  politics,  even  though  this  outside  still  remains  only 
relative.  Contrary  to  Cacciari  and  Esposito,  Agamben  views  the  impolitical  only 
negatively,  nevertheless,  his  project  is  especially  helpful  in  suggesting  an avenue for 
unpolitical  thought based on the notion of “form-of-life.” In it  we can trace some of 
Agamben's intimations of the unpolitical: “form-of-life” or “happy life,” addressing the 
negativity of “bare life,” is life that is not separate from its form. Thus, it is necessarily 
always  a  political  life.  As  a  result,  in  his  messianic  project  of  the  “redemption”  of 
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Western politics, Agamben addresses the problem of the impolitical, i.e., bare life, solely 
by  “redeeming”  its  politicalness.  What  remains  to  be  further  explored,  then,  is  the 
possibility of something like an unpolitical form-of-life, where “bare life” is allowed to 
persist positively outside the space of “coming politics.”
Chapter 3 of this dissertation has assumed the task of thinking life unpolitically in order 
to arrive at a conception of the radical outside of politics.  The earlier analysis of  the 
notion of the impolitical, as a vision and as bare life, brings to the fore and articulates the 
relationship  between  politics,  thought  and  life.  In  this  respect,  the  notion  of  the 
unpolitical form-of-life addresses the relationship between life and politics, as well as life 
and thought. Drawing on the radical philosophy of life of contemporary French thinker 
Michel Henry, I conceived the unpolitical as the unthought or the unconscious as such of 
the political. What is more, the unpolitical is life-as-such: positive, real, non-relational 
experience of self-affection that manifests itself in the radical reduction of the world. I 
have argued that this view of the unpolitical, i.e., as acosmic life, addresses the problem 
of the political correlation and its totalizing ambition insofar as it affirms life as an  a 
priori of the world and, thus, of politics. Furthermore, this “life” is essentially “form-of-
life”: life is radically immanent to itself and so it does not carry a separation between 
itself and what it generates, its “form” – the living. However, inasmuch as the unity of 
life and the living appears in the absence of the world, this form-of-life remains radically 
unpolitical. As such, it offers a further possibility for redefining notions of the “human 
being” and “community” unpolitically in terms of, respectively, “the living” and a priori  
“community of life,” of an immediate bond of pathos of every living with every living. 
The  forgetting  of  life-as-such  leads  to  the  forgetting  of  the  unpolitical,  as  a  result, 
“remembering” life  leads to  the positive acknowledgement  of the unpolitical  as an  a 
priori  of politics and presents a way of addressing the totalizing ambition of politics in 
modernity.  In  addition,  the  notion  of  the  unpolitical  form-of-life  has  important 
“ecological” implications: insofar as life is not limited to humanity in its manifestation, 
the  community,  the sharing of  life  is  not  limited  to  human community but  embraces 
everything that “suffers.” Life is more than the living,  thus, life is equally more than 
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human understood as living, as a result, I followed Henry in asserting the a priori of life: 
it is from life, not from the human, that we must begin. 
The question of where to begin becomes very important once we consider the 'practical' 
issues of living outside of the political system of states today. In the absence of a political 
community, it becomes of the utmost importance to assert that life is not a right, nor a 
quality that manifests itself in the world, but is an invisible experience of self-affection 
that is full of itself and rejoices in itself even in the most unhappy 'forms' of life. To do so 
means to redeem “bare life” in a positive, unpolitical way, that allows it to persist as such, 
without  an  immediate  incitement  to  politicization,  to  salvation  through  politics  (that 
produced  its  apparent  misery in  the  first  place).  In  order  to  explore  the  possibilities 
presented by the notion of the unpolitical form-of-life, I turned to an examination of the 
modern condition of refugeeness. I suggested that the figure of the refugee appears in its 
uniqueness in the reduction of the political world, which initially defines and constitutes 
this figure. Not only  the paradigm of a new historical consciousness, the refugee is a 
historically situated epitome of life's acosmic becoming, i.e., of the ahistorical (however, 
in this case, forced) experience of 'becoming-unpolitical'. Despite its historicity and its 
forced negativity, the figure of the refugee gives us a positive insight into what constitutes 
the unpolitical form-of-life, of living beyond politics. Furthermore, in return, the notion 
of the unpolitical, I argued, offers an important reversal in the way in which this figure is  
understood  in  contemporary  scholarship.  Most  importantly,  it  allows  for,  first,  an 
affirmation of life not as a human right but as an immediate experience available to all the 
living  regardless  of  their  relation  to  the  world,  and,  second,  an  affirmation  of  pure 
movement not as a 'resistance' to stasis or, again, as a right, but as a projection of life's  
abundant and incessant movement of self-revelation, becoming and transformation. 
I  believe  that  the  major  significance  of  my  research  lies,  first,  in  pointing  out  and 
analyzing the totalizing and correlationist aspects of contemporary thought that attempts 
to  rethink  politics  in  terms  of  the  political;  and second,  in  bringing together  various 
accounts of something like the unpolitical in contemporary thought, ranging from post-
foundational accounts of the political difference to the engagements in Italian thought 
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with the notions of the impolitical and bare life. As I have showed, these engagements 
with the unpolitical remain insufficient insofar as they do not extend the reality of the 
unpolitical beyond the consideration of politics and the political. Furthermore, by raising 
the question of the unpolitical  in  terms of the radical outside of politics,  my project, 
similarly to Cacciari and Esposito, represents a call for at least a partial reversal of the 
perspective: away from the primacy of the political  and toward its outside.  My work 
ultimately encourages a return to the original points of contention within political thought 
by raising the questions of what it means to live, to live politically and beyond politics. 
My proposed way of addressing these questions is located at  a unique intersection of 
post-foundational theory, which seems to have abandoned the questions of an a priori and 
origins, and the phenomenology of life, which brings these questions back into debate; of 
correlationist  political  thought  that  tends  to  address  the  question  of  the  real  only in 
relation to thinking subject and a novel phenomenological approach that is able to locate 
the reality of life beyond the reach of thought and its vision. I believe that the result of 
this intersection or synthesis of different, often opposing schools of thought, is productive 
in addressing the question of the unpolitical: it presents a way of extending our view of 
life, reality and the world beyond a one-dimensional plane. It allows us to speak of both 
the inner, unpolitical, and the outer, political, dimensions of living without the necessity 
of excluding one or the other, of reducing one in favour of the other. In a way, I return to 
an earlier theoretical distinction between politics and the non-political, however, in this 
case both politics and the unpolitical lose their restrictive delimitation in terms of spheres 
and,  instead,  remain  fluid  in  their  determinations  and  operation  without  losing  their 
mutual independence. Thus, I might say that the relationship between these 'politics' and 
their  'outside'  is no longer that of either clear separation or differentiation (difference 
itself seems to have reached a point of exhaustion) but, rather, of 'indifference'. It is this 
relationship of 'indifference' between politics and life, between life and the world, that 
requires further consideration. It may constitute a ground of future unpolitical thinking as 
well as a road to a renewal of political thought. 
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However productive, my study has its limitations. First of all, because of its deliberate 
focus on Henry's radical phenomenology of life, it excludes from the field of its vision 
other  possibilities  for  approaching  the  unpolitical.  For  example,  further  and  deeper 
examination  of  the  practices  of  care  of  the  self,  of  materialist  thought  inspired  by 
speculative realism, and of the possibilities presented by the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze 
and Félix Guattari,  among many others.  My approach might be also criticized for its 
overly idealistic or utopian attitude, that is, one might argue that by merely affirming life 
theoretically as an a priori of politics, I do not effectively challenge the dominance of the 
political  and,  moreover,  of  the  persistence  and  importance  of  practical  politics,  i.e., 
national and international policies that continue to govern the lives of human populations 
and their environments. For instance, it might be suggested that my rendering of refugees 
through an unpolitical perspective does not really change and improve the lives of the 
real people, it does not address their suffering in any substantial way. Or, alternatively, 
that  my affirmation of  life,  no longer  conceived as a  human right  but  as a universal 
immediate experience available to all the living, cannot alter the fact that the task of the 
protection of lives, however conceived, rests with those human groups that carry arms 
and possess technological capabilities. In other words, even if humanity is not the giver 
or creator of life and the living, it remains somehow entrusted with the decision to either 
protect or abandon the living to their 'fate'. Furthermore, on a more theoretical level but in 
the same vein, do I not walk a very fine line by affirming life as universal experience 
without  paying  attention  to  its  multiple,  always  singular  manifestations,  marked  by 
concrete and unique experiences? Moreover, do I not walk a very fine line by affirming 
life as essentially suffering? Is it not dangerous to proclaim with Henry that happiness 
essentially lies in suffering when very similar proclamations were made by those who 
aimed at nothing other than the slaughter of millions of living beings? 
These  are  important  questions  and they certainly have  to  be kept  in  mind.  They are 
questions that open up a field of further scholarship regarding unpolitical life. However, I 
believe  that  to  continue  to  think  the  unpolitical  and  to  think  unpolitically  requires 
courage. To walk at the limit of politics and to challenge its primacy unpolitically, in a 
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way  unknown  by  politics,  such  as,  in  a  way  of  friendship  and  love,  is  to  become 
vulnerable, to expose oneself to severe critique from those who believe that politics is the 
means to 'salvation' and 'happiness' in this world. As Foucault reminds us, by speaking 
truth or living a true life one always seems to risk one's life. Does this ultimately imply 
that the limit of politics and the limit of life tend to coincide? I continue to hope not. It is  
a task for a further study, then, to elaborate the possibility of living and thinking beyond 
politics in a way that might be positively present in the world for longer than a fleeting 
moment of 'goodbye'.
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